Stanbridge, D. v Minister for Defence & Ors [1995] FCA 318

CATCHWORDS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - standing - no sufficient standing to challenge the decision by the relevant Minister to destroy military weapons Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) - ss 3(4) and 5 Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers v Secretary, Department of Transport (1986) 71 ALR 73 Applied Broadbridge v Stammers (1987) 76 ALR 339 Applied R v Greater London Council; Ex parte Blackburn (1976) 1 WLR 550 Not followed Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association v Minister for Industrial Affairs (High Court, unreported, 10 May, 1995) Considered Dennis Stanbridge v Minister for Defence, Senator The Hon. Robert Francis Ray & Anor. QG 54 of 1995 Drummond J Brisbane 18 May, 1995

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA) No. QG 54 of 1995 QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY ) GENERAL DIVISION ) BETWEEN: DENNIS STANBRIDGE Applicant AND: MINISTER FOR DEFENCE, SENATOR THE HON. ROBERT FRANCIS RAY and the BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BHP (BROKEN HILL PROPRIETARY) FOR 1994/5 Respondents MINUTES OF ORDERS JUDGE MAKING ORDER: Drummond J DATE OF ORDER: 18 May, 1995 WHERE MADE: Brisbane THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The application be dismissed. 2. The applicant pay the respondents' costs of these proceedings, to be taxed. NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA) No. QG 54 of 1995 QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY ) GENERAL DIVISION ) BETWEEN: DENNIS STANBRIDGE Applicant AND: MINISTER FOR DEFENCE, SENATOR THE HON. ROBERT FRANCIS RAY and the BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BHP (BROKEN HILL PROPRIETARY) FOR 1994/5 Respondents Coram: Drummond J Date: 18 May, 1995 Place: Brisbane REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Mr. Stanbridge applies under s. 5(1) the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ("the ADJR Act") to review a decision of the Minister for Defence to have a large number of military weapons melted down. Mr. Stanbridge has put material, which includes newspaper reports, before me that indicates that BHP, whose directors he has also joined in these proceedings, has been engaged to carry out this task. There is an obvious difficulty in justifying the joinder of the BHP directors in these proceedings under the Act upon which Mr. Stanbridge relies. However, when the matter was before me last week, it was also obvious from what Mr. Stanbridge had to say in his application on the issue of his being "a person aggrieved" by the Minister's decision, that it was highly unlikely that he comes within the meaning of that expression in s. 5 the ADJR Act as defined in s. 3(4)(a), and as explained in a large body of case law, which includes decisions of appeal courts that are binding on me. I therefore set down for determination today as a preliminary question whether Mr. Stanbridge was an aggrieved person for the purposes of the ADJR Act. Mr. Stanbridge and the other parties to the application, in accordance with my directions, have prepared and exchanged written arguments. Mr. Stanbridge's is exhibit 1. It contains not only argument but factual material which Mr. Stanbridge wishes to put before me and which I have read. His concerns centre on the decision by the Minister to have a large quantity of what he says are perfectly serviceable weapons melted down when the Australian military now has to rely on what he submits is an inferior basic weapon. He fears that this decision will encourage the invasion of this country. He has identified many other concerns he has which he says are associated with these two core considerations. I accept that he has gone to much trouble and effort to inform himself about the decision, the background to it and what he identifies as the consequences of it. He has no doubt taken a much greater interest personally in the matter than most other Australian citizens. However, it is plain beyond doubt in my view that he is not a person aggrieved by this decision within the meaning which I am bound to give to this term in the ADJR Act by the case law. The meaning of the term is authoritatively laid down in a decision of the Full Court of this Court Broadbridge v Stammers (1987) 76 A.L.R. 339. There it was suggested that a person employed as a country post master lacked standing because he was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of that expression in the ADJR Act to challenge a decision of the Postal Authorities under the Postal Services Act 1975 (Cth) to close down his post office. The submission failed. The Court approved a statement by Gummow J, of what it is necessary to show before a person can establish that he is an aggrieved person for the purposes of the ADJR Act, in Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers v Secretary, Department of Transport (1986) 71 A.L.R. 73 adopting the principle that, before a person will be an aggrieved person for the purposes of s. 5 the ADJR Act, there must flow from the decision sought to be challenged a danger and peril to the interests of the person challenging it that is clear and imminent rather than remote, indirect or fanciful, and that the person challenging the decision must be able to show that he has an interest in the matter of an intensity and degree well above that of an ordinary member of the public.