Federal Court of Australia
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY NG 3186 of 1997
BETWEEN: Ronald Seaforth Weatherall
Applicant
AND: Satellite Receiving Systems (Australia) Pty Ltd
First Respondent
Gregory Paul Mullane
Second Respondent
Grandos Pty Ltd
Third Respondent
Wilson (Wenjun) Wang
Fourth Respondent
Compact Pty Ltd
Fifth Respondent
Universal Space Technology Limited
Sixth Respondent
Satellite Receiving Systems (Qld) Pty Ltd
Seventh Respondent
Satellite Receiving Systems (WA) Pty Ltd
Eight Respondent
JUDGE: WHITLAM J
DATE OF ORDER: 6 august 1998
WHERE MADE: SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The motion is refused with costs. 2. The matter is stood over for further directions on Thursday 13 August 1998 at 9.30am.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY NG 3186 of 1997
BETWEEN: Ronald Seaforth Weatherall
Applicant
AND: Satellite Receiving Systems (Australia) Pty Ltd
First Respondent
Gregory Paul Mullane
Second Respondent
Grandos Pty Ltd
Third Respondent
Wilson (Wenjun) Wang
Fourth Respondent
Compact Pty Ltd
Fifth Respondent
Universal Space Technology Limited
Sixth Respondent
Satellite Receiving Systems (Qld) Pty Ltd
Seventh Respondent
Satellite Receiving Systems (WA) Pty Ltd
Eight Respondent
JUDGE: WHITLAM J
DATE: 6 August 1998
PLACE: SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT (EX TEMPORE) On this motion, notice of which was filed on 22 July 1998, the applicant seeks an order that each of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth respondents give "general discovery by filing and serving … a Verified List of Documents". As I understand it, this means that the applicant seeks a list of documents relating to all matters in question in the proceedings. The motion is opposed. In support of the motion, counsel for the applicant commenced to read the applicant's affidavit sworn on 17 July 1998. It was soon apparent that much of that affidavit was not in admissible form, irrelevant or both. When I say that part of the affidavit was not in admissible form, I am conscious of the fact that evidence in an interlocutory proceeding need only be on an information and belief basis. Counsel for the applicant then reverted to the pleadings to identify the matters in question in the proceedings. I need only say that the application and the statement of claim, both filed on 7 August 1997, are two of the most bizarre documents I have ever seen. In exchanges with counsel for the applicant, I was unable to obtain any satisfactory description of the causes of action supposed to be alleged in the statement of claim. To the extent that counsel was able to articulate any causes of action, it was necessary for him to supply many facts that do not appear in that statement of claim. I should say, too, that the company named as the sixth respondent in the proceedings has not yet been served. Nor has any application been made for substituted service on that company. The company was evidently incorporated at one time in the British Virgin Islands and, as I have been told at a number of directions hearings, it may well have been dissolved. The continuance of proceedings against that company, without any application for substituted service, is prima facie an abuse of process. The remaining respondents have been served and are represented by a solicitor, Mr Hand. In support of the motion, counsel for the applicant read part of an affidavit sworn by Mr Hand on 4 August 1998. Consequently, there are two letters in evidence. One is from Mr Hand to the solicitor for the applicant, dated 24 December 1997. The other more important letter is dated 6 July 1998 and is from the solicitor for the applicant to Mr Hand. In it the applicant's solicitor asks Mr Hand to treat the letter as a formal notice to produce. The schedule to the letter of 6 July 1998 comprises six pages and seeks a huge variety of documents. Some of those documents are sought from the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth respondents. However, others are sought from people who are not party to these proceedings, including the company named as sixth respondent. Counsel for the applicant was obliged to concede, of course, that he could not press for discovery from persons who are not parties. Nonetheless, the breadth of the discovery sought shows how ill conceived these proceedings are, comprising as they do badly drafted pleadings, ill-conceived causes of action and the joinder of quite disparate causes of action which it would never, in my view, be appropriate to hear together. In addition, if discovery is necessary it should have been addressed before this matter was referred to a judge's docket. Nor is the fact that the so‑called agreed informal discovery was not provided to the applicant's satisfaction something to be held against the respondents. The applicant must take his own course in relation to the conduct of the proceedings. As I have said, the pleadings defy description and in the circumstances it would be quite hopeless, in my view, to order discovery because the matters in question in the proceedings are impossible to identify. I propose to refuse the motion and to stand the matter over with a view to fixing it for hearing in the event that none of the parties are prepared to move for any further interlocutory relief. Might I add that, before being allocated to my docket, this matter was before different Deputy District Registrars on several occasions. On those occasions, directions were given for the completion of pleadings and the filing of affidavits. When, on 13 February 1998, the matter was allocated to my docket it was on the basis that it was ready for hearing. Despite this the matter has come before me on no less than four occasions. Regardless of my invitations to the respondents to take steps to have the matter struck out or the pleadings addressed, only the applicant's motion for discovery is before me today. If there is at the base of this matter a genuine commercial dispute between the parties, it seems to me that it might be resolved by mediation. However, the court is limited in terms of what it can do of its own motion. It appears to me that the only way to bring this particular matter to a head is, provided that it is ready for hearing now that the motion for discovery has been refused, to fix it for hearing and to refer it to mediation in the interim. The applicant's motion for general discovery is refused with costs. I stand the matter over for further directions on Thursday 13 August 1998 at 9.30am.
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