Australian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Sunland Enterprises Pty Ltd [1988] FCA 343
Federal Court of Australia
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JUDGMENT No. a
CATCHWORDS
Industrial law - costs - whether proceedings instituted
"without reasonahle cause"- prosecutor unable to prove
element of offence occurring within Limitation period -
Prosecution could not have succeeded - prosecutor misled by
third party - separation from costs of other proceedings -
likely amount of costs.
Conciliation and Arbitration Act s.5, s.197A.
Crimes Act 1914 s.2l.
AUSTRALASTIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES' UNION v. SUNLAND
ENTERPRISES PTY. LTD. trading as SUNLAND WHOLESALE MEATS,
HEATHER DAWN ALDOUS trading as SUNLAND WHOLESALE MEATS and
DONALD CHARLES ALDOUS trading as SUNLAND WHOLESALE MEATS.
Nos. I 35, I 36, I 46, I 47, I 50 and I 51 of 1987
GRAY J.
MELBOURNE:
8TH JUNE 1988
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
No. I 35 of 1987
BETWEEN:
AUSTRALASTAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES' UNION
Prosecutor
= and-
HEATHER DAWN ALDOUS trading as
SUNLAND WHOLESALE MEATS Defendant
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT the prosecutor pay the defendant's
costs of the proceeding.
(NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by 0.36
of the Federal Court Rules.)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. I 36 of 1987
)
)
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES' UNION
Prosecutor
-and-
DONALD CHARLES ALDOUS trading as
SUNLAND WHOLESALE MEATS Defendant
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT the prosecutor pay the defendant's
costs of the proceeding.
(NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by 0.36
of the Federal Court Rules.)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. I 46 of 1987
we eww
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES' UNION
Prosecutor
-and-
DONALD CHARLES ALDOUS trading as
SUNLAND WHOLESALE MEATS
Defendant
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT the prosecutor pay the defendant's
costs of the proceeding.
(NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by 0.36
of the Federal Court Rules.)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. I 47 of 1987
eww vww
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES' UNION
Prosecutor
-and-
SUNLAND ENTERPRISES PTY. LTD. trading as
SUNLAND WHOLESALE MEATS
Defendant
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT the prosecutor pay the defendant's
costs of the proceeding.
(NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by 0.36
of the Federal Court Rules.)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. I 50 of 1987
)
)
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES' UNION
Prosecutor
-and-
HEATHER DAWN ALDOUS trading as
SUNLAND WHOLESALE MEATS Defendant
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT the prosecutor pay the defendant's
costs of the proceeding.
(NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by 0.36
of the Federal Court Rules.)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. I 51 of 1987
www Ww
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
AUSTRALASTAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES' UNION
Prosecutor
-and-
SUNLAND ENTERPRISES PTY. LTD. trading as
SUNLAND WHOLESALE MEATS
Defendant
MINUTES OF' ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT the prosecutor pay the defendant's
costs of the proceeding.
(NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by 0.36
of the Federal Court Rules.)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA >
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) Nos. I 35, I 36, I 46,
)
)
I 47, I 50 and I Sl of
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION 1987
BETWEEN:
AUSTRALASTIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES' UNION
Prosecutor
~-and~
SUNLAND ENTERPRISES PTY. LTD.
trading as SUNLAND WHOLESALE MEATS,
HEATHER DAWN ALDOUS trading as
SUNLAND WHOLESALE MEATS and DONALD
CHARLES ALDOUS trading as SUNLAND
WHOLESALE MREATS
Defendants -
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE: Gray J.
PLACE: Melbourne
8th June 1988
:
In these six proceedings, the defendants were
charged with offences under s.5(1}(a) and (1A)(b) of the
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 ("the Act"). In
matters nos. I 36, I 50 and I Sl of 1987, the defendants were
charged with having dismissed George Hughes from his
employment, by reason of the circumstance that he was a
member of the Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union
("the Union"), an organization of employees registered
pursuant to the Act. In matters nos. I 35, I 46 and I 47 of
2.
1987, the defendants were charged with having threatened to
dismiss Robert Coxen, with intent to dissuade him from
becoming a member of the Union.
The six proceedings came on for trial at HBrisbane
on 7th December 1987, together with eighteen other
proceedings. At the outset, counsel for the prosecutor
applied for leave to make amendments to certain of the
informations and summonses then before the Court, including
those relating to George Hughes. On the following day, the
Court ruled on the applications for leave to amend, and
rejected them, for reasons which were then given. Counsel
for the prosecutor conceded that she was unable to prove the
charges laid in respect of George Hughes. She asked for an
adjournment of those charges, ta enable the prosecutor to
consider whether it would seek leave to appeal from the
decision refusing leave to amend.
In the meantime, the trial of the other
proceedings, including the three relating to Robert Coxen
proceeded. At the close of the prosecution case, counsel for
the defendant submitted that there was no case to answer in
respect of a number of charges. On 10th December 1987, the
Court ruled on this submission. So far as the matters
relating to Robert Coxen were concerned, the ruling was that
there was no evidence to support the proposition that within
the limitation period any threat was made to Mr. Coxen in any
way that would amount to an offence against the Act. The
reference toa the Limitation perio¢d was a reference to
s.21(1)(c) of the Crimes Act 1914, under which a prosecution
in respect of an offence against a law of the Commonwealth,
where the punishment provided in respect of the offence is a
pecuniary penalty and no term of imprisonment is mentioned,
May be commenced at any time within one year after the
commission of the offence. There was some evidence hefore
the Court of the making of a statement which may have
amounted to a threat, to a number of employees, including Mr.
Coxen, but no precise date was ascribed in the evidence to
that statement. So far as there was evidence of a date, it
put the alleged threat earlier than twelve months prior to
the commencement of the proceedings. The prosecutor's case
had not been made out. As a result, the three proceedings
with respect to Mr. Coxen were then dismissed.
The trial of the remaining eighteen informations
proceeded, and was adjourned until 15th February 1988. On
that date, counsel for the prosecutor announced that the
prosecutor did not intend to take any further steps in
relation to the proceedings concerning George Hughes, and did
not intend to offer any evidence on those matters.
Accordingly, those proceedings were dismissed as well.
On 28th April 1988, judgment was delivered in the
remaining eighteen proceedings. Orders were made dismissing
4.
sixteen of the informations; the remaining two were adjourned
for consideration of penalty and other orders. Those matters
came hefore the Court om 3lst May 1988, and are the subject
of a2 separate judgment. On that date, counsel for the
defendants applied for orders that the prosecutor pay the
defendants' costs in the matters relating ta George Hughes
and Robert Coxen.
Counsel for the defendant accepted that the power
of the Court to award costs in these cases is limited by
3.197A of the Act, so that an order for costs can only be
made if "the party against whom the order is made instituted
the proceeding vexatiously or without reasonable cause". He
did not suggest that any of the proceedings was instituted
vexatiously, but relied on the proposition that each was
instituted without reasonable cause. An initiating party
will not be held lightly to have instituted a proceeding
without reasonable cause. The mere fact that an argument
proves unsuccessful is mot an indication that a proceeding
has been so commenced: Rv. Moore; ex parte Federated
Miscellaneous Workers' Union of Australia (1978) 140 C.L.R.
470, at p. 473 in the judgment of Gibbs J., as he then was.
On the other hand, even where a matter has proceeded ta
judgment, it may be held that the claims of the initiating
party were "manifestly groundless" or "bad beyond argument",
and that party may be ordered to pay costs. See Heidt v.
Chrysler Australia Ltd. (1976) 26 F.L.R. 257, at pp. 274-276.
In the proceedings relating ta Robert Coxen, j the
onus always lay upon the prosecutor to lead evidence of a
threat made to Mr. Coxen, being a threat to dismiss him,. in
circumstances where such a threat might have been made with
intent to dissuade him from becoming a member of the Union.
The onus of proving the threat was on the prasecutor; the
onus of showing that it was not made with the intent alleged
would have been on the defendants. If there had been clear
evidence of such a threat, made more than twelve months prior
to the commencement of the proceedings, the defendants would
have been entitled to an acquittal and, in the normal case,
to their costs. The Court ordered the prosecutor for an
offence under s.5 of the Act to pay costs where the
prosecution had been commenced out of time in Nagvi v.
M.B.P (S.A.) Pty. Ltd. (1981) 36 A.L.R. 379. In my view,
where the prosecutor is unable to bring forward evidence that
an alleged threat, or possible threat, was made within the
pericd of twelve months prior to the commencement of
proceedings, the position is no different. In the absence of
such evidence, the proceeding has been commenced without
reasonable cause.
In the proceedings relating to George Hughes, no
evidence was led. In argument about costs, however, both
parties made reference to evidence which was heard in
relation to the other proceedings. From that evidence, it is
6.
clear that George Hughes was not a member of the Union at the
time when he was dismissed. Charges in the terms of those
which were made could not have succeeded. Counsel for the
prosecutor attempted to argue that the prosecutor had acted
reasonably in instituting the proceedings because it had
received a statement in writing from George Hughes to the
effect that he was a member at the time of his dismissal, and
had been one since 1953. Whilst this statement may well have
misled the prosecutor, there should also be taken into
account evidence which George Hughes had given to the
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission prior to
the commencement of these proceedings. That evidence was his
own statement on oath that he was not a member of the Union
at the relevant time. The Union was represented in the
Commission when that evidence was given, and ought to have
known of the true position.
Even if the Union were misled by George Hughes as
to the true state of affairs, such misleading would not
amount to reasonable cause for the commencement of the
proceeding. The test of reasonableness must be an objective
one. The fact is that the proceedings could not possibly
have succeeded at the time when they were instituted, and
this means that they were instituted without reasonable
cause. Of course, the position may have been different if the
prosecutor had been misled by the defendants about some fact,
but there has been no suggestion of that in the present
cases.
Counsel for the prosecutor also attempted to argue
that the defendants' costs of the proceedings relating toa
Robert Coxen and George Hughes could not be separated from
their costs relating to the other proceedings, or, if they
could, they would amount to a very small sum. It may be
that, because of the way in which the proceedings were dealt
with, the defendants will not have incurred very much in the
way of costs in these proceedings, as distinct from the other
eighteen informations. I cannot accept, however, that the
amount incurred would be so trivial as to permit the Court to
disregard it. It is clearly necessary for legal advisers to
give proper consideration to each charge, and some costs must
be involved in doing so. To the extent to which it is
relevant, the amount of the costs incurred is a matter for
the taxing officer, and not for the Court.
For these reasons, the prosecutor should be ordered
to pay the costs of the defendants of each of these
proceedings.
Appearances
Counsel for the prosecutor: Mr. Goot
Solicitors for the prosecutor: Poteri Wood & Co.
Counsel for the defendant: Mr. Murdoch
Solicitors for the defendant: Morris Fletcher & Cross
Date of Hearing:
31 May 1988
I certify that this and the
preceding seven (7)
Pages are atrue copy of the
Reasons for Judgment of the
Honourable Justice Gray.
Dated: 7 Sune 1983
Associate: Lowa tLe