CATCHWORDS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - inquiry into requested exercise of non-existent power - whether should be restrained ~ sources of jurisdiction to determine legality of inquiry - joinder of interested parties - whether interlocutory relief available. BROADCASTING — remote licence - whether Tribunal may force introduction of new consortium member - power to require presentation of implementation plan - power to vary conditions of licence. Federal Court Rules, 0.54, r.5(b) Judiciary Act 1903, 39B Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, ss.12, 16 Broadcasting Act 1942, ss.17, I7A, 17B, I7C, 85, 89A, 92V Telecasters North Queensland Limited & Anor v. Australian Broadcasting Tribunal Qld G298 of 1988 PINCUS J. BRISBANE T8 AUGUST 1988 ERAL COURT OF FED AUSTRALIA INCIPAL eaISTRY JUDGMENT No. 43.0.9.£3:.. wet ome at ee ey ee ee ee 8 emergence ee oe ° IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY ) QLD G298 of 1988 GENERAL DIVISION ) BETWEEN: TELECASTERS NORTH QUEENSLAND LIMITED First Applicant AND: FAR NORTHERN TELEVISION LIMITED Second Applicant AND: AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING TRIBUNAL Respondent MINUTES OF ORDER JUDGE MAKING ORDER: PINCUS J. DATE OF ORDER: 18 AUGUST 1988 WHERE MADE: BRISBANE THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. NOTE: the respondent be enjoined until the trial of this application or further earlier order from proceeding with the inquiry the subject of these proceedings so far as it relates to the orders sought under ss.17 and 92v of the Broadcasting Act 1942, which orders are set out in Section TIT) of the Notice of Inquiry published in the Gazette of 18 May 1988; the applicants serve forthwith by post on Brian Walsh of Brian Walsh and Associates Pty Ltd a copy of this order and these reasons; the application for interlocutory relief be otherwise dismissed; the principal application be adjourned to a date to be fixed, for directions, if any are desired. Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. tw een we ree , IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY ) QLD G298 of 1988 GENERAL DIVISION ) BETWEEN: TELECASTERS NORTH QUEENSLAND LIMITED First Applicant AND: FAR NORTHERN TELEVISION LIMITED Second Applicant AND: AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING TRIBUNAL Respondent PINCUS Jd. 18 AUGUST 1988 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT This is an application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 concerning an inquiry by the respondent, Australian Broadcasting Tribunal under the Broadcasting Act 1942 ("the Act"). The applicants came to Court to seek interlocutory relief, but it was agreed at the hearing that final relief could, if the Court thought fit, be granted. There is a procedural difficulty about the latter course, mentioned below. The applicants are partners in a "consortium" called Queensland Satellite Television (QSTV), which holds a remote television licence granted under the Broadcasting Act 1942. In March 1988, a body (TAIMA) called either the Townsville Aboriginal and Islander Media Association Limited, or that name without the word "Limited", made applications to the respondent to have it exercise certain powers relating to the licence, and those applications were accepted by the Tribunal; it published a notice, More particularly referred to below, that it had commenced a public inquiry. The applicants before me have told the Tribunal they dispute its jurisdiction to hold the inquiry, which has been set down for hearing on 6-8 September next. The applicants seek a declaration that the respondent has no jurisdiction to do any of the things to which the inquiry is directed, and other relief; the matter was argued as on a final hearing. I have, for reasons which will be explained, determined to grant interlocutory relief only. Three points are raised, but only two have substance. The third, the details of which need not be expounded, was put forward on the erroneous assumption that the applicants' licence runs for a period of five years only. That 1s not so. The licence is a "remote licence" within the meaning of s.23(2) of the Broadcasting Amendment Act (No. 3) 1987 - No. 184 of 1987 - and is therefore now a seven-year licence, although originally granted for five years only. The licence I have mentioned was granted on 3 September 1986 and authorised QSTV to "provide a remote 'television service in accordance with the service specification and other conditions of the licence set out in the attached Schedule". Its commencement date was 30 June 1987 and expiry date 30 June 1992. sorte The conditions of the licence granted were three, of which only the second need be set out: "The licensee shall provide access for the following number of hours of aboriginal programs to meet the specific needs of the aboriginal population within the service area and educational programs based on or consistent with established curricula (including primary, secondary, tertiary and continuing education) to meet the specific educational needs and interests of the population within the service area: (a) during the first and second year of operation ~ a minimum of 80 hours per year; (b) during the third and fourth year of operation - a minimum of 280 hours per year; (c) during the fifth year of operation —- a minimum of 560 hours per year; The licensee shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the number of hours referred to above are transmitted using program material from independent, educational and its own resources." The special provisions of the Act applicable to licences of this sort do not require full analysis; some of them are mentioned by Wilcox J. in his reasons in Television Capricornia Pty Ltd v. Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1986) 70 A.L.R. 147. That concerned an application for a remote licence other than the one presently in issue; in all, four remote licences have been granted. TAIMA applied to the respondent, as mentioned above, under s.17B of the Act, which reads as follows: "(1) A person may at any time make an application under this section requesting the Tribunal to exercise any of its substantive powers, other than a substantive power in respect of the wow +54 (2) exercise of which an application is expressly permitted to be made under another provision of this Act. An application under this section shall be made in accordance with the regulations." The consequences of such an application are set out in s.17C, which reads, so far as relevant, as follows: (5) The s.17c(1) is explained in s.17A(2), which reads in part as follows: Where the Tribunal receives an application under this Act requesting the exercise of any of its substantive powers, or proposes to exercise any of its substantive powers otherwise than on such an application, the Tribunal shall hold an inquiry into the requested or proposed exercise of the power. Subject to sub-section (6), an inquiry under sub-section (1) shall be held in accordance with this Division and the regulations." reference to exercise of substantive powers "A reference 1n this Division to a substantive power of the Tribunal is a reference to a power of the Pribunal ~— (c) Section 85, referred to in s.17A(2)(c), reads in part as to vary, revoke or impose a condition of a licence under section 85, otherwise than in accordance with sub-section 85(4); to make orders for the purposes of section 92V; in mayor - aa ee eee - ys ocr - follows: "(1) Subject to this section, the Tribunal may, during the currency of a licence, by notice in writing to the licensee, vary or revoke any of the conditions of the licence (other than conditions applicable by virtue of section 129) or impose further conditions." Section 92V is set out below, under the heading "Second Point". TAIMA's application asked that the conditions of the licence be varied under s.85 of the Act, that an additional condition be added under the same section and that orders be made under ss.17 and 92V. Pursuant to regulations governing the conduct of s.17C({1) inquiries (which regulations are mentioned in s.17C(5), set out above), a notice of inquiry (under Reg.9) inviting public submissions was published in the Gazette on 18 May 1988. According to that notice the issues to be addressed are, in substance, whether the Tribunal should act as TAIMA's application asks and "Such other matters relevant to the Inquiry as the Tribunal sees fit". Although considerable reliance was placed on the regulations before me as providing answers to QSTV's case, it appears to me that the basic question whether the Tribunal has power to make such orders as TAIMA seeks does not depend on the Regulations, but on the Act. It should be noted, however, that although Reg.4 of the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (Inquiries) Regulations relating to s.17C(1) inquiries prescribes the content of such an application as TAIMA has made, non-compliance with that is not necessarily fatal: Reg.4(4). It appears that the Tribunal is given by the Regulations adequate powers to deal with s.17B applications which it thinks to be ultra vires: Regs.4 and 8. However, the Tribunal has to date not treated TAIMA's application as beyond the scope of what is permitted by s.17B. There has been some correspondence between the applicant and the respondent, into the details of which it is unnecessary to enter; the respondent's expressed attitude to the applicants' jurisdictional objections is that it is "continuing with the inquiry" and "any further submissions on this matter can be raised at the hearing". One possible course for the applicants is simply to press their objections during the course of the inquiry and, if orders are ultimately made to which the applicants object, challenge them then. The applicants' counsel, however, contended that if orders sought by TAIMA were plainly beyond the power, it might be both fair and convenient so to declare, at this stage. The decision of the High Court in The Queen v. Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Company Proprietary Limited (1953) 88 C.L.R. 100 is a familiar example of interference with an inquiry on jurisdictional grounds before its conclusion. The Court granted prohibition during the inquiry; the majority remarked: "There can be no foundation for a writ of prohibition unless and until it appears, whether from the course of the inquiry or from the preliminary statement of the matters to which the inquiry is directed, that there can be no basis for the exercise of the power conferred by s.23{1) or wroteacoe yea once > ee er ee eee ee ee ? ee oe that an erroneous test of the liability of the employer to the cancellation or suspension of his registration will be applied or that some abuse of authority is likely." In my opinion, there is substance in the applicants' contention, just mentioned, particularly with regard to the issue discussed below under the heading "Second Point". Ti TAIMA succeeded on that issue, the result would be, or be equivalent to, a forced transfer to another party or parties of a substantial interest in the licence. That aspect of the inquiry would seem likely to involve the applicants in a deal of preparatory work, which would be unnecessary if the respondent has no power to make such an order as is sought. Further, the acceptance of TAIMA's application in that respect and the publication of the notice to which I have referred place the applicants' title to their fairly new licence under a cloud, which they reasonably desire to dispel as soon as possible. As mentioned above, the application was brought under the Judicial Review Act, but its jurisdictional basis was broadened during the course of argument. Reference was made to the Court's power to grant declaratory relief under s.16(1)(c) of the Judicial Review Act, but a simpler foundation is, perhaps, the power to grant injunctive relief under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903. The anomalous circumstance that this Court had a lesser power to grant declaratory relief against the Commonwealth and its functionaries than have State courts (see Pearce v. Button (1986) 65 A.L.R. 83) has been put an end to by the cross-—vesting legislation, which came into force on 1 July 1988. FIRST POINT TAIMA's application to the respondent sought the deletion of condition 2 of the licence, which has been quoted above in full, and its replacement by a provision of a broadly similar character, but with significant variations. For example, it is sought to make the obligation in condition 2 relate to educational programs for the stated number of hours, not, as in the present condition, both aboriginal programs and educational programs; the former are proposed to be dealt with by a separate additional condition. TAIMA asks for the insertion of a condition providing, inter alia, that: "The licensee shall take all reasonable steps to... obtain the approval of the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal by 31st October 1988 for an implementation plan designed to satisfy the conditions of licence." There is power under s.81(1) to impose conditions on the grant or renewal of a licence, that power being restricted, but not in a relevant way, by s.84(2)(b). The conditions may be varied under s.85 and a breach of condition is a ground for refusal to renew a licence (s.86(11B)(ca)(1ii)) and for suspension or revocation (s.88(1)(aa)(iii)). Mr Russell Q.C., senior counsel for the applicants, argued that there is no power in the Act for the respondent to we approve an implementation plan of any relevant kind. Provision for implementation plans is made by Part IIIC of the Act, inserted by Act 79 of 1987. It gives the Tribunal no power to approve such plans; that is a function of the Minister. Further, Part IIIC applies only to "licences" as defined; that is, it applies to "commercial television licences", a term which does not include remote licences. The expression "implementation plan", although no doubt intended by TAIMA to refer to such a plan as is dealt with in Part IIIc, need not be restricted to that meaning. The question is whether the respondent has power under the Act to insert in a remote licence a condition requiring its approval to such a plan, being one designed to satisfy the licence conditions. Mr Russell said that the power to impose and vary conditions does not go so far. Mr Grey for the respondent argued, generally and with respect to this specific point, that s.17B, quoted above, was inserted to improve public access to the respondent and to enable ordinary citizens to have their proposals considered. He contended that a pedantic or legalistic construction of applications to the Tribunal under s.17B would tend to defeat the obvious purpose of this remedial legislation. I think there is substance in these contentions. The application by TAIMA, if based on a limited understanding of the Act, is not necessarily invalid on that account. eR ats np e ee ee er powcr oe 10. In Herald-Sun U.v. Proprietary Limited v. Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1985) 156 C.L.R. 1, a point arose concerning the construction of s.16(1)(d) of the Broadcasting and Television Act 1942, making it a function of the Tribunal "to determine the standards to be observed by licensees in respect of the broadcasting or televising of programs". What the Tribunal there sought to do was to set standards by a process of classification - i.e. approval of programs before transmission. Despite the contention that this put forward "the mere opinion of the Tribunal as to whether a programme complies with the standard" (see 57 A.L.R. 309 at 325), this Court held that the standards were lawfully imposed, but was reversed by the High Court, which remarked: "Failure to comply with a condition of the licence may lead the Tribunal to refuse to renew the licence ... and is an offence.... These provisions assume that it is possible to determine whether a pre-existing standard has been observed" (156 C.L.R. p.5). That case may be described as merely a decision on the meaning of the word "standard", in its context. More broadly read, it may support a contention that generally-—expressed powers of the Tribunal to require action or inaction of licensees should not necessarily be read as permitting the Tribunal to require licensees so to act as to satisfy the Tribunal or earn its approval and that the imposition of objective criteria is contemplated. If the failure to obtain approval were to be in itself a 11. breach of condition, an argument that the relevant inquiry is beyond power would have more strength. But if a condition were inserted using the precise language set out in the application by TAIMA and in the notice of inquiry — "The licensee shall take all reasonable steps to ... obtain the approval of the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal ..." - it would be the omission to take the steps required which would bring about the breach of condition. Further, if more precision were required as to the content of the condition, it appears to me within the power of the Tribunal to furnish it. It is true that s.17C speaks of the holding of "an inquiry into the requested ... exercise of the power" (emphasis added), but I do not read that expression as implying that in such an inquiry the Tribunal cannot consider, and 1n the end decide to effect, exercises of power not precisely conforming to that suggested by an applicant. To return to Mr Grey's point, applicants who have not the benefit of legal advice may ask for the exercise of powers in ways which do not accord exactly with the requirements of the statute, and those unfamiliar with the intricacies of the broadcasting industry may ask for the exercise of powers in ways which are not commercially practicable; yet the Tribunal can in my view inquire into what they put forward and consider whether that or some variant should be adopted. Suppose that, during the course of the proposed hearing, it 1s suggested that the fulfilment of the licensee's present obligations to supply educational programs cannot be satisfactorily achieved unless the licensee has certain basic resources, such as the part-time services of an educational officer. It would appear to be at least arguable that that could voy eae aeok eee nn es ne 12. be added as a condition; but, if sceptical about the licensee's ability properly to fulfil the conditions relating to the type of programs to be furnished, the Tribunal might in such an inquiry consider having the licensee itself put forward suggestions as to the most practical way to meet its obligations. If those suggestions were presented formally to the Tribunal, they could be described as an "implementation plan". In my opinion, what this Court has to consider, when asked to prevent the holding of an inquiry prompted by an application under s.17B, is not whether the precise exercise of power the applicant puts forward could properly be effected, but whether the Tribunal's powers could be exercised along the lines desired by the applicant. On the other hand, if the purported application asks for the exercise of what is claimed to be, but is in truth not, the exercise of a substantive power of the Tribunal, the right and obligation to hold a s.17C inquiry do not arise. The application under s.17B should not, however, be regarded as 1f it were a claim for relief in a pleading. Even 1f it were so regarded, a Court hearing an ordinary claim for relief would not necessarily strike out an inappropriately worded claim, but would incline towards letting the precise form of relief be determined at the end of the trial, Applying the test I have mentioned, I have come to the firm conclusion that the relevant subject matter of inquiry may properly be considered by the Tribunal. en ne re re eee on ee SECOND POINT The major point in the case, 13. the applicants, is that TAIMA's application asks: "III. That the Tribunal make orders further to its substantive powers under s.i7 and s.92V to the effect that: "(1) (2) The consortium structure of the licensee be amended so it shall contain provision for not less than two members, each with equal voting rights, and both being acceptable to the Tribunal ain terms of their joint and individual ability to: a) Secure a rapid establishment of service, b) Assist in managing the financial risk posed by the service, c) Serve the special and distinct needs of the service area, with particular regard to an adequate and comprehensive service directed to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and individuals within the service area. Provided that for the purposes of this order any two or more associated persons within the meaning of the Acquisition of Shares Act (1980) shall be treated as one member. The constitution of the consortium shall not be changed without the prior approval of the Tribunal.'" from the point of view of The contention on behalf of the applicants is that any such order would be beyond the respondent's power. ground that the applicants are It is common "associated persons" within the proviso. Imposition of such a condition would therefore require the applicants to transfer part of their interest in the licence, ae Se — 14. unless the Tribunal simply can vest an interest directly. Section 92V, is as follows: (2) (3) The Tribunal may make orders under section 17 for and in relation to - (a) the ownership of remote licences; (b) the holding of interests in the holders of remote licences; and (c) the exercise of control of, or influence on, the holders, or the operations of the holders, of remote licences. Without limiting the generality of sub-section (1), the Tribunal may make orders under section 17 with respect to - (a) the number of remote licences, or of remote licences of a particular kind, that may be held by a person or in the holders of which a person may have an interest; (b) the interests that a person may have in the holder of a remote licence; (c) the number of directorships that a person may hold in companies having interests in the holder of a remote licence; (d) the approval by the Tribunal of transactions involving the acquisition of interests in the holder of a remote licence; (e) the provisions to be contained in the memorandum and articles of association of the holder of a remote licence; and (f) changes to the memorandum or articles of association of the holder of a remote licence. In making orders for the purposes of this section, the Tribunal shall have regard to undesirability of the exercise of undue influence by foreign persons on the operations of the holders of remote liences. referred to in s.17A(2)(k) (set out above) se eae 15. (4) In this section - "control' includes direct or indirect control and control as a result of, or by means of, trusts, agreements, arrangements, understandings and practices, whether or not having legal or equitable force and whether or not based on legal or equitable rights; 'foreign person' has the same meaning as in section 92D; 'interest' means an interest of any kind, whether direct or indirect, and includes a shareholding interest, a voting interest anda financial interest." It will be noted that s.92V refers to s.17, sub-section (1) of which reads as follows: "For the purpose of exercising its powers and functions under this Act, the Tribunal shall have power to make such orders, give such directions and do all such other things as it thinks fit." Section 92V could, read literally and without regard to context, be taken to allow the making of orders of an extraordinary kind. For example, an order that a remote licence be henceforth owned by A rather than B (the present licensee) could be said to be an order in relation to the ownership of that licence. That would be odd, since there is express power to revoke and suspend licences (s.88), having every appearance of dealing exhaustively with those methods of taking away, permanently or otherwise, the rights of licensees. The argument for the applicants is that under s.92V, the Court is entitled to make orders applying to licences generally, os : 4 Te cme ety eee ne fp ep 16. but not orders with respect to a specific licence. Counsel argues that the scheme of the Act is that whereas, in general, provisions for ownership and control of licences are detailed in the Act itself, the legislature has delegated to the Tribunal the task of devising rules on that subject, as to remote Licences. The principal provisions relating to ownership and control of television licences are in Division 3 of Part IIIB, s.91(1) of which defines "licence" to mean for the purposes of that Division "commercial television licence". That term is defined in s.4(1) to mean "a licence granted as a commercial television licence under section 81". Reference to s.81 shows that it does not include the expression "commercial television licence", but speaks of a "commercial licence", which is defined by s.4(1) to mean, inter alia, a "commercial television licence". Section 81 deals separately with licences other than commercial licences, and in particular with remote licences, so that, in the end, it seems clear enough that the word "Licence" in s.91(1) does not include a remote licence. Division 3 of Part IIIB contains fairly elaborate provisions designed to achieve the result that there is not undue concentration of media power, but the Tribunal is not expressly given jurisdiction to devise special rules for particular licensees. In my opinion, reading s.92V in the context of the Act as a whole, it contemplates the making of orders establishing rules about ownership and control of the same general nature as those set out in Division 3 of Part IIIB, relating to commercial licences. It is not conceivable that the legislature intended to 17. empower the Tribunal to require that a particular licence be transferred from its present owners to others, or that the Tribunal might, more directly, make orders divesting the present owners and vesting ownership in another person or other persons. The scheme of the legislation is that the possibility of the Tribunal's depriving licensees of their title is governed solely by s.88; that provision strictly limits its power to do so. No argument was directed to the paragraph numbered 2 in the application, requiring the prior approval of the Tribunal to any change in the constitution. Such a provision would be otiose, as s.89A has the effect of requiring the consent of the Tribunal to any change in the constitution in the consortium. It reads: "(1) Subject to sections 89B and 89C, a licensee may, with the consent in writing of the Tribunal, but without that consent shall not, transfer the licence or admit another person to participate in any of the benefits of the licence or to exercise any of the powers or authorities granted by the licence." However, no relief was sought as to that aspect of the inquiry. RELIEF It is necessary to deal with the procedural matter referred to in the first paragraph of these reasons. I inquired during the hearing whether it was thought necessary that TAIMA should be joined as a party. Counsel for the applicants asked that an opportunity be given to join that body, if the conclusion was reached that the matter could not otherwise be dealt with. pe pemeene ere et mee as is. Counsel for the respondent asked that the application simply be dismissed for non-joinder of TAIMA. Section 12 of the Judicial Review Act allows a person interested to apply to be made a party to such an application as this and, presumably with a view to affording a prospective party an opportunity to apply to come in. Order 54 r.5(b) of the Federal Court Rules empowers the Court to direct the giving of notice of the application to persons or classes of persons. In ordinary declaratory proceedings, according to Viscount Maugham in London Passenger Transport Board v. Moscrop [1942] A.C. 332 at p.345, "all persons interested should be made parties, whether by representation orders or otherwise, before a declaration by its terms affecting their rights is made". It is safe to infer, from the fact that joinder of interested parties appears to be made discretionary by s.12, that it is not essential that every party interested be joined in proceedings under the Judicial Review Act. Presumably, the Court is given a discretion because such joinder may in a particular case be seen to be inconvenient or unnecessary; cf. Ibeneweka v. Egbuna [1964] 1 W.L.R. 219. It is unclear what the legal status of TAIMA is - whether it is incorporated or not. The respondent Tribunal has engaged counsel and sought to defend itself against each of the attacks made on its proceedings. It does not appear whether TAIMA is aware of the fact that these proceedings are on foot; no doubt it may have heard of them. Although it is, I suppose, only a collection of actual or potential viewers, or a representative of that collection, it has a special interest as the initiator of the inquiry; c£. the status of the objector in Sinclair v. Mining wo. sees, op ere 19. Warden at Maryborough (1975) 132 C.L.R. 473 (at p.479). It would appear to be a sound course, where a party has, or may have, an interest in resisting the grant of relief sought under the Judicial Review Act, for the applicant either to make that party a respondent or at least notify it of the institution of proceedings, to enable it to consider applying under s.12. Where, as here, neither of those steps has been taken, the Court still has, in my opinion, jurisdiction to determine the case, but would decline to do so if injustice would thereby be caused to the absent party; that must necessarily be so where no respondent interested to oppose the application has been joined. Of course, in broadcasting matters, definition of the parties interested may be troublesome; no doubt the whole potential group of viewers may be interested, as may various sub-groups of them. As to the second point dealt with above, there is at least a serious question to be tried: my view, in fact, (the matter having been fully argued) is that the respondent plainly has no power to force the consortium to take in a new partner or new partners. Apart from the difficulty as to parties just discussed, I would grant an appropriate declaration. I have considered whether, because of the absence of TAIMA, even interlocutory relief should be refused, but have concluded that that would be an inconvenient result. I have, then, come to a view as to each of the points dealt with, but have determined not to grant any final relief. To do so would decide the case as between the present parties, but ty teat ne on 2 we ee er re eee rene ee ee eee Be eee, wae cron oa, 20. not for or against TAIMA, because 'AIMA has not been joined and there is no evidence that it has had an opportunity to apply for joinder. The respondent will be enjoined until the trial of this application or further earlier order from proceeding with the inquiry so far as it relates to the orders sought under ss.17 and 92V, set out in Section III(1) of the Notice of Inquiry. I will direct the applicants to serve a copy of this order and my reasons by post forthwith on Mr Brian Walsh of Brian Walsh and Associates Pty Ltd, the agent for TAIMA, so that TAIMA may consider its position. The application for interlocutory relief will otherwise be dismissed and the principal application will be adjourned to a date to be fixed, for directions, if any are desired. ' certify that this and the YF" preceding pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of His Honour Mr. Justice Pincus Amagelas D Associ Dated /3 Avgust /98F ociate Mr D.G. Russell Q.C. with Counsel for the applicants: Mr R.W. Gotterson Solicitors for the applicants: Morris Fletcher & Cross Counsel for the respondent: Mr L. Grey Solicitors for the respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Date of Hearing: 11 August 1988