Tasmanian Conservation Trust Inc. v. Minister for Resources & Anor [1994] FCA 944

JUDGMENT No, wnat ty GY

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES REGISTRY - No NG 536 of 1994 GENERAL DIVISION

TASMANIAN CONSERVATION TRUST INCORPORATED Applicant

RECEIVED ~7 DEC 1994

FEDERAL COURT Or

AUSTRALIA PRINCIPAL REGISTRY

AND:

MINISTER FOR RESOURCES AND ANOR i Respondent

CORAM: SACKVILLE J. PLACE: SYDNEY DATE: 17 NOVEMBER 1994

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HIS HONOUR: Mx Basten has tendered a statement contained in a paragraph of a letter dated 10 January 1994. That letter is addressed to the executive director of the Australian Heritage Commission and it is signed by Mr Ross Dalton who is described as acting assistant secretary, forests branch, land resources division. The statement that is tendered consists of two sentences. The first refers to the sources of saw logs to be processed by Gunns which is the second respondent in the present proceedings. That statement asserts that the sources are the same as those considered for two licences granted to two other

companies.

~2- The second sentence states a belief framed with the words "we believe". The belief expressed is that should the Minister issue a licence to Gunns, including the export of wood chips from logs harvested from certain National Estate areas, there would be an adverse effect on the National Estate in relation to logging operations and hence he would need to formally consult with the you, that is with the Australian Heritage Commission, in accordance with s.30 of the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975. Although some argument was directed to the possible

application of s.7B of the Evidence Act 1905 (Cth) as the basis for supporting the admissibility of this statement in the letter,

Mr Basten ultimately rested his submission on the proposition that the statements should be regarded as admissions, admissible as such as against the Minister, but not as against the second respondent. Technically speaking, that would produce the consequence that the statement would be admissible against the first respondent only but not against the second respondent. As Mr Hale has pointed out it may be that that is a distinction that will be more theoretical than practical in its application to the circumstances of this case. Be that as it may, I should deal