FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA Applicant "F" v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 304 MIGRATION – review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal affirming respondent's refusal to grant protection visa – whether Tribunal failed to set out findings on material questions of fact – whether Tribunal's decision was an improper exercise of power – whether there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision – whether Tribunal based its decision on a particular fact which did not exist – whether the information which the Tribunal may "get" under s 424(1) of the Migration Act, extends beyond information obtained on its own initiative and includes information supplied by the applicant – whether Tribunal thus obliged to "have regard" to that information. Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 13(3), 15AB Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424(1), 430(1)(c), 476(1)(d), 476(3), 476(1)(g), 476(4)(b) Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469 applied APPLICANT 'F' v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS W 173 of 2000 CARR J 23 MARCH 2001 PERTH IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY W 173 OF 2000 BETWEEN: APPLICANT "F" Applicant AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS Respondent JUDGE: CARR J DATE OF ORDER: 23 MARCH 2001 WHERE MADE: PERTH THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The application be dismissed. 2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY W 173 OF 2000 BETWEEN: APPLICANT "F" Applicant AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS Respondent JUDGE: CARR J DATE: 23 MARCH 2001 PLACE: PERTH REASONS FOR JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION 1 This is an application for an order of review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, made on 20 September 2000, by which the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant a protection visa to the applicant. The applicant, who is a citizen of Iran, arrived in Australia in June 2000. On 30 June 2000 he applied for a protection visa. On 9 August 2000 a delegate of the respondent refused to grant him a protection visa. On 11 August 2000 the applicant sought review of the delegate's decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal. the applicant's claims and the Tribunal's decision 2 The applicant's claims, in summary, were as follows: · Between 1979 and 1981 or 1982, when still in High School, he was involved with the Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organisation ("the MKO"), Iran's leading opposition group. He distributed pamphlets, put posters up for them, sold the MKO newspaper and worked at a shop selling MKO books. He ceased to be involved in these activities after the leader of the MKO, Massoud Rajavi, was forced to flee the country in 1981 and the MKO was suppressed. · In 1980 the applicant's family moved from Abadan in the south of Iran to Sari in the north. On leaving school he worked in a steel plant and in high voltage electricity plants both in Sari and in Esfahan. · In 1984 he was detained and questioned for three hours in Esfahan in connection with the activities of a group called Hojatieh, led by Mehdi Hashemi, a fundamentalist Islamic group. The applicant gave details of this incident and the events leading up to it. · While carrying out his military service between 1986 and 1988 the applicant had been detained for 104 or 109 days because his file contained information that he had been involved with the MKO. For at least a month he had been bashed every day. · After his military service the applicant returned to work in high voltage electricity plants and managed to complete his examinations to obtain his certificate for year 9. He gave details of his employment record including employment from 1994 with a company in the petro-chemical industry, which employment ended in about November 1999 when he was dismissed. · In his statement accompanying his original application for a protection visa the applicant said that in 1999 members of the Iranian Intelligence Service had detained him, blindfolded him and questioned him for three hours, including questions about what he thought about Ayatollah Khomeini. They had threatened him, kicked him and called him names. As a result of these beatings he had lost some teeth and had back problems. The applicant did not know exactly why he had been arrested, but thought that the Intelligence Service believed that he was not supporting the Islamic regime and was not displaying respect for the religious leaders of Iranian society. · Also in 1999, the applicant had become involved with a few friends in making copies of videotapes for distribution to inform people about what was happening in Iran. One tape was of Ayatollah Montazeri (a dissident cleric, currently under house arrest) speaking against Ayatollah Khomeini. Another tape had been of a student meeting. The Intelligence Service in Teheran had become interested in him, had searched his house, but had not found the videotapes as he had moved them. This claim was made in his statement accompanying his original application. At a subsequent interview the applicant said he had given one of the tapes to a person who he had thought was a friend, but who had actually been working for the Intelligence Service. He had been arrested, but was freed because there had been no proof. · At the hearing before the Tribunal, the applicant explained that he had been arrested in about October 1999 at his sister's house for possession of an audio-tape of a speech of Ayatollah Montazeri directed against the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei and a videotape showing members of the Anasar-e-Hezbollah disrupting a meeting of students at Teheran University. He had been released after three hours, but the Intelligence Service had sent a letter to his employers asking them not to employ him any longer, with the result that he lost his employment in about November 1999 and had decided to leave Iran. · The applicant had converted from Islam, or at least for the time being had no religion. He was interested in Christianity and he was learning about Christianity. If the Iranian Government knew that he wanted to convert to Christianity they would punish him severely. · In March or April 2000 the applicant left Iran travelling on an Iranian passport, (which he had obtained in 1996) in his own name. He had not had any problems leaving Iran because he had used the services of a smuggler. 3 Rather than attempt to summarise the Tribunal's findings and reasons, I set them out in full below. I have added paragraph numbers to facilitate references, which I make below, to parts of those findings and reasons. "FINDINGS AND REASONS FOR DECISION 1. I accept that when the Applicant was still at school he was involved with the MKO but that his involvement did not continue after the MKO was suppressed in Iran in 1981. I accept that the Applicant was detained while doing his military service because his juvenile involvement in the MKO came to light. However I do not accept that the Applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his juvenile involvement in the MKO if he returns to Iran now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Applicant was issued with an Iranian passport in 1996 and, as the Applicant himself noted, this indicates that he did not have security problems at the time. 2. I accept that the Applicant was arrested and questioned for three hours in 1984. However as the Applicant's evidence developed it appears that he was arrested on this occasion because he was taking notes of a speech made by one of the members of the Hojatieh in a mosque rather than because of his actual or imputed political opinion. In any event no further consequences appear to have flowed for the Applicant as a result of his arrest on this occasion. 3. I do not accept that the Applicant was arrested in March 1999 at the time of the local council elections and questioned about his attitude to Ayatollah Khomeini, as the Applicant said in the statement accompanying his original application. I consider that it is implausible for the Applicant to suggest that he would have been singled out to be arrested and threatened, kicked and beaten for no apparent reason. At the hearing before me the Applicant suggested for the first time that he had in fact been singled out as a result of his involvement in campaigning for a friend in the local council elections. He said that he had mentioned this before but that it had not been translated. However I note that the statement accompanying the Applicant's original application indicates that it was translated back to him in the Farsi language before he signed it. I consider that the Applicant's evidence that he was campaigning for a friend in the local council elections is an embellishment intended to provide some explanation for his arrest on this occasion. 4. I likewise do not accept that the Applicant was arrested again in October 1999 as a result of his role in copying an audio tape of Ayatollah Montazeri speaking against Ayatollah Khamenei and a video tape of a student meeting being disrupted by members of the Ansar-e-Hezbollah. I consider that the Applicant's evidence with regard to this incident is contradictory and implausible. The Applicant suggested that he had been released on this occasion after only three hours because there was no proof but he claimed that the reason he was arrested in the first place was that a tape had passed from him either directly (as he said at the Departmental interview) or indirectly (as he said at the hearing before me) to a person who was working for the Intelligence Service. The Applicant said that he believed that they thought that if he was free he would do some more things and they could have more proof to arrest him in the future but at the same time he suggested that his involvement in copying and distributing the tapes was regarded sufficiently gravely for the Intelligence Service to write to his employers asking them not to employ him any more. 5. Moreover, if the Applicant had been arrested in October 1999 and released after only three hours so that the authorities could gather more evidence against him, I do not accept that he would then have been allowed to leave Iran travelling on a passport in his own name as he did in March or Apri12000. As I put to the Applicant, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has advised that travel out of Iran through legal exit points is a reliable indication that a person is of no particular adverse political or security interest (DFAT Country Profile -Islamic Republic of Iran, March 1996, paragraph 1.7.1.3). The Applicant said that the reason he had been able to leave in this way was that he had paid a smuggler $1,000. However, as I put to him, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has advised that it would appear virtually impossible for Iranians whose names were on the computerised black-list because they were of adverse political or security interest to use bribery to have their names removed to effect a legal departure from Iran (DFAT Country Information Reports Nos. 78/99, dated 18 March 1999, CX34282, and 185/99, dated I June 1999, CX35323). 6. The Applicant said that the smuggler he had used had had connections with a person who worked for the Ministry of Information in Iran. He suggested that the exit of a person whose name was on the computerised black-list was not as serious as some of the other things that occurred through corruption in Iran. However I give greater weight to the independent advice of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in this regard and I conclude that the Applicant was not perceived by the Iranian Government as being of adverse political or security interest at the time that he left Iran. I do not accept, therefore, that he was arrested in October 1999 and released so that the authorities could gather more information against him nor that he was arrested, detained and beaten in March 1999 by reason of his political opinion, real or imputed. I likewise do not accept that the Applicant was dismissed from his employment in November 1999 at the request of the Intelligence Service following his supposed arrest in October 1999. 7. The Applicant's representatives submitted that the Applicant's lengthy absence from Iran and application for refugee status in Australia were likely to attract suspicion on his return to Iran and that this meant that he was likely to face mistreatment which could be characterised as persecutory. However, as I put to the Applicant, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has advised that the act of applying for asylum abroad is not, in itself, an offence in Iran. At worst knowledge that an individual had sought political asylum would not result in much more than verbal harassment, unless the asylum-seeker had had a high opposition political profile (DFAT Country Profile -Islamic Republic of Iran, March 1996, paragraph 1.7.6.2). 8. I consider that it is clear that the Applicant does not have a high opposition political profile in Iran. I have rejected above the Applicant's claims with regard to his arrests in March and October 1999 and I do not accept that the Applicant's juvenile involvement in the MKO has given him a significant opposition political profile. Once again I note in this connection that the fact that he left Iran travelling on a passport in his own name indicates that he was of no particular adverse political or security interest to the authorities at the time that he left (DFAT Country Profile -Islamic Republic of Iran, March 1996, paragraph 1.7.1.3). The Applicant suggested that he would be imprisoned or even killed if he were to return to Iran but I regard the Applicant's claims in this regard as fanciful. I do not accept that there is a real chance that the Applicant will be persecuted by reason of his political opinion, real or imputed, if he returns to Iran now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. 9. The Applicant said at the hearing before me that he had converted from Islam, or at least that for the time being he had no religion. He said that he was interested in Christianity and that he was learning about Christianity. He said that if the Iranian Government knew that he wanted to convert to Christianity they would punish him severely. However, as I put to the Applicant, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has advised that the evidence is that converts to Christianity who go about their devotions quietly are generally not disturbed (DFAT Country Profile -Islamic Republic of Iran, March 1996, paragraph 1.7.7.8). The Applicant said that if a Muslim converted he was regarded as an unbeliever and anyone could kill such a person in the street. However, while apostasy is regularly reported as carrying a death sentence there are only one or two high profile cases (involving Christian clergy) where this penalty has actually been imposed (DFAT Country Profile -Islamic Republic of Iran, March 1996, paragraph 1.7.7.8). 10. As I put to the Applicant, a delegation from a western country which visited the Assemblies of God church in Tehran was told that the Government appeared to be prepared to turn a blind eye to conversions, as long as the church was very discreet and low key in its proselytising activities (DFAT facsimile dated 5 March 1996, CXI5554). The Applicant said that he had heard a report on the BBC to the effect that the Iranian Government had asked the leaders of churches in Iran to turn away Iranians who wanted to join their churches. However I do not regard such public pronouncements as necessarily inconsistent with the attitude reported by the Assemblies of God church in Tehran. Obviously the Islamic regime in Iran does not publicly approve of conversions but this does not mean that apostates or converts are in fact persecuted in Iran by reason of their religion. Whether or not the Applicant pursues his interest in Christianity and converts, therefore, I do not accept that there is a real chance that he will be persecuted by reason of his religion if he returns to Iran now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. 11. I have considered the totality of the Applicant's circumstances as someone who had a juvenile involvement in the MKO which led to his detention while he was undertaking his military service in 1986, as someone who has applied for refugee status in this country and as someone who has turned way from Islam and who has expressed an interest in Christianity. However, even taking into account the cumulative effect of all these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason if he returns to Iran. It follows that he is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Consequently the Applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in subsection 36(2) of the Migration Actfor the grant of a protection visa. application for review 4 There were six grounds of the amended application. Ground 1: Failure to set out a finding on a material question of fact 5 The applicant contended that the Tribunal failed, contrary to s 430 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"), "to make a determination of fact" as to whether his bribing of an Iranian official could have resulted in his removal from the black-list, thus enabling him to leave Iran through lawful channels. Instead, so it was pleaded, the Tribunal had mistakenly addressed the issue of whether the applicant could "pay off all the right people". 6 By way of particulars of this ground the applicant stated in his Notice of Appeal [para 1(a)(ii)] that the Tribunal had impliedly accepted the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ("DFAT") Country Information Report No 78/99 which the applicant paraphrased as being to the effect that a person would be prevented from leaving Iran if they were on the black-list, but that by bribery it would be possible to get oneself removed from that black-list. 7 The applicant's complaint was that the Tribunal should have made a finding of fact in respect of whether he had bribed an official or officials, instead of concluding that because he had left Iran on a valid passport, he was therefore of no particular adverse or political interest to the authorities. my reasoning 8 In paragraph numbered 5 of the Tribunal's reasons set out above, the Tribunal can be seen to have put to the applicant the proposition that DFAT had advised that travel out of Iran through legal exit points was a reliable indication that a person was of no particular adverse political or security interest. The applicant's response (as recorded by the Tribunal) was that he had been able to leave through a legal exit point because he had paid a smuggler $1,000. The Tribunal then referred to DFAT advice that it would appear virtually impossible for Iranians whose names were on the computerised black-list because they were of adverse political or security interest to use bribery to have their names removed to effect a legal departure from Iran (my emphasis). 9 At paragraph numbered 6 of its above reasons the Tribunal referred to the applicant's contention that the exit of a person whose name was on the computerised black-list was not as serious as some of the other things that occurred through corruption in Iran. Earlier in its reasons (at p 8 in a passage not reproduced above) the Tribunal had referred to DFAT Country Profile – Islamic Republic of Iran, March 1996, paragraph 1.7.1.3 which relevantly stated: "… People are placed on the black-list for a variety of reasons, most commonly when they are involved in court cases, criminal investigations or are in dispute with the taxation office … It is difficult, but still possible, to pay to have one's name temporarily removed from the list to allow unimpeded exit, if one is in the non-political category … Also on the list are those who have a history of active political opposition to the regime and have probably served time in prison or are fugitives from justice..." (My emphasis) 10 Returning to paragraph numbered 6 of the Tribunal's above reasons, it can be seen that the Tribunal gave greater weight (than the weight which it gave to the applicant's contentions) to the independent advice of DFAT in concluding that the applicant was not perceived by the Iranian Government as being of adverse political or security interest at the time when he left Iran. The point is that the Tribunal was well aware of the possibilities of using bribery to have a name removed from the black-list if a person was in the non-political category. 11 It was not necessary, in my view, for the Tribunal to find whether or not the applicant bribed any person. I accept the respondent's submission that that issue was merely incidental to the issue of whether the applicant had a significant political profile and was thus at risk of persecution. The Tribunal accepted the DFAT evidence that it would be virtually impossible for Iranians whose names were on the black-list because of adverse political or security interest, to use bribery to have their names removed so that they could effect a legal departure from Iran. The Tribunal found that the applicant was able to leave Iran travelling on a passport in his own name. That finding could have been based on a finding that the applicant had bribed an official or officials to remove his name and that his name was removed from the black-list because he was not of any adverse political or security interest to the authorities. Alternatively, it could have been based on a finding that no bribe was paid and that the applicant's name was not on the black-list because he was of no adverse political or security interest. 12 I think that that demonstrates that the material question of fact was whether the applicant was of adverse political or security interest at the time when he left Iran. It was simply not necessary to make a finding of fact in respect of whether the applicant had bribed an official or officials. If he had done so and successfully obtained the removal of his name from the black-list, that could only (on the Tribunal's assessment of the security situation in Iran) have been because he was on the black-list for other reasons. If he had not done so, and had passed through the checkpoints on his own passport then likewise, as the Tribunal found, he was not of adverse political or security interest to the authorities. The Tribunal's decision did not, in my opinion, turn on whether any bribe was in fact paid – see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469 at para 57. Ground 2: Improper exercise of power 13 This ground was expressed in the following terms: "The Tribunal erred in that there was no legally defensible foundation in fact or in logic to decide that the Applicant was not at risk because he would have had to pay off too many people, when his contention was that he had bribed an official to be removed from the black-list, and that the decision was therefore an improper exercise of the power conferred by section 476(1)(d) of the Act." 14 In his written submissions the applicant said this: "The Tribunal impliedly accepted that there would be too many people to bribe in order to effect an exit from Iran if on the blacklist, and on that basis rejected the Applicant's evidence that he bribed an official. The Tribunal further found that it would appear impossible to use bribery to exit from Iran, which finding was not open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it. It is submitted that this decision constituted an improper exercise of the power conferred by section 476(1)(d) of the Act." 15 There are several problems with this ground. First, s 476(1)(d) is qualified by s 476(3) so that it applies only to an abuse of power constituted by (a) an exercise of a power for a purpose other than a purpose for which the power was conferred, (b) an exercise of a personal discretionary power at the direction or behest of another person or (c) an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case. The contention that there was no legally defensible foundation in fact or in logic for the decision does not, in my view, fall within those permitted grounds. 16 Secondly, it can be seen from the applicant's written submissions that his contentions on this ground are based largely on paragraph 1.7.3.2 of the DFAT Country Profile of March 1996. As the respondent points out in his submissions, this particular paragraph was not referred to by the Tribunal. The paragraph is concerned with the unlikelihood or impossibility of someone whose offences were considered serious enough to warrant denial of a passport, to be able to bribe enough people to obtain a passport an exit stamp and depart Iran through Teheran airport. The evidence was that the applicant had been issued with a passport in 1996. 17 Thirdly, the applicant's submission is misconceived. The Tribunal did not find that it was impossible to use bribery to exit from Iran. What it did was to rely on independent DFAT evidence for the proposition that it was virtually impossible for Iranians whose names were on the computerised black-list because they were of adverse political or security interest, to use bribery to have their names removed to effect a legal departure from Iran. That was clearly open to it on the evidence. 18 In my view, this ground has not been made out either. Ground 3: Further failure to make a finding of fact 19 The basis of this ground was that the applicant had given evidence to the Tribunal that: (i) he had copied and distributed audio and video tapes to persons and was arrested on two occasions in 1999; and (ii) he provided a tape or tapes to someone who had connections with the Iranian Secret Service. 20 The applicant contended that the Tribunal had erred in failing to make a finding of fact as to whether the matters referred to in either paragraph (i) or (ii) above had occurred. my reasoning 21 In my view, the findings made by the Tribunal in each of paragraphs numbered 3,4,5 and 6 above quite clearly constitute sufficient setting out of findings on all material questions of fact as to satisfy the requirements of s 430(1)(c) of the Act. In paragraphs numbered 3,4 and 6 it can be seen that the Tribunal rejected the applicant's story that he was arrested on two occasions in 1999. In paragraph numbered 4, where the Tribunal dealt with the matter of the tape or tapes, the Tribunal expressly stated that it considered that the applicant's evidence with regard to the incident in October 1999 was contradictory and implausible. 22 In my opinion, there was no need for the Tribunal to make further reference to the details of the applicant's claims. The material question was whether the applicant's activities had generated a political profile sufficient to give rise to a real risk of persecution. The Tribunal found that this was not the case, principally because it disbelieved the applicant, but also on the basis of independent evidence. In doing so it did not, in my view, err in the manner alleged. Ground 4: No evidence 23 This ground was based on an assertion that the Tribunal had erred in finding that the applicant had not been arrested and released so that the authorities could gather more evidence against him and consequently was allowed to leave Iran travelling on a passport in his own name. 24 In this ground the applicant contended that: "In so finding, there was no evidence before the Tribunal under section 476(1)(g) to justify so finding that the Applicant had not been arrested, because the Tribunal relied upon a fact that did not exist, under section 476(4)(b) that people were only arrested if they had a political profile." my reasoning 25 In my opinion, it is quite clear from the Tribunal's reasons, which I have set out above, that its decision was not based on the existence of the particular fact that people in Iran were only arrested if they had a political profile. It based its decision that there was no real chance that the applicant would be persecuted by reason of his political opinion or his religion if returned to Iran, on the fact that the applicant was not perceived by the Iranian Government as being of adverse political interest and on country information about the degree of religious intolerance in Iran. Those were the only two Convention-based reasons advanced on his behalf. There was quite clearly sufficient evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision. I refer to paras 21 and 22 of my reasoning above. Ground 5: 26 Ground 5 read as follows: "The Tribunal failed to have regard to relevant information provided by the Applicant in the form of country information explaining that people are arbitrarily arrested, contrary to section 424 of the Act." 27 In written submissions in relation to this ground the applicant contended as follows: "The Tribunal failed to have regard to the Applicant's relevant information regarding the arbitrary arrest and detention of people in Iran, contrary to section 424 of the Act, which provides that the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant, but having got that information the Tribunal must have regard for (sic) it in making its decision. This was critical information to which the Tribunal made no reference." my reasoning 28 This ground, in my view, misconceives the operation of s 424 and amounts to an attempt to raise an administrative law ground which is not available in respect of "judicially-reviewable" decisions within the meaning of that term in the Act. I shall deal with the latter point first. 29 In so far as the applicant is seeking to assert that the Tribunal failed to take a relevant consideration into account in the exercise of its power, it is quite clear that s 476(3) and in particular sub-paragraph (e), precludes a judicially-reviewable decision being reviewed on that ground. That leaves s 424 of the Act. 30 In the applicant's written submission, which I have quoted above, s 424 has been paraphrased sufficiently for present purposes. Ms S C Lloyd, who appeared for the applicant on a pro bono publico basis, submitted that the word "get" in s 424(1) meant "obtained" or "received" and included the country information supplied to the Tribunal by the applicant's migration agents with their submissions to it on his behalf. 31 In my view, this submission misconstrues s 424(1). I think that it is sufficiently plain that s 424 deals with information which the Tribunal gets (in the sense of "obtains") by its own initiative. The context suggests that it is not intended to refer to information proffered by the applicant – s 423 deals with that. 32 The heading to s 424 reads "Tribunal may seek additional information". The heading is not part of the Act [see s 13(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)]. However, pursuant to s 15AB [and bearing in mind the matters referred to in s 15AB(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act] I consider that the headnote to s 424(1) is capable of assisting in its meaning and that I may give consideration to it. I do so in reaching the interpretation which I have put on the word "get" immediately above. In my opinion, the duty imposed on the Tribunal by s 424(1) to "have regard" to information only relates to such information as it obtains on its own initiative pursuant to that sub-section. 33 In any event, I do not think that it has been demonstrated that the Tribunal did not "have regard" to the information referred to in this ground of application. At page 9 of its reasons it referred to the information supplied by the applicant's representatives concerning the human rights situation in Iran. The mere fact that the Tribunal did not discuss that information in its reasons does not, in my view, establish that it failed to have regard to it. 34 This ground has not been made out. Ground 6: 35 This ground reads as follows: "The Tribunal failed to set out its findings on a material question of fact, as required by s 430(1)(c) of the Act, namely that the country information revealed that people are arbitrarily arrested and kept under surveillance." my reasoning 36 In my opinion, it is quite clear from the Tribunal's reasons that its decision, in the particular circumstances of this particular case, did not turn upon whether people are arbitrarily arrested and kept under surveillance in Iran – see Singh at para 57. Accordingly, the Tribunal was not obliged by s 430(1)(c) to set out its finding on that question. Conclusion 37 For the foregoing reasons the application will be dismissed with costs. I certify that the preceding thirty-seven (37) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Justice Carr. A/g Associate: Dated: 23 March 2001 The Applicant was represented, on a pro bono publico basis, pursuant to Order 80 of the Federal Court Rules, by Ms Su Lloyd, Barrister Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A A Jenshel Solicitor for the Respondent: Australia Government Solicitor Date of Hearing: 22 March 2001 Date of Judgment: 23 March 2001