International Writing Institute Inc. v. Rimila P/L & Anor [1994] FCA 934
Federal Court of Australia
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JUDGMENT No. smn tty 2
jecorteonsees enevesesesce
IN_THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
N OUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. G466 of 1991
)
)
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN: INTERNATIONAL WRITING INSTITUTE
INC
Applicant
AND: RIMILA PTY LIMITED
First Respondent
RODNEY BANFIELD TUBBS
Second Respondent
COURT: LOCKHART J.
PLACE: SYDNEY
DATE: 25 NOVEMBER 1994
CORRIGENDUM
Amendment to the reasons for judgment of Justice Lockhart.
1. Page 7, line 4, replace "IWI" with "Rimila";
2. Page 7, line 7, replace "Rimila" with "IWI".
Ky, AA Pedi
Associate to Justice Lockhart
Date: 12 December 1994
RECEIVED
13 DEC 1994
FEDERAL COURT OF
AUSTRALIA
PRINCIPAL
REGISTRY
JUDGMENT No. snl bonl srcd Tie
CATCHWORDS
DAMAGES - breach of copyright in writing skills courses and
materials - calculation of damages for infringement under
s 155(2) and for conversion under s 116(1) Copyright Act -
calculation of overlap - additional damages for flagrancy of
infringement - award of interest.
Copyright Act 1968: ss 10, 37, 38, 115, 116
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976: s SIA
INT TING INSTITUTE INC v LA PTY ED and
RODNEY BANFIELD TUBBS
NG466 of 1991
LOCKHART J.
SYDNEY
25 NOVEMBER 1994
RECEIVED
~2 DEC 1994
FEDERAL COURT OF
AUSTRALIA
PRINCIPAL
REGISTRY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
)
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. G466 of 1991
)
)
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN: INTERNATIONAL WRITING INSTITUTE
INC
Applicant
AND: RIMILA Y LIMITED
First Respondent
DNEY_ BANF D_ TUB
Second Respondent
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: LOCKHART J.
WHERE ORDER MADE: SYDNEY
DATE ORDER MADE: 25 NOVEMBER 1994
UTE OR
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The matter be stood over to a date to be fixed.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in
Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN _ THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G466 of 1991
wee ww
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN: INTERNATIONAL W
INSTITUTE INC
Applicant
AND: RIMILA PTY LIMITED
First Respondent
RODNEY BANFIELD TUBBS
Second Respondent
25 November 1994
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LOCKHART J.
On 10 November 1993 I gave judgment on the issues
relating to the liability of Rimila and Mr Tubbs' to
International Writing Institute Inc. (IWI) concerning the
claim by IWI that Rimila had infringed IWI's copyright in
IWI's writing skills course entitled "Put It In Writing",
which included a Participant's Manual, a Conference Leader's
Guide, audio visual materials and video cassettes (the PIIW
Works).
My findings included the following:-
. That Rimila had reproduced in a material form a
substantial part of the literary work in the
Participant's Manual PIIW published in 1968, 1972, 1977,
1986 and 1989 save for the illustration at p 86 of
exhibit AJ8. This reproduction was admitted by the
respondents.
Reproduction by Rimila in a material form of a
substantial part of the Participant's Manual PIIW UK
edition 1983 UK (exhibit AJ5) and Participant's Manual
PIIW published 1989 US edition (exhibit AJ8), the
reproduction being in the Rimila publication
Participant's Manual BWS (exhibit 4). This reproduction
was admitted by the respondents.
IWI was entitled to claim damages for infringement and
conversion of the PIIW Participant's Manual.
Reproduction by Rimila in photocopy form in its BWS
Overhead Transparencies (exhibit 19) which were taken
from the Participant's Manual PIIW and Conference
Leader's Guide PIIW, which constituted an infringement by
reproduction.
IWI did not press its claim for infringement of the PIIW
Conference Set (videos) or the BWS Guidelines' for
Instructors BWS (exhibit 20).
IWI established its case for infringement by reproduction
in a material form of the 1986 edition of the PIIW
Conference Leader's Guide and the 1989 edition of the
PIIW Participant's Manual (exhibit AJ7 and AJ8). This
infringement was established as against Rimila and Mr
Tubbs pursuant to s. 30(1)(i)(a)(i) and s. 36 of the
Copyright Act 1968 (the Act).
. The BWS overhead transparencies of Rimila constituted an
adaptation of both the Participant's Manual PIIW and the
Conference Leader's Guide PIIW. The case of IWI was
established against Rimila and Mr Tubbs.
. IWI established its case that Rimila authorized its
franchisees to publish and reproduce its BWS course which
contained a substantial part of the PIIW course.
My earlier reasons for judgment must be read in full in
order to understand the present aspect of the case dealing
with the assessment of damages. My earlier judgment is
reported at (1993) 27 IPR 546.
On 1 December 1993 I made orders in the following terms:
"1, The respondents and each of them,
whether by themselves and in the case
of the first respondent, its
directors, officers, servants or
agents, or otherwise howsoever, be
restrained from infringing the
applicant's copyright in the
applicant's manual and course
materials known as the Put [It In
Writing ("PIIW") writing skills
course including the Participant's
Manual PIIW ("the literary and
artistic works") and, in particular,
from printing, publishing or offering
for sale, exposing for sale or
selling or by making an adaptation or
by reproducing or by authorising
others to reproduce any of the
literary and artistic works therein
contained or any substantial part of
the literary and artistic works
therein contained.
The respondents and each of them
Shall within 21 days of the date of
this order deliver up on oath to the
applicant at the address of the
applicant's solicitors, Anisimoff
Davenport, 170 Pacific Highway, North
Sydney all infringing copies of the
said literary and artistic works and
all proofs, plates, bromides,
matrices and other reproduction
materials used or intended to be used
for making such infringing copies
which have been at any time or which
are at this date comprised in the
respondents' 1990 edition Business
Writing Skills ("BWS") course whether
they be in the possession power or
control of either of the respondents
or in the possession power or control
of any of the officers of directors
of the first respondent.
The respondents and each of them pay
to the applicant damages for
infringement of the applicant's
copyright in the Participant's Manual
PIIW and the Conference Leader's
Guide PIIW pursuant to s115(2)
Copyright Act 1968.
The respondents and each of them pay
to the applicant damages for
conversion of all infringing copies
and other reproduction materials and,
in particular, the Participant's
Manual BWS and the Audio Visual
Materlals BWS, each of which
comprises or relates to the
respondents' 1990 edition BWS course,
pursuant to sll6(1) Copyright Act
1968.
Liberty to apply on 2 days' notice is
reserved to any party as to costs of
these proceedings to this date.
The proceedings stand over to a date
to be fixed for further hearing to
determine, firstly, the amount of
10.
il.
damages payable pursuant to both
S115(2) and s116(1) Copyright Act
1968, and secondly, to determine
whether, and if so, in what amount,
additional damages ought be ordered
to be paid by each of the respondents
to the applicant pursuant to s115(4)
Copyright Act 1968.
The applicant file and serve any
additional affidavits and expert's
reports to be relied upon on the
issue of quantification of the
damages so ordered and on the issue
of whether or not additional damages
ought be ordered and if so what
amount by 5.00pm on Friday 14 January
1994.
Each of the respondents file and
serve any additional affidavits and
expert's reports to be relied upon on
the issue of quantification of the
damages so ordered and on the issue
of whether or not additional damages
ought be ordered and if so _ what
amount by 5.00pm on _ Friday, 18
February 1994.
The applicant file and serve any
affidavits in reply and expert's
reports to be relied upon on the
issue of quantification of the
damages so ordered and on the issue
of whether or not additional damages
ought be ordered and if so what
amount by 5.00pm on "Friday, 25
February 1994.
The proceedings stand over for
further directions, with a view to
fixing a date for hearing on the
issue of quantification of damages,
until 9.30am on Thursday 3 March 1994
before Lockhart J.
Direct that either party make any
subpoenas which they may be so
advised to issue seeking production
of documents relating to either the
issue of quantification of damages or
to the issue of payment of additional
damages returnable at 9.30am on
Wednesday, 23 February 1994 before
the Registrar."
I gave directions for the purpose of preparing the case
for hearing with respect to the issue of damages. The trial
of that issue commenced on 17 August 1994.
It is apparent from reading my earlier reasons for
judgment that the facts of this case are complex. It is
necessary to keep in mind some of those facts which have a
distinct bearing on the assessment of damages. The business
of IWI is not a large one. IwIl received approximately
$US10,000 per year for the four years in which Rimila used the
PIIW course. The IWI course which Rimila conducted in
Australia during the years 1985 - 1989 was at the end of its
useful commercial life; or, to use the words of Mr Albert
Joseph, it was becoming a "dodo". Even the US course as
updated resulted in small business. I accept the contention
of counsel for the respondents that the total infringement
found against Rimila involved the printing of 3,222 books,
each of 80 pages, and 15 sets of 70 overhead transparencies.
There 1s some evidence which might lead to a slight variation
of these figures, but on balance I am satisfied that they are
correct. Hence the assessment of damages is not to be
approached on the basis of some large scale deprivation by
Rimila of moneys to which IWI would otherwise be entitled.
Also, the scale of the infringement and of the relevant
conduct of Rimila was small.
What I have just said 1s significant, because the
approaches adopted by the two principal witnesses on the
question of damages, the two experts, were fundamentally
opposed. IWI called as its expert witness, Mr W L Lonergan, a
chartered accountant and a partner of Coopers & Lybrand in its
Corporate Services Division, specializing in the provision of
financial advice to clients. Rimila called Mr Pittorino, a
chartered accountant in the employ of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
and a manager for its corporate advisory division. I shall
not pause here to discuss the approaches adopted by these
expert witnesses; I shall deal with them later. IWI prepared
various schedules, in the alternative, relating to the
assessment of its claim and they vary considerably from each
other. Rimila's case is that the damages suffered by IWI
total $35,506. The large difference between the figures is
accounted for primarily by the differences in approach between
the two experts. Many things fall into place once I have
resolved the question of which of the two experts I prefer in
whole or in part, if either of them. I should say at once
that the approach adopted by Mr Lonergan is in my opinion the
correct approach.
IWI is entitled to damages from Rimila for infringement
pursuant to s. 115(2) of the Act. It is also entitled for
conversion damages pursuant to s. 116(1), but not to the
extent that there is an overlap between the two.
I accept the submission of counsel for Rimila that the
primary infringement and focus for damages by IWI must be the
making by Rimila for a commercial purpose of 3,222 copies of
the Participant's Manual BWS and 15 sets of 70 overhead
transparencies. I accept also the submission that IWI suffers
no additional loss as a result of the adaptation or
publication infringements once it has been fully compensated
for the reproduction.
As to infringement damages, the best measure is the
depreciation in value of the copyright as a chose in action:
Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd v Caxton Publishing Co Ltd [1936]
Ch 323 at 336. The application of this test requires that the
asset be valued as a chose in action and an assessment made of
the extent to which it has been damaged.
As to conversion damages which arise under s. 116(1) of
the Act, it is important to note that s. 116(1) provides
"Subject to this Act, the owner of the
copyright in a work or other subject-~-
matter is entitled in respect of any
infringing copy, or of any plate used or
intended to be used for making infringing
copies, to the rights and remedies, by way
of an action for conversion or detention,
to which he would be entitled if he were
the owner of the copy or plate and had
been the owner of the copy or plate since
the time when it was made."
The interpretation section (s. 10) defines an "infringing
copy" as:
"(a) in relation to a work - a
reproduction of the work, or of an
adaptation of the work, not being a
copy of a cinematograph film of the
work or adaptation;
(b) in relation to a sound recording - a
copy of the sound recording not being
a sound-track associated with visual
images forming part of a
cinematograph f1lm;
(c) in relation to a cinematograph film -
a copy of the film;
(dq) in relation to a television broadcast
or a sound broadcast - a copy of a
cinematograph film of the broadcast
or a record embodying a _ sound
recording of the broadcast; and
(e) in relation to a published edition of
a@ work - a = reproduction of the
edition;
being an article the making of which
constituted an infringement of the
copyright in the work, recording, film,
broadcast or edition or, in the case of an
article imported without the licence of
the owner of the copyright, would have
constituted an infringement of that
copyright if the article had been made in
Australia by the importer."
The relevant measure of damages for copyright conversion
is the same measure as common law conversion, that is, "by
reference to the value of the goods converted": Infabrics Ltd
v Jaytex Ltd [1982] AC 1 at 26 and W H Brine & Co v Whitton
(1981) 37 ALR 190 at 196-198.
-10-
The act of conversion 1s the act of dealing with the
article in a way that is "inconsistent with the rights of the
(deemed) owner" or "unequivocally as their own": Caxton
Publishing Co v Sutherland Publishing Co [1939] AC 178 at 189.
The value of the goods converted 1s the figure that someone is
prepared to pay: Caxton at 203-204. Here there is evidence
which assists in determining the value, namely, what was in
fact paid by the franchisees.
There is clear authority for the proposition that where
infringement damages under s. 115(2) and conversion damages
under s. 116(1) overlap, the total award of damages must be
reduced by the extent of the overlap: Caxton; Lewis Trusts v
Bambers Stores Ltd [1983] FSR 453.
Overlap occurs when' the infringement measure is
"essentially an award of damages in respect of the same
sales": Lewis Trusts per Ditton L.J. at 469-470. Overlap
occurs, on the facts of the present case, if conversion
damages are awarded in respect of the same sales.
Claims were also made by IWI for additional damages under
s. 115(4) of the Act which provides as follows:
"Where, in an action under this section:
(a) an infringement of copyright is
established; and
(b) the court is satisfied that it is
proper to do so, having regard to:
(i) the flagrancy of the
infringement;
(ii) any benefit shown to have
accrued to the defendant by
reason of the infringement; and
(111) all other relevant matters,
the court may, in assessing damages for
the infringement, award such additional
damages as it considers appropriate in the
circumstances."
The term "flagrancy" has been variously defined in the
reported cases. It was described in Prior v Lansdowne Press
Pty Ltd (1975) 29 FLR 59 at 65 as "calculated disregard of the
plaintiff's rights, or cynical pursuit of benefit". In
Ravenscroft v Herbert & New English Library Ltd [1980] RPC 193
it was described at 208 as "the existence of scandalous
conduct, deceit and such like; it includes deliberate and
calculated copyright infringement."
Plainly, flagrancy is not established by proof of mere
knowledge of copying. If it were, then every instance of
infringement under s. 37 and s. 38 would attract additional
damages because knowledge of copying or of infringement is an
essential element of any act of secondary infringement under
those sections.
The term "benefit" in s. 115(4)(b)(i1) 1s not easy to
define. It 18 possible, as counsel for Rimila submitted, that
this expression is intended to encompass the case of innocent
infringers who benefit from the infringement and who should
therefore account for their profits, but are not amenable to
damages at all. Whatever be the answer to this, I am not
satisfied on the facts of this case that any discretion of the
Court which 1s given by s. 115(4) should be exercised in
favour of an award for additional damages. This is not a case
where there have been other instances of infringement by
Rimila, but not either precisely identified or quantifiable in
terms of damages. The conduct of Rimila and of Mr Tubbs was
not clandestine. The evidence makes clear that ali acts of
infringement have been ascertained and can be compensated for
in an award of damages. In my opinion no award of additional
damages under s. 115(4) is appropriate in all the
circumstances.
Facts
There was some degree of conflict of evidence between the
witnesses called for the parties on the hearing of the
assessment of damages. I prefer the evidence of Mr Tubbs on
this issue. I am satisfied that from about November 1985 to
December 1989 Rimila purchased PIIW course materials from IWI
and sold them to Rimila's franchisees. Rimila also granted to
those franchisees the right to conduct PIIW's courses in
defined territories in Australia and received a royalty from
franchisees for courses conducted. Those courses were taught
under the name "Business Writing Skills". The only payments
made by Rimila to IWI in order to offer the PIIW courses in
Australia was for the purchase of material. The total
- 13-
purchases of Participant's Manuals made by Rimila from IWI in
the period from November 1985 to December 1989 were 1,500
Participant's Manuals.
I accept Mr Tubbs's evidence that the following table
accurately sets out the number of courses taught, the number
of participants and the royalties realized by Rimila in the
teaching of PIIW courses for the period 1986 to 1989. I
accept his evidence that no revenue was realized in 1985
because any courses taught during November and December 1985
were free promotional courses.
. 1986 1987 1988 1989 ota
Courses
taught 34 45 28 34 141
Number of
participants 473 598 292 406 1,769
Royalty (SA) 14,168 17,654.40 9,804.40 13,268"
The number of participants (1,769) exceeds the number of
workbooks purchased from IWI because Participant's Manuals
were also used from the teaching sets purchased in late 1985
from Gower TFI.
Rimila received two forms of income from the teaching of
these courses: workbooks purchased by Rimila from IWI were
onsold to franchisees at approximately the landed cost price;
and franchisees paid a royalty to Rimila of 20% of gross fees
from teaching PIIW courses. The selling price by Rimila of
the PIIW participant's manuals varied somewhat as the landed
cost of those goods to Rimila varied, but averaged
approximately A$36.00. That price was made up of the price
paid to IWI (about US$21.00, which with exchange rate
fluctuations was usually about A$30.00), plus costs incurred
in shipping the books to Australia.
Rimila's franchisees received from PIIW courses which
they taught, 80% of the gross fee less the cost of purchasing
one workbook per participant, less certain expenses and
overheads of conducting a course.
I accept that in 1986 there were effectively 15
franchisees of Rimila and that by 1990 the figure had
increased to 26 and stayed at approximately 26 continuously
Since then.
The facts most relevant to the assessment by Mr Lonergan
of IWI's claim for damages are as follows:
(a) Rimila was appointed on or about 26 September 1985 as
IWI's exclusive Australian distributor of PIIW courses;
(b) At that time there were other Australian distributors of
PIIW courses whose sales were very small;
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(9)
(h)
The total sales by IWI to Rimila were small;
In 1989 Rimila decided to give up the PIIW courses and
produce its own writing course which it adopted from
March 1990 until early November 1992;
On or about 8 March 1990 Rimila commenced selling its own
course entitled "Business Writing Skills" (BWS)
throughout its franchise network;
The Participant's Manual and Overhead Projector
Transparencies (OHPs) used in the BWS course sold by
Rimila were in breach of IWI's copyright in the PIIW
course materials;
In late October 1992 Rimila introduced a revised BWS
course which was no longer in breach of copyright in the
PIIW course materials; and
Although well known in the United States, IWI is a small
company which measures its gross revenue in hundreds of
thousands, not millions, of dollars.
Mr Lonergan expressed the opinion that Mr Pittorino's
report contained a number of major errors in methodology. He
summarized them as follows:-
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(f)
(g)
- 16 -
various examples of double counting in the assessment of
alleged loss;
the failure to distinguish between Rimila's sale of PIIW
courses and its other business activities; likewise with
respect to Rimila's franchisees;
the failure to allow for the actual costs incurred by
Rimila (or its franchisees) in assessing its alleged
profitability;
the use of an inadequate discount rate and inadequate
allowance for risk to assess the present value of the
alleged loss of future PIIW sales;
the failure to take account of the impact of changed
market conditions and the impact of intervening economic
events on the alleged growth potential of PIIW sales;
the failure to take into account the natural limits of
the market and reaction of competitors when assessing the
alleged growth potential of PIIW sales;
the treatment of the alleged loss during the relatively
short period of time when the infringement occurred, as
if it was a loss in perpetuity;
(h)
(4)
(i)
(k)
(1)
the failure to take into account the fact that IWI could
re-enter the allegedly large market for PIIW type
training courses either directly or via another agent
from, at least, late October, 1992;
the use of an incorrect volume and incorrect sales price
per unit sold to assess IWI's entitlement to conversion
damages;
the failure to take into account the likely actions of
other potential or actual competitors of PIIW type
products;
the failure to perform any reasonability check on the
damages allegedly incurred by IwI;
the failure to allow for the price elasticity of demand
(eg. that higher sales prices of IWI manuals ($27) would
have reduced consumer demand compared to the price of
Rimila's manuals of $7.50 to $12.50) in calculating the
alleged potential sales revenue and profitability of
Rimila;
the failure to allow for all costs incurred by IWI;
the failure to distinguish between ratio of other course
material sales of Power (major proportion) and those of
Rimila (negligible);
(0) the failure to take into account that the growth of
Rimila''s sales was partly as a result of the
corresponding decline in sales by Power;
(p) the failure to take into account changes in the exchange
rate between the Australian and U.S. dollars;
(q) the failure to take into account the statement by the
president of IWI that total sales lost by IWI were only
USS$55,437;
(vr) the failure to take into account the statement by the
president of the plaintiff that no sales by IWI were lost
beyond early 1993; and
(s) the failure to distinguish between turnover and
profits/cash flow in measuring the value of royalties.
In my opinion each of these criticisms by Mr Lonergan of
Mr Pittorino's report is warranted.
Mr Lonergan then proceeded to give his opinion with
respect to the damages and loss sustained by IWI. He divided
the claims into a claim for infringement damages and a claim
for conversion damages. He assumed that the measure of
- 19 -
infringement damages is the depreciation caused by the
infringement to the value of the copyright as a chose in
action. He assumed that the measure of conversion damages 15
the market value of the copies at the date of conversion less
any post-conversion expenses.
Mr Lonergan adopted as the measure of the value of the
copyright as a chose in action the net present value of future
cashflows. There is evidence that this is the standard
accounting procedure; in my opinion it is a sensible and
practical one. When dealing with infringement damages Mr
Lonergan said that the first relevant factor he took into
account was the historical revenue earned by IWI during the
period prior to infringement, based on the number of attendees
at Rimila's franchise business writing skills courses. He
then took the number of participants requiring manuals in PIIW
courses taught by the franchisees of Rimila in each of the
years 1986 to 1989. He expressed certain qualifications about
this (which it is not necessary for me to state) and concluded
that the total gross income generated by IWI from its sales to
Rimila were on average about $12,100 per annun. Using
assumptions favourable to IWI (that is no decline in sales and
an exchange rate of $US0.7 and a profit of 84.5%) he said one
reaches a maximum gross profit of $10,225 per annum. The
infringement continued for two years and ten ~months.
Therefore by multiplying 10,225 by 2 years and 10 months one
reaches $28,971. This is therefore the starting point as to
- 20 -
the correct, and indeed upper, limit of IWI's claim for
infringement damages under s. 115(2) of the Act. This figure,
however, needs to be reduced because it is based on the
assumption that the entire value of the copyright in the
relevant works is destroyed by reason of the infringement.
The evidence establishes to my satisfaction that for reasons
which are quite unrelated to the infringement, sales of the
PIIW courses were declining and disappearing and that IWI's
profit could not have been as high as 84.5%. Mr Joseph, the
president of IWI, accepted this in cross examination. Also
IWI did not take steps to mitigate its losses. This appears
clearly from Mr Joseph's evidence in cross examination. It
did not seek another distributor here or look into the market
potential; these factors must be taken into account. It is
impossible to make any precise quantification of the
percentage or amount by which the upper limit of $28,971
should be reduced; I am persuaded from the evidence and the
submissions that a reduction of 30% for these factors is fair
and reasonable. This therefore produces a figure for a s.
115(2) damages of $20,280 (that is $28,971 x 70%).
As to infringement damages, Mr Lonergan said that the
first relevant factor taken into account was the historical
revenue earned by IWI during the period prior to the
infringement, based on the number of attendees at Rimila
Franchise Business Writing Skills courses. He then took the
number of participants requiring manuals in PIIW courses
- 21 -
taught by the franchisees of Rimila in each of the years 1986
to 1989. He expressed certain qualifications to this (which
it is not necessary for me to state) and concluded that the
total gross income generated by IWI from its sales to Rimila
were on average about $12,100 per annum.
As to conversion damages, Mr Lonergan assumed that the
law focuses on the specific works found to be an infringement,
in this case the Participant's Manual and OHP, and then awards
the copyright owners the market value of those goods at the
time of their conversion. He then set out his calculations to
determine the correct measure of conversion damages to which
IWI is entitled as follows:
The market value of manuals $28,419.00
by Rimila based on the number
of manuals at actual sales price
Plus: The value of Overhead
Projector Transparencies supplied
by Rimila (1) $ 1,050.00
Less: Post-conversion expenses (2) $_3,200.00
$26,269.00
Notes:
(1) He did not review documents concerning supply of
OHPs, and assumed the calculation of the value of
OHPs supplied set out in the affidavit of Mr Tubbs
to be accurate.
(2) He assumed the calculation of these expenses in the
affidavit of Mr Tubbs to be accurate. (It is
unnecessary to recite them.)
- 22 -
In my opinion Mr Lonergan's approach to the assessment of
conversion damages is correct.
He then proceeded to take into account overlap between s.
115(2) and s. 116(1) damages. He approached the matter as
follows. Mr Lonergan assumed that infringement damages are
awarded on the basis of profit which the copyright owner would
have made but for the infringement. He said that the owner
cannot also recover conversion damages for those same sales
because the infringement damages already put the plaintiff in
the position that it would have been in had it made those
sales itself. Mr Lonergan's calculation of infringement
damages assumed, in order to establish a maximum value for the
copyright, that, but for the infringement, sales would have
continued for two years and ten months at their historical
average rate. He concluded that the overlap is therefore the
conversion value of 1,252 manuals, on the basis of IWI having
sold 1,252 manuals during the period of two years and ten
months, 442 being the average number of participants in PIIW
courses taught by Rimila's franchisees in that historical
period. He calculated the average value of the manuals
converted by Rimila to have been $8.82 (the total price
realized $28,419 divided by the number sold 3,222). Therefore
the value of the overlap between conversion and infringement
damages is, he said, 1,252 x 8.82, namely $11,043. If awarded
both infringement and conversion damages, as calculated by Mr
Lonergan, he says IWI would be credited with having made the
- 23 -
1,252 sales of manuals twice. In my view Mr Lonergan's
approach to this question is correct. It follows that the sum
of $26,269 for conversion damages must be reduced by the sum
of $11,043 as representing what Mr Lonergan describes as
"double counting with infringement damages" or expressed in
other words as the value of the overlap between conversion and
infringement damages.
IWI is therefore entitled to recover damages from Rimila
in the sum of $20,280 for s. 115(2) damages and $15,226 as s.
116(1) damages, a total of $35,506.
Interest
Interest under s. 51A of the Federal Court of Australia
Act 1976 is applied for by IWI. No good cause has been shown
to the contrary (see s. 51A(1)). Interest should therefore be
included in the sum for which judgment is given in accordance
with that section. It should be awarded at the relevant Court
rate applicable from time to time during the currency of the
period from the accrual of the cause of action to the date of
judgment.
Conclusion
Counsel for all parties have asked me to enter no formal
award for damages at this stage, but to allow them to peruse
my reasons in case any further brief submissions need to be
made. When the matter is relisted I shall make a formal award
of damages and deal with the question of costs.
In the result, I am satisfied that IWI is entitled to an
award of damages in the sum of $35,506 together with interest.
I shall make no orders today but stand the matter over to a
date to be fixed for the purpose of hearing brief submissions
on any outstanding questions with respect to damages and on
costs, including the question whether the award should be
against Rimila and Mr Tubbs equally or in different
proportions.
I certify that this and the
preceding twenty-three (23)
pages are a true copy of the
reasons for judgment herein of
the Honourable Mr. Justice
Lockhart.
Associate Leh [ex Cu
Dated: 25 November 1994
Counsel for Applicant : Mr C J Bevan
Solicitors for Applicant : Anisimoff Davenport
Counsel for Respondent : Mr R Cobden
Solicitors for Respondent: Baker and McKenzie
Dates of Hearing : 17, 18 August, 12, 13
September 1994
Date of Judgment 3 25 November 1994