Lowes Park P/L v. Headlam, C.B. & Ors [1994] FCA 579
Federal Court of Australia
Full text
Select any passage to save a personal note with optional tags.
JUDGMENT No. socdecscteal stction
CATCHWORDS
CORPORATIONS - oppression action by shareholder - just and
equitable ground - effect of breaches of Corporations Law and the
Articles - fairness in all the circumstances of a family company
set up upon family planning advice - grazing family in which
father assisted sons in acquiring properties - whether applicant
relevantly "locked in" ~ whether entitled to insist on dividends
being declared - collateral benefits - claim against deceased
person - method of valuation of shares where rights were limited
by special provisions in Articles.
Corporations Law, ss. 260 and 461
Plunkett v. Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544
Thomas v. H.W. Thomas Ltd (1984) 2 ACLC 610
Re G. Jeffery (Mens Store) Pty Ltd (1984) 2 ACLC 421
Buche v. Box Pty Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 368
Re Bagot Well Pastoral Company Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACLC 1
Re Bagot Well Pastoral Company Pty Ltd (1993) 61 SASR 165
Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1985) 61 ALR 225
Gregory v. Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of
Australia (1971) 123 CLR 547
RE: LOWES PARK PTY LTD; CHARLES BARRY HEADLAM AS TRUSTEE OF THE
C.B. AND M.J. HEADLAM TRUST v. LOWES PARK PTY LTD & ANOR
TG 3001 of 1993
Burchett J.
Sydney (heard in Hobart)
30 September 1994
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY TG 3001 of 1993
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
RE: LOWES PARK PTY LTD
BETWEEN: CHARLES. BARRY HEADLAM AS TRUSTEE OF
THE C.B. AND M.J. HEADLAM TRUST
Applicant
AND: LOWES PARK PTY LTD
First Respondent
AND: JAN EDWARD HEADLAM
Second Respondent
AND: IAN EDWARD HEADLAM
Cross-Claimant
AND: CHARLES BARRY HEADLAM
Cross—Respondent
CORAM: Burchett J.
PLACE: Sydney (heard in Hobart)
DATE : 30 September 1994
ORDERS OF THE COURT
THE COURT ORDERS THAT the respondents, within fourteen days,
bring in short minutes of orders, and the applicant file and
serve within a further fourteen days a document setting out any
objections to or variations of the short minutes for which he
contends.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order
36 of the Federal Court Rules.
TG 3001 of 1993
RE: LOWES PARK PTY LTD
BETWEEN: CHARLES BARRY HEADLAM AS TRUSTEE OF
THE C.B, AND M.J. HEADLAM TRUST
Applicant
AND: LOWES PARK PTY LTD
First Respondent
AND: IAN EDWARD HEADLAM
Second Respondent
AND: LAN_EDWARD HEADLAM
Cross-Claimant
AND: CHARLES BARRY HEADLAM
Cross-Respondent
CORAM: Burchett J.
PLACE: Sydney (heard in Hobart)
DATE : 30 September 1994
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BURCHETT J. 2
This ia a very regrettable piece of litigation. It involves
an application filed on 2 March 1993 to wind up a family company
in which is vested a substantial grazing property known as "Lowes
Park", Woodbury, Tasmania. Alternatively, an order is sought for
the purchase of the applicant's shares at a value to be
determined by the Court. The major protagonists are, on the one
side, the applicant, and on the other, his brother, who is the
second respondent, and their aged mother. The substantial
2.
grounds on which the relief is sought are the ground of
oppression and the just and equitable ground (see ss. 260,
461(e), (f), (g) and (k) and 467 of the Corporations Law) -
At the outset, it should be noted that a cross-claim,
brought by the second respondent, is not pursued, and may be
dismissed.
Before coming to the dispute which has arisen between the
brothers, I must first go back to some family history. From
about 1947, for a number of years, the late Charles Leonard
Headlam, who was married to Emilie Patricia Headlam, owned the
property "Lowes Park". He conducted it as a grazing property.
Even earlier, it had belonged to his father. Mr and Mrs C.L.
Headlam had four children, two sons and two daughters. The sons
were the applicant Charles Barry Headlam, born 9 July 1941, and
the second respondent Ian Edward Headlam, born 20 October 1942.
For reasons which will become apparent, it is unnecessary to set
out details in respect of the daughters. Both Barry Headlam and
Ian Headlam, as I shall call them, worked on the "Lowes Park"
property after leaving school, but Barry Headlam moved in 1963
to a property known as "Brandy Bottom" at Colebrook, about fifty
kilometers (said to be three quarters of an hour's drive) from
Woodbury, and he married his wife Mary June Headlam on 6 October
1964, since when he has visited "Lowes Park" only occasionally.
Ian Headlam continued to work at "Lowes Park" (he did not marry
his wife Margaret Eleanor Headlam until 1972), eventually
becoming a manager of the property, until about 1970, when he
3.
moved to a property known as "Thule" on Flinders Island. In the
19608, he also worked on a property known as "Kheme" at York
Plains, which was held in the name of his mother, but was managed
by his father.
The property "Thule", on Flinders Island, was purchased in
1965 by a company the shares in which were owned by Ian Headlam
and his mother, the purchase being partly funded by the sale of
the property "Kheme". "Thule" was leased by the company, Thule
Pty Ltd, to a partnership of the same persons, under the name
E.P. & I.E. Headlam.
Some time in the first half of 1966, Mr C.L. Headlam became
concerned about the devastating effect which, he foresaw, the
then state and federal laws in respect of probate and federal
estate duty might have upon his family after his death. He
consulted the family's accountants, W.S. McKay & Associates. A
memorandum signed on their behalf, dated 5 July 1966, is in
evidence. It contains detailed calculations based on the then
value of "Lowes Park" assessed at $320,000, and "Brandy Bottom"
assessed at $70,000. It was proposed that "Brandy Bottom" be
transferred to Barry Headlam under a contract for value, but on
the basis that the amount required (or much of it) would be given
by Mr C.L. Headlam to his son. The document, which was headed
"MEMORANDUM re PROBATE REDUCTION PROPOSALS," went on:
"To enable you to retain control of the property and
farming activities to be conducted at 'Lowes Park'
while gifting for probate duty reduction, it is
proposed that a land holding company be incorporated.
4.
The share structure of the company envisaged is as
follows :-
Preference Shares - Entitled to maximum dividend of 5%
per annum and to a maximum of par value on winding up
or reduction of capital. Each share to have one vote.
To be held by:-
C.L. Headlam 10 shares
Mrs. E.P. Headlam 10 shares
Independent Shareholder (say
Solicitor or Accountant) 1 share .
- Entitled to all dividends after
demands of preference shareholders, and to balance of
capital on winding up or reduction of capital. Not to
be entitled to any voting rights, nor to entitle
holders to any notice of meeting inspection of
accounts nor attendance at meeting of the company.
To be held by:-
Tan 1,000 shares
Barry 1,000 shares ,
Thus the company is controlled by the preference
shareholders, but any increase in the net assets of
the company passes to the ordinary shareholders. If
so desired, the equity shareholdings can be
effectively deprived of any permanent benefit of such
increases by future issue of a large number of
ordinary shares.
The company would then purchase 'Lowes Park' from
yourself at the present Government Value, with the
purchase price being left on deposit with the
company. "
It is apparent that this advice was accepted. Lowes Park
Pty Ltd was incorporated on 19 August 1966. The usual wide
ranging objects, set out in the Memorandum of Association,
included an object to "hold develop and deal generally with real
property". The subscribers were Mr C.L. Headlam, in respect of
ten A class shares, Mrs E.P. Headlam, in respect of ten A class
shares, and Mr W.S. McKay, in respect of one A class share. One
aspect of the purpose of incorporation of the company was
5.
indicated by Barry Headlam when he acknowledged in evidence that
it "was set up ... as a land holding company", of which he said:
"It was a vehicle - the company was there as a vehicle for the
partners [in a partnership also set up by Mr C.L. Headlam] to
derive a profit from the land". Indeed, his counsel conceded,
in address, that "it is not a trading company, and it has never
traded". As the accountants' memorandum makes clear, another
main purpose was to confer control on the holders of the
preference shares, who had virtually no other tangible rights in
return for the transfer to the company of "Lowes Park".
The Articles of Association of the company excluded Table
A in the Fourth Schedule to The Companies Act 1962 of Tasmania,
and contained certain special provisions. Clause 4 dealt with
the company's shares. It provided:
"(a) The original capital of the Company is $50,000
divided into 50,000 shares of $1 each. Shares
numbered 1 to 1,000 both inclusive shall be 'A'
Shares. Shares numbered 1,001 to 50,000 both
inclusive shall be 'B' Shares.
(b) The said 'A' Shares shall confer on the holders
thereof the following rights viz:
9 [sic] (i) The right to attend and vote at all
meetings of members of the Company.
(ii) The right to be paid out of the profits of
each year a fixed dividend for such year at the
rate of Five per cent per annum on the capital
for the time being paid up thereon and the right
to rank in a winding up as regards return of
capital pari-passu with all other shares in the
Company but shall not confer the right in a
winding up to payment of arrears of dividend
(whether earned or declared or not) or to any
further participation in profits or assets.
6.
(c) The said 'B' Shares shall confer on the holders
thereof the following rights viz:
(i) Subject to the rights of 'A' Shares the right
to rank for dividend pari-passu with all shares
other than 'A' Shares.
(ii) The right to rank in a winding up pari~passu
with all other shares to the extent of the amount
actually paid up thereon and to receive all
surplus assets thereafter in proportion to the
amount paid up on such 'B' shares at the
commencement of the winding up.
(d) The 'B' Shares shall not confer on the holders
thereof the right to vote either in person or by proxy
at any General Meeting or to have any vote in the
management of the business or control of the company
or to interfere in such management or control or to
inspect the accounts books and documents of the
Company (except as by law entitled) and such holders
shall be bound by the Accounts from time to time
furnished by the Directors and passed at General
Meeting of the Company."
There were also restrictive conditions in respect of the
transfer of shares in the company, clauses 22 to 26, as follows:
"22. EXCEPT as hereinafter provided no shares in the
Company shall be transferred unless and until the
rights of pre-emption hereinafter conferred shall have
been exhausted.
23. EVERY member or other person referred to in
Article 28 who intends to transfer shares (hereinafter
called 'the Vendor') shall give notice in writing to
the Directors of his intentions. That notice shall
constitute the Board his agent for the sale of the
said shares in one or more lots at the discretion of
the Company at a price to be agreed upon by the Vendor
and the Board, or, in case of difference, at the price
which a chartered accountant agreeable to the Board
and the Vendor shall certify by writing under his hand
to be in his opinion the fair selling value thereof as
between a willing Vendor and a willing Purchaser.
24. THE Directors shall forthwith give notice to all
the members of the Company of the number and price of
the shares to be sold and invite each of them to state
in writing within twenty-one days from the date of the
7.
said notice whether he is willing to purchase any, and
if so, what maximum number of the said shares.
25. AT the expiration of the said period of twenty-
one days the Directors shall allocate the said shares
to or amongst the member or members who shall have
expressed his or her willingness to purchase as
aforesaid, and (if more than one) so far as may be pro
rata according to the number of shares already held by
them respectively, provided that no member shall be
obliged to take more than the said maximum number of
shares so notified by him as aforesaid. Upon such
allocation being made the Vendor shall be bound on
payment of the said price to transfer the shares to
the Purchaser or purchasers, and if he make default in
so doing, the Board may receive and give a good
discharge for the purchase money on behalf of the
Vendor and enter the name of the Purchaser in the
register of members as holder by transfer of the said
shares purchased by him,
26. IN the event of the whole of the said shares not
being sold under Article 24 the Vendor may at any time
within six months after the expiration of the said
twenty-one days transfer the shares not so sold to any
person and at any price."
The first directors of the company were Mr and Mrs C.L. Headlam.
The proposed transfer of "Brandy Bottom" also occurred, and
at about the same time Barry Headlam purchased (with some
assistance from his father) another property at Colebrook, known
as "Springfield". Ian Headlam continued to reside at "Lowes
Park" until the retirement of the manager at "Thule" in 1970,
when he moved, as I have said, to Flinders Island to manage that
property.
In 1971, Mr C.L. Headlam suffered a severe stroke. The
evidence indicates that it left him partially paralysed and
suffering from a somewhat distressing condition of inability to
control weeping. He was incapacitated from carrying out farming
8.
operations. Although a manager was engaged for "Lowes Park", it
is plain that he needed the assistance of his sons, and it is
equally plain, on the evidence, including the evidence of their
mother and their brother-in-law Mr Bayne (which was not
challenged by cross-examination), that it was Ian Headlam who
provided that assistance. This was notwithstanding the fact that
Ian was living at Flinders Island, while Barry Headlam was
working a property which was only some 50 odd kilometers distant
from "Lowes Park". Ian Headlam visited regularly from Flinders
Island, at least once in every month or two, until it was decided
he should return permanently to run "Lowes Park" and an adjoining
property known as "The Braes", which was purchased in 1976
utilizing the proceeds realized by selling the property "Thule".
So little was Barry Headlam involved in what was happening at
"Lowes Park" at that time that he said he did not know his
brother would be returning until he heard that "The Braes" had
been sold.
The events following Mr C.L. Headlam's stroke do not suggest
the emergence of any conflict in the family. On the contrary,
as I shall recount, Mr C.L. Headlam continued to give very
considerable financial assistance to his son Barry Headlam. But
I think an appreciation of the fact that it was Ian Headlam who
came to his parents' aid in the years following the stroke is
relevant to one area of conflict in the evidence which the
parties themselves, or at any rate Barry Headlam, regarded as
significant. That conflict relates to a partnership in respect
of "Lowes Park". Therefore, it is appropriate that I indicate
9.
the basis on which I accept Jan Headlam's evidence concerning the
assistance he gave to his parents, and indeed his evidence
generally. In the first place, I formed the view that Ian
Headlam was an honest, though somewhat inarticulate and
occasionally confused, witness. I formed a much less favourable
opinion of Barry Headlam, and I do not accept his evidence where
it is in conflict with other witnesses or with what seem to me
to be the general probabilities of the situation. On a number
of issues, Barry Headlam's evidence was quite unsatisfactory, and
he gave me the impression that he was prepared to assert what he
thought would assist his case, although he preferred to suggest
a falsehood rather than to say it outright. On the matter of
Barry Headlam's claim to have assisted his father during the
difficult years following 1971, Mr Bayne, an accountant who
married Mr C.L. Headlam's daughter Catherine in 1967 and
thereafter visited "Lowes Park" at least once a month, confirmed
that it was Ian Headlam who returned to assist his parents to run
"Lowes Park", and he said that "from [his] observation the
applicant [Barry Headlam] has given neither [Ian Headlam] nor his
parents any material assistance to carry out those tasks".
Similarly, Mr C.L. Headlam's widow swore:
"From the time of my husband's stroke Ian travelled
backwards and forwards from the 'Thule' property on
Flinders Island to 'Lowes Park' in order to help
oversee the property. ... In 1972 Ian travelled from
Flinders Island once a month for the five months at
the beginning of the year. My other son Barry took
little interest in the running of 'Lowes Park' and did
not come up for shearing and rarely came to visit his
father following the stroke."
10.
I accept the evidence of Mr Bayne and Mrs Emilie Headlan.
Anticipating matters a little, it is convenient to note here that
Mrs Emilie Headlam gave evidence too:
"Following my husband's death, Ian continued to care
for my welfare being aware of my health and finances.
I lived alone at the house at 'Lowes Park' with the
help of Ian who found help for me including nursing
and companionship. When I decided to move to Hobart,
Ian and his sisters helped me to move and settle in my
new home. The house in which I presently live was
bought by Barry and Ian. [Provision in this respect
was made by the will, of which they are executors. ]
Ian has continued to help with its upkeep and
maintenance. "*
Of course, the performance and non-performance of filial duties
cannot generally affect vested legal rights, but the particular
matters to which I have referred are relevant to some of the
issues in the present case, as I shall show.
In 1973, Mr C.L. Headlam obtained further accounting advice,
which I assume was sought because his stroke had raised doubts
whether the programme of reduction of his estate by the making
of regular gifts to members of his family could be implemented
in time to avoid the incurring of a very substantial impost upon
his death. A plan was devised involving reliance upon
discretionary trusts, a Norfolk Island Scheme and a "Gorton"
Scheme (see Gorton v. The Commissioner of Taxation of the
Commonwealth of Australia (1965) 113 CLR 604). The rearrangement
of family affairs involved led, amongst other things, to the B
class shares held in Lowes Park Pty Ltd by Barry Headlam and Ian
Headlam being transferred to discretionary trusts for the benefit
11.
of each of their families. The discretionary trust relating to
the family of Barry Headlam is known as the "C.B. and M.J.
Headlam Trust". It is as trustee of that trust that he brings
the present application.
Mr C.L. Headlam, as the person then in control (by virtue
of his wife's acquiescence) of Lowes Park Pty Ltd, arranged for
that company to provide sufficient funds to enable Barry Headlam
to increase his land holding by adding to "Brandy Bottom" and
"Springfield" two further properties known as "Hardwick House"
and "Lynwood" at a total cost of $490,000 plus a further
substantial sum for stock. "Hardwick House" was bought in 1974,
and Lynwood shortly afterwards. The assistance granted by Lowes
Park Pty Ltd took the form of a loan to Hardwick House Pty Ltd,
Barry Headlam's family company, of $200,000 at an interest rate
of 5% per annum. In order to provide this sum, Lowes Park Pty
Ltd had to borrow on mortgage from a bank. That mortgage still
exists, and it is the first of four mortgages which featured in
the evidence. Hardwick House Pty Ltd has repaid neither any
principal nor any interest, so that at the present time, in round
figures, some $400,000 would be outstanding, and, of course, the
actual outlay incurred by Lowes Park Pty Ltd would be much
greater, since it has had to pay commercial rates to the bank.
This particular transaction provides an interesting illustration
of Barry Headlam's attitude. Asked: "Did you pay 5% interest or
was that a book entry or what?" he answered: "It was debited to
Hardwick House Pty Ltd and credited to Lowes Park Pty Ltd."
Pressed: "But not actually paid?" he replied: "Not physically
12.
paid." He was then asked: "Do you acknowledge a debt in that
amount, including the interest?" he answered: "We acknowledge the
debt of the initial $200,000 with the interest component of
$60,000 accrued to 1980." He was then asked: "Interest was not
shown in the books of Lowes Park Pty Ltd since 1980 - are you
aware of any reason for that?" he replied: "I have no reason
whatsoever, your Honour." When it was put: "No reason why it
should not continue to be shown, is that what you are saying?"
he replied: "That's right, your Honour." While complaining of
amaller transactions on the basis that they were for the benefit
of his brother (they also benefited his mother), Barry Headlam
was quite content to continue to accept their generosity in
relation to this one, and even to ignore the obligation to pay
the minimal interest rate of 5% per annum during the past 14
years. But being pressed, he had no reason to offer why he
should not be obliged to pay interest during that period.
In addition to the first mortgage, Barry Headlam had the
benefit of a further mortgage, initially for the sum of $40,000,
granted by Lowes Park Pty Ltd to assist farming operations at
Hardwick House, under which $4,000 was still owing at the time
the present proceedings were commenced. That balance has since
been paid. This mortgage ranked as a third mortgage.
Back in 1966, at the time when Lowes Park Pty Ltd was
formed, the grazing business on "Lowes Park" was being carried
on by a partnership known as "C.L. Headlam & Son", consisting of
Mr and Mrs C.L. Headlam, Barry Headlam and Ian Headlam. On 1
13.
July 1973, following the receipt of the family planning advice
to which I have already referred, Barry Headlam's wife and Ian
Headlam's wife were also admitted to the partnership. As I
understand the position, the idea was that the shares in any
profits of the partners other than Mr and Mrs C.L. Headlam would
be applied towards the discharge of liabilities created by the
family planning schemes. Of course, there were taxation
implications, and the introduction of the wives of Barry Headlam
and Ian Headlam produced appropriate splittings of income,
But after the return of Ian Headlam following the sale of
"Thule" and purchase of "The Braes", in order to assist his
incapacitated father, the situation must have appeared in a
different light. "The Braes" was not a property comparable, as
I infer from the evidence, to "Lowes Park", but it was a
significant property, and Ian Headlam was going to run the two
properties together. Barry Headlam had by then acquired the
properties I have mentioned, which totalled very substantial
holdings. It must have seemed entirely appropriate that "Lowes
Park" and "The Braes" should be run by a single partnership of
Mr and Mrs C.L. Headlam, Ian Headlam and his wife. That is in
fact how Mr C.L. Headlam instructed the family's accountants to
record the position as from 1 July 1977. I accept Ian Headlam's
evidence that he understood the arrangements were made with his
brother's full knowledge. However, as Mr C.L. Headlam died on
9 October 1979, his version of the events cannot be obtained.
Barry Headlam and his wife assert that they knew nothing of any
dissolution or reconstitution of the partnership. As to Barry
14.
Headlam's wife, in cross-examination she made it clear that she
left anything to do with the partnership entirely to her husband.
As to Barry Headlam, it is necessary to give some consideration
to the probabilities, having regard to the opinion I have already
expressed concerning his credit.
I think Mr C.L. Headlam may well have regarded himself as
entitled to take decisions on behalf of his family, including his
adult sons and their wives, without always consulting them in
advance. However, it is much less likely that he would have
refrained from telling them afterwards. Although Barry Headlam
did not often come to "Lowes Park" during his father's later
years, Mr C.L. Headlam did from time to time visit his son at
"Hardwick House". The distance was not great. There is one
piece of evidence which makes it quite unlikely that Barry
Headlam was left in ignorance of the position. That evidence is
provided by his tax returns. For the year ending 30 June 1977,
immediately prior to the change, Barry Headlam's tax return
showed the receipt of a share of partnership income from the
partnership C.L. Headlam & Son in the amount of $3,158, and for
the previous year there was a similar return. When first asked
about these documents in cross-examination, Barry Headlam
conceded that, having signed the returns, he "would have been
aware ... that [he was} deriving some income from the C.L.
Headlam & Son partnership". That accords with my impression of
Barry Headlam as a man who would have read with care the returns
he signed. But when he was then shown the following two returns,
in which there was no reference to income from that partnership,
15.
he said: "I signed the returns on the faith of the tax agent, our
accountants, and they were lodged along those lines." And
pressed: "So, you did not bother to read where you were getting
income from?" he answered: "No, I didn't." He asserted it was
only after his father's death that he had "a close look at any
incomes or tax returns". Asked: "So, you are just saying you did
not know?" he replied: "I wasn't fully aware of what was going
on, no." This final answer, it will be observed, is by no means
a clear denial of knowledge of the substance of what had
happened. If he did know, and said nothing, during his father's
lifetime, it seems to me he must have acquiesced in the
reconstitution of the partnership. He was taking no part in its
affairs, and in particular, was doing nothing in the way of work
to earn its income. This last aspect of the matter was put to
him in evidence. The topic produced a flurry of answers which
were either irrelevant or subsequently withdrawn. They had the
appearance of clutching at straws, and in my opinion they were
not frank answers. After reconsidering the whole of the
evidence, I have come to the conclusion that the exclusion of
Barry Headlam and his wife from the partnership was either agreed
in advance or, at any rate, was accepted with full knowledge
shortly afterwards, and well before the death of Mr C.L. Headlam.
Although I have not found it necessary to rely on the
special rule relating to claims first raised against a person
after his death, I think that rule clearly applies. What is
being said is that Mr C.L. Headlam unilaterally purported to
reconstitute the partnership in breach of his obligations towards
16.
his son Barry Headlam and his daughter-in-law, Barry Headlam's
wife. Where it is claimed that a person who is now deceased
incurred an obligation, in a case of conflict of evidence, there
is no rule of law requiring corroboration. But it has been laid
down that a Judge "ought to examine with care the evidence of the
[claimant] and any other evidence offered, and if he should be
dissatisfied with that evidence he ought to disallow the claim"
(per Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. in Rawlinson v. Scholes (1898)
15 TLR 8). A somewhat stronger statement of the principle was
endorsed by Isaacs J. in Plunkett v- Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544 at
549, where he said of a claim to recover money against an
executor:
"(I)t has always been considered necessary to establish
as reasonably clear a case as the facts will admit of,
to guard against the danger of false claims being
brought against a person who is dead and thus is not
able to come forward and give an account for himself."
Plunkett v. Bull was cited by McLelland C.J. in Eq. in Eyota Pty
Ltd v. Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785 at 789, where he said
that "in a claim based on communications with a deceased person,
the court will treat uncorroborated evidence of such
communications with considerable caution". The principle was
applied by Bryson J. in Noonan v. Martin (1987) 10 NSWLR 402 at
404, where he said:
"fhe burden of proof required is proof on the balance
of probabilities but the circumstances, including the
fact that his claim was only brought forward after the
testatrix's death and that it depends almost entirely
on his own evidence, require me to be careful in
accepting his evidence ... ."
17.
The older cases are interestingly summarized in a note in (1921)
37 LOR 268-269.
Following the death of Mr C.L. Headlam on 9 October 1979,
probate of his last will was granted to Ian Headlam, Barry
Headlam and a nephew of the deceased Kevin James Headlam. The
first bequest in the will was of the deceased's A class shares
in Lowes Park Pty Ltd, which he gave to Ian Headlam "together
with all my interest in the partnership of C.L. Headlam & Son".
Clause 5 of the will was in the following terme:
"I_RECORD that it is my desire that my son JAN EDWARD
HEADLAM and his family should from the date of my
death have the management and control of the Company
Lowes Park Pty Ltd including the ownership of all B
Class Shares therein."
This clause could, of course, have had only a precatory effect.
The B class shares held by the trust on behalf of which this
application has been made were not the deceased's shares to
dispose of. Nor could he directly dispose of a sufficient number
of A class shares to give control of the company. An equal
number of A class shares was held by his widow, and one A class
share was held by the accountant, Mr McKay. After the death of
the deceased, Mr McKay transferred the lastmentioned share to the
widow, so that in fact it was she who could control by her voting
power the decisions of the company.
18.
The deceased left his personal effects to his widow, and
there was also a provision devising his principal residence to
his trustees
"to hold the same to provide a residence for my wife
for so long as she should
survive me but should my said wife desire to reside at
any place other than the principal residence owned by
me at the date of my death then J DIRECT my Trustees
to provide for my said wife such residence as she may
reasonably require to provide her with a comparable
living standard to that enjoyed by her at the date of
my death."
It is, I understand, in pursuance of this clause that the widow
now resides elsewhere. What effect that has in relation to the
residence on the property "Lowes Park", where she remained until
1988, it is unnecessary to consider.
The will contains a trust for sale, subject to a power of
postponement, in respect of residue with a life estate in favour
of Emilie Patricia Headlam, and a gift of the remainder in equal
shares to Ian Headlam and Barry Headlam. It also contains the
following:
"I_LRECORD that I have not made any provision in this my
will for my daughters or further provision for my said
wife as provision has been made for them during the
joint lives of my said wife and myself."
Immediately after the death of Mr C.L. Headlam, Ian Headlam
was appointed a director of the company, and on 31 December 1982
he was appointed principal executive officer. His mother remains
a director, and on 13 November 1992 Mr Bayne was also appointed
19.
a director. Since the death of Mr C.L. Headlam, "Lowes Park" and
"The Braes" have continued to be managed by Ian Headlam on behalf
of the partnership, now consisting of himself (as to a 50%
share), his wife (as to a 25% share) and his mother (as to a 25%
share). Thus the income earned from "Lowes Park" has not been
earned exclusively on behalf of Ian Headlam and his wife; it has
also supported his mother. And, of course, insofar as the loan
arrangements to which I have already referred have remained in
place, Lowes Park Pty Ltd has gone on providing a substantial
benefit to Barry Headlam. But, as was the case from the
formation of the company until Mr C.L. Headlam's death, the
company has continued to be operated as a land holding company
which has paid no dividends. Each year the rental for "Lowes
Park" has been adjusted to match the company's expenditure; it
has not been fixed with a view to the earning of a profit through
the company. Since 1966, that mode of operation was not at any
time the subject of complaint by Barry Headlam until the
institution of this proceeding.
In 1983, a second mortgage was entered into by the company
to secure amounts not to exceed $180,000. The proceeds were
applied to the purchase of a property called "Roxford" at
Westbury, in the north of Tasmania, quite some distance away from
Woodbury. In his affidavit, Barry Headlam asserted:
"I object strongly to the second and fourth mortgages
over the Company's assets, and the use of the Lowes
Park property as security for Ian's private ventures.
I was neither consulted nor approved of these
securities."
20.
It is, of course, apparent that if these transactions were proper
transactions for the company to enter into, Barry Headlam was not
entitled to be consulted, having regard to the strong terms in
which the Articles commit management to the A class shareholders.
However, the reference to "Ian's private ventures" suggests the
argument was that the transactions were not proper transactions.
But in cross-examination Barry Headlam conceded, although
somewhat grudgingly, that, having regard to the assistance he had
received in respect of "Hardwick House", the provision of
security to assist his brother was not objectionable. He said
his "real substantial objections to the second and fourth
mortgages [were] that the company's procedure in procuring those
mortgages might not have properly been followed". Asked: "Is
that all?" he answered: "I think so."
In fact, the description of the purchase of "Roxford" as a
"private venture" of Ian Headlam is not entirely fair. I accept
Ian Headlam's evidence that the property was bought, during a
situation of drought at "Lowes Park", because there was a need
for somewhere to put the "Lowes Park" sheep. In due course,
after two years, the property was sold again, and the mortgage
has been fully discharged. That was long before the institution
of the present proceedings. The purpose this mortgage served
involved the provision of a benefit to the partnership including
Mrs Emilie Headlam and, of course, indirectly to "Lowes Park",
which might otherwise have suffered the effects of over stocking
in time of drought. I do not understand Barry Headlam to have
21.
gone so far as to object to the provision out of the security of
the company's property of a benefit to his mother.
The complaint about the fourth mortgage is, in my opinion,
quite unjustifiable. That mortgage was raised in the sum of
$60,000 in order to construct a dam on "Lowes Park". The
interest has been paid, and half the principal repaid, either by
Ian Headlam himself or by the partnership; it has not been borne
by the company. The company has simply provided security for a
loan obtained to carry out capital works on the company's
property. There was a suggestion - which I find not established
- that the dam construction was unwise because of salinity
problems. But whether that be so or not, the directors of the
company were entitled to make their own bona fide decision upon
the matter, and there is no suggestion that the dam was not
constructed in the bona fide belief that it would advantage the
property of the company. In fact, the applicant's own expert
valuer treated the dam as contributing $60,000 to the present
value of "Lowes Park".
A further complaint made by Barry Headlam relates to a
proposal to consolidate various borrowings relating both to
"Lowes Park" and to "The Braes". It was when Barry Headlam
learned of this proposal through his bank, and not from Ian
Headlam, that he caused these proceedings to be instituted. The
proposal did not in fact go ahead. Instead, Ian Headlam arranged
for the sale of "The Braes", which he was able to achieve at a
figure well in excess of $1 million, more than sufficient to
22.
repay all the borrowings in question. Indeed, although as I have
said some $400,000 due from the "Hardwick House" transaction has
never been received by the company, the encumbrances on "Lowes
Park" at the present time are, relatively speaking, extremely
small - less than $300,000.
Having said that, it seems the proposal, if it had been
implemented, would have involved consolidating both loans and
securities, so that "Lowes Park" would have provided security for
loans applicable to "The Braes", although at the same time loans
applicable to "Lowes Park" would have been secured also upon "The
Braes". Of course, "The Braes" was a less valuable property.
I should add that, while this appears to be the position, I
accept Ian Headlam's evidence that he did not so understand the
proposal as discussed by him with the bank. I have already
stated my view of Ian Headlam. I do not think he had a clear
understanding of what the bank meant by consolidation of the
loans. At all events, the matter must now be looked at in the
light of the fact that the proposal never was implemented.
Doubtless, what has happened has made Ian Headlam well aware of
the danger of not keeping the affairs of the company separate
from his own affairs and the affairs of other entities.
In evaluating the conduct of Ian Headlam in relation to the
proposal with respect to the refinancing of the debts totalling
$770,000, it is relevant to bear in mind that, at the time, his
brother Barry Headlam had the benefit of almost $400,000 of the
23.
company's money, at a cost to the company that must have been
much higher.
The applicant's case was presented on the footing that
another matter of complaint was Ian Headlam's failure to give his
brother notice of meetings of the company, or in any way to
consult his brother about the company's affairs. It seems that
neither brother communicates with the other. However, after at
first asserting that there were a "few occasions" when he was
notified of meetings during his father's lifetime, then that he
"may have" received notice on two or three occasions after 1966,
Barry Headlam finally admitted that he could not "honestly
recall" ever "receiving any notice at all". It will be
remembered that the company's Articles were drawn 80 as to
exclude as far as possible any right in a B class shareholder to
be concerned in the affairs of the management of the company.
However, senior counsel for the applicant points to the rights
conferred by the Corporations Law. Accepting that these rights
override the Articles, a director acting honestly might well,
particularly in the circumstances of this case, not have
appreciated that fact. There was a long series of failures to
comply with particular requirements of the Corporations Law, to
which reference was made. Although accountants were engaged,
their instructions do not seem always to have been understood or
carried out. Probably, a realization of the problem may have
been a factor in the appointment of Mr Bayne to the board within
the last couple of years. However, some more vigorous action is
plainly required. In particular, steps need to be taken with
24.
regard to the audit of the company's books, although there has
been no suggestion of any dishonesty. In a case involving
"blatant breach of duty by the directors", failures to appoint
auditors were not, in themselves, regarded as "oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial": Coombs v. Dynasty Pty Ltd (unreported, von
Doussa J., 8 July 1994, at 67-68). There have also been failures
with regard to the keeping of the company's minute book and the
due observance of the formalities required for execution of
documents. Although formal resolutions have not been recorded,
I have no doubt that in fact the directors agreed in the
appropriate resolutions. It is unnecessary to list here each of
the provisions of the Articles and the Corporations Law breaches
of which were relied upon. I have considered in detail in these
reasons the substantial transactions of which complaint is made,
and I have referred to a number of the breaches of the
Corporations Law. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of concern that
any provision of the law should be breached. But the question
is whether the applicant has made out a case for the relief he
seeks.
In considering that question in relation to the matters I
have been discussing, it is relevant to remember that Barry
Headlam did not complain at all to his brother about the failure
of the company so to conduct its affairs as to be able to declare
dividends, and indeed he never talked to him at all about the
company. He did not give any notice of an address to which
company documents should be sent, and when he learned of the
proposal to consolidate the existing loans, he still did not
25.
speak to his brother, or even write to him, but simply instructed
solicitors to take steps to block the proposal. As to an address
for service of notices, it should be borne in mind that Barry
Headlam is not a shareholder in his own right, and that it was
an address for service of notices to the discretionary trust
which was required. In cross-examination, Barry Headlam said:
"That address would be our accountants", but he conceded he had
never given any notice about it. Not only did Barry Headlam not
ask his brother; he conceded he did not ask his mother about the
affairs of the company. This state of affairs, of course, is
quite consistent with an acceptance, for some time, of the
precatory clause in Mr C.L. Headlam's will. Notwithstanding the
obligations imposed on Ian Headlam by the Articles and the
corporations Law (as to which I accept that he placed reliance
on the accountants who had always attended to these matters
during his father's lifetime), I think there is some difficulty,
so far as discretionary questions are raised in this case, about
the proposition that Barry Headlam should be entitled, quite
suddenly, to rely on these matters as grounds for the drastic
relief he seeks.
Counsel for the applicant was, of course, perfectly alive
to these considerations. His argument was that all the matters
of complaint should be considered together. So considered, he
claimed to have made out the grounds contained in s. 260 of the
Corporations Law - "that the affairs of a company are being
conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial
to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members ...
26.
or in a manner that is contrary to the interests of the members
as a whole", as amplified by the reference in s. 260(2)(b) to
proposed acts, omissions and resolutions - and s. 46l(e), (f),
(g) and (k) -
"The Court may order the winding up of a company if:
(e) directors have acted in affairs of the company in
their own interests rather than in the interests
of the members as a whole, or in any other manner
whatsoever that appears to be unfair or unjust to
other members;
(£) affairs of the company are being conducted in a
manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial
to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member
or members or in a manner that is contrary to the
interests of the members as a whole;
(g) an act or omission, or a proposed act or
omission, by or on behalf of the company, or a
resolution, or a proposed resolution, of a class
of members of the company, was or would be
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or
unfairly discriminatory against, a member or
members or was or would be contrary to the
interests of the members as a whole.
(k) the Court is of opinion that it is just and
equitable that the company be wound up."
It is apparent that these grounds involve a considerable amount
of overlapping.
In considering whether the terms of either s. 260 or s. 461
have been made out, it would not be proper to take a narrow view.
The sections are concerned with the notions of oppression, unfair
prejudice, unfair discrimination, unfairness and injustice to
27.
other members, and justice and equity. It is in this context
that the sections also speak, as for example in s. 461(e), of
directors acting "in their own interests rather than in the
interests of the members as a whole or in any other manner
whatsoever that appears to be unfair or unjust to other members"
(emphasis added).
Many discussions of these provisions take as their starting
point the well known observations of Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi
vy. Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 at 379:
"The foundation of it all lies in the words 'just and
equitable' and, if there is any respect in which some
of the cases may be open to criticism, it is that the
courts may sometimes have been too timorous in giving
them full force. The words are a recognition of the
fact that a limited company is more than a mere legal
entity, with a personality in law of its own: that
there is room in company law for recognition of the
fact that behind it, or amongst it, there are
individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations
inter se which are not necessarily submerged in the
company structure. That structure is defined by the
Companies Act and by the Articles of Association by
which shareholders agree to be bound. In most
companies and in most contexts, this definition is
sufficient and exhaustive, equally so whether the
company is large or small. The 'just and equitable'
provision does not, as the respondents suggest,
entitle one party to disregard the obligation he
assumes by entering a company, nor the court to
dispense him from it. It does, as equity always does,
enable the court to subject the exercise of legal
rights to equitable considerations; considerations,
that is, of a personal character arising between one
individual and another, which may make it unjust, or
inequitable, to insist on legal rights, or to exercise
them in a particular way."
This passage was cited in the Court of Appeal of New Zealand by
Richardson J. in Thomas v. H.W. Thomas Ltd (1984) 2 ACLC 610 at
28.
617, where that learned Judge also made it clear that the
expressions "oppressive", "unfairly prejudicial to" and "unfairly
discriminatory against" should not be read "separately in water
tight compartments". He said:
"The three expressions overlap, each in a sense helps
to explain the other, and read together they reflect
the underlying concern of the subsection that conduct
of the company which is unjustly detrimental to any
member of the company whatever form it takes and
whether it adversely affects all members alike or
discriminates against some only is a legitimate
foundation for a complaint under sec 209 [the New
Zealand section]."
Richardson J., whose judgment has been frequently cited since,
also said (at 618):
"Fairness cannot be assessed in a vacuum or simply from
one member's point of view. It will often depend on
weighing conflicting interests of different groups
within the company. It is a matter of balancing all
the interests involved in terms of the policies
underlying the companies legislation in general and
sec 209 in particular: thus to have regard to the
principles governing the duties of a director in the
conduct of the affairs of a company and the rights and
duties of a majority shareholder in relation to the
minority; but to recognise that sec 209 is a remedial
provision designed to allow the Court to intervene
where there is a visible departure from the standards
of fair dealing; and in the light of the history and
structure of the particular company and the reasonable
expectations of the members to determine whether the
detriment occasioned to the complaining member's
interest arising from the acts or conduct of the
company in that way is justifiable.
The company for its part does rely on the history of
this family company and so on the understanding on the
part of past shareholders and all current members,
except [the complainant], that it should continue to
operate in its specialised transport field continuing
to adopt its traditionally conservative financial
29.
management policies and providing employment on proper
commercial terms for members of the family. It would
be unrealistic in a family company to ignore family
considerations of that kind."
Somers J. (at 619) made it clear he did not think unfair
discrimination or prejudice could be shown "because the affairs
of the company have been managed in the interests of those
shareholders who are employed by it". Nor did he accept that a
shareholder was "locked in" who had not put the matter to the
test by attempting to sell his shares under restrictive Articles.
McCarthy J. (at 620) said that the powers in the section "should
not be lightly exercised, especially so when a lack of probity
or want of good faith is not established". He thought the court
had to "give weight to the consideration that [the company] since
its incorporation has been essentially a family company having
as a central objective the provision of employment for members
of the founder's family."
Crockett J. in Re G. Jeffery (Mens Store) Pty Ltd (1984) 2
ACLC 421 at 426 emphasized the importance, as negativing unfair
prejudice or unfair discrimination, of a continuance of a company
to conduct business in much the same way as it had for many
years, "including the period during which the applicant's father,
from whom the applicant inherited his shares, was actively
engaged in the businesses." He also said (at 428):
"An order for winding up is not lightly to be made. If
an order is made because it is just and equitable to
do it must be just and equitable not just for the
applicant but for all."
30.
In Buche y. Box Pty Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 368 at 377-378,
Brownie J. took account of the purposes of death estate duty and
tax minimisation, without loss of control of the grazing business
conducted upon a property, which (at 374) he had found the
corporators to have had when the company was incorporated, and
of the fact that the plaintiff's shares were the gifts of her
father made in circumstances which might well change and require
modification of the company structure, in concluding that
"the fiduciary duty which a company director ordinarily
owes was modified in the circumstances of Box so as to
permit {the father] to make allotments and
determinations, for the purposes mentioned, and so
long as he did so conscientiously."
Brownie J. cited (at 377) the Canadian case Re Giroday Sawmills
itd (1983) 49 BCLR 378, which involved class A shares conferring
all the voting rights in a company, the majority of which were
held by a father. Taylor J. of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia said (at 381):
"(T)he court cannot, I think, disregard the fact that
the petitioners received their shares without charge
and as a part of a scheme through which their father
intended to benefit members of his family. Can these
petitioners say that they are unfairly dealt with,
prejudiced or oppressed when their father desires to
use the scheme he has so created in such a way as to
benefit other members of the family without also
giving a similar benefit to them?"
He answered that question in the negative.
31.
The applicant placed reliance on the decision in Re Bagot
Well Pastoral Company Pty Ltd (1993) 61 SASR 165. That was a
case bearing some superficial resemblance to the present, but
with the important difference that the complaining minority
shareholder (as appears at 171) had received her minority
shareholding from her father as her "inheritance". Her shares
were not B class shares issued for the special purposes for which
Lowes Park Pty Ltd was incorporated, looking as those purposes
did particularly to the question of value upon a winding up, but
ordinary shares subjected to the control of a governing director
provision. As Debelle J. said (at 176):
"The duties imposed upon Mr Shannon as a director to
act bona fide and in the interests of the company as
a whole were not diminished by the extensive powers
and privileges available to him as the holder of the
life governor's share ...
In the present case, the applicant complains that the lease
of "Lowes Park" to a partnership, consisting of Ian and Margaret
Headlam and the widow Emilie Headlam, has the result that the
company is not providing any benefit to him as the holder of B
class shares. But since 1974 the company has been providing him
and his family with a very substantial benefit, though of a
different kind, by way of the provision of the finance for the
purchase of "Hardwick House" and "Lynwood", and it was only after
that benefit had been secured that he and his wife were excluded
from the partnership C.L. Headlam & Son. There was no attempt
made in evidence to show that, over the years, the share of the
partnership which he lost would have yielded a greater return
32.
than the benefit of the loan of $200,000 at 5% per annum. The
figures in the tax returns, to which I have already referred,
must make this at least doubtful. Furthermore, if it is right,
as some of the cases I have cited suggest, to take into account
family considerations, I do not think Barry Headlam can be heard
to say that the provision of support for his mother in her
widowhood is something with which he has no concern. She has
received 25% of the income of the partnership. Obviously, if Ian
Headlam is to run the property so that it may make that return
to their mother, while Barry Headlam is running his own
properties, it is just and equitable that Ian Headlam should
receive a higher return than his brother from "Lowes Park". I
put this consideration in argument to senior counsel for the
applicant, who conceded it, but asserted there was "commercial
unfairness" in the situation, while adding: "(W)e have no
particular objection to the money being used ... in part for the
Support of Mrs E.P. Headlam as to which both brothers have an
interest."
Independently of the considerations I have just been
discussing (which are not exhaustive - for instance, in the past
few years, half the cost of the dam has been provided by Ian
Headlam or the partnership, conferring a benefit out of the
income of "Lowes Park" upon every shareholder), the applicant's
argument, if correct, would negate the purpose of the A class
shares. For it is plain that the object in view, when the
company was set up, was to enable the holder of the majority of
those shares to conduct the farming operations to be carried out
33.
upon "Lowes Park". That is why the shares were reserved to Mr
and Mrs C.L. Headlam, apart from the one held in trust by the
accountant. The intention was to enable them to preserve the use
of their property during their lives, while minimizing death
duties. Nothing could have been further from the intentions of
Mr C.L. Headlam, and the accountants who advised him, than the
idea that the incorporation of the company reduced the holders
of the A class shares to a position where a significant
proportion of the income of the property had to be paid out to
others. Nor is there any basis for assessing what that
proportion would have been. It could not have been based merely
on the numbers of shares, disregarding their class. That would
have reduced Mr and Mrs C.L. Headlam to penury. Nor is there any
reason, if it be conceded that Mr C.L. Headlam was not so bound,
for thinking that during the life of his widow, who had an equal
number of the same A class shares, the position would be
different. Even if the applicant's argument were correct in
respect of the situation which will obtain once his mother dies,
which I do not think it is, I cannot see any basis for
discriminating between the deceased and his widow in the way
Barry Headlam's case requires. He said repeatedly in evidence
that he did not object to the decisions concerning the company
that were made by his father during his lifetime.
In my opinion, fairness in relation to a family company,
such as this is, can only be considered in the light of the
history of the company and of the family with which that history
is intimately bound up. Fairness cannot be considered, as it has
34.
been said, in a vacuum; and that is because there is no such
thing as the conduct of a transaction in a vacuum: see Wayde v.
New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1985) 61 ALR 225, where even
a harsh singling out of a particular club was not, when all the
circumstances were reviewed, unfairly prejudicial or
discriminatory. When the history of this matter is taken into
account, and the family circumstances are examined, it seems to
me to be clear that there is neither oppression nor unfairness,
nor any basis to wind up this company on the just and equitable
ground. Numerous features of the situation, not by any means of
equal weight, must all be taken into consideration. The shares
on which Barry Headlam relies were the produce of his father's
bounty and were issued pursuant to a plan, as class shares, on
a basis that made it clear the shares were intended to confer a
great benefit (though not without the possibility of change by
further issues or otherwise) in the event of a winding up, but
not to confer any right to control over the operations of the
company so as to gain access to any income except at the will of
the A class shareholders. "Lowes Park" was to continue to
support its previous owners by virtue of the issue to them of the
majority of the A class shares. It could not have done so if the
income had been channelled through dividends, and that cannot
have been the intention of the corporators. At the same time,
the company's property was to be utilized as security to enable
the acquisition of additional properties for Barry Headlam and
Ian Headlam. In the event, that utilization greatly favoured
Barry Headlam. But it was to Ian Headlam that the task fell of
assisting their parents at "Lowes Park", and their mother after
35.
their father's death. It is he who has provided, by working the
property, and also the adjacent property "The Braes", the income
stream by which the other A class shareholder, the widow, has
been supported. At the same time, Barry Headlam has continued
to receive the substantial advantage of the borrowing for
"Hardwick House". It was in these circumstances, as they existed
and as he may have foreseen them, that the founder substituted
Ian Headlam for himself as a controlling shareholder by his will.
Fairness in this context must include fairness to the widow.
Barry Headlam has not indicated in the case any intention of
assisting in the support of his mother. Counsel's concession
that there is "no objection" to her being supported by the
company in which she holds controlling shares is hardly an
assurance of any contribution on his part to her support. The
family planning, of which the incorporation of the company was
part, involved her giving up personal assets of significant
value, and receiving her A class shares. If orders were made as
asked, there would be a real possibility that Ian Headlam would
be unable to continue farming operations, and that the company's
property "Lowes Park" would eventually be sold.
Fairness should also take account of the fact that what
ultimately loomed at the hearing - once it became clear the
objections to the two mortgages were more technical than
substantial - as the largest objection to the conduct of the
company, the failure to declare dividends, which could have been
36.
declared by reorganizing the lease to the partnership after Mr
C.L. Headlam's death so that income could be earned and dividends
paid, was never the subject of any complaint, or request for a
change of policy, by Barry Headlam prior to the institution of
the proceedings. (A general accounting between the brothers,
involving a sale of Barry Headlam's B class shares to Ian
Headlam, had certainly been sought earlier, and particularly at
the end of 1991 when a tentative agreement was reached, and then
abandoned by Ian Headlam.) Nor were a number of the other
matters relied on, such as the failure to send out notices, of
which he must have been aware as soon as twelve months went by
without his receiving any.
Counsel for the applicant urged upon me the proposition that
relief was required because his client was "locked in", and there
was a deadlock in the company. Neither of these propositions
seems to me to be factually correct. A mechanism for the sale
of the shares is provided, and Barry Headlam has taken no step
to test whether a satisfactory result can be obtained by
implementing that mechanism. There is certainly no deadlock in
the normal sense of a situation in which the board of directors
is paralysed from acting. The situation in which Barry Headlam
finds himself, as a result of his father's bounty having been
conferred upon him in a particular way, does not in law provide
a ground for the relief he seeks. Even a refusal by other
shareholders to buy him out would not provide such a ground: Re
G. Jeffery (Mens Store) Pty Ltd (supra, at 426-427); Thomas
37.
(supra, at 619-620); Swane v. Swane Bros Pty Ltd (1992) 10 ACLC
904. And the position of the recipient of a locked gift is not
to be compared with that of an investor who discovers that his
own money has become trapped in a company from which he cannot
extricate himself.
Had I taken a different view, the question would have arisen
whether an order should be made requiring the purchase of the
applicant's shares, and at what price. Senior counsel for the
applicant argued that the shares should be valued on an assets
basis, without any allowance for the special provisions in the
Articles. I do not think this can be correct. In Re Bagot Well
Pastoral Company Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACLC 1 at 15-16 Cox J. said,
with reference to a minority shareholding in a company controlled
by a governing director:
"She [ie the complainant] is not entitled to have the
price assessed according to the company's net assets.
That would be to ignore her very disadvantageous
position as a shareholder under the Articles,
including Article 5 which gives the holder of the Life
Governor's Share the right in a winding up to all
surplus assets. ... Nor, on the other hand, should
the shares be valued as though the company were being
or were about to be wound up, for that was not the
position in 1985 [the year up to which the conduct in
question in that case had occurred] just as it is not
the position now."
The use of the word "including" in this passage makes it clear
that the disadvantageous position which his Honour had in mind
was not limited to the right in a winding up mentioned by him;
it also included the fact that the Life Governor had the powers
of a governing director over the operations of the company. On
38.
appeal, as appears from the report I have already cited in 61
SASR, at 183-184, Cox J.''s approach was confirmed by the Full
Court.
Other authorities support this view of the matter. In
Australia (1971) 123 CLR 547 at 569, Gibbs J. said, of the
valuation of a parcel of shares:
"A purchaser of those shares would have acquired them
with such disadvantages as the provisions of the
articles entailed. It is true that the power given by
the articles to the directors was a fiduciary power to
be exercised bona fide for the benefit of the company
-.. but that does not mean that the presence of
restrictive articles has no effect on the value of a
minority holding. From a practical point of view, the
possibility of obtaining redress in the courts against
a wrongful exercise of a power given by the articles
is not a substitute for articles under which the power
is not conferred. In the present case it seems to me
clear that a prospective purchaser would have been
influenced to some extent by the provisions of the
articles, and I can see no reason in justice to ignore
this fact in making a valuation."
The effect of disadvantages arising out of the provisions of
Articles upon the valuation of a company's shares was also the
subject of some consideration in an earlier High Court decision,
to which Gibbs J. referred in this case at 571. That was the
judgment of Williams J. in Kent v. Federal Commissioner of
Taxation (Martin's Case) (unreported, 22 October 1945). There
Williams J. discussed at some length what he described as "the
effect which the unusual Articles and the size of the parcel
would have upon the value of the shares". The whole discussion,
which deals with more than one type of unusual Article, proceeds
39.
on the basis that, as a matter of fact, the value might be
affected. Although the situation he was considering did not
involve anything like the practical factors which would tend to
reduce the value in the present case, he made the comment:
"The fact that such shares are difficult to mortgage or
sell makes then unattractive to buyers, who, like the
ordinary investor on the Stock Exchange, attach great
importance to negotiability, and they must be regarded
as a long term investment. Some discount must ... be
allowed on this account ... ."
See also the comments of Stephen J. (with whom Mason and Aickin
JJ. agreed) in Q'Donnell_v. Thor Industries Pty Ltd (1977) 51
ALJR 569 at 572; and of Brownie J. in Buche v. Box Pty Ltd
(supra, at 376).
In my opinion, the true value of the applicant's B class
shares is much less than the figure which would be calculated if
they were valued upon an assets backing basis. However, it is
unnecessary, in view of the conclusion I have already reached,
to proceed to an assessment.
The application fails, and I direct the respondents to bring
in, within fourteen days, short minutes of the orders that are
appropriate in the light of these reasons. I also direct that
the applicant file and serve, within a further fourteen days, a
document setting out any objections to or variations of the short
minutes for which he contends. If there is dispute, I shall then
fix a date to hear the parties, or alternatively, give directions
as to written submissions.
40.
I certify that this and the preceding thirty-nine (39)
pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment
herein of his Honour Mr Justice Burchett.
Associate: frekipoe lea
Date: 30 September 1994
Counsel for the Applicant:
Solicitors for the Applicant:
Counsel for the Respondents:
Solicitors for the Respondents:
Dates of hearing:
Mr G. Garde Q.C. with
Mr M. Chambers
Messrs Shields
Heritage
Mr M. O'Farrell with
Mrs C. Ingles
Messrs Dobson Mitchell
& Allport
21, 22, 23, 24 and 25
March 1994
Related laws
No related documents linked yet.
You've got 21 of 22 free Acts left this visit. Sign up anytime for Facts, Related, and study briefs too.