Deloitte Touch Tohmatsu & Ors v. Australian Securities Commission [1994] FCA 780
Federal Court of Australia
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JUDGMENT NO. san Oy ot.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - Administrative Decisions Judicial Review
Legislation - s. 5 (1) (b) - "procedures that are required by
law to be observed in connexion with the making of" decision
impugned - necessity of connection - whether sections 16 and
18 of Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 (Cth)
prescribe "procedures" in connection with "the making of"
decision by Australian Securities Commission under s. 50 of
the Act.
CORPORATIONS - Administration of Companies Legislation -
decision of Australian Securities Commission under Australian
Securities Commission Act 1989 (Cth), s. 50, that proceedings
be begun and carried on by company against auditors ~ order of
review of decision applied for by auditors under
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) - no
interim report by Australian Securities Commission under s. 16
of former Act - whether requirements of ss. 16 and 18 relating
to interim report constituted in relation to Commission's
decision under s. 50 "procedures in connexion with" that
decision for purposes of s. 5 (1) (b) of AD(JR) Act
Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 (Cth) ss. 13, 16,
17, 18, 50
inistrativ isions udicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s. 5
(1) (b)
DELOITTE T H_T T formerly known as DELOITTE HASKINS &
SELLS __and_ DELOITTE ROSS TOHMATSU) v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES
COMMISSION
No NG 286 of 1994
Lindgren J
Sydney
21 October 1994
RECEIVED
26 OCT 1994
FEDERAL Cou
ri RT OF
PRINCIPAL
REGISTRY
IN THE FEDERAI. COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. G 286 of 1994
)
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU
(formerly known = as DELOITTE
HASKINS & SELLS and DELOITTE
ROSS TOHMATSU)
Applicant
AND:
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES COMMISSION
Respondent
CORAM: LINDGREN J
PLACE: SYDNEY
DATE : 21 OCTOBER 1994
I E_OF E
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The applicant be granted leave to amend the application
by filing a Further Further Re-Amended Application for an
Order of Review in the form of annexure "A" to the
Reasons for Judgment excluding paragraph 4 in part D and
paragraph 3 in part E with any alterations consequential
upon those exclusions.
2. The question of costs of the motion be reserved.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of Orders is dealt with in
Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. G 286 of 1994
GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN:
DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU
(formerly known as _ DELOITTE
HASKINS & SELLS and DELOITTE
ROSS TOHMATSU)
Applicant
AND:
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES COMMISSION
Respondent
CORAM: LINDGREN J
PLACE: SYDNEY
DATE: 21 OCTOBER 1994
NS FOR NT
NA! F. PROCEEDIN
The applicant ("DTT") applies for an order of review under the
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 ("the
AD(JR) Act") in respect of a decision of the respondent ("the
ASC") on 29 March 1994 that it was in the public interest to
cause proceedings to be begun and carried on by The Adelaide
Steamship Company Limited ("Adsteam") against, according to
the application, Deloitte Haskins & Sells ("DHS") and Deloitte
Ross Tohmatsu ("DRT") in the South Australian District
Registry of the Court pursuant to s. 50 of the ASC Law. The
ASC's decision referred to "the Auditor, Deloitte Ross
Tohmatsu, formerly Deloitte Haskins & Sells". On 20 April
1994 proceedings were begun by Adsteam against, inter alia,
DHS as 6th respondent and DRT as 7th respondent in the South
Australian District Registry of the Court No. SG 3036 of 1994
("the Proceedings").
The application is set down for hearing before me on 27 and 28
October 1994 for 1 to 2 days, the fixing of those dates having
taken place on 5 August 1994. The ASC filed a notice of
objection to competency on 6 June 1994. The most recent form
of the application is a "Further Re-Amended Application for an
Order of Review" filed on 2 August 1994. By notice of motion
filed on 5 October 1994, DTT seeks leave to file and serve a
Further Further Re-Amended Application for an Order of Review.
A copy of that proposed pleading is, for convenience, annexed
to these Reasons and marked "A".
The principal amendment sought to be made appears in para 4 of
part D ("Statement of Grounds") in annexure "A". By the
proposed para 4 the applicant seeks to introduce as a ground
for impugning the ASC's decision, the ground provided for in
para (b) of sub-section 5 (1) of the AD(JR) Act. This is
"that procedures that were required by law to be observed in
connexion with the making of the decision were not observed."
According to the proposed para 4, at the time of making the
impugned decision on 29 March 1994 the ASC had, in the course
of an investigation into the affairs of Adsteam and its
subsidiaries, within the meaning of s. 16 of the ASC Law
formed the opinion that a "serious contravention" of a State
Law had been committed. If this was in fact so, the ASC Law
required the ASC to prepare an interim report setting out its
findings about the contravention and the evidence and other
material on which those findings were based and give a copy of
it to the Minister, and empowered it to give a copy of the
whole or of part of the interim report to, relevantly, the
auditors. According to the proposed para 4, the ASC did not
prepare an interim report and so the applicant was deprived of
the opportunity to make submissions to the ASC prior to the
commencement of the Proceedings. It is implicit in the
proposed para 4 that the requirements of ss. 16 and 18 of the
ASC Law were "procedures that were required by law to be
observed in connection with the making of the decision" under
s. 50.
Order 13 Rule 2 empowers the Court to grant the leave to amend
sought. A ground on which leave to amend is properly refused
is that a proposed amendment is "obviously futile" or "plainly
demurrable": Dennis v Brownlee (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 1239
(NSW/FC); Abela v Giew (1964) 81 WN (Pti) (NSW) 344
(NSW/Taylor J). This is the ground on which the respondent
submits that I should exercise my discretion against the
applicant.
The respondent acknowledges that none of the amendments would
prejudice it since they give rise only to questions of law and
questions as to the effect of the evidence (which has all been
filed), which would be able to be determined within the 1-2
days set aside for the hearing.
On the other hand, and no doubt for the same reasons, the
applicant does not submit that it would be prejudiced by a
determination of these questions now rather than on the final
hearing.
The questions raised by the proposed para 4 have been fully
argued before me on the hearing of the application for leave
to amend and I am therefore as well placed to decide them now
as I would be on the final hearing. It would be possible to
take the view that since there would be no prejudice to the
respondent, leave to amend should be granted and the questions
raised by the amendments determined on the final hearing. If
that course were to be followed, the parties could be expected
to adopt as their submissions on the final hearing what they
have said on the application for leave to amend. The
alternative course is to determine now at least any of the
proposed amendments which have been fully addressed and which
I have time to determine, thereby saving some, though perhaps
not much, time on the final hearing.
Notwithstanding the lack of prejudice to it, having regard to
the fact that the Further Re-Amended Application for an Order
of Review was filed as long ago as 2 August 1994 and so the
Application for Leave to Amend is made comparatively late in
the day, I think that the ASC has a case for my following the
latter course, and I will do so. However, I will refuse leave
to make any particular amendment only if it can be said at
this stage that the amendment would be futile. I proceed
accordingly.
PROVISIONS OF THE ASC LAW
Part 2 (ss. 7-12) of the ASC Law provides for the
establishment, functions and powers of the ASC. Part 3 (ss.
13-93) provides for, inter alia, the making of investigations
and gathering of information by the ASC in connection with the
due administration of a "national scheme law", an expression
which is defined in sub-section 5 (1) to mean, relevantly, the
Corporations Act 1989 (Cth), the Corporations Law of the State
or Territory in question, or the Australian Securities
Commission Act 1989 (Cth), or a law of another jurisdiction
that corresponds to any such Act or Law.
The following provisions of Division 1 (ss. 13-18) of Part 3
are relevant to the present application:
"13 (1) The Commission may make such investigation as it
thinks expedient for the due administration of a
national scheme law of this jurisdiction where it
has reason to suspect that there may have been
committed:
(a) a contravention of a national scheme law; or
(b) a contravention of a law of the Commonwealth
or of a State or Territory, being a
contravention that:
(i) concerns the management or affairs of a
body corporate; or
(ii) involves fraud or dishonesty — and
relates to a body corporate, securities
or futures contracts,
16 (1) Where, in the course of an investigation under
17 (1)
18 (1)
(2)
(3)
this Division, the Commission forms the opinion
that:
(a) a serious contravention of a law of the
Commonwealth or a State or Territory has been
committed;
it shall prepare an interim report that relates
to the investigation and sets out:
(d) if paragraph (a) applies - its findings about
the contravention, and the evidence and other
material on which those findings are based;
and such other matters relating to, or arising
out of, the investigation as it thinks fit.
At the end of an investigation under section 13
... the Commission may prepare a report about the
investigation and shall do so if the Minister so
directs.
As soon as practicable after preparing a report
under this Division, the Commission shall give a
copy of the report to the Minister.
Where a report, or part of a report, under this
Division relates to a serious contravention of a
law of the Commonwealth or of a State or
Territory, the Commission may give a copy of the
whole or a part of the report to:
(a) the Australian Federal Police;
(b) the National Crime Authority;
(c) the Director of Public Prosecutions; or
(d) a prescribed agency.
Where a report, or part of a report, under this
Division relates to a person's affairs to a
material extent, the Commission may, at the
person's request or of its own motion, give to
the person a copy of the report or of part of the
report.
(4) The Minister may cause the whole or a part of a
report under this Division to be printed and
published."
Division 5 (ss. 49 and 50) in Part 3 empowers the ASC to cause
legal proceedings of various kinds to be begun and carried on
where certain matters appear to it, relevantly, "as a result
of an investigation". In particular, s. 50 provides as
follows:
"50 Where, as a result of an investigation or from a
record of an examination (being an investigation or
examination conducted under this Part or a
corresponding law), it appears to the Commission to
be in the public interest for a person to begin and
Carry on a proceeding for:
{a) the recovery of damages for fraud, negligence,
default, breach of duty, or other misconduct,
committed in connection with a matter to which
the investigation or examination related; or
(b) recovery of property of the person;
the Commission:
(c) if the person is a company - may cause; or
(d) otherwise - may, with the person's written
consent, cause;
such a proceeding to be begun and carried on in the
person's name."
Facts
On 29 September 1992 the Commission decided to make an
investigation into the affairs of Adsteam and its subsidiaries
in relation to the year ended 30 June 1990. The investigation
was into whether Adsteam's directors should have identified
certain loans to subsidiaries as being bad or doubtful and
made adequate provision against them.
On 29 March 1994, there was a meeting of the ASC at which a
"Submission paper" by ASC staff was considered. The applicant
referred me to passages in the Submission paper and in the
minute of the ASC's deliberations on it on 29 March 1994 with
a view to establishing that the ASC had, on or by that date,
"formed the opinion" that a "serious contravention" of a law
of a State had been committed.
The Submission paper asserted that the 1990 accounts of
Adsteam disclosed a profit of $236 million, when in fact
Adsteam had incorrectly and inappropriately treated various
items and inter-company transactions, a correct treatment of
which would have resulted in a declared loss of $224 million.
On that basis, there would have been no profit available for
payment of dividend, and no dividend could have been declared
and paid, except in contravention of s. 565 of the Companies
(South Australia) Code and Article 113 of Adsteam's articles
of association. It was alleged in the Submission paper that
Adsteam's directors and auditors had been negligent.
The Submission paper observed that the 1990 accounts showed an
operating profit: after income tax of $217 million and retained
profits at the beginning of the year of $243 million, with a
resultant sum of $460 million available for appropriation to
dividend. The Submission paper asserted that all members of
Adsteam's board and its auditors, DHS, were aware of the acts
and omissions giving rise to the overstatement of Adsteam's
profit by at least $539 million, in consequence of which
Adsteam's assets were "grossly overvalued" (reference was made
to an internal Adsteam valuation prepared in about August 1990
asserting a net value of Adsteam as $1.85 billion, in contrast
to an external valuation as at December 1990 of between nil
and $97 million).
The Submission paper identified (at para 27.2) breaches of the
Corporations Law by the auditors as being "breach of
retainer", "negligence", "negligent misstatement", "breach of
statutory duty" and "being knowingly concerned in breaches by
the directors".
The Submission paper referred (at paras 49 and 50) to s. 50 of
the ASC Law, and said that it was proposed that proceedings be
begun and carried on under the section. It dealt (at paras 51
and 52) with "the public interest" and referred, for example,
in para 52.4 to the payment as dividend of $228 million by an
"ailing public company [which] was not generating enough
income to meet its operational needs" as "serious, negligent
and irresponsible conduct on behalf of the directors and on
behalf of Deloittes who condoned such conduct". Para 52.6 of
the Submission paper was as follows:
"the conduct in question amounts to a gross breach of
accounting rules. It contravenes fundamental principles
of company law and management. It goes to the heart of
audit practice. Adsteam was a substantial Australian
public corporation;"
Para 68 acknowledged that the cost of major litigation such as
that being proposed was "significant" but asserted that it was
"commensurate with the seriousness of the conduct identified".
The ASC's resolution on 29 March 1994 was as follows:
"Resolution
The Commission, having regard to the debate:
As a result of the investigation into the affairs of The
Adelaide Steamship Company Limited (Adsteam) and its
subsidiaries and upon consideration of and taking into
account the matters set out in the Submission paper, the
Commission has formed the opinion that it appears to the
Commission to be in the public interest for Adsteam to
commence civil proceedings,' pursuant to section 50 of the
ASC Law, against former directors of Adsteam, namely
Messrs Spalvins, Kent, Branford, Russell and Gregg (the
former directors) and the Auditor, Deloitte Ross
Tohmatsu, formerly Deloitte Haskins & Sells (Deloittes),
for the 1990 financial year for the recovery of damages
and ancillary relief in respect of the matters arising
out of the 1990 accounts and payment of dividends by
Adsteam for the 1990 year.
RESOLVED that the Commission cause such proceedings to be
begun and carried on in the name of Adsteam."
Following the minute of the resolution, certain matters were
get out introduced by the words "Matters relevant to the
public interest include: ... ". There followed paragraph 1
which was as follows:
"1. The investigation by the Commission into the affairs
of Adsteam and its subsidiaries shows the 1990
financial year accounts disclosed profits of $236
million when on the information Adsteam had
incorrectly and inappropriately treated various items
and inter-company transactions. Correct treatment of
these items in the accounts would have resulted in a
declared loss of $244 million. The 1990 accounts
were certified by Deloittes and the former directors
of Adsteam as true and fair. Based on the 1990
accounts the former directors declared and paid a
final dividend of 25 cents per share. The interim
dividend and the final dividend totalled $228
million. Further, the alleged conduct as identified
through the investigation disclosed gross negligence
and a significant breach of accounting standards."
There followed 6 numbered paragraphs. Paragraph 7 read,
"Matters outlined in the Submission paper, in particular in
paragraph 52". I have earlier quoted from paras 52.4 and 52.6.
In the result the ASC caused the Proceedings to be begun and
carried on in the name of Adsteam.
It was common ground that the investigation commenced on 29
September 1992 and was not completed when the ASC took its
decision and when the Proceedings were begun, and indeed that
the investigation is still ongoing. It was also common ground
that no interim report relating to the investigation has ever
been prepared by the ASC.
SUBMISSIONS
The submission of DTT proceeded along the following lines:
1.
The
Within the meaning and for the purposes of s. 16 of the
ASC Law, the ASC, in the course of its investigation,
formed the opinion that a serious contravention of a law
of a State had been committed and accordingly that
section obliged it to prepare an interim report relating
to the investigation and setting out its findings about
the contravention, the evidence and other material on
which those findings were based, and such other matters
relating to, or arising out of, the investigation as it
might think fit;
Since the interim report would have related to the
auditors' affairs to a material extent, s. 18 of the ASC
Law empowered the ASC at DTT's request or of its own
motion to give DTT a copy of the interim report or of
part of it;
By reason of the ASC's failure to observe the terms of
ss. 16 and 18, DTT was deprived of the opportunity to
make submissions relating to the interim report, and in
particular, submissions as to why the ASC should not
resolve that proceedings be begun and carried on in the
name of Adsteam.
submissions of the ASC proceeded along the following
lines:
1.
There has not been, within the meaning and for the
purposes of s. 16, a forming of the opinion by the ASC
that a serious contravention of a law of a State had been
committed;
There is no connection between the provisions of ss. 13,
16 and 18 on the one hand and s. 50 on the other, and in
particular, ss. 16 and 18 do not establish procedures
required to be observed "in connexion with" the making of
a decision under s. 50.
REASONS
The ASC did not in terms resolve that it had formed the
opinion referred to in para (a) of sub-section 16 (1) of the
ASC Law. The minute of its proceedings on 29 March 1994 was
expressed by reference to s. 50. Yet it is arguable that at
the time of passing its resolution on 29 March 1994, the ASC
had, for the purposes of that provision, formed the opinion
described in it. I refer in particular to the "matters
relevant to the public interest" stated immediately following
the ASC resolution quoted earlier.
The expression "forms the opinion" in para 16 (1) (a) may
denote a formal and deliberate process of developing and
"formulating" an opinion with an eye to the provision. On the
other hand it may denote merely an opinion formed in fact.
According to the latter construction, whenever it can be said
that the ASC has in fact formed the opinion described, the
statutory duty to prepare an interim report arises. Whether
"the ASC", on the facts of a particular case, had formed that
opinion would be a mixed question of law and fact.
Even if the latter construction is correct, the ASC submits
that the evidence does not establish that the ASC formed the
requisite opinion. In this respect the ASC's submission (a)
distinguished between the Submission paper and the minute of
the proceedings of the ASC itself on 29 March, and (b)
emphasised that both the Submission paper and the minute were,
in terms and in substance, directed to s. 50 considerations as
distinct from the opinion described in para 16 (1) (a).
I have not found it necessary to choose between the two
constructions of "forms an opinion" to which I have referred,
because I have come to a firm view in relation to the second
question which enables me to determine the motion for leave to
amend.
That question is whether ss. 16 and 18 stipulate "procedures
that were required by law to be observed in connection with
the making of the" decision under s. 50. In my opinion they
do not.
Section 50 does not, expressly or by implication, refer to a
report, whether interim or final, provided for in ss. 16 and
17 respectively. The omission appears to be deliberate. The
opening words of s. 50 are "Where, as a result of an
investigation or from a record of an examination ... ". This
draws a distinction between an investigation and the record of
an examination. Moreover, the opening words of the
predecessor of s. 50, namely sub-s. 306 (11) of the Companies
Code, were "If, from a report under this Part, or from the
record of an examination under this Part, ... " (emphasis
supplied). The reference in sub-s. 306 (11) is to Part VII,
of the Code. Interim and final reports by inspectors on their
investigations were provided for in s. 305 within Part VII.
Accordingly there is a contrast between the reference to an
investigation in s. 50 and the reference to a report on an
investigation referred to in its predecessor.
Sections 16 and 18 have a different focus from that of s. 50.
Sections 16 and 18 are concerned, relevantly, to provide for
what is to happen in any case where the ASC, in the course of
an investigation, forms the opinion that a serious
contravention of any law of the Commonwealth, a State or a
Territory has been committed. In any such case, the ASC must
prepare an interim report, must give a copy to the Minister
and may give a copy of the whole or of part of the interim
report to, inter alia, certain authorities concerned with the
enforcement of the criminal law. These provisions, are
directed to ensuring that discovered violations of legal rules
and prohibitions are drawn to the attention of appropriate
authorities (on the meaning of "contravention" see Zalai_ v Col
Crawford (Retail) Pty Ltd (1980) 32 ALR 187 (NSW/Rogers J) and
Arturi v Zupps Motors Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 243 (FCA/Brennan
J). Section 50, on the other hand, is concerned to empower
the ASC to cause a person to litigate for certain civil
remedies in any case where, as a result of an investigation,
it appears to the ASC to be in the public interest for the
person to do so.
The condition precedent to the ASC's obligation under s. 16 to
prepare an interim report is that it forms the opinion that a
serious contravention "has been committed". Other states of
mind of the ASC are described in ss. 49 and 50 as the
"triggers" of its power to cause a prosecution to be begun and
carried on (s. 49) and to cause proceedings in a person's name
to be begun and carried on (s. 50).
The field covered by "a serious contravention of a law of the
Commonwealth or a State or Territory" referred to in para 16
(1) (a) is not co-extensive with the field covered by "fraud,
negligence, default, breach of duty, or other misconduct"
referred to in para 50 (a).
For all these reasons, the description in para 5 (1) (b) of
the AD(JR) Act, "procedures that were required by law to be
observed in connection with the making of" a decision, is not
an apt description of the obligations imposed on the ASC by
ss. 16 and 18 of the ASC Law, by reference to the making of a
decision by it under s. 50 of that law. It follows that even
on the assumption in favour of DTT that the ASC formed the
opinion referred to in para 16 (1) (a) and so had a duty to
prepare an interim report, its failure to do so did not fall
within para 5 (1) (b) of the AD(JR) Act.
If leave were granted to amend by introducing the proposed
para 4, I would, for the foregoing reasons, dismiss the
application in so far as it depended on the ground introduced
by that paragraph. Accordingly, it would be futile to allow
that amendment.
Amendments are also sought to be made by way of additions to
the particulars in sub-para 2 (b) and in para 3 and by the
inclusion of a new para 5 (all within the "Statement of
Grounds" constituting part D of the application), as well as
by the inclusion of a further paragraph in the "Relief"
claimed (in part E of the application). These amendments were
not the subject of extensive debate before me.
In relation to the additional particulars sought to be
included as para (ii) within the particulars in sub-para 2
(b), the ASC submits that there is no factual basis for the
allegation that it did not have regard to "any aspects of the
public interest which did not favour" the commencement of the
Proceedings. In my view this is a matter more appropriately
left to the more extensive consideration of the evidence and
debate which will take place on the final hearing, and this
amendment should, accordingly, be allowed to be made.
The particulars sought to be included as para (iii) within the
particulars in para 3 raise a question of law. The ASC
submits that I should decide now that it did not lack
"jurisdiction" to cause the Proceedings to be begun because
the investigation was not complete. The issue of construction
raised is whether the words "Where, as a result of an
investigation" at the beginning of s. 50 signify that the
section is addressing only what appears to the ASC to be in
the public interest as a result of a completed or entire
investigation. This question was not explored fully before me
on the application for leave to amend and time has not
permitted me to explore it fully since. Since I have not
reached a view that it would be futile for this amendment to
be allowed, leave to amend in this respect will be granted.
For the same reasons, I have not reached the view that it
would be futile to allow amendment by the introduction of the
proposed new para 5 and leave to amend in this respect will be
granted.
In relation to the proposed additional head of relief,
however, namely declarations that the ASC failed to comply
with the mandatory requirements of either or both of ss. 16
and i8 of the ASC Law, the position is different. That head
of relief is rendered otiose by my refusal of leave to amend
to include the proposed new para 4.
CONCLUSION
The applicant will be granted leave to amend the application
by filing a Further Further Re-Amended Application for an
Order of Review in the form proposed, excluding para 4 in part
D and para 3 in part E. The question of the costs of the
applicant's motion for leave to amend will be reserved to the
final hearing.
I certify that this and the preceding 14
pages are a true copy of the Reasons for
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Lindgren.
Associate: 4 L
Mebach 7
Dated: 21 October 1994
12 October 1994
Sydney
21 October 1994
Mr R A Conti QC instructed by Messrs
Mallesons Stephen Jaques, solicitors for the
applicant.
Mr T R Gray QC with Mr R J Whitington of
counsel instructed by Valdemar Malinaric,
solicitor for Australian Securities
Commission, for the respondent.
A
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISSIRY ) No. G286 of 1994
GENERAL DIVISION )
DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU
(formerly known as DELOITTE HASKINS &
SELLS and DELOITTE ROSS TOHMATSU)
Applicant
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES COMMISSION
Respondent
FURTHER FURTHER RE-AMENDED APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER OF REVIEW |
(ORDER 54)
A. Decision sought to be reviewed.
The Applicant seeks to review the decision of the Respondent made on or about
29 March 1994 ("the Decision") and announced by Press Release dated 21 April 1994
that it was in the public interest to cause proceedings to be begun and carried on by
The Adelaide Steamship Company Limited ("the Company") against Deloitte Haskins
& Sells ("DHS") and Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu ("DRT") in the Federal Court, South
Australian Registry (Matter No: SG3036 of 1994) ("the Proceedings") pursuant to
section 50 of the Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 ("the Act").
B. Parties
1. The Applicant is a partnership carrying on the business of accountancy
within Australia under the name of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu. The
Applicant formerly carried on such business under the names Deloitte
Haskins & Sells and Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu respectively.
2. The Respondent is a body corporate established under the Act and is able to
be sued in its own name and style.
Filed on behalf of the Applicant by:
MALLESONS STEPHEN JAQUES DX 113, SYDNEY
Solicitors Tel: (02) 250 3000
Governor Phillip Tower Fax: (02) 250 3133
1 Farrer Place Ref: EJD:KFL
SYDNEY NSW 2000 C:407404:L169018
Cc. Applicant is person aggrieved
The Applicant is aggrieved by the Decision because its interests are adversely
affected by the Decision. In consequence of the Decision the Applicant is required
to defend the Proceedings against allegations which impugn its professional
conduct. The preparation of the defence in the Proceedings will involve
considerable time and expense.
D. Statement of Grounds
The grounds of the Application are as follows:
1. The making of the Decision was an improper exercise by the Respondent of
the power conferred by section 50 of the Act in that:
(a) There was a failure to take into account relevant considerations.
(i)
(ii)
Judgment in the Proceedings against the Applicant would
involve an award of damages against the Applicant and the
ultimate beneficiaries of such award would be or would be
likely to be:
(a)
(b)
shareholders in the Company who have already
benefited from sharing in the payment of the
dividends complained of;
shareholders in the Company who acquire
shareholdings subsequent to payment of the
dividends complained of.
No creditors of the Company at the time of payment of the
dividends complained of would benefit from an award of
damages in the Proceedings against the Applicant, except
possibly the Bankers to the Company to the extent of what
sums may remain unpaid in relation to their respective
debts existing at the times of such payments.
(iii)
(iv)
The Company is a publicly hsted company which is able to
pay its debts as and when they fall due and is actively
engaged in the pursuit of its businesses under the control
and direction of its board of directors who were opposed to
the commencement of the Proceedings against inter alia
the Applicant.
The applicant comprises a substantial body of partners
resident and engaged in professional practice throughout
Australia whereof only two participated in the conduct of
the audit complained of, yet all such partners would be
adversely affected professionally to a substantial extent in
their individual capacities by the conduct and outcome of
the Proceedings, irrespective of what the outcome might
be, and any clarification of accounting standards in relation
to the auditing of consolidated accounts and of any other
accounting and audit issues of principle and practice arising
m the Proceedings are capable of being effected at the
mstance of the Respondent by proceedings, processes and
procedures which would not visit the Applicant and its
general body of members with circumstances of such
adversity as are inherently involved in the pursuit and
outcome of the Proceedings.
(b) Irrelevant considerations were taken into account.
(i)
(ii)
The Respondent's desire to bring the Proceedings for the
purpose of setting legal precedents and/or the desire to
seek clarity on various matters.
Any perceived need or cause for the Respondent:
(a) to expose for clarification or development
- principles of the common law relating to companies
in the context of proceedings having the
consequences to the Applicant and to its general
body of members thereby actually and potentially
involved;
(ce)
(d)
(b)
(c)
to demonstrate to the Applicant its duty of care
under the common law in relation to the adoption of
accounts in the context of such proceedings;
to resolve issues and clarify principles relating to
group consolidated accounts in the context of such
proceedings where the matters complained of are
confined to the parent company's accounts.
The powers conferred by section 50 of the Act were used for a
purpose other than a purpose for which the powers were conferred.
Particulars of Improper Purpose
The Applicant relies on the particulars to paragraph 1(b) above.
In making the Decision the Respondent effected an exercise of
power that was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could
have so exercised the power in that way.
(i)
(ii)
Particulars
The Applicant repeats each of the particulars in paragraph
l(a) above.
The Decision was disproportionate to the regulatory
objectives sought to be achieved by the commencement and
prosecution of the Proceedings, by reason of:
(a)
(b)
the matters stated in paragraph 1(a)(iv);
the likely adverse implications and consequences
for the professional reputation and image of the
Applicant and each of its many members and
partners of being sued in the Proceedings, being
Proceedings which on the Respondent's estimate
would take three to nine months to be heard and
which would require and involve the input of
massive resources of time and money for the
preparation and hearing thereof, and substantial
disruption to the professional affairs of the
Applicant;
(e) the likely adverse implications and consequences
for:
(i) auditors in the conduct of their profession
in Australia; and
(ii) existing and potential clients of auditors
engaged professionally in Australia
which would flow from an award of damages against
the Applicant of the dimension sought in the
Proceedings, in terms of the cost and in particular
the insurance cost of continuing so to conduct their
profession and engage professionally in Australia.
(iii) When the Respondent made the Decision in
the exercise of its powers under section 50
of the Act, it did not have before it
adequate evidentiary materials or
information to enable it properly to decide
for itself whether or not to exercise its
powers under Section 50 of the Act in the
circumstances of this case.
Sub-Particulars
(A) The only documentary material before the
Respondent when it made the Decision was a
submission paper dated 29 March 1994 apparently
prepared by "the investigating officer" ("the
Submission") and some legal advice ("the Legal
Advice");
()
Under the heading "Identification of wrongdoing",
the Submission set out in paragraphs 14 to 18
therein, various contentions and conclusions of the
investigating officer, unsupported by any evidence
or reasoned argument which purported to
substantiate the said contentions and conclusions,
to the effect that:
1 certain loans from the Company to various
of its subsidiaries should have been written
down in the Company's accounts for the year
ended 30 June 1990 by a total of
$434 ,000,000;
2 the effect of certain transactions between
the Company and Buckley & Nunn Antiques
Pty Ltd was to disguise losses of
$103,000,000;
3 the Company's profits in 1990 were
overstated by at least $539,000,000, being
the combined amounts of $434,000,000 and
$103,000,000 referred to above;
4 the profit and loss and retained earnings of
the Company as at 30 June 1990 should have
been calculated to include as a loss the said
amount of $539,000,000;
5 the Company did not have profits available
to pay either the interim or final dividend
for the 1990 year; and
6 various persons, including the Applicant,
were "aware of the acts and omissions giving
rise to the overstatement of the Company's
profit by at least $539 m".
(C) Apart from the Submission and the Legal Advice,
the Respondent did not have before it at the time it
made its Decision any other material relating to the
investigation by the Australian Securities
Commission into the affairs of the Company or any
other material in support of the investigating
officer's allegations, conclusions and contentions
set out in sub-paragraph (B) above.
(D) The Legal Advice apparently related only to the
matters set out in sub-paragraph (B)(2) above and
not to the other matters set out in paragraph (B)
above.
(E) At the time the Respondent made the Decision it
did not have before it any accounting advice,
whether expert or otherwise, concerning the
validity or reasonableness of the investigating
officer's conclusions and contentions as set out in
sub-paragraph (B) above.
(F) Given the significance of the Decision and its
serious potential ramifications for the Applicant,
the Respondent should have had before it and taken
into account at the time it made its Decision,
sufficient documentary or other material to enable
it objectively and critically to assess the validity or
reasonableness of the investigating officer's
conclusions and contentions as set out in
sub-paragraph (B) above.
32. The making of the Decision involved an error of law in that:
(a) The Respondent erred in deciding that section 50 of the Act enabled
it to cause the Proceedings to be begun and carried on against DHS
and DRT at all.
(b) The Respondent failed to have any proper regard as to whether the
Proceedings were im the public interest or alternatively
misconceived what was involved in forming the opinion required by
section 50 of the Act.
Particulars
(i) The Applicant relies on the particulars to paragraphs l(a),
(b), (ce) and (d) above.
Gi Instead _of identifying and weighing up competing aspects of
the_ public _interest_in_ determining whether to cause _the
Proceedi to_ be be and carried on, the Responden
merely considered those aspects of the public interest
which favoured the taking of that course of action and did
not _have regard to any aspects of the public interest which
did not favour the taking of that course of action.
The Respondent did not have jurisdiction to make the Decision.
Particulars
(i) The Respondent only had jurisdiction to cause the
Proceedings to be begun and carried on if it appeared to the
Respondent that it was in the public interest to do so, and
there was no evidence or other material to warrant such a
jurisdictional finding.
dai The applicant repeats the particulars in paragraphs 1(a), (b),
(ec) and (d) above.
iii The Respondent only had jurisdiction to cause the
Proceedi ied_on if it had c NC
its investigation pursuant to section 13 of the Act and, as at
29__March 1994 when the Decision was made, the
Respondent had not completed _ its investigation into the
fairs of the Company, which investigation had n
form roved on or about 29 September 1992.
4,
Further _or_in
procedures that were required by law to be observed in connection with the
making of the Decision.
@
Gi)
(iv)
@
(w)
(vii)
rnative, the Respondent did not comply with
Particulars
Qn_ or about 29 September 1992, the Respondent formally
approved_an_ investigation into the affairs of the Company
ursuant _to sub-section _13(1) of the Act (''the
The Investigation is still continuing;
As _at 29 March 1994 and during the course_of the
Investigation, the Respondent formed the opinion that one
or__more serious _contraventions of a law of thi
Commonwealth or_a State had been committed by various
persons, including the Applicant;
By reason of the facts and matters stated in sub-paragraphs
@) to Gii) of these Particulars and the requirements of
paragraph 16(1)(a) of the Act, the Respondent was obliged
to. prepare _an__interim__report_ that related to the
Investigation;
By _ virtue of h_16(1)(d)_ of the Act, the Respondent
was further obliged to set out im such an interim report
inter alia its findi he alle ntraventi d
the evidence and other material on which those findi
were based;
By_virtue of section 18 of the Act, the Respondent was
f r_ obliged or alternatively empowered to give
f h. interim ort to vari ons, includi
persons in relation to whose affairs the interim report
materi: nt;
If_ the Respondent had pre: d. interim report_on
investigation, as it was required to do, such report would
have related either in whole or in part to the Applicant's
affairs to a material extent;
viii
-10-
As _a consequence of the Respondent's failure to prepare an
interrm_report on the Investigation, the Applicant was
deprived _of an opportunity of receiving a copy _of such
report or part thereof pursuant to either or both
sub-section 18(3) or 18(4) of the Act;
The Respondent failed to comply with the requirements of
sections 16 and 18 of the Act pror to making the Decision
or _at all;
As_a_ consequence _of the Respondent's failure to comply
with the requirements of sections 16 and 18 of the Act, the
Applicant was deprived of the opportunity to make
submissions to the Respondent on various matters, including
any or all of the following:
{A) the_matters contained in the interim report, had
such_a_ report been prepared, insofar _as_ those
matters related to the Applicant's affairs;
(B) the_ Respondent's consideration of the matters in
the interim report, had such a report been prepared,
in determining what action if any the Respondent
should take which might adversely affect the
Apphcant's rights, interests or __ legitimate
e i including an ion proposed th
Respondent_pursuant to section 50 of the Act
affecting the Applicant; and
() reasons and grounds why it was not in the public
interest_for the Respondent to begin and carry on
the Proceedi inst_the Applicant ant to
section 50 of the Act.
-ll-
Dd. A_breach of the rules of natural justice/procedural fairness occurred in the
making of the Decision.
E, Relief
Particulars
Th ndent_was required at law notify the Applic: of its
rt i n the Pr j and Ovi
opportunity to the Applicant to make submissions or comment on
th: Propo rior to the Respondent _m the Decision and the
Respondent failed to do so.
The Applicant claims:
l. Declarations that the Decision is invalid and contrary to law.
to
.
Ie
Orders setting aside or quashing the Decision the subject of this Application.
Declarations that the Respondent has failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements of either or both sections 16 and 18 of the Australian
Securities Commission Act 1989.
ie
An Order that the Respondent refrain from pursuing or further conducting
proceedings No. SG3036 of 1994 in the Federal Court, South Australian
District Registry.
45. Costs.
86. Such further or other Orders as the Court thinks fit.
BO Soptemter
DATE: 1994
-12-
To: The Respondent
Australian Securities Commission
New South Wales Regional Office
Level 10
135 King Street
Sydney NSW 2000
If there is no attendance before the Court by you or by your Counsel or solicitor at
the time and place specified below, the Application may be dealt with and you will
be liable to suffer judgment or an order against you in your absence. Before any
attendance at that time, you must file an appearance in the Registry.
APPOINTMENT FOR DIRECTIONS HEARING:
TIME:
PLACE:
DATE:
Registrar
The Applicant's address for service is C/- Mallesons Stephen Jaques, 1 Farrer
Place, Governor Phillip Tower, Sydney, NSW, 2000 (Ref: EJD:KFL).