Swain, J.P. & Anor v. Inspector-General in Bankruptcy & Ors [1994] FCA 710
Federal Court of Australia
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JUDGMENT NO. see! Queenl att.
CATCHWORDS
BANKRUPTCY - Deed of Arrangement under Part X, Bankruptcy Act,
1966 (Cth) - collection of money or property by Official
Receiver from party to transaction that is void against the
trustee - whether sale by trustee of property with net value
in excess of $20,000 was in breach of ss. 134 and 135 -
whether, notwithstanding trustee's breach, transaction valid.
BANKRUPTCY - Trustees -— Remedies and penalties for breach of
duty by trustee - trustee also appointed trustee of deed of
maintenance under s.87 Family Law Act - whether court's power
pursuant to s.176(2)(c) should be exercised as a remedy for a
breach of duty a trustee in his capacity as a trustee under
the Bankruptcy Act.
FAMILY LAW - Deed of maintenance agreement under s.87, Family
Law Act, 1975 - whether trustee owed any fiduciary duty to
debtor's estate other than in relation to any surplus
remaining from the proceeds of realisation of an assigned
asset.
Bankruptcy Act, 1966 (Cth) ss. 134, 135, 176, 237,
Family Law Act, 1975 (Cth) 5s. 87
RECEIVED
17 OCT 1994
FEDERAL COURT OF
AUSTRALIA
PRINCIPAL
REGISTAY
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JUDGMENT NOx ends Coal tn
eee
IN_THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF NEW SOUTH WALES No NB 247 of 1988
Re: JOHN PHILIP SWAIN
WILLIAM EDWARD ANDKEW
Applicant/Cross—Respondent
INSPECTOR-GENERAL IN BANKRUPTCY
First Respondent/Cross-Applicant
ANGUS BARTLEY CAMERON THORBURN
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Fourth Respondent
ARTLEY
Fifth Respondent
Coram: Olney J
Place: Melbourne (Heard in Sydney)
Date: 7 October 1994
MINUTE OF ORDERS
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The applicant be directed to distribute all moneys
presently held by him in his capacity as trustee under
the Deed of Arrangement executed on 20 July 1988 by John
Philip Swain in accordance with the terms of the deed and
the Bankruptcy Act.
NOTE:
The amended application filed on 3 June 1993 be otherwise
dismissed with no order for costs.
The cross-claim filed on 21 April 1993 be dismissed.
The cross-claimant pay the costs of the third respondent
of and incidental to the amended application and the
cross-claim.
The amended application filed in the Family Court of
Australia on 26 November 1993 be dismissed with no order
for costs.
Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in rule
124 of the Bankruptcy Rules.
IN _THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
GENERAL DIVISION }
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF NEW SOUTH WALES ) No NB 247 of 1988
Re: JOHN PHILIP SWAIN
WILLIAM EDWARD ANDREW
Applicant/Cross—Respondent
INSPECTOR-GENERAL IN BANKRUPTCY
First Respondent/Cross-Applicant
ANGUS BARTLEY CAMERON THORBURN
Second Respondent
ELIZABETH KENDALL
-G OCT 1994 Third Respondent
TEORUSTRALA TAXATI
PRINCIPAL
REG
ISTRY Fourth Respondent
BARTLEY RON TH
Fifth Respondent
Coram: Olney J
Place: Melbourne (Heard in Sydney)
Date: 7 October 1994
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
IHTRODUCTION
The matters presently before the Court have to do with the
affairs of the late Dr John Philip Swain, who entered into a
deed of arrangement under Part X of the Bankruptcy Act (the
Part X deed) on 20 July 1988, and who died on 12 April 1990.
At the time the Part X deed was signed Dr Swain (to whom I
will refer as the debtor) was the registered proprietor of an
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undivided half share as tenant in common in a house property
at 12 Boolarong Road St Ives (the St Ives property). The
other half share was held by the debtor's former wife Janet
Gwendoline Audrey Swain who is now known as Mrs Arthur-Lennox.
Under the Part X deed the debtor's interest in the St Ives
property vested in William Edward Andrew a registered trustee
under the Bankruptcy Act (the trustee), for the benefit of the
creditors. On 24 June 1991 the trustee transferred his
interest in the St Ives property to Mrs Arthur-Lennox without
having obtained the permission of the creditors or the leave
of the Court.
THE PROCEEDINGS
By application filed on 2 March 1993 the trustee sought the
following declarations and orders namely:
1. A declaration that the action of the trustee in selling
to Janet Gwendoline Audrey Arthur-Lennox his right and
interest in the property known as 12 Boolarong Road, St
Ives did not require a resolution of creditors or the
leave of the Court.
2. Directions generally in connection with the distribution
of moneys from the sale to Janet Gwendoline Audrey
Arthur-Lennox of his right title and interest in the
property known as 12 Boolarong Road, St Ives.
3. Such further or other orders as the Court may deem fit.
On 21 April 1993 the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy (the
Inspector-General) filed a cross-application seeking:
1. A declaration that the Applicant, ae Trustee of the
estate of John Philip Swain has been guilty of breaches
of duty in relation to the estate and affairs of John
Philip Swain.
2. An Order that the Applicant pay to the estate of John
Philip Swain the sum of $77,378.00 with interest.
3. Such other orders as the Court considers just and
equitable in the circumstances.
Costs.
An amended application was filed on 3 June 1993 in which the
trustee sought,
original application the following further relief, namely:
3.
An order that the approval of the Family Court of
Australia at Sydney of the Deed of Maintenance Agreement
dated 24 May 1989 between John Philip Swain, Janet
Gwendoline Audrey Swain, William Edward Andrew and the
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation be revoked.
An Order that the Application of the Trustee, William
Edward Andrew dated 25 February 1993 and filed herein be
transferred to the Family Court of Australia pursuant to
8 35A of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
Subsequently, on 22 November 1993, the trustee filed
in addition to the relief claimed in the
an
application in the Family Court of Australia which was amended
on 26 November 1993, in which the following relief was sought:
1.
4.
A Declaration that a Deed of Maintenance Agreement dated
24 May 1989 between John Philip Swain, Janet Gwendoline
Audrey Swain, William Edward Andrew and the Deputy
Commissioner of Taxation is unenforceable either in law
or in equity or pursuant to the provisions of the Family
Law Act 1975.
An order that the approval pursuant to the provisions of
the Family Law Act 1975 Deed of Maintenance Agreement
dated 24 May 1989 between John Philip Swain, Janet
Gwendoline Audrey Swain, William Edward Andrew and the
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation be revoked.
An order that the application of William Edward Andrew be
transferred to the Federal Court of Australia.
Such further and other orders as the Court may deem fit.
On 10 February 1994, the Family Court of Australia ordered by
consent that the trustee's amended application be transferred
to this Court.
The matters presently before the Court are the trustee's
amended application filed 3 June 1993, the Inspector-General's
cross-application filed 21 April 1993 and the trustee's
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amended application filed in the Family Court of Australia on
26 November 1993.
THE FACTS
The debtor's statement of affairs placed before a meeting of
his creditors held on 20 July 1988 disclosed assets of
$256,500 including his half interest in the St Ives property
which he then valued at $200,000. The statement disclosed
liabilities of $174,027 owing to 5 creditors. The major
creditor was the Commissioner of Taxation (the Commissioner)
who was said to be owed $168,000.
At the meeting, the creditors approved a scheme of arrangement
whereby the debtor conveyed and assigned his half interest in
the St Ives property to the trustee upon trust to deal with in
accordance with Part X of the Bankruptcy Act for the benefit
of the creditors and as to any surplus after paying the
creditors in full and the costs of the scheme, for the debtor,
his executors administrators or assigns. The deed was
executed by the debtor and the trustee on 20 July 1988. The
deed provided that the creditors agreed and accepted the
distribution made pursuant to the deed in full and final
satisfaction of their respective claims against the debtor.
The only creditors to prove their debts were the Commissioner,
who proved for the sum of $155,361 and Mervyn Finlay Thorburn
& Marshall, a firm of solicitors, who proved for $2,597.
Angus Bartley Cameron Thorburn (Thorburn) to whom reference is
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made later, is and was at all material times a partner in that
firm.
On 24 May 1989 certain proceedings in the Family Court of
Australia between the debtor and his former wife relating to
financial and other matters were settled pursuant to an
agreement which was approved by the Family Court pursuant to s
87 of the Family Law Act. The agreement is hereafter
referred to as the s 87 agreement. The parties to the s 87
agreement were the debtor (described as the husband), his
former wife (described as the wife), the trustee and the
Commissioner.
Relevant to the matters presently in dispute, the s 87
agreement provided as follows:
4. The Trustee and the Wife shall within six weeks of the
date of approval of this agreement sign all documents and
do all acts and things necessary to cause the matrimonial
home to be listed for gale by private treaty through such
real estate agents that the Trustee and the Wife may
agree (excepting Raine & Horne) and in absence of
agreement then L J Hooker Limited at such asking price as
the Wife and the Trustee may agree in writing but in any
event not less than $585,000.00 and in the event of a
willing buyer being found at a price agreed between the
Trustee and the Wife in accordance with this provision
then both the Trustee and the Wife covenant that they
shall each give such instructions, sign all documents and
otherwise do all acts and things necessary to cause the
property to be sold to such buyer.
5. In the event that the matrimonial home does not sell by
private treaty and there has been no exchange of an
unexpired preliminary agreement within five months of the
date of approval of this Deed, then the trustee and the
Wife shall both forthwith sign all documents and do all
acts and things necessary to cause the property to be
submitted for sale by public auction at the earliest
convenient date thereafter as recommended by the
auctioneer, such auctioneer to be agreed between the Wife
and the Trustee and in absence of agreement then L J
Hooker Limited, such auction to be conducted at such
reserve price as the trustee and the Wife may agree in
writing and in absence of agreement at a reserve price
nominated by a valuer to be appointed by the President of
the Real Estate Institute of New South Wales and upon the
said auction being held the Trustee and the Wife shall
attend such auction and shall do all acts and things
necessary to sell to the highest bidder at or above the
said reserve price at such auction or at such other price
as the trustee and the Wife may agree in writing and
negotiate with the highest bidder.
6. In the event that the matrimonial home fails to sell at
public auction in accordance with operative clause (5)
herein then the trustee and the Wife do covenant that
they shall both join in doing all acts and things
necessary to cause the said property to be resubmitted
for auction at the earliest convenient date to be
recommended by the auctioneer pursuant to the same terms
and conditions excepting that there shall be no reserve
price.
7. In the event of the matrimonial home being sold pursuant
to the forgoing (sic) provisions of this Deed then the
proceeds of sale shall be paid and applied in the
following manner and priority namely:
(a) in payment of agents' commission and auction
expenses, if any, on the sale.
{b) 1n payment of solicitors costs and disbursements on
the sale.
{c) in payment of any valuation fees incurred pursuant
to these covenants.
(da) in payment of the sum of $12,000.00 to the
Australian Government Solicitor being the agreed
legal costs of the Commissioner and the Trustee in
these proceedings.
{e)} the balance of the proceeds of the matrimonial home
as remain after payments (a) to (d) above shall be
referred to herein as "the nett fund".
(f) fifty per cent of the nett fund shall be paid to
the Trustee to enable payment by the Trustee
pursuant to the terms of the Deed of Arrangement
dated 20 July 1988 and pursuant to his obligations
under the Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Rules.
(g) the husband and the wife shall then join in signing
all documents and doing all acts and things
necessary to cause the surplus of funds held by the
Trustee after discharging all duties referred to in
(f) herein together with the remaining fifty per
cent of the nett fund to be distributed between
them by a payment to Messrs McDonell Milne Fowler
on behalf of the Wife equivalent to 60% of "x"
where "X" equals (nett fund, less $155,361.13
payable to the Commissioner by the Trustee and less
the proper remuneration and costs of the Trustee in
administering the Deed of Arrangement dated 20 July
1988) thereafter the balance then remaining shall
be paid to the Husband or as he shall direct.
Thorburn had acted as the debtor's solicitor in the Family
Court proceedings and witnessed his signature to the
agreement, but neither he nor his firm (in its capacity as a
creditor of the debtor) was a party to the agreement.
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Initially, the debtor's former wife did not co-operate with
the trustee in giving effect to the s 87 agreement. Indeed,
the trustee went so far as taking proceedings in the Family
Court against her for contempt, but those proceedings were not
pursued.
The debtor died on 12 April 1990. By his will he appointed
Thorburn and Elizabeth Kendall (Mrs Kendall) to be his
executors. Probate was granted to the executors on 6 June
1990. Subject to her surviving the debtor for a period of 30
days (which she did), Mrs Kendall was the sole beneficiary.
Acting pursuant to the s 87 agreement, the trustee arranged
for the St Ives property to be offered for sale by auction on
24 April 1990. The reserve price was set at $450,000. The
auction did not take place. On 19 April 1990 the trustee
became aware that there was a caveat on the title to the
property which had been lodged by the trustee of a previous
Part X scheme which had been set aside. The caveat had not
been withdrawn when the scheme was set aside. On 21 April
1990 Mrs Arthur-Lennox told the trustee that she intended to
obtain revocation of the s 87 agreement and that she had
instructed solicitors to seek an injunction to prevent the
auction taking place on 24 April 1990. On the same occasion
Mrs Arthur-Lennox said she had arranged a loan through the
National Australia Bank for sufficient funds to enable the
debtor's creditors to be paid and she offered to acquire the
trustee's interest in the St Ives property for $225,000.
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Subsequently, on 23 April 1990, a solicitor acting for Mrs
Arthur-Lennox told the trustee that he had instructions to
seek an injunction and an order setting aside the s 87
agreement. The St Ives property was withdrawn from sale on
the trustee's instructions but as it happened, no action was
taken on Mrs Arthur-Lennox's behalf in respect of either
obtaining an injunction or setting aside the s 87 agreement.
The trustee also spoke to the manager of the National
Australia Bank at St Ives and was told that the bank would
provide funds to enable Mrs Arthur-Lennox to purchase the
trustee's interest in the St Ives property provided that a
clear title could be obtained.
The trustee formed the opinion that Mrs Arthur-Lennox's offer
should be accepted. It was clear to him that unless the
caveat could be withdrawn, the auction could not proceed on 24
April 1990. A valuation obtained in March 1989 had placed
the value of the property in the range of $380,000 to
$400,000. At an inspection of the property on 21 April 1990 a
prospective purchaser had offered $380,000 and was later
prepared to increase the offer to $400,000. Clearly, an
offer of $225,000 for the trustee's half share in the
property, without the cost and risk involved in a sale by
auction represented reasonable value. He agreed to cancel
the auction and sell his interest to Mrs Arthur-Lennox for
$225,000. There is no evidence of a formal contract having
been executed.
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It is not suggested by any party to these proceedings that
$225,000 was other than an appropriate value of the trustee's
interest in the St Ives property.
The trustee called a meeting of creditors for 23 August 1990.
In a report to the creditors dated 16 August 1990 the trustee
wrote:
I refer to my Report dated 18th November 1988, and advise
following the death of Doctor Swain in April, 1990, I agreed to
sell my interest in the house property at St Ives to his former
wife Janet Arthur Lennox for $225,000 and anticipate settlement
of the sale will be effected shortly.
As the result of the necessity to institute proceedings in the
Family Court of Australia my remuneration to 3lst July, 1990,
calculated in accordance with the scales of fees recommended by
Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia to 3lset July,
1990 totals $18,865.00
Creditors are requested to fix my total remuneration in this
matter at the sum of $20,000.00 such amount including future
remuneration in the finalisation of my administration.
The meeting on 23 August 1990 was attended by the trustee, Ms
Helen O'Sullivan (as proxy for the Commissioner) and Thorburn
(representing his firm). The minutes record the following
reference to the sale of the St Ives property:
The trustee informed the meeting of the present position
regarding the sale to Mrs Arthur-Lennox and tabled the copy
certificate of title issued on lst August, 1990.
At the same meeting Thorburn advised that he was one of the
executors appointed by the debtor. In that capacity he
enquired as to what surplus was expected from the
administration. The trustee agreed to furnish an estimate.
The sale of the trustee's interest in the St Ives property to
Mrs Arthur-Lennox was settled on 24 June 1991. On 23 July
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1991 the trustee made a distribution of 50 cents in the
dollar.
A further meeting of creditors was convened for 20 December
1991. The meeting purported to pass resolutions relating to
the payment of legal costs, auctioneer's fees and the
trustee's remuneration. As no quorum was present these
resolutions were a nullity.
On 30 November 1992 another meeting of creditors was held.
The notice of meeting identified 5 motions which were to be
put to the meeting. Four of them were identical to the
motions put to the abortive meeting of 20 December 1991. The
fifth was as follows:
S. That the action of the Trustee in selling to Janet
Gwendoline Audrey Arthur-Lennox his right, title and
interest in the property known as 12 Boolarong Road, St
Ives be and it is hereby approved and confirmed.
The meeting was attended by the trustee, Ms O'Sullivan (proxy
for the Commissioner) and Thorburn. Two officers of the
Insolvency Trustee Service Australia and Mrs Kendall attended
as observers. The motions relating to legal costs,
auctioneer's fees and trustee's remuneration were duly passed.
The minutes record the following under the heading "Sale to
J.G.A. Arthur-Lennox":
The Chairman restated the reasons for his decision to sell his
right title and interest in the property at St Ives to Mrs
Arthur-Lennox and a general discussion took place as to the
result of that decision from which the following points:
1. There is a balance due by Mrs Arthur-Lennox to the trustee
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for the adjustment of rates, repairs to swimming pool etc.
However it was generally agreed any attempts to recover the
balance would be futile.
2. The executors of the Will of John Philip Swain have no
objection to the sale to Mrs Arthur-Lennox or the price agreed
upon however contend the formulae provided for in the
maintenance agreement for the distribution of the proceeds of
sale must be followed.
3. Nothing in the maintenance agreement prevented a sale by
the trustee to Mrs Arthur-Lennox and it was always open to a
decision by the trustee to sell to her.
4. The Official Receiver will furnish to the Trustee and
executors his calculation of the amount which Mrs Arthur-Lennox
was liable for and the points he considers should be covered in
the proposed Application to the Court for Directions.
Mrs Kendall does not agree that the foregoing accurately
records the whole of the discussion concerning the matter in
question. However, it is common cause that the fifth
proposed motion set out in the notice of meeting was not put
to the creditors. Nor was any other motion touching upon the
sale of the St Ives property.
The trustee currently holds the balance of the net sale
proceeds less his remuneration and other costs of the
administration. The sum in hand is of the order of $70,000.
The trustee proposes to distribute this sum in payment first
of legal costs due to the Australian Government Solicitor in
relation to the Family Court proceedings (payment of which has
been approved by the creditors) and then to pay the creditors
a further dividend. The amount in hand is insufficient to
pay the creditors a full 100 cents in the dollar. There will
be no surplus available to pay to the debtor's estate.
Thorburn filed an affidavit in these proceedings, sworn by him
on 27 April 1993. It is obvious that the affidavit relates
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to his interest in the matter in his capacity as one of the
debtor's executors rather than as a creditor. He did not
appear at the hearing as a party in either capacity but he did
make himself available for cross-examination. In his
affidavit he said, inter alia:
38. The trustee did not, prior to his agreement with the
deceased's former wife, seek my consent as to his course
of action in selling the property to her. After being
advised by the trustee of his decision to sell his half
share of the property to the widow of the deceased, I
accepted his reasons for deciding on this course,
particularly those expressed as being that there had been
no other offers on the property greater than that offered
by the wife, and the likelihood of the wife instigating
further proceedings in relation to the maintenance
agreement, albeit, in my view, doomed to failure.
I did, however, believe that he would conduct the sale
according to the terms of the Maintenance Agreement, and
make the necessary adjustment from the wife for the
liabilities arising out of the agreement.
I also believed that the trustee would, having in mind
his past experience with the wife of the deceased during
the course of the previous litigation - endeavour to
ensure that a settlement was completed as quickly as was
reasonably possible.
Mrs Kendall also says that she was not consulted concerning
the decision to sell the trustee's interest in the St Ives
property to Mrs Arthur-Lennox.
In an affidavit sworn on 15 August 1994 and filed in the
proceedings on behalf of the Commissioner, Ms O'Sullivan
recounts a conversation with the trustee on 8 May 1990 in
which she was advised of the proposal to sell the trustee's
interest in the St Ives property to Mrs Arthur-Lennox for
$225,000. At paragraph 6 - 8 of her affidavit Ms O'Sullivan
says:
6. To the best of my recollection during that conversation
the trustee gave a number of reasons for his action. I
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was aware that there had been difficulties dealing with
Mrs Swain and I was pleased that the matter was finally
coming to a conclusion. I assumed that the sale would be
conducted according to the terms of the Maintenance
Agreement dated 24 May 1989.
7. Annexed hereto and marked with the letter "C" is a copy
of a file note I made in relation to a creditors meeting
held on 23 August 1990. To the best of my recollection
the Maintenance Agreement was not discussed at that
meeting.
8. I did not give any thought to the fact that the funds
from the gale were not being distributed in accordance
with the Maintenance Agreement until I attended a
creditors meeting held on 30 November 1992. That
meeting was also attended by representatives of the
Insolvency Trustee Service Australia.
The Inspector-General has become involved in these proceedings
following a complaint by Mrs Kendall as to the trustee's
conduct in not disposing of his interest in the St Ives
property in accordance with the terms of the s 87 agreement.
Mrs Kendall says, and it is fact, that had the whole property
been sold for $450,000, the debtor's estate would have had an
entitlement to a substantial sum following a distribution of
the sale proceeds in accordance with clause 7 of the s 87
deed. It was as a result of the intervention of the Official
Receiver in Bankruptcy following Mrs Kendall's complaint that
the trustee was encouraged to institute these proceedings.
Indeed, the encouragement was supported by a firm indication
from the Official Receiver that failure to seek appropriate
orders from the Court could have dire consequences for the
trustee. As it was, once the trustee commenced the
proceedings the Inspector-General filed a cross-application,
but seemed to step back from the position previously adopted
by having his solicitors write to each of the parties as
follows:
Our client's Application, made under section 176 of the
Bankruptcy Act 1976 (Cth), should enable all matters in dispute
between the parties to the proceedings to be the subject of
proper adjudication. It is designed to enable the Court:
(1) to determine the merits of Mrs Kendall's complaint about
the conduct of the Trustee; and (1i) to make such orders as
the nature of the case may require in respect of that
complaint.
The Inspector-General does not propose to take what might be
described as an ordinary adversarial role in these proceedings.
His object will be to assist the Court by endeavouring to
ensure that all parties have a reasonable opportunity to place
before the Court such facts and submissions as may be
appropriate to enable Mrs Kendall's complaint to be fairly
determined by a Judge. The Inspector-General's role being to
serve the public interest, it should not be assumed, by
anybody, that he can serve the private interests of any party
to the proceedings.
We record these observations here, publicly, so as to ensure
that all parties are on notice to take such precautions as they
think appropriate to protect their personal interests.
The Inspector-General has put in evidence a calculation said
to be made in accordance with clause 7 of the s 87 agreement
on the basis that there was a notional sale of the St Ives
property for $450,000. The Inspector-General's figures are
as follows:
Notional sale price of property $450,000.00
Disbursements as per clause 7 of Maintenance
Agreement
Agent's commission (as per scale
costs quoted by Real Estate Institute of NSW)
$ 10,100.00
Legal Fees $ 1,630.00
Valuation fee $ 1,168.00
Survey fee § _ 350.00
$ 13,248.00
Costs due to Australian Government
Solicitor £.12,000,00
§ 25,248.00
Available for distribution as net fund $424,752.00
50% of $424,752.00 is payable to the
Trustee pursuant to clause 7(f) $212,376.00
Paid by the trustee under the terms of
the Deed of arrangement
Legal costs $ 37,404.24
Official fees $ 4,315.80
Bank charges and administrative costs & 1,941.05
$43,661.09
Trustee's remuneration $ 26,500.00
Proved creditors $157,958.00
$228,119.09
4 share of water and council rates $2,713.63
4; share insurance premiums $454.4)
$3,185.03
Less paid by Dr Swain $1,385.03
$1,405.00
$231,306.80
Deficit of deed of arrangement $(18,930.80)
Adding back the $212,376.00 held by
McDonnell Milne & Fowler pursuant to
clause 7(g) $212,376.00
$193,445.00
60% to Mrs Arthur-Lennox $116,067.00
40% to Dr Swain $77,378.00 $193.4 0.
The order sought in paragraph 2 of the cross-application is
based upon the above calculation. There is no evidence
before the Court to establish the accuracy of all of the
figures used in the calculation but for present purposes the
figures used are adequate to demonstrate that had the St Ives
property been sold for $450,000 and the sale proceeds
distributed according to clause 7 of the s 87 agreement, the
creditors would not have been paid in full but Dr Swain's
estate would have had some entitlement and Mrs Arthur-Lennox
would have received a sum less than half of the value of the
property.
THE TRUSTEE'S ROLE IN RELATION TO THE PART X DEED
The provisions of ss 134 and 135 of the Bankruptcy Act apply
in relation to a deed of arrangement under Part X as if a
sequestration order had been made against the debtors on the
day on which he executed the deed and as if the trustee of the
deed were the trustee in bankruptcy (s 237(2)).
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Section 134(1)(a) empowers a trustee to sell all or any part
of the property of a bankrupt but does not authorise a trustee
to sell by private contract any property having a net value
exceeding $20,000 (s 134(2), (2A)), but a trustee may, with
the permission of the creditors granted by resolution passed
at a meeting of the creditors, or with the leave of the Court,
sell by private contract any property of the bankrupt having a
net value exceeding $20,000 (s 135(1)(a)). The failure by a
trustee to obtain the permission or leave required by s 135(1)
in relation to a transaction by the trustee does not affect
the validity of the transaction if the transaction was for
valuable consideration and the person with whom it took place
acted in good faith and without notice of the failure to
obtain the necessary permission or leave (s 135(4)).
Upon the evidence before the Court it is beyond question, and
I find, that:
(a) The trustee's interest in the St Ives property at
all relevant times was valued in excess of $20,000;
(b) The trustee was required to obtain the permission of
the creditors granted at a meeting of creditors, or
the leave of the Court, before he could sell his
interest in the St Ives property to Mrs Arthur-
Lennox by private contract;
(c) The trustee did not obtain either the permission of
the creditors or the leave of the Court;
(d) The trustee's conduct in selling his interest in the
St Ives property to Mrs Arthur-Lennox by private
contract was in breach of his duty as trustee;
(e) The transaction involved in the sale of the
trustee's interest in the St Ives property to Mrs
Arthur-Lennox was for valuable consideration;
(£) It may be inferred in the absence of any evidence or
suggestion to the contrary and from the nature of
the transaction, that Mrs Arthur-Lennox took the
trustee's interest in the property in good faith and
without notice of the failure to obtain the required
permission or leave.
(g) Notwithstanding the trustee's breach of duty in
failing to obtain the creditors' permission or the
leave of the Court before selling his interest in
the St Ives property to Mrs Arthur-Lennox, the
creditors have not by reason of such failure
suffered any loss or damage.
These facts and circumstances lead to the conclusion that the
trustee's failure to obtain permission or leave in relation to
the sale of his interest in the St Ives property to Mrs
Arthur-Lennox does not affect the validity of the transaction.
Furthermore, insofar as the trustee has realised the asset
assigned to him by the Part xX deed it is his duty to
distribute the proceeds of the sale in accordance with the
terms of the deed. This is what he proposes to do and the
Court should not interfere in the carrying out of that
function.
-18-
THE TRUSTEE'S ROLE IN RELATION TO THE S 87 AGREEMENT
At the time the s 87 agreement was executed the trustee was
entitled to an undivided half share in the St Ives property
which he held upon trust for the creditors and the debtor for
their respective interests. There is no information before
this Court to indicate the nature and extent of the competing
claims made by the debtor and his former wife in relation to
financial matters in the Family Court proceedings. Nor is
there any evidence as to whether those claims were made before
or after the execution of the Part X deed and what effect they
may have had on the carrying out of the Part X scheme.
However, the fact that the trustee became a party to the
proceedings and participated in the settlement is strongly
suggestive of the probability that until resolved, those
proceedings constituted a threat to the asset which he held as
trustee, and thus a threat to the interests of the creditors.
The formula for distribution of the surplus funds provided for
in clause 7(g) provided neither any benefit nor any detriment
to the creditors, but it did provide some benefit to the
debtor and his successors. It seems likely that the s 87
agreement was in the nature of "a compromise in respect of (a)
claim exceeding $20,000 ... arising out of the administration
of the estate of (the debtor)" which pursuant to s 135(1)(h)
the trustee would have been authorised to make with the
permission of the creditors or the leave of the Court, but no
such permission or leave was sought or obtained.
-19-
The trustee seeks to justify his conduct in abandoning the s
87 agreement on the ground that Mrs Arthur-Lennox had
repudiated the agreement and that he had accepted her
repudiation. But it was not for him to repudiate the right
of the debtor's estate under the agreement. It is clear from
the formula in clause 7(g) that unless the sale of the
property yielded less than "X" as defined in clause 7(g), the
debtor's estate would become entitled to some payment under
the agreement; and that such sum would be in addition to the
entitlement the debtor had to any surplus remaining after the
Part X scheme had been fully carried out.
Whilst it is easy to criticise the trustee for walking away
from the s 87 agreement when it became apparent that Mrs
Arthur-Lennox's lack of co-operation was likely to render the
carrying out of the agreement both difficult and expensive it
must be said in his favour that he did not conceal his
intentions from any of the other parties to the agreement.
And having revealed his intentions, he encountered no dissent.
By the time the proposal to sell to Mrs Arthur-Lennox was
first canvassed Thorburn was both a creditor and one of the
debtor's executors. He says that his consent was not sought,
and this appears to be so, but nevertheless he was made aware
of the proposal and acquiesced in it. He says further that
he believed the trustee would conduct the sale according to
the terms of the s 87 agreement "and make a necessary
adjustment from the wife for the liabilities arising out of
-20-
the agreement" but it is difficult to understand how this
could be done. Clearly, a sale to Mrs Arthur-Lennox of the
trustee's half interest in the property was not a sale in
accordance with the agreement. Further, to "make a necessary
adjustment from the wife for the liabilities arising out of
the agreement" must necessarily have involved the trustee
obtaining from Mrs Arthur-Lennox a sum in excess of $225,000,
which sum the trustee had no right either to demand or to
receive. It would not have been money to which the trustee
could lay claim either under the Part X deed or under the s 87
agreement. In my opinion the trustee owed no fiduciary duty
to the debtor's estate other than in respect to any surplus
remaining from the proceeds of the realisation of the assigned
asset. He certainly owed no duty to the debtor's estate in
respect of the debtor's entitlement under the s 87 agreement.
THE RELIEF SOUGHT
The trustee seeks a declaration that his action in selling his
interest in the St Ives property to Mrs Arthur-Lennox did not
require the permission of the creditors or the leave of the
Court. It is obvious that either permission or leave was
required and should have been obtained. Clearly, no order
can be made in terms of paragraph 1 of the amended
application.
Nor is it appropriate for the Court to now grant such leave,
even if it is within the Court's power to do so. What has
been done has been done. The trustee's interest in the
-21-
property has been sold and the validity of the transaction
cannot be attacked.
It is however appropriate that the trustee should be directed
to distribute all funds presently held by him as trustee under
and by virtue of the Part X deed in accordance with the terms
of the deed and the Bankruptcy Act.
The Court's power to revoke the approval of the s 87 agreement
is governed by s 87(8) of the Family Law Act which provides:
87(8) A court may, by order, revoke the approval of a
maintenance agreement under this section if, and only if, the
agreement 1s registered or deemed to be registered in that
court and the court is satisfied that -
(a) the approval was obtained by fraud;
(b) the parties to the agreement desire the revocation of the
approval;
(c) the agreement 18 void, voidable or unenforceable; or
(da) in the circumstances that have arisen since the agreement
was approved it is impracticable for the agreement to be
carried out or impracticable for a part of the agreement
to be carried out.
In the facts of this case it is not alleged that the approval
of the agreement was obtained by fraud nor is it the case that
all of the parties to the agreement desire the revocation of
the approval. No evidence has been advanced to suggest any
basis upon which it could be found that the agreement is void,
voidable or unenforceable. The only ground upon which the
Court could order revocation of the approval is that contained
in paragraph 87 (8)(d).
Whilst it is true that circumstances arose after the agreement
was approved that impacted upon the practicality of carrying
=-22—
out the agreement, those circumstances related entirely to the
conduct and attitude of one of the parties to the agreement.
The agreement itself was not one which was lacking in
practicality. There were clearly options open to the parties
other than Mrs Arthur-Lennox to compel her to accept her
responsibilities under the agreement. If the approval of the
agreement is revoked any residual interest that the debtor's
estate may have and any rights of enforcement may be affected.
Just what those interests and rights may be, if they exist at
all, is not something that requires consideration in these
proceedings but in the circumstances of the case it is not
appropriate that any order be made which could prejudice the
estate's interests. And this is particularly so in
circumstances where it has not been demonstrated that any
practical benefit would be achieved by the revocation.
The Inspector-General's cross-application seeks the exercise
of the Court's power under s 176 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 176 applies in relation to the trustee of a deed of
arrangement as if the debtor by whom the deed was executed
were a bankrupt and the trustee of the deed were the trustee
in his bankruptcy (s 237(4)). The section provides:
176(1) Where, on application by the Inspector-General or by a
creditor who has or had a debt provable in the bankruptcy, the
Court is satisfied that a person who is or has been a trustee
of a bankrupt's estate has been guilty (whether before or after
the commencement of this section) of breach of duty in relation
to the bankrupt's estate or affairs, subsection (2) applies.
176(2) The Court may make any one or more of the following
orders:
(a) an order directing the person to make good any loss
that the bankrupt's estate has sustained because of
the person's breach of duty;
(b) if the person is registered under section 155 - an
-23-
order cancelling the person's registration under
that section;
(c) any other order that the Court considers just and
equitable in the circumstances.
To the extent that the trustee sold his interest in the St
Ives property by private contract without the permission of
the creditors or the leave of the Court, I have found that he
has been guilty of a breach of duty in relation to the
debtor's estate or affairs. Accordingly s 176(2) applies.
The debtor's estate has not sustained any loss because of the
trustee's breach of duty. There is therefore no occasion for
any order to be made pursuant to s 176(2)(a).
No order has been sought pursuant to s 176(2)(b). In the
circumstances of the case it is obvious that even if
cancellation of the trustee's registration had been sought,
the breach of duty found is not of such gravity as to warrant
any such response.
Presumably, the Inspector-General considers that it is just
and equitable in the circumstances that the Court order the
trustee to make good to the estate of the debtor the sum which
the estate would have received pursuant to the s 87 agreement
had its terms been given full effect to.
In my opinion, the Court's power pursuant to s 176(2)(c)
should be exercised as a remedy for a breach of duty by a
trustee in his capacity as a trustee under the Bankruptcy Act.
In this case the breach of duty found to have occurred had no
—-24-
bearing upon the consequences that flowed to the estate of the
debtor by reason of the s 87 agreement not being given effect
to. Furthermore, the amount of any loss sustained by the
estate of the debtor is entirely speculative. The fact is
that the property was not sold at auction. It is
conceivable, and indeed in the circumstances quite possible,
that ultimately the property may have been sold at auction
pursuant to clause 6 of the agreement, without any reserve.
In those circumstances it is not fanciful to speculate that
the return from the sale would be considerably less than was
in fact achieved.
No basis for the exercise of power under s 176(2)(c) has been
demonstrated and no order will be made.
CONCLUSIONS
On the trustee's amended application there will be an order
directing the trustee to distribute all moneys presently held
by him as trustee pursuant to the Part X deed in accordance
with the terms of the deed and the Bankruptcy Act.
The Inspector-General's cross-application and the trustee's
application to the Family Court will be dismissed.
Although it was proper that the creditors be served with the
application they have had no real interest in the outcome.
Their interests as creditors have not been at risk, and in any
event, it is unquestionable that they acquiesced in all that
the trustee did concerning the sale to Mrs Arthur-Lennox.
There will be no order for costs in favour of the creditors.
The trustee's application and the Inspector-General's cross-—
application both had their origins in Mrs Kendall's complaint
to the Official Receiver, although the complaint was
misdirected in that it was not the trustee's conduct as
trustee of the Part X scheme which gave rise to Mrs Kendall's
interest and concern. The Inspector-General's cross-
application was in my opinion misconceived and as it gave rise
to an unreasonable expectation on the part of Mrs Kendall that
the proceedings could provide a vehicle for her to obtain some
redress, the Inspector-General should pay Mrs Kendall's costs.
It is not appropriate that any order for costs be made either
in favour or against the trustee. He was in effect forced
into making the application by the attitude of the Official
Receiver. In my view the application was unnecessary as was
the application to revoke the approval of the s 87 agreement.
The justice of the case dictates that no order for costs be
made.
I certify that this and the
preceding 24 pages are a true
copy of the Reasons for Judgment
of the Honourable Mr Justice
Olney
Associate: (deebue (I YI
Dated: 7 (Cacwerew tet
-26-
Heard: 18 and 19 August 1994
Place: Sydney
Judgment: 7 October 1994 (delivered in Melbourne).
Appearances:
Mr B. Skinner (instructed by Gye Perkes & Stone) appeared for
the applicant/cross respondent.
Mr G.C. Lindsay (instructed by Lobban McNally & Harvey)
appeared for the first respondent/cross-claimant.
Mr N. Perram (instructed by Stacks) appeared for the third
respondent.
Mr S.J. Gageler (instructed by Australian Government
Solicitor) appeared for the fourth respondent.
The second and fifth respondent did not appear.
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