Hells Angels Motorcycle Club Incorporated v Duffy, Attorney-General [1991] FCA 944
Federal Court of Australia
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IN_THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VI A_ DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
No. VG 305 of 1991
~~ SS ww
BETWEEN:
HELL'S ANGELS MOTORCYCLE CLUB INCORPO
Applicant
- and =
THE HONOURABLE M. DUFFY, ATTORNEY-GENERAL
First Respondent
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THE HONOURABLE G.L. HAND, STATE MINISTER FOR
IMMIGRAT LOCAL RNMENT AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS
Second Respondent
Coram: Black C.J.
Place: Melbourne
Date: 18 November, 1991.
EX _TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application by the applicant in matter VG No. 305
of 1991, Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club Incorporated, that I
should exercise the power conferred by s.20(1)(a) of the
Federal Court Act 1976 to order that the matter be heard by a
Full Court. This application relates to a second application
before me, which is that the matter should be heard at the
same time and before the same justices who will hear the
expedited appeal in matter VG No. 302 of 1991.
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That appeal will now be heard on 25 November, and the Court
has allocated, if necessary, 2 days for the hearing. The
estimate of the parties is that the hearing will occupy a day-
and-a-half and that estimate seems to be accurate, but only on
the basis that the parties put their arguments concisely and
that there are, to some extent in any event, written
submissions.
The substantive application in matter VG No. 305 of 1991,
raises several very important issues and I would be satisfied
that it is a matter of sufficient importance to justify the
giving of a direction that it be heard by a Full Court if that
were otherwise appropriate. However, as Mr. Graham Q.C. for
the respondents points out, the power under s.20(1)(a) is
discretionary and one of the factors that has to be taken into
account in the exercise of that discretion is whether it is
practicable for a matter to be heard by a Full Court.
There would be little point in having a matter heard by a Full
Court, urgently, so that it might be heard at the same time as
another matter, if there would not be sufficient time
available, either to the parties or to the Court, to deal with
either matter in the way in which, having regard to its
importance and complexity, it ought to be dealt with.
I would wish, as I indicated to the parties, that the Court
should hear all matters in controversy between them as quickly
as possible, and resolve them. However in my view, the
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estimate of Mr. Graham that the duration of the hearing, if
both matters were heard by a Full Court at the same time,
would be something of the order of 4 days - I think he said 4
to 5 days, but at least 4 - is closer to the mark than the
extra half-day or so which was the estimate given by Mr. Rose
who appeared with Mr. Bell for the applicant corporation. In
saying that, I know that neither counsel will feel offended
because it is difficult to estimate how long a hearing will
take, but my judgment is that the complexity of the new
application (VG No. 305 of 1991) is such that a hearing of
both matters would take considerably longer than the time
originally set aside for the hearing of the expedited appeal
in VG 302 of 1991.
Now, the point is that both matters are complicated and
obviously require careful consideration. If they are heard
together, even assuming that the Court was able to do so at
such short notice, it would be inevitable that some additional
time would pass before the Court could give its decision, and
it seems to me that that would risk defeating the purpose of
the expedited appeal in the first matter, that is to say,
matter VG 302 of 1991.
I should also note that although the applicant, Hell's Angels
Motorcycle Club Incorporated, apprehends that the Minister
will make a declaration in respect of the corporation under
the newly proclaimed Migration Regulations (Amendment) 1991,
the Minister has not done so, whereas there is of course an
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unquestionably live issue in relation to the Minister's appeal
against the decision of Mr. Justice Olney in matter VG 302 of
1991.
In these circumstances, I consider that, as a matter of
discretion, I ought not to exercise, at least at this stage,
the power conferred by s.20(1)(a) of the Federal Court Act
1976. I say "at this stage" because, as I have indicated, the
matter is of importance and I am not able to say if and how
circumstances may change. It seems to me that the best thing
to do in all the circumstances is to proceed, as the Court has
indicated it will, with the hearing of the appeal against the
decision of Mr. Justice Olney.
Accordingly, the first application in the notice of motion is
dismissed, as is the second. In dismissing the first
application, it will be apparent from what I have said that it
is dismissed on the material before the Court at this time and
in the circumstances revealed by that material.
I propose in all the circumstances to reserve the costs of the
application.
I will otherwise adjourn the application in VG No. 305 of 1991
until 10.00 a.m. on Monday, 25 November in Melbourne for
directions.
I certify that this and the
preceding four (4) pages are a
true copy of the Reasons for
Judgment herein of the
Honourable Chief Justice agk.
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