Nirmalan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1997] FCA 1619
Federal Court of Australia
Full text
Select any passage to save a personal note with optional tags.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Between:
JUDGMENT No, 46.7
osvoccotece
~
) No. NG 1032 of 1997
~
PATHMANATHAN NIRMALAN
Applicant
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
haul Koo |
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
DERAL COURT
FOF AUSTRALIA
21 JAN 2003
LIBRARY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
EINFELD J SYDNEY 19 DECEMBER 1997
The applicant seeks an order for review of a. decision of the
Refugee Review Tribunal made on 28 July 1997. The applicant
appears for himself in these proceedings and his application for
order of review is handwritten. Attached to it is a typewritten
document which represents what appears to be something very
similar to the substance of the submission made to the Refugee
Review Tribunal. It was not the submission itself that was made
there and is in fact a commentary on the Tribunal's decision but
it contains a number of matters similar to those put to the
' Tribunal at its hearing.
The application for an order of review was that the Tribunal had
made what was described as "an unfair decision". It was alleged
that the Tribunal failed to take the applicant's evidence into
its account, denied him natural justice, and made certain other
chepseewbsag Land howedtede rs
-2-
errors which are presented as if they were errors of law but in
fact represent a challenge to various findings of fact. The
application was supplemented by a motion seeking an order that
the applicant's removal from Australia be stopped "Uritded, his
¥ 4.
appeal could be heard and for similar orders.
Pe hes if a
grounds that it was not filed within 28 days weno eo nt
ret end
being notified of the decision. The Minister pointed to the fact
that the legislation now prevents the Court from extending that
time. Accordingly, it was asserted that the Court has no
jurisdiction in relation either to the application or the motion.
When the matter was first listed for hearing in this Court on 12
December 1997, I pointed out to Mr Pathmanathan that it was in
the circumstances not possible for the Court to hear the matter
even if his assertions in relation to the failings of the
Tribunal were correct because of the fact that it was
substantially out of time. I have in this connection read the
material upon which he wishes to rely in relation to the delay
which is all set out in another affidavit in typewritten form. I
call it an affidavit; it is dated 11 December but the copy in the
file has not actually been signed. I have assumed, however, that
it represents the evidence upon which the applicant wishes to
rely in relation to the extension of time.
I explained to Mr Pathmanathan that the Court had no power to
grant an extension of time and the only course that might be open
to him is an application to the High Court. As I am now
informed, no such application has been made but the applicant has
presented to the Court today by fax an affidavit dated 18
December which is in typewritten form. It sets out the grounds
of his application which are not dissimilar to, but are a little
more particular than, those made in the original application. [In
the new affidavit he says that procedures required by the
Migration Act were not observed in that the Tribunal failed to
consider the matter according to substantial justice and the
merits of the case, a requirement of section 420 of the Migration
Act.
The particulars given in this regard are that the Tribunal failed
to make findings in relation to and address the substance of that
part of his case for review which relied upon his fear of
persecution by the authorities in Sri Lanka. The second
allegation is that the Tribunal failed to make findings of a
similar kind and on the same subject. There is a reference there
to something he did in 1997 in Sri Lanka but in fact the
applicant has not been in Sri Lanka for very many years so I
presume that he meant 1987.
=4-
The third ground is that the Tribunal failed to make findings on
the fear of persecution arising out of events that he raised
before it and are raised in his submissions concerning his
involvement with the Tamil Separatist organisation, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The affidavit of
yesterday also alleges an error of law in that the Tribunal
either incorrectly interpreted the applicable law or incorrectly
applied the law to the facts.
The specific assertion is that the Tribunal misinterpreted the
definition of a refugee or misapplied the definition to the facts
found by it or failed to act according to substantial justice in
deciding that he was not a refugee. In turn, the particulars of
that allegation appear to be that it did not consider that the
definition required that consideration be given to the cumulative
effect of the various fears of persecution that he held; that it
did not consider that the definition required that consideration
be given to each aspect of a claim of fear of persecution; that
it ignored the fact that he had helped the LTTE which was brought
and came to the adverse attention of the authorities, and also
ignored that he had been arrested and kept in detention for 17
days with 8 other Tamils when he was in Colombo by concluding
that he had only been kept and released overnight in what I have
assumed to be 1987. He explained that the tension and torture
involved in this type of treatment creates immense fear in the
minds of a Tamil when considering the situation in Sri Lanka.
The Court is, of course, acutely aware of the situation in Sri
Lanka and the difficult position in which Tamils have found
themselves now for very many years. It is a matter of great
regret that in such a lovely country it has been found impossible
to bring the current conflict to a peaceful end much earlier than
now, and that as a consequence many people have been killed and
ill treated and some Tamils in particular live in considerable
fear for their safety from time to time. Of course, Tamils are
not the only people in Sri Lanka who are the victims of the long
running conflict in that country, but many of them have certainly
endured a great deal of suffering and apprehension over the
years.
There are, however, two problems with the applicant's
application. One is the one I raised early last week, and that
is that his application is well out of time and there is no power
for the Court to extend the time. Moreover, the reasons given by
him for any possible extension of time, even if it were
permitted, do not strike me as even beginning to address the
reason as to why he did not make his application within time.
Thus even if there was a power to extend, it would be very
difficult to exercise it in this particular case upon the grounds
given.
The second problem with the application is that the assertions
made by the applicant, although dressed up in legal language, are
in fact assertions of fact and not of law. A reading of the
Tribunal's decision shows that all of the matters referred to by
the applicant were considered by the Tribunal, but for the
reasons set out in the Tribunal's decision they were not accepted
or at least to the point of creating the type of fear of
persecution to which the convention is directed. As I pointed
out to Mr Pathmanathan last week, everything that happened to him
in this regard happened ten years ago or more. The likelihood
that the same people are in charge of the security forces now as
then is extremely remote, Likewise it is my experience of such
matters that the record-keeping in most countries where this type
of thing occurs is unlikely to be anything like as efficient as
would be needed in order to identify him as the same person who
had come under what I might describe for present purposes as
adverse attention more than ten years ago.
It has been held time and again that for someone to be able to
establish a risk of persecution of the kind referred to in the
Geneva Convention, it is necessary to establish that the relevant
threat is special or particular to the applicant rather than as
-7-
might apply to everyone else in the same category of people in
the country concerned. As I have earlier mentioned, the
situation of Tamils in Sri Lanka is certainly not what is desired
or desirable and quite understandably creates considerable
concern to them and to the international community. Indeed much
effort is being expended to try to address this problem on a day
by day basis, internationally as well as within Sri Lanka. But
Mr Pathmanathan's situation, as it seems to me, is unlikely to be
any different on his return than applies to everyone else in Sri
Lanka, and that is clearly something which the Convention cannot
support even if there was a valid application before the Court.
However, as I have said, there is nothing before the Court which
can be dealt with. The only Court in this country that can deal
with any matter relating to Mr Pathmanathan is the High Court,
which may have some constitutional basis for intervention. I
mentioned this last week and suggested that Mr Pathmanathan
obtain pro bono legal advice if he could not afford a lawyer. It
does not seem to have happened and I very much regret that I
cannot extend the matter any further. Accordingly, the
application of review is dismissed.
(After discussion]
| certify that this andthe *'*
I order that the applicant pay the fdspenddentss aie astrue Copy of the
Justice Enfela
Mil» Associate
Dated: J. 2. a
Re:sons for judgment herein of his Honour :
t
i
:
"
Related laws
No related documents linked yet.
You've got 21 of 22 free Acts left this visit. Sign up anytime for Facts, Related, and study briefs too.