Trade Practices Commission v. CC (NSW) P/L [1994] FCA 917
Federal Court of Australia
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JUDGMENT No. saccd! cloud wcdten
TRADE PRACTICES - restrictive trade practices - arrangements
or understandings containing exclusionary provisions or
substantially lessening competition - individual knowingly
concerned in, or party to, contravention by corporation -
pecuniary penalty to be imposed on individual - determination
of appropriate amount.
Trade Practices Act 1974 ss 4D, 45, 45A and 76.
Trade Practices Commission v CSR Limited (1991) ATPR 41-076
TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION v
&_ ORS
No NG 574 OF 1994
LINDGREN J AS GPAL
SYDNEY REGISTRY
24 NOVEMBER 1994
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No NG 574 of 1994
GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN:
TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION
Applicant
CC (NEW SOUTH WALES) PTY LIMITED
formerly known as
_ CONCRETE CONSTRUCTIONS (NSW) PTY
LIMITED
First Respondent
PETER WOOLLARD
Second Respondent
HOLLAND STOLTE PTY LIMITED
Third Respondent
GRAHAM RONALD DUFF
Fourth Respondent
MULTIPLEX CONSTRUCTIONS PTY
LIMITED
Fifth Respondent
GEOFFREY THOMAS PALMER
Sixth Respondent
LEIGHTON CONTRACTORS PTY LIMITED
Seventh Respondent
LEONARD DIXON
Eight Respondent
THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION OF
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS
Ninth Respondent
RUSSELL NORMAN RICHMOND
Tenth Respondent
CORAM: LINDGREN J
PLACE :* SYDNEY
DATE: 24 November 1994
THE COURT:
*
-
ORDERS that within 28 days of 24 November 1994, the tenth
respondent pay to the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty of
$10,000.00 in respect of all his acts and omissions referred
to in the amended statement of claim filed on 17 November 1994
in these proceedings constituting his being in any way,
directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to,
the contravention by all and any of the first, third, fifth,
seventh and ninth respondents of all and any of sub-paragraphs
45 (2) (a) (i), 45 (2) (b) (4), 45 (2) (a) (41) and 45 (2) (b)
(ii) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in
Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No NG 574 of 1994
GENERAL DIVISION
CORAM:
PLACE:
DATE:
LINDGREN J
SYDNEY
24 NOVEMBER 1994
)
BETWEEN:
TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION
Applicant
CC (NEW SOUTH WALES) PTY LIMITED
formerly known as
CONCRETE CONSTRUCTIONS (NSW) PTY
LIMITED
First Respondent
PETER WOOLLARD
Second Respondent
HOLLAND STOLTE PTY LIMITED
Third Respondent
GRAHAM RONALD DUFF
Fourth Respondent
MULTIPLEX CONSTRUCTIONS PTY
LIMITED
Fifth Respondent
GEOFFREY THOMAS PALMER
Sixth Respondent
LEIGHTON CONTRACTORS PTY LIMITED
Seventh Respondent
LEONARD DIXON
Eight Respondent
THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION OF
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS
Ninth Respondent
RUSSELL NORMAN RICHMOND
Tenth Respondent
MATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
-
-
The applicant ("also referred to as "the Commission")
commenced these proceedings by application filed on 30 August
1994 seeking one set of remedies against the corporate
respondents, that is to say, the first, third, fifth, seventh
and ninth respondents, and another set of remedies against the
individual respondents, that is to say, the second, fourth,
sixth, eighth and tenth respondents. With the application was
filed a statement of claim. According to this pleading each
individual respondent was at all material times employed by
the corporate respondent named in the title to the proceedings
immediately preceding his name. Accordingly, and so the
statement described them, at all material times Woollard was
employed by Concretes, Duff was employed by Hollands, Palmer
was employed by Multiplex, Dixon was employed by Leightons and
Richmond was employed by the AFCC. As well, it was pleaded
that all acts alleged in the statement of claim were performed
by the individual respondents in their capacities as employees
of their respective corporate employers.
These reasons relate only to a pecuniary penalty of $10,000,
which, on 24 November 1994, I ordered under s 76 of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the Act") that Richmond, who had
been at all material times employed by the AFCC as its
"National Executive Director", pay to the Commonwealth within
28 days of 24 November 1994.
The following is an account of the facts as pleaded in the
statement of claim (see later as to the amended statement of
cos
claim).
At all material times Concretes, Hollands, Multiplex and
Leightons carried on business as building and construction
contractors in New South Wales and were members of the AFCC.
On or about 11 August 1988, Australian Construction Services
("ACS"), part of the Commonwealth Department of Administrative
Services, for and on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia,
invited Concretes, Hollands, Multiplex and Leightons ("the
Tenderers") to submit tenders for a building project known as
the Commonwealth Offices-Haymarket ("the Haymarket Project").
In or about September or October 1988, John Cunningham
("Cunningham"), Director of Special Projects with the AFCC,
for and on behalf of the AFCC, contacted the Tenderers and
notified them of his intention to conduct a meeting of them in
relation to the Haymarket Project prior to the closing date
for tenders. The Tenderers accepted Cunningham's invitation.
The intention of Cunningham and of each of the Tenderers in
the setting up of, and agreement to attend the meeting, was
that the Tenderers would be enabled to take into account in
the preparation of their tenders any matters agreed at the
meeting, which they expected, would include arrangements or
understandings on the subjects of a "special fee" payable by
the successful Tenderer to the AFCC, and unsuccessful
tenderers' fees payable by the successful Tenderer to the
three unsuccessful Tenderers.
Prior to the proposed meeting, Richmond instructed Cunningham
to propose that the successful Tenderer should pay to the AFCC
a special fee of $1,000,000.00.
The meeting took place in September or October 1988 and was
attended by Woollard of Concretes, Duff of Hollands, Palmer of
Multiplex, Dixon of Leightons and Cunningham of the AFCC ("the
Meeting") when it was agreed that each Tenderer would, if its
tender was accepted, pay a special fee to the AFCC of
$1,000,000.00 ("the Special Fee"), would take its obligation
to do so into account in the preparation of its tender, and
would not disclose to ACS the terms of the arrangement or
understanding or the fact that the Meeting had taken place.
After that agreement ("the Special Fee agreement") had been
reached, Cunningham was asked to leave the room which he did
and the Meeting resumed between the four representatives of
the Tenderers who agreed that the successful Tenderer would
pay to each of the unsuccessful Tenderers an unsuccessful
tenderer's fee of $750,000.00 ("the UTF"), and that each
Tenderer would take this obligation into account in the
preparation of its tender, and would not disclose to ACS the
terms of the arrangement or understanding or the fact that the
Meeting had taken place ("the UTFs agreement").
The Tenderers did take into account the arrangements or
understandings reached at the Meeting in the preparation and
submission of their tenders; ACS awarded the contract to
Hollands; Richmond caused or procured the AFCC by its National
Executive Committee to ratify and levy the Special Fee on
Hollands; in or about January or February 1989 Hollands paid
$200,000.00 or $300,000.00 to the AFCC as part of the Special
Fee; subsequently over a period from 24 July 1989 to 1
February 1990 the AFCC sent a series of invoices of
$100,000.00 each to Hollands which it paid on account of the
Special Fee; Concretes, Multiplex and Leightons each sent to
Hollands a number of invoices purporting to be for
"consultancy services" which had in fact not been provided and
were never intended to be provided and which in fact
represented parts of the respective UTFs and totalled in each
case $750,000.00 which Hollands paid.
The statement of claim further alleged that the conduct
pleaded constituted various contraventions of the Act.
After three earlier directions hearings, at a directions
hearing on 29 September 1994, when the Commission and Richmond
were each represented by senior counsel, by consent, orders
were made against Richmond in terms of paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and
10 of the application. Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 provided for
injunctive and declaratory relief not presently relevant. By
paragraph 7, however, the Commission had sought:
"A pecuniary penalty in respect of each instance in which
the Respondent:
(a) has induced a person to contravene;
(b) has attempted to induce a person to contravene; or
(c) has been in any way, directly or indirectly,
knowingly concerned in, or party to, the
contravention by a person of,
a provision of section 45 of the Trade Practices Act 1974
including its extended operation by virtue of sections 4D
and 45A as alleged in the Statement of Claim."
I noted that the amount of the pecuniary penalty referred to
remained to be determined on a date to be fixed.
An amended statement of claim was filed on 17 November 1994.
It made no alteration to the allegations of facts which I
recounted earlier, but is the pleading which now gives content
to the reference in paragraph 7 of the application quoted
above to contravention of a provision of s 45 of the Act as
.extended by ss 4D and 45A of the Act.
Sub-section 45 (2) prohibits corporations from making certain
contracts or arrangements or arriving at certain
understandings and from giving effect to certain provisions of
contracts, arrangements or understandings. In substance, sub-
section 45 (2) is directed against provisions of contracts,
arrangements and understandings which are likely to deprive
markets of the benefits of competition.
There are two evils against which the section is directed and
by reference to which such provisions are defined:
"exclusionary provisions" on the one hand and provisions which
"substantially lessen competition" in a market on the other.
Section 4D prescribes the circumstances in which = an
exclusionary provision will exist. An exclusionary provision
is a "collective boycott" between competitors directed to
preventing, restricting or limiting the supply or acquisition
of goods or services. The objective is to protect the
"competitors" against competition between themselves, at the
expense of their customers.
Section 45A provides that price fixing is, for the purposes of
s 45, deemed to have the purpose, or to have or be likely to
have the effect, of substantially lessening competition.
Section 76 provides relevantly that although it is only a
corporation which can "contrayene"" the prohibitions expressed
"in sub-section 45 (2), pecuniary penalties may be imposed not
only upon those who have contravened, attempted to contravene,
or conspired with others to contravene a provision of Part IV
(in which s 45 occurs), but also upon various classes of
"accessories".
Paragraph (e) of sub-section 76 (1) targets a person who "has
been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned
in, or party to, the contravention by a person of such a
provision". It is by means of this paragraph that the
Pleading seeks to draw in Richmond. Relevantly, it is, in
effect, pleaded that Richmond was "knowingly involved in each
of the contraventions by each of AFCC and each of the
Tenderers" and that by engaging in the conduct pleaded against
him Richmond was "directly or indirectly knowingly concerned
in, and party to, the Tenderers and the AFCC making and
arriving at the arrangements or understandings ..." in
contravention of s 45. On the hearing senior counsel for the
Commission made it clear that he relied only on the Special
Fee agreement and not on the UTFs agreement in relation to
Richmond.
At the relevant time, s 76 provided that if the Court was
satisfied that a person had been in any way, directly or
indirectly, knowingly concerned in or _ party to, the
contravention of a provision of Part IV, the Court might order
the person to pay to the Commonwealth such pecuniary penalty
'in respect of each act or omission by the person to which the
section applied, as the Court determined
"to be appropriate having regard to all relevant matters
including the nature and extent of the act or omission
and of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the act
or omission, the circumstances in which the act or
omission took place and whether that person ha[d]
previously been found by the Court in proceedings under
this Part to have engaged in a similar conduct".
At all material times, s 76 provided that the pecuniary
penalty payable by a person other than a body corporate was
not to exceed $50,000.00 for each act or omission to which the
section applied.
The only issue before me on 24 November 1994 was that of the
amount of the pecuniary penalty which Richmond was to be
ordered to pay. I ordered that he pay within 28 days from 24
November 1994 a pecuniary penalty of $10,000.00 to the
Commonwealth in respect of all the acts and omissions pleaded
against him in the amended statement of claim and indicated
that I would publish my reasons later. These are those
reasons.
-10-
Agreement between the Commigsion and Richmond on desirable
amount of pecuniary penalty.
The Commission submitted that a penalty of $10,000.00 was
appropriate. Although Richmond made submissions directed to
the imposition of no more than a modest penalty, he did not
submit that any particular amount less than $10,000.00 should
be imposed. In effect, the parties were agreed that
$10,000.00 was an appropriate penalty.
Of course, the amount of penalty is a matter for the Court,
and no doubt without the parties' suggestion, I may have
arrived at a different amount, more or less than $10,000.00.
But a series of single judge decisions in this area have
consistently treated it as proper for the Court to be informed
of and treat as relevant, the parties' agreement on an
appropriate amount, and further, if the agreed amount is
within the range of amounts which the Court would have had in
mind ordering in any event, to make an order for payment of
the agreed amount: see Trade Practices Commission v Allied
Mills Industries Pty Ltd (No 5) (1981) 60 FLR 38 (FCA/Sheppard
J) at 41; Commerce Commission v New Zealand Milk Corporation
Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 730 (HC of NZ/FC); Trade Practices
Commission ov Hymix Industries Pty Ltd, unreported,
FCA/Lockhart J, 25 August 1994.
-1l1-
Matters relevant to the quantum of pecuniary penalty
-
The passage from s 76 quoted earlier requires the Court to
have regard "to all relevant matters" including those
specified. In Trade Practices Commission v CSR Limited (1991)
ATPR 41-076 at 52,152-52,153, French J listed nine matters to
which the Court will have regard in its assessment of "a
penalty of appropriate deterrent value" of which the first
three are mentioned in s 76:
"1. The nature and extent of the contravening conduct.
2. The amount of loss or damage caused.
3. The circumstances in which the conduct took place.
4. The size of the contravening company.
5. The degree of power it has, as evidenced by its
market share and ease of entry into the market.
6. The deliberateness of the contravention and the
period over which it extended.
7. Whether the contravention arose out of the conduct
of senior management or at a lower level.
8. Whether the company has a corporate culture
conducive to compliance with the Act, as evidenced
by educational programs and disciplinary or other
corrective measures in response to an acknowledged
contravention.
9. Whether the company has shown a disposition to co-
operate with the authorities responsible for the
enforcement of the Act in relation to the
contravention."
Although useful as reminders, statements of factors likely to
be found relevant cannot be exhaustive. Moreover, the passage
quoted in particular was directed to corporate contraveners.
In Trade Practices Commission v Caravella (1994) ATPR 41-293
(FCA/Spender J) and Trade Practices Commission v Prestige
Motors Pty Ltd (unreported, 18 November 1994, Lee J),
penalties which had not been the subject of agreement with the
Commission were imposed on individuals in respect of their
liability under s 76 as "accessories". In each case the
extent to which an individual's conduct contributed to the
contravention by the corporation was treated as significant in
the quantification of penalty.
Submissions of the Commission
Senior counsel for the Commission submitted as follows:
It could not allege that Richmond had been present at the
Meeting;
Richmond had offered to co-operate and to provide a
witness statement;
The Commission might well have discontinued against
Richmond but sought a modest penalty instead;
On the evidence (referred to below) Richmond would not
find it easy to pay any penalty;
The Commission "knew" that Richmond would not have
withdrawn his defence byt for the Commission's agreeing
to make a submission in favour of a modest penalty;
Although the amended statement oof claim pleaded
contravention of more than one provision, there was only
one factual matter to be taken into account and that was
Richmond's conduct in relation to the Special Fee, namely
his instructing Cunningham to propose that there be a
Special Fee of $1,000,000.00 (sub-section 76 (3) provides
that where conduct constitutes a contravention of two or
more provisions of Part IV, a person is not liable to
more than one pecuniary penalty under s 76 in respect of
the same conduct).
Submissions of Richmond
Senior counsel for Richmond submitted as follows:
(a)
(b)
Richmond did not admit all the allegations pleaded and
consented to an order against him under s 76 as sought by
the Commission on the basis of those allegations without
admitting their truth (see later);
Richmond's role was minor;
(c) The case was not one of conscious wrongdoing on
Richmond's part;
(d) Richmond's personal position (see below) warranted
imposition of only a modest penalty.
Richmond's personal position.
There was tendered a statement relating to Richmond's personal
position. He was born at Gunnedah, New South Wales in
November 1945 and so was just under 44 years at the time of
the contraventions. He was raised on the land, attending an
agricultural high school before attending the University of
New England at Armidale where he graduated with the degree of
Bachelor of Agricultural Economics in 1967. Upon graduation
he took up a scholarship with the Hunter Valley Research
Foundation in Newcastle and for three years researched into
the rural concerns of the day. In the early 1970's he
transferred to the New South Wales Department of Agriculture
as an Economist and then as Senior Economist in the Division
of Marketing and Economics. In these two agriculture-oriented
roles he authored more than 50 publications with
specialisation in the economics of flood irrigation.
He became Assistant Director with the AFCC in 1977. In 1978
he married. He and his wife have two children.
- 15 -
He became Executive Director of the AFCC in 1981 and National
Executive Director in 1983. -
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Richmond recognised that
the AFCC had largely achieved its goals and should move to
dissolve itself. He convinced its members of the wisdom of
this course, and this resulted in his retrenchment in July
1993. After being unemployed for some ten months, earlier
this year (1994) he was appointed General Manager of
Rehabilitation Tasmania Pty Ltd and as such he is the chief
executive of a private hospital specialising in
rehabilitation. The shareholders are the Tasmanian State
Government and the Motor Accidents Insurance Board. He has
substantial responsibilities for the overseeing of the
treatment of public and private patients.
Richmond now permanently resides in Tasmania and it was
submitted that he "is looking forward to making a positive
contribution to the local community".
Richmond has a half interest in a house and its contents in
Hobart, the half share being worth approximately $135,000.00,
in total, cash at the bank of $2,576.00 and superannuation and
pension entitlements.
- 16-
zs
The facts of the alleged contraventions by the corporations
and of Richmond's involvement were not proved before me by
evidence. Rather, the hearing proceeded on the basis that
Richmond no longer traversed, for the purpose only of the
fixing of penalty, the allegations made by the Commission in
its amended statement of claim: see Order 11 r 13 (1) of the
Federal Court Rules. Accordingly, although it is necessary
for me in fixing the amount of the pecuniary penalty payable
by Richmond to refer to the relevant "facts" of the case, it
must be understood that the basis for these "facts" is the
Commission's allegations in its pleadings and Richmond's non-
traversal of them for the limited purpose of the
quantification of pecuniary penalty.
The arrangements or understandings pleaded are of a serious
nature. They involved the payment by Hollands of a Special
Fee of no less than $1,000,000.00 to the AFCC, and UTFs
totalling no less than $2,150,000.00 to Concretes, Multiplex
and Leightons. The inference is that the tenders submitted,
including Hollands', were $3,150,000.00 more than what they
would have been but for the arrangements or understandings.
This was, of course, a gross imposition on the Commonwealth
and so upon the people of Australia.
In dealing with Richmond alone, I am to disregard the UTFs.
Nevertheless, the corruption of market forces even to the
extent of $1,000,000.00 in the interests of an association of
construction contractors and to the detriment of the
Commonwealth deserves the strongest condemnation. Richmond
was part of this.
It is difficult to avoid the impression that Richmond, who was
once of a mind to study and engage in research, became, by
virtue of his employment by the AFCC, infected by the moral
insensitivity which, at least in the respect revealed in the
proceedings, apparently characterised the construction
industry at the time. Although Richmond nominated the amount
of the Special Fee to be paid to his employer, in substance
his employer was an instrument of the very construction
contractors which would be conspiring against the
Commonwealth's interest in the integrity and reliability of
the tender process, one of which would be paying the Special
Fee to the AFCC. He and the AFCC appear to have been in one
sense, "arms" of the Tenderers. There is no suggestion that
the AFCC dominated the Tenderers, forcing them to accept the
Special Fee agreement against their wills. Rather, the
pleadings give the impression that the adding of the Special
Fee onto the amounts of their tenders and the concealed
payment of it to "their" association, were readily accepted by
the Tenderers as though they constituted a normal practice.
I accept that Richmond's involvement in the contravention was
- 18 -
not as vital as was that of others. Not only did he not
attend the Meeting, but as, I pointed in the course of
submissions, according to the pleading it was Cunningham who
initiated the Meeting, Richmond's role being to instruct him
to propose $1,000,000.00 as the amount of the Special Fee. I
also accept that after a period of unemployment Richmond is
again now seeking to make "a positive contribution to the
local community" and that his means would justify a relatively
modest level of penalty.
Importantly, Richmond "has shown a disposition to cooperate
with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the
Act in relation to the contravention". His consenting to
orders at such an early stage of the proceedings has made for
a saving in cost and time.
In all the circumstances I think that the fixing of the
pecuniary penalty in an amount of $10,000.00 as suggested by
the parties is an appropriate exercise of my discretion.
The Commission has not sought an order that Richmond pay its
costs or any part of them, no doubt because he consented to
orders against him so early in the proceedings and because the
proceedings continue on foot as against others.
- 19 -
CONCLUSION
-
There will be an order that Richmond pay a pecuniary penalty
to the Commonwealth of $10,000.00 in respect of all the acts
and omissions alleged against him in the amended statement of
claim as constituting his being knowingly concerned in, or
party to, contraventions by all and any of the AFCC,
Concretes, Hollands, Multiplex and Leightons of sub-paras 45
(2) (a) (i), 45 (2) (b) (i), 45 (2) (a) (ii) and 45 (2) (b)
(ii) of the Act, and that he have a period of 28 days from 24
November 1994 in which to pay that amount.
I certify that this and the preceding 18 pages
are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of
the Honourable Justice Lindgren.
Dated: 29 November 1994
Heard: 24 November 1994
Place: Sydney
Decision: 24 November 1994
Appearances: Mr C A Sweeney OC instructed by Australian
Government Solicitor appeared for the
applicant.
Mr B H K Donovan QC instructed by Alan John
Cullen appeared for the 10th respondent.