Polygram P/L v. Golden Editions P/L & Anor [1994] FCA 925
Federal Court of Australia
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an JUDGMENT No. wnat 224 Att.
CATCHWORDS
COPYRIGHT - determination of defences under s 115(3) and s
116(2)(b) as separate issues - infringement of copyright in
sound recordings - respondents admit infringement ~- whether
'infringement was "innocent" - whether respondent was not aware
and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that act
constituting infringement was an infringement of copyright -
whether respondent believed or had reasonable grounds for
believing that licensed sound recordings were infringing
copies - whether defences under ss 115 and 116 available where
respondent reckless as to whether there is infringement of
copyright: Copyright Act 1968: ss 115, 116.
Copyright Act 1968
James Arnold & Co Ltd v Maifern Ltd (1980] RPC 397 at 410
Pollock v J.C. Williamson Ltd [1923] VLR 225
Byrne v Statist Co [1914] 1 KB 622
Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd
(1985) 5 IPR 213
Copyright, Patents and Designs Act 1988 (UK)
Copyright Act 1956 (UK)
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
OR v DEN EDITIONS PTY LIMITED &
ANOR
No. G37 of 1993
Beazley J
2 December 1994
RECEIVED
~2 DEC 1994
FEDERAL COURT OF
AUSTRALIA
PRINCIPAL
REGISTAY
T STRALIA )
Ww STR R TRY ) No. G37 of 1993
GENERAL DIVISTON )
BETWEEN: POLYGRAM PTY LIMITED
ACN 000 158 592
First Applicant
and: RECO ITED
Second Applicant
and: A&M RECORDS INC
Third Applicant
E
N_E NS PTY LIMITED
ACN 001 311 629
Pirst Respondent
and: HOGHTON. HUGHES
Second Respondent
Court: Beazley J
Place: Sydney
Date: 2 December 1994
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is a claim for damages or an account of profits,
additional damages and damages for conversion for infringement
of the applicants' copyright in certain sound recordings of
two well known singing artists, Cat Stevens and The
Carpenters, pursuant to the provisions of ss 115(2), 115(4)
and 116(1) of the Copyright Act 1968 (the Act). The
respondents have admitted the infringement but claim that they
are not liable to pay damages pursuant to ss 115(3) and
116(2)(b) of the Act. The respondents concede that for the
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purposes of determining these defences, the second
respondent's state of mind was the first respondent's state of
-mind. I ordered that these defences be determined separately
from the issue of damages or an account of profits.
Background facts
The applicants are recording companies and are part of what
has been described as the PolyGram group. The applicants
alleged in the Statement of Claim that the Cat Stevens
original sound recordings were made by the second applicant
(Island) in 1969 and 1970 and that Island owned the copyright
in those recordings. They also alleged that The Carpenters
original sound recordings subject of these proceedings were
made by the third applicant (A&M) and that Island owned the
copyright in those recordings. There is evidence that Island
and A&M have exclusively licensed their respective catalogues
to PolyGram International BV including original sound
recordings by Cat Stevens and the Carpenters, including those
which are the subject of these proceedings.
The Statement of Claim further alleges that Polygram has a
catalogue licence agreement with PolyGram International BV
whereby it licensed the copyright in the whole of PolyGram
International BV's catalogue, including the Cat Stevens and
The Carpenters original sound recordings which are the subject
of these proceedings (the original sound recordings). It was
also alleged in the Statement of Claim that Polygram was the
exclusive licensee in Australia of the copyright in the
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original sound recordings pursuant to its catalogue licence
agreement with PolyGram International BV. However, the matter
-has proceeded upon the basis" of an admitted infringement of
Island's copyright in the Cat Stevens original sound
recordings and of A&M's copyright in The Carpenters original
sound recording. No issue was raised before me as to who was
entitled, as between Polygram as-licensee and Island and A&M
as owners of the respective copyright in the original sound
recordings, to bring these proceedings.
It is convenient at this stage to identify the tracks on the
original sound recordings:
- Tracks on the Cat Stevens' original sound recording:
Where the Children Play
Hard Headed Woman
Wild World
Sad Lisa
Miles From Nowhere
But I Might Die Tonight
Longer Boats
Into White
On the Road
Father and Son
Tea For the Tillerman
- Tracks on The Carpenters' original sound recording:
Love Me
Eventide
Aurora
Only Yesterday
Desperado
Mr Postman
I Can Dream
Solitaire
Happy
I'm Caught
The first respondent (Golden Editions) was established by the
second respondent (Mr Hughes} in New Zealand in 1966 and has
been trading in Australia since 1979 as an independent record
and video company. It specialises in low priced cassettes,
compact discs and videos for the Australian mass market. It
is currently the largest producer. of Australian recordings in
Australia and the largest licensor of Australian recordings to
the USA, mainland Europe and South East Asia. The company has
recorded all types of music "...from rock to country to
Classical, children's, relaxation...".
Golden Editions' current catalogue consists of more than 700
albums. It releases between 10 and 20 new albums each month,
about half of which are sourced from international record
companies or licensors. Its customers are predominantly in
the over 30's age group and it commonly releases' sound
recordings made by well known artists, such as Elvis Presley,
Roger Whittaker and The Platters. Most of its releases are of
recordings of artists who had their prime recording years
before 1980.
Golden Editions concludes between 50 and 100 international
licensing arrangements each year, about 60% of which are made
with licensors in the United States. It most commonly enters
into a form of licence agreement known in the United States as
a "short form agreement" which omit a great deal of the detail
found in Australian licenses. Most of its licenses are non-
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exclusive and its recordings are sold side by side with
competitive recordings.
-
Mr Hughes has been involved in the music industry since
leaving school in 1959 at the age of 16. He is the managing
director of Golden Editions and since its inception has been
involved in all aspects of its work. He has done extensive
production work and has been the principal, if not only,
officer of the company involved in the negotiation and
finalisation of licensing arrangements for sound recordings.
Mr Hughes exhibited an extensive knowledge both of the content
and variety of licence agreements available on the
international and Australian market, extending to the way in
which rights in sound recordings arose and the way those
rights changed from time to time. He also has an extensive
knowledge of the rights in the sound recordings of various
individual artists and changes in those rights. He stated
that it is his experience that the rights, in Australia, to
recordings of well known artists sometimes do not belong to
the original recording studio. He cited, by way of example,
the fact that many well known artists, such as Kenny Rogers
and Pat Boone, re-recorded their hit songs for various record
labels and that companies which originally owned the copyright
in the original recordings often sub-licensed their rights to
other companies or to licensed brokers. He also referred to a
practice in the 1960's and 1970's for artists to make their
own recordings and then to license the rights to make records
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from the master recording to a record company for a fixed
period of time. Mr Hughes stated that to keep up with these
. various changes in rights in- recordings in the international
market place, he travels frequently and maintains contact with
a range of international music brokers, licensors, record
companies and fellow licensees both in Australia and overseas.
He stated that it was:
",..critical to the business of Golden Editions that
I keep up-to-date with the changes of ownership in
the right to recordings or catalogues of music in
which Golden Editions has, or might in future have,
a commercial interest".
Mr Hughes has at all times been aware that Cat Stevens
originally recorded for Island and that The Carpenters
originally recorded for A&M and that, as at 1991, those
companies owned the copyright in the respective original sound
recordings. He was also aware that, as at 1991, Island and
A&M had each been asserting that it owned the copyright in
Australia in the Cat Stevens and The Carpenters original sound
recordings. He said he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of
these assertions. He also believed that it was possible that
they were still selling those recordings in Australia in 1991.
He had no information which indicated to him that the position
was otherwise.
The New Breed Music Licenses
In June 1990, Mr Hughes became aware that New Breed Music
International, an American licence broker, had Cat Stevens
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sound recordings available for license. Mr Hughes stated
that, at the time he became aware of this, he believed that
the rights to the recordings derived either from re-recordings
or "lease deals". He used this latter term, which he
described as a "term of art" in the international recording
and licensing business, to refer to two situations: the first
was a form of licensing agreement in which the master
recordings were supplied for use by the licensee to make the
records which had been licensed; the second was where a
performer had funded the making of the original sound
recording and then had contracted with record companies to
reproduce records for distribution and sale. Mr Hughes did
not provide any basis for his belief that the rights to the
recordings available from New Breed Music International were
either re-recordings or lease deals.
On about 29 June 1990, Golden Editions entered into a "Lease
Agreement" with New Breed Music International for a Cat
Stevens sound recording of the same song titles as on the Cat
Stevens original sound recording, save for the title "Longer
Boats". The Lease Agreement stated that New Breed Music
International was the owner of the master sound recording of
the ten song titles and granted to Golden Editions a non-
exclusive, three year lease, for the territories of Australia
and New Zealand, of the right to manufacture and reproduce
records, tapes, compact discs or any other device from the
master sound recording, together with the right to merchandise
and exploit the right to use the artist's name and likeness
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and any other rights necessary to enjoy the use of the master
sound recording. Mr Hughes stated in cross examination that
_he was not aware, nor has he.ever checked, whether the master
was of the original sound recording or of a re-recording.
Golden Editions commenced manufacturing compact discs and
cassettes from the Cat Stevens' master in December 1990 and
commenced sales in January 1991.
In April 1991, Mr Hughes contacted New Breed Music
International about sound recordings of The Carpenters which
he believed had become available for licensing. He gave
evidence that at the time he made the inquiries, he believed
that the rights in these recordings also derived either from
re-recordings or lease deals of the type previously described.
Golden Editions received the master for The Carpenters
recording in May 1991, although it had not signed any lease
agreement at that time. The song titles on the master were
the same as on The Carpenters original sound recording. In
July 1991, New Breed Music International advised Mr Hughes
that, because of problems caused by Richard Carpenter in the
United States, it was not able to license any more Carpenters'
albums. However, in October 1991, New Breed Music
International advised the respondents that The Carpenters
titles were available and on 29 October 1991 Golden Editions
signed a Lease Agreement for The Carpenters sound recording.
The Lease Agreement was in the same terms as that entered into
for the Cat Stevens recording. Golden Editions commenced
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production of The Carpenters album, in compact disc and
cassette form, in February 1992 and released it in March 1992.
_AS was the case with the Cat §gtevens licensed sound recording,
Mr Hughes stated that he was not aware whether The Carpenters
master was of the original sound recording or of a re-
recording and he has never checked.
In May 1992, Golden Editions participated in a major "Star
burst television campaign" which featured The Carpenters
licensed sound recording. On 18 June 1992, the applicants'
solicitors wrote to Golden Editions, advising that Polygram
was the exclusive licensee for Australia of the copyright in
the Cat Stevens and Carpenters original sound recordings and
alleging that the manufacture and distribution of the
recordings by Golden Editions constituted an infringement of
Polygram's rights. Golden Editions acted immediately by
withdrawing the recordings from sale and gave an undertaking
to Polygram's solicitors that it would refrain from any
further importation, manufacture or distribution until the
dispute had been resolved. Golden Editions breached that
undertaking on one occasion, after being informed by
Polygram's managing director that Cat Stevens and The
Carpenters had never had any agreement with Island and A&M.
However, the undertaking was reinstated and remains in place.
Mr Hughes stated that until he received the 18 June 1992
letter, he had no knowledge "that there was any problem with
the recordings". His reason for not having checked the
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position as to the ownership of copyright in the recordings
was because he "trusted New Breed explicitly".
The Copyright Act
Copyright, in relation to a sound recording, is the exclusive
right to, inter alia, make a copy of the sound recording: s
85(a). The maker of a sound recording is the owner of any
copyright subsisting in the recording: s 97(2). Copyright is
infringed by a person, who, not being the owner of the
copyright, and without the licence of the owner of the
copyright, does in Australia, or authorises the doing in
Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright: s 101(1).
A party whose copyright has been infringed, may claim damages
or an account of profits: s 115(2). Additional damages may be
claimed: "s 115(4). Damages may also be claimed for
conversion: s 116(1). However, if a party claims that the
infringement was "innocent", it may be excused from liability
to pay damages pursuant to the provisions of s 115(3) or s
116(2) but may still be liable to an account of profits. The
respondents bear the onus of establishing matters sufficient
to satisfy the provisions of the respective sections: James
Arnold & Co Ltd v Maifern Ltd [1980] RPC 397 at 410.
Defence under section 115(3)
Section 115(3) provides:
"Where, in an action for infringement of copyright,
it is established that an infringement was committed
but it is also established that, at the time of the
infringement, the defendant was not aware, and had
no reasonable grounds for suspecting, that the act
constituting the infringement was an infringement of
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the copyright, the plaintiff is not entitled under
this section to any damages against the defendant in
respect of the infringement, but is entitled to an
account of profits in respect of the infringement
whether any other reltef is granted under this
section or not."
The section is one which, in practical terms, has not spread
an extensive protective net. It has been held, for example,
that it does not protect a person who, knowing or suspecting
that copyright exists, makes a mistake as to the owner of
copyright: Pollock v J.C. Williamson Ltd [1923] VLR 225; Byrne
v_ Statist Co [1914] 1 KB 622. As was said in Kalamazoo (Aust)
sines: stems Pt td (1985) 5 IPR 213
per Thomas J at 243~244:
"...the special defence created by s 115(3) of the Act...
is an alternative means by which a defendant may avoid an
assessment of damages, although, curiously, it gives no
assistance in avoiding the taking of an account (cf
Ricketson, supra, para 2.21). The provision has not
afforded defendants much assistance in practice. The
requirement that the defendant should have no reasonable
grounds for suspecting that his act was an infringement
has been difficult to maintain under this provision and
its forerunners: John Lane the Bodley Head Ltd v
Associated Newspapers Ltd [1936] 1 KB 715; Pytram Ltd v
Models (Leicester) Ltd [1930] 1 Ch 639. A mistake of law
has not been regarded as being sufficient unless that
mistake was made after reasonable inguiry and
investigation: Pollock v J C Williamson Ltd [1923] VLR
225. Of course, the facts in the present case go far
beyond a mere ignorance of law on both sides. At first
glance, it may be thought that the defendants must have
failed to make reasonable inquiries as to subsistence of
copyright.
Their conduct must be seen in light of the fact that they
were encouraged to believe in the legality of their
action by the conduct and statements of the plaintiff.
Such facts reduce the ambit of the reasonable inquiry
that might be expected in the circumstances".
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Although the section does not speak of a need to make
inquiries in order to satisfy its provisions, it is clear from
Kalamazoo, that the circumstances may be such as to put a
respondent on notice, so that unless inquiries are made, the
respondent may not be able to successfully assert there were
no reasonable grounds to suspect that copyright subsisted in
the offending items. Indeed, the learned authors of Copinger
and Skone James on Copyright (13th Ed, para. 11-28) state of s
97(1) of the Copyright, Patents and Designs Act 1988 (UK):
"When can a direct infringer have no reason to believe
that copyright subsisted in the work which he copies? It
is submitted that the proper attitude of mind of an
infringer towards a work that he copies is that copyright
in the latter subsists unless he has evidence to the
contrary. He can only have no reason to believe that
Copyright subsists if he has grounds for thinking that
(a) the period of copyright protection has run out; or
(b) the work is of such a character that it ought not to
be a subject of copyright..."
Section 97(1}) is not in the same terms as s 115(3). It
provides that a plaintiff is not entitled to damages in
respect of an infringement, if it is shown that, at the time
of the infringement, the defendant did not know, and had no
reason to believe, that copyright subsisted in the work, to
which the action relates. However, its predecessor provision,
s 17(2) of the Copyright Act 1956 (UK), was in the same terms
as s 115 (3). The authors of Copinger and Skone James
considered that the change in the wording of the new United
Kingdom provision was not intended to reflect any change in
the law.
Counsel for the applicants submitted that I should find that
_.Mr Hughes was aware that the licensed sound recordings were
copies of the original sound recordings or, alternatively,
that he had no basis whatsoever, and certainly no reasonable
basis, for suspecting that the recordings might be re-
recordings so that no defence under s 115(3) had been made
out. He further submitted that if I did find that the
infringement was innocent within the provisions of s 115(3), I
should find alternatively that the respondents could not
sustain the defence after March 1992, when Festival Records
commenced infringement proceedings against the respondents in
respect of an Olivia Newton John recording, which Golden
Editions had licensed from new Breed Music International (the
Festival proceedings), or, at the latest, after receipt of the
letter of 18 June 1992. The Festival proceedings were settled
in November 1992. As part of the settlement, Golden Editions
agreed to pay damages for infringement of Festival's
copyright, and, to state the matter in general terms, was
permanently restrained from infringing Festival's copyright.
The principal reason advanced in support of the s 115(3)
defence was Mr Hughes' implicit trust in New Breed Music
International. He said that they were a reputable company
with whom Golden Editions had dealt for many years and he had
never had cause to question them, at least until the Festival
proceedings in March 1992. It is possible that dealings with
a reputable company might be sufficient to satisfy s 115(3) in
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a given case. However, whether the defence has been made out
will depend upon all the circumstances. In the present case,
_this requires an examination~-of the basis and reliability of
Mr Hughes' explicit trust in New Breed Music International in
the context of his state of knowledge, both of the music
industry generally and of his specific knowledge of Island's
and A&M's ownership of copyright in the original sound
recordings.
In his affidavit sworn 24 January, 1994, Mr Hughes stated he
had been dealing with New Breed Music International, which
originally traded as Music City Associates, Nashville for
about five years. Music City Associates had been owned by a
Paul Wyatt, who had sold the business in about 1988 to his
chief assistant, Frankie Moore, who now carried on business as
New Breed Music International. Mr Hughes stated that "Music
City Associates was one of the most reputable licensing
brokers in the world". He also said:
"as I keep trying to emphasise, I had ~ because of
the predecessor of Frankie Moore which was a company
called Music City Associates that had the - just
enjoyed the great credibility of any of the
licensing brokers I've come across in 28 years of
business and when Mr Wyatt got seriously ill and
sold the business to Frankie Moore, I mean I
naturally assumed that the operation was the same
integrity.
Mr Hughes stated he had never been challenged in respect of
licensed sound recordings from New Breed Music International
until the Festival proceedings were commenced in March 1992.
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There was no other evidence to support Mr Hughes' opinion as
to the integrity of Paul Wyatt, Music City Associates, New
_ Breed Music International or its current owner. Even so, had
there been no other critical material in the matter, Mr
Hughes' opinion of New Breed Music International and his
implicit trust in its integrity, given his trouble free
dealings with it, at least until March 1992, may have been
sufficient for him to establish that he was not aware, or had
no reasonable grounds' for suspecting infringement of
copyright. I should add however, that the relatively short
period of dealing and the absence of evidence to support Mr
Hughes' belief in the reputation of New Breed Music
International and its predecessor and its principals,
including the absence of any evidence of enquiries he had made
or information he had received upon which to base his opinion
as to the integrity of the broker, would be factors which
could weigh against the defence having been made out in that
limited case.
However in this case, there are other relevant factors. It
will be recalled that in his affidavit evidence, Mr Hughes
said he believed that the rights in the recordings derived
from either re-recordings or lease deals of the original sound
recordings. He said that it was of no concern to him as to
what the position was, as his concern was Golden Editions'
commercial aim to tap into the market of known artists with
popular songs. He also said he had no reason to believe that
New Breed Music International was not entitled to grant the
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rights granted by the two Lease Agreements. He provided no
basis for his belief or for his reasoning and, it follows, no
_ evidence in support of his belief or reasoning.
The picture which emerged in cross-examination was
significantly different from that portrayed in Mr Hughes'
affidavit evidence. In cross-examination, Mr Hughes conceded
that he did not know, one way or the other, whether the
licensed sound recordings were of the original sound
recordings or were re-recordings, and that, at the time he
entered into the Cat Stevens Lease Agreement, he appreciated
that it was possible that the licensed sound recording was of
the original sound recording. He said he was concerned not to
mislead the market by selling re-recordings, unless they were
labelled as such and had he been aware that they were re-
recordings, he would have labelled them accordingly. Assuming
this to be correct, it is difficult to accept that an astute
business person, as Mr Hughes projected himself to be, would
be unconcerned as to whether he was selling the original sound
recordings or re-recordings. This is even more so, given Mr
Hughes' evidence that the likelihood of a re-recording being
the same as an original sound recordings was "extremely
remote" and further that Mr Hughes had had an earlier
experience where Golden Editions had marketed a Kenny Rogers
album which was a re-recording. He said in relation to that
incident:
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"...We got heaps of consumer complaints about how
bad they were and that they weren't the originals.
In fact we had to, in the end, we had to establish a
practice of marking on the packages that these are
not the original recordings."
The only explanation he gave as to why he had not taken any
steps to ascertain what the true position was with the
licensed sound recordings was: "...I didn't know and hadn't
had that experience before". He then gave the following
evidence:
"The short answer I suggest to you, Mr Hughes, would
you agree, is that your assumption was that they
were the same as the originals?---Either the same or
close.
I will put it more clearly. Would you agree that
your assumption was that they were copies of the
originals?---No, I didn't know whether they were or
not.
Would you agree that your assumption was that the
great probability was that they were copies of the
originals?---There would be a strong possibility".
This last answer is a significant concession in the
respondent's case. If I accept Mr Hughes evidence that he was
concerned not to mislead the market and that he would have
relabelled the recordings as re-recordings had he known that
was the case, it is difficult to accept his evidence that he
did not know what he had licensed and that he was unconcerned
about it. If that evidence is to be accepted, I would be
compelled to find that Mr Hughes was reckless as to what he
licensed. However, I consider that more likely than not, Mr
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Hughes was aware that he was licensing the original sound
recordings.
s
There are a number of other factors which reinforce my view
that Mr Hughes at all times believed that he was licensing the
original sound recordings. First, had Golden' Editions
licensed re-recordings, the respondents would have had a
complete defence to the applicants' claims. However, the
respondents have never asserted that the licensed recordings
were re-recordings, nor have they taken the most simple of
steps, such as by listening to the licensed recordings, to
establish whether they were re-recordings.
Secondly, at the time that the respondents gave an undertaking
not to further distribute the sound recordings until the
dispute was resolved, the only matter it sought to raise with
the applicants's solicitors was for them to prove their title
to the original sound recordings. His reason for this limited
response is found in the following passage in cross-
examination:
Would you agree with the suggestion that the only
point you had to make through your solicitors to
Gilbert and Tobin was for them to try and prove to
you the title they had to those original recordings,
would you agree with that?---That's correct.
And apart from that you had nothing else to put in your
instructions to Phillips Fox to be put to Gilbert and
Tobin?---No, you see, because we had licensed them on a
non-exclusive basis."
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The last answer is consistent with a belief that Golden
Editions had licensed copies of the original sound recordings.
Mr Hughes' subseguent evidence that he had no grounds for
believing, in 1991, that Island and A&M did not own the
copyright in the Cat Stevens and The Carpenters original sound
recordings and Golden Editions' practice of labelling re-
recordings as such, following the Kenny Rogers incident, is
also consistent with a belief being held by Mr Hughes that
Golden Editions had licensed copies of the original sound
recordings.
The specific factors to which I have just referred must be
considered in light of Mr Hughes' general evidence. He placed
considerable emphasis on the fact that he was an "industry
veteran". He prided himself on his knowledge of the market
place. His affidavit evidence was replete with examples of
his experience in the music industry. At various times in his
evidence, he was at pains to demonstrate that knowledge. I
consider that the whole tenor of Mr Hughes' evidence is such
that he knew or at least suspected that he was licensing the
original sound recordings. If he neither knew nor suspected
that he was licensing the original sound recordings, then I
consider that he was reckless as to what he was licensing.
That, of course, does not mean that the respondents were aware
or had no reasonable grounds to suspect that the manufacture
and distribution of the licensed sound recordings constituted
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an infringement of copyright. The New Breed Music
International licenses were non-exclusive licenses. Thus,
even knowing that the licensed sound recordings were of the
original sound recordings, it was possible that Golden
Editions could exercise the rights conferred by the New Breed
Music International licenses without infringing copyright.
There are three factors which support the respondents' case
that they were not aware that the licensed recordings were
infringing copies: first, the fact that the licenses were
non-exclusive and the related evidence that at the time that
Golden Editions entered into the licenses, Mr Hughes,
understood that the recordings had been licensed to other
licensees, in particular, to Tring International in the United
Kingdom and VS Music in Germany, although there was no
evidence to support Mr Hughes' understanding that this was the
case; secondly, Golden Editions' expenditure on the "Star
Burst" advertising campaign, which, as counsel for' the
respondents submitted, does not sit comfortably with the
respondents being aware that its recordings were infringing
copyright, as it gave exposure to the infringing recording;
and thirdly, the fact that New Breed Music International had
withdrawn The Carpenters recording from sale, confirming the
respondents belief in New Breed Music' International's
integrity.
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Counsel for the respondents relied upon the following further
_ factors in support of the s J15(3) defence: first, until the
issue of proceedings, neither Island nor A&M had made a claim
for infringement of their respective copyright in the sound
recordings; secondly, Polygram did not provide documentary
proof of its chain of title, despite the respondent's request
that "it do so; thirdly, Polygram's managing director had
advised Mr Hughes, in about August 1992, that there was no
contract in existence between Cat Stevens and Island and New
Breed Music International had given advice to the same effect;
fourthly, the Cat Stevens licensed recording was on the market
for 18 months before any complaint was made in respect of the
recording or indeed in respect of either recording. These
factors are all matters which arose after the commencement of
the infringement, which occurred when Golden Editions first
manufactured each of the licensed recordings. They are
matters which, if the respondents did not know they were
infringing copyright, would have confirmed that belief. They
are also matters which would not give the respondents any
ground to suspect that they were infringing copyright.
However, the overall effect of these matters, as with the
three specific matters to which I have referred, has to be
considered in conjunction with all other relevant
circumstances. Mr Hughes' knowledge of the music industry
generally, his knowledge of Island and A&M's ownership of the
copyright in the original sound recordings and his belief that
it was possible that those companies were still selling the
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recordings in Australia as at 1991 are matters which make his
assertion that he did not know or had no reasonable grounds to
suspect that the respondents "were infringing copyright naive,
but not untenable.
However, there is one significant factor which points to the
opposite conclusion. Each of the Cat Stevens and The
Carpenters lease agreements stated that New Breed Music
International "was the owner of the master sound recordings".
Mr Hughes stated he understood that, by that clause, New Breed
Music International was asserting that it owned the copyright
in the master sound recordings. He also knew that a lease of
copyright did not entitle a party to assert ownership of the
copyright. Having regard to Mr Hughes' avowed understanding
of copyright and the state of his knowledge to which I have
referred, both generally and in respect of Island's and A&M's
rights in respect of the original sound recordings, he must
have appreciated that this provision in the lease agreements
was either false or erroneous and that therefore, by
manufacturing and distributing the licensed sound recordings,
the respondents were infringing copyright. If he did not have
such an appreciation, then I consider that he was reckless as
to whether the respondents were or were not infringing
copyright. In my opinion, s 115(3) does not assist a party
who is reckless in this way.
To say that a party is reckless as to whether it is or is not
infringing copyright may only be another way of concluding
-23-
that a party has no reasonable grounds to suspect the
infringement. Even if that is not so, I consider that the
circumstances here were such that the respondents were put on
inquiry as to whether they were infringing copyright. This is
so, notwithstanding that Mr Hughes believed he was dealing
with a reputable broker and that he had an non-exclusive
license. The particular matters which put him on inquiry were
his awareness that he was licensing (or even possibly
licensing) the original sound recordings; his knowledge that
Cat Stevens and The Carpenters had recorded for Island and
A&M; his knowledge that Island and A&M owned the copyright in
the original sound recordings; the possibility that they were
still selling the original sound recordings in Australia in
1991; the clause in the lease agreements to which I have
referred and Mr Hughes' understanding of the meaning of that
clause. Mr Hughes did not make any enquiries, and in this
case, I consider that he did so at his peril.
There are certain additional factors to which I should refer.
Those matters, in the main, go to Mr Hughes' credit.
If, as Mr Hughes said, it was critical to Golden Editions'
business to keep up-to-date with changes of ownership and the
right to recordings or catalogues of music in which Golden
Editions has or might, in future, have a commercial interest,
and that he did so, it was disingenuous for him to assert, in
relation to the applicants: "...I really take no notice of
what competitor companies do, I get on with my own business".
- 24 -
This is the more so given that he admitted that he knew that
Cat Stevens and The Carpenters had recorded for the Island and
_ A&M respectively and that he knew of their ownership of
copyright. It also follows from his knowledge of this matter
that his assertion that the copyright could have been in the
artists with a lease or licence to a third party such as to
Island or A&M does not withstand scrutiny.
In their defence dated 4 May 1993, the respondents pleaded
that s 115(3) and s 116(2) of the Copyright Act applied:
"...by reason of the fact that the respondents were
not aware, and had no reasonable grounds for
suspecting, that copyright subsisted in the Cat
Stevens' recordings and in The Carpenters'
recordings..."
Mr Hughes conceded this allegation was incorrect. Counsel for
the applicants submitted that this was one of the matters
which demonstrated that Mr Hughes's should not be accepted as
truthful or reliable. Care has to be taken when assessing a
witness's credit on the basis of errors or apparently false
statements in pleadings which have been prepared by someone
other than the person whose credit is in issue. However, Mr
Hughes gave evidence that he discussed the terms of the
defence with his solicitors, reviewed a draft of the defence
and approved it. It may be that Mr Hughes did not appreciate
the falsity of the defence at the time it was drafted.
However, his failure to notice the error was, at the least,
careless.
Mr Hughes admitted to another' error in the formal
documentation before the court, this time in paragraph 12 of
_Mr Hughes' second affidavit sworn 17 June 1994. In order to
understand the error it is necessary to refer to the following
paragraphs of the affidavit:
"5. The Cat Stevens Sound Recordings were
included in the Golden Editions catalogue
at the beginning of January 1991, as
catalogue number STB 8722 (CASSETTE) AND
cd 8722 (compact disc).
6. In April 1992, the cat Stevens Sound Recordings
were released as part of a double cassette and
CD package. This package was given a new
catalogue number. This affidavit details all
sales and manufacture of the Cat Stevens Sound
Recordings, including those which were sold as
part of the double packages, CLIV 533 and LTV
533.
di. In May 1994, I instructed Phillips Fox to
deliver up to the solicitors for the
Applicants all copies of the Sound
Recordings in the possession, power or
control of Golden Editions. Iam
informed by Katherine Haddock, and verily
believe, that on 25 May 1994, Phillips Fox
delivered up to Gilbert & Tobin:
11.1 3494 copies of CD STB 8751;
11.2 2778 copies of STB 8751;
11.3 319 copies of CD STB 8722; and
11.4 323 copies of STB 8722.
12. The copies of STB 8722 and CDSTB 8722
which were delivered up on 25 May 1994
include cassettes and CDs which were
included in CLTV 533 and LTV 533, which
once removed from their packaging are
indistinguishable from STB 8722 and CDSTB
8722 respectively."
- 26 -
As I have said, the assertion in paragraph 12 was wrong. He
gave the following explanation as to how he had made the
error:
"m--For want of better terminology, I have a very
hands-off involvement in the manufacture of the
recordings. I do liaise and licence, do the
licensing, authorise the releases and then I pay
employees good money to look after that for the
company. In fact, this is the first time I have
ever held this cassette.
What checks did you make before you swore the
affidavit in relation to the statement in paragraph
12?---No checks, just personal knowledge."
It is not known what personal knowledge Mr Hughes had or how
he might have acquired that given the first of those two
answers just quoted. Indeed, the two answers seem to be
internally inconsistent. Whatever be the position, it
indicates another occasion of carelessness, at least, in
respect of Mr Hughes approach to the litigation. However, Mr
Hughes' "carelessness" both in relation to the affidavit and
the defence, reinforced my view as to Mr Hughes recklessness
to which I have referred earlier.
The next matter to which reference should be made is Mr Hughes
evidence that he did not know whether any person in his employ
had listened to the original sound recordings to ascertain
whether there was any difference between them and the original
sound recordings. His evidence in this regard was as follows:
- 27 -
"A simple way you appreciated in 1991 to check
whether they were the original recordings or re-
recording would have been to listen to the New Breed
ones and listen to the Island ones?---Whosever
wanted to check, of course.
And did you do that?---No, I had no reason to.
Have you listened to it since?---No, never listened
to it.
You have not bothered to listen to it?---No.
fo your knowledge has anyoné in your company - are
you aware of anyone in your company having listened
to the two?---I'm sure they would have. I'm not
aware of anyone, no.
Somebody may well have? ---May well have, possibly, of
course. I employ a lot of people".
I was unimpressed with Mr Hughes' evidence on this point. The
very quick change in his answer, from stating that he was sure
that someone in his company had listened to the recording, to
stating "I'm not aware of anyone, no" indicated to me that Mr
Hughes appreciated there may have been a difficulty with his
concession that employees would have listened to the two
recordings. The second part of his answer and the next answer
seeks to expunge that difficulty, so as to enable him to
maintain the fundamental part of his case that he was not
aware and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
respondents were infringing the applicants' copyright.
Counsel for the applicants submitted that having regard to the
respondents' failure to call any employee to give evidence as
to whether they had listened to the recordings, I should infer
that responsible persons within Golden Editions were aware
that the licensed sound recordings were copies of the
- 28 -
originals and that Island and A&M were still selling those
recordings: Jones v Dunke] (1959) 101 CLR 298. The principle
in Jones vy Dunkel is that the unexplained failure of a party
to call a witness may, in appropriate circumstances lead to an
inference that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted
that party's case. The inference which counsel for the
applicants would have me draw, is therefore, too wide.
However, having regard to the admission of the infringement I
do not consider that this is an appropriate case in which to
draw the permitted inference.
There was other unsatisfactory evidence. In his affidavit
evidence, Mr Hughes had offered another alternative as to the
nature of the licensed recordings, namely that he believed
that their source was in lease deals between the artists and a
record company. However, this assertion is inconsistent with
his industry knowledge and knowledge of Island's and A&M's
ownership of copyright in the original sound recordings. Mr
Hughes initially denied the inconsistency. However, under
cross examination he was forced to retract this stance. His
evidence in this regard was:
"You knew very well in 1991, from your understanding
as a veteran in the industry, that a lease of the
copyright by an artist to a record company did not
entitle the record company to assert that it was the
owner of that copyright; correct?---Correct.
So that once you understood that Island and A & M
owned the copyright in these recordings, the
original recordings, you appreciated that the artist
could not have owned the copyright in_ those
recordings; correct?---No, I really don't know what
the arrangement was with either Cat Stevens or the
- 29 -
Carpenters with their respective companies.
Would you agree with me that you perfectly
understood that it was inconsistent, it would have
been inconsistent, fore the artist to own the
copyright in those recordings if you understood that
the record companies owned the copyright; would you
agree with that?---Yes.
Just to be clear, I suggest to you that you well
understood from your knowledge of copyright law as a
veteran in the industry that if A & M and Island
owned the copyright in these recordings that the
artists could not have owned the copyright in those
recordings; do you agree with that?---If they owned
them, yes."
The qualification in the last answer does not assist the
respondents, given Mr Hughes' admission that at all times he
knew that Cat Stevens recorded for Island and The Carpenters
recorded for A&M and that those recording companies
respectively owned the copyright, not that they had a license
in respect of the copyright, in the original sound recordings.
Finally, reference should be made to Golden Editions' use of
the symbol "C" on its recordings. Mr Hughes stated that the
use of this symbol indicated that Golden Editions "had leased
the copyright for that territory for the period of your
licensing agreement". He admitted, however, that he had both
seen and used the expression "manufactured under license" on
sound recordings. He also admitted that he:
"understood that "c" next to the name of a record company
such as Island on any record they put out in Australia
was an indication by that company that they were saying
that they owned the copyright in that recording"
(emphasis added).
- 30 _-
His evidence also clearly demonstrated that he knew and
understood the difference between ownership and the lease or
_ license of copyright. -
As I have said, the matters to which I have just referred, in
the main, go to the question of Mr Hughes' credit. The
inconsistencies in his evidence are such that I did not find
him to be a satisfactory witness and I do not accept his
assertions that he was not aware or had no reasonable grounds
to suspect that the respondents were infringing copyright. In
any event, as I have said, I consider that he was reckless as
to these matters. Accordingly, I reject the respondents'
defence under s 115(3).
Defence under Section 116(2)
The owner of copyright of a work is entitled, in respect of
any infringing copy or of any plates used or intended to be
used for making infringing copies to the rights and remedies
by way of an action for conversion or detention to which the
owner would be entitled if owner of the copy or plate : s
116(1). However, s 116(2) provides:
"(An applicant] is not entitled by virtue of this
section to any damages or to any other pecuniary
remedy, other than costs, if it is established that,
at the time of the conversion...
(A) eee
(b) where the articles converted...were infringing
copies - the [respondent] believed, and had
reasonable grounds for believing that they were
- 31 -
not infringing copies;
Section 116(1) differs from s 115(3) in that it is not
dependant upon a party's awareness nor upon whether it had
reasonable grounds to suspect infringement. The question to
be determined, under s 116(2)(b) is whether a party believed
the articles converted were infringing copies. Section 116(2)
is directed to a genuinely held belief, hence the requirement
that there must be reasonable grounds for the belief. The
respondents rely upon the same factors to support their
defence under s 116(2)(b) as they did under s 115 (3). As I
have found that Mr Hughes was aware that the licensed
recordings were infringing copies, the defence under s
116(2)(b) must also fail. However, even if I am wrong in
that finding, and if Mr Hughes believed that the licensed
recordings were not infringing copies, for the reasons which I
expressed in relation the s 115(3) defence, I consider that he
was reckless as to whether he was or would be infringing
copyright by exercising his rights under the lease agreements.
It follows therefore that his belief was a reckless belief.
In my opinion, s 116 (2) does not apply to a reckless belief.
In any event, I consider that the matters upon which the
respondents relied to prove that they had reasonable grounds
for the belief are outweighed by the evidence as a whole, for
the same reasons that I made that finding in respect of the s
115(3) defence.
- 32 -
I will stand the matter over for 7 days to enable the parties
to bring short minutes of order and to consider the further
-
conduct of the matter.
I certify that this and the preceding (31) pages are a true
copy of the Reaso gment of the Honourable Justice
Beazley. LS.
Associate:
Dated: 2 December 1994
PP CES
Counsel for the Applicant: T. Bannon
Solicitors for the Applicant: Messrs Gilbert & Tobin
Counsel for the Respondent: D.M. Yates
Solicitors for the Respondent: Messrs Phillips Fox
Dates of hearing: 17 June, 13 July and 19
August 1994