FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA Yogarajan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 711 KALANITHY YOGARAJAN AND ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS V 789 OF 2000 NORTH J 2 MAY 2001 MELBOURNE IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY V 789 OF 2000 BETWEEN: KALANITHY YOGARAJAN FIRST APPLICANT THIYAGARAJAH YOGARAJAN SECOND APPLICANT YUNITHA YOGARAJAN THIRD APPLICANT YUTHESDRAN YOGARAJAN FOURTH APPLICANT YUTHESAN YOGARAJAN FIFTH APPLICANT YUGENTHINI YOGARAJAN SIXTH APPLICANT AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS RESPONDENT JUDGE: NORTH J DATE OF ORDER: 2 MAY 2001 WHERE MADE: MELBOURNE THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The application is dismissed. 2. The first applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY V 789 OF 2000 BETWEEN: KALANITHY YOGARAJAN FIRST APPLICANT THIYAGARAJAH YOGARAJAN SECOND APPLICANT YUNITHA YOGARAJAN THIRD APPLICANT YUTHESDRAN YOGARAJAN FOURTH APPLICANT YUTHESAN YOGARAJAN FIFTH APPLICANT YUGENTHINI YOGARAJAN SIXTH APPLICANT AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS RESPONDENT JUDGE: NORTH J DATE: 2 MAY 2001 PLACE: MELBOURNE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 This is an application for review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) on 1 September 2000. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, to reject the application made by the applicants for protection visas. The delegate's decision was made on 8 December 1997. 2 Kalanithy Yogarajan, the first applicant, is a female citizen of Sri Lanka who was aged 30 at the time of the decision under review. She arrived in Australia on 14 July 1996 with her husband (the second applicant) and their children (the third to sixth applicants). The first applicant is the principal applicant because her circumstances were said to found the fear of persecution of all the applicants. 3 The detailed case put by the applicants to the Tribunal is set out on pages 3 to 7 of the decision of the Tribunal. It is not necessary for me to repeat that summary, but rather I adopt it as if it were set out in full in these reasons. 4 The basis of the first applicant's claim before the Tribunal was that she feared persecution for reasons of political opinion, real or imputed, and by reason of her Tamil race and ethnicity. The first applicant was born in Vavuniya and she later left for Jaffna in order to pursue her secondary schooling. In 1998 she returned to Vavuniya and married very shortly afterwards. She left Vavuniya for Colombo in February 1996. In 1989 her brother-in-law was killed by reason of his support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). When the LTTE exercised control of the Vavuniya area the first applicant, as a Hindu Tamil, was required to sew uniforms and prepare food parcels for the LTTE. She and her husband were engaged in business in Vavuniya and when the Moslem population of the area was expelled, her husband looked after the businesses of some of those who were forced away. At this time, the LTTE demanded that the first applicant's husband pay a tax to the LTTE from his business activities. 5 The central elements in the first applicant's claim relate to three separate sets of circumstances and it is appropriate that I outline each of those in some greater detail. 6 The first related to an alleged assault and demand for payment by the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). The Tribunal outlined the role of PLOTE as follows: "PLOTE is active in the Vavuniya area. PLOTE cadres work with security forces personnel at checkpoints along the 'border' between government and LTTE-controlled areas, as part of a security arrangement with the military. Their role is to alert the security forces to people they believe are members of the LTTE. Unofficially, they also search, detain and question Tamil people they suspect of LTTE involvement. Politically, PLOTE (or DPLF) is aligned with the other former militant Tamil groups. In parliament, its members support the government on some issues." This description comes from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Country Information Report No. 520197 October 1997 (CX26052). 7 The claims in relation to the PLOTE were described by the Tribunal as follows: "In Vavuniya, members of PLOTE often ordered people to leave their houses and go to the park while the houses were searched. In the first week of July 1995, some PLOTE members came to the Applicants' house and demanded a 200 cc motorbike. The Applicant's spouse, noting that the person making the demand could not handle the bike, told him that he would not be able to ride such a large bike. The men became angry and left without the bike. Two days later, the house was raided by PLOTE. The Applicant said it was five men, her spouse said there were 10 men and more waiting inside the van they used. The men forced their way in and the Applicant spouse asked for permit or identification. In response, he was reminded of the brother-in-law's demise and assaulted, and the Applicant and their children were confined to another room, where the Applicant was alleged to be a supporter of the LTTE, kicked in the stomach and warned she would be killed if she was seen outside. At that time she was four months pregnant. Her child was later born in Vavuniya in January 1996 and her father left for Australia the following week. In written submissions, it was claimed that a week after the assault, two of the men returned and they said they would issue a security clearance for the Applicant to go to Colombo on payment of a 'ransom'. It took several months for the Applicants to raise the money as they had been forced to close their business and eventually they went to Colombo in February 1996. At the hearing, the Applicant stated that the men came in December 1995 and said they would issue the pass on payment of Rs. 200,000. The Applicants responded more or less immediately to that proposition, agreeing to pay Rs. 100,000 and the balance after they reached Colombo, and they went to Colombo the following February, after the birth of their child. They stated that a distant relative of the Applicant spouse vouched for them and registered their residence at the police station. 8 The second circumstance relied upon by the first applicant was a claim of harassment by the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP). This body was a pro‑government Tamil group apparently opposed to the LTTE. The claims in relation to the EPDP were set out by the Tribunal as follows: "Once there, [meaning Colombo after Vavuniya] however, the Applicant was harassed by members of the EPDP, another armed group associated with the EPRLF. She was detained and questioned for two weeks in late April 1996 and the EPDP warned her not to harbour LTTE cadres in Colombo. They told her that they were aware that she had sewed uniforms for the LTTE and forced her to identify LTTE cadres and then only released her on payment of a bribe of $A8,500. At the hearing, she added that after one week she was escorted home to feed her infant and then taken away again. The husband said her captors demanded Rs. 500,000 and he sought to reduce the demand, eventually offering the 300,000 he knew was immediately obtainable. However, they refused and took her away again until he raised the further Rs. 100,000 they had finally demanded. He stated that he raised it by selling jewelry, collecting business debts and borrowing from a business friend. They stated that they moved to the house of their Muslim friend after her release as they feared further difficulties and that the Applicant had to dress as a Muslim to effect the change of location. They did not report the abduction to the police because they are Tamils and it was too dangerous to make such a report." 9 The final situation upon which the first applicant relied concerned events in April 1996, again in Colombo. As to this claim the Tribunal said: "The Applicant claimed that LTTE cadres also visited her in April and insisted her family return to Vavuniya. When she explained she was weak after her detention and as a result of her pregnancy, they told her to return within six months. Before she could return to Vavuniya, however, her father passed away in Australia and she came here for his funeral. She and other family members had been issued with passports in June 1996." 10 The attack made on the Tribunal's decision in respect of these three circumstances was based on s 476(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). This section provides a ground of review where procedures that were required by the Act to be observed in connection with the making of the decision were not observed. The first applicant relied upon the procedure set out in s 430 of the Act for the purposes of this ground of review. Section 430(1) provides: "(1) Where the Tribunal makes its decision on a review, the Tribunal must prepare a written statement that: (a) sets out the decision of the Tribunal on the review; and (b) sets out the reasons for the decision; and (c) sets out the findings on any material questions of fact; and (d) refers to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based." 11 Before turning to consider each of the three circumstances relied upon by the first applicant, it is important to consider a passage in the decision which is relevant to some of the arguments put before me. That passage reads as follows: "The Applicants claim they were suspected of LTTE sympathies, but that claim runs counter to their evidence that they would go to the authorities and to the militant groups to vouch for friends and relatives who had come from Jaffna to avoid the renewed fighting. Nor were they ever approached by the government security forces during that period when Vavuniya became a centre for refugees from the Jaffna peninsula, although it is common ground that the town had a large concentration of security forces as it is "the gateway to the traditional Tamil home in the north" and the major security checkpoint for people travelling between the north and the south. Further, they state that they employed two men whom they believed to be LTTE operatives and one of whom disappeared, yet they were still not approached by the security forces. Subsequently, they were able to obtain security passes to go to Colombo, where they registered with local police and passed through all of the security checking that accompanies the issue of travel documents and exit from the country. The Applicant spouse later returned to Sri Lanka and was permitted to leave without being harassed by government security officials. In all of the circumstances, the Tribunal finds that neither the Applicant, her spouse or her children were of any adverse interest to government authorities because they were suspected to be sympathetic to the LTTE. On the contrary, their success in vouching for visitors from Jaffna is a clear indication that government officials, including members of the security forces, were satisfied that they did not have any connection with the LTTE, and those views are supported by their ability to live in Colombo and then leave the country without hindrance by State agencies." 12 The first question concerning which it was alleged that the Tribunal failed to comply with s 430 was the threat by LTTE cadres alleged to have been made in Colombo. The Tribunal addressed this issue as follows: "The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant and her spouse were required to pay "tax" to the LTTE when it had control in Vavuniya. However, they remained for five years or so after the LTTE took over and taxed them without encountering any further difficulties at the hands of that group. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces have long since resumed control in Vavuniya and, even though the LTTE may maintain some presence in that area and clash with the Army and other militant groups, there is no more than a remote chance the Applicants face persecution by the LTTE. The Tribunal does not accept that LTTE cadres visited the Applicant in Colombo prior to her departure for Australia. One reason for disbelieving her is that she has stated that she was in hiding at a friend's place, disguised as a Muslim. Another is that it would be extremely risky for the LTTE cadres to expose their identity to the Applicants in Colombo when the Applicants had given no indication that they supported the LTTE. It is also inherently unlikely that the LTTE, allegedly intent on harming her because she was suspected of identifying LTTE cadres, would tell her she could put off her return for six months because she was 'very weak due to the birth of my last child and the extra judicial detention'. The Tribunal reiterates that the Applicants do not face a real chance of persecution by the LTTE. If they feel anxious that they are in danger from LTTE members, the Tribunal is satisfied they can effectively avail themselves of State protection." 13 The first applicant filed written contentions prior to the hearing. They were very helpful, comprehensive and at the same time succinct. It is appropriate, in those circumstances, to set out from the written submission the case made by the first applicant on this issue. In par 42 of the written submissions the first applicant contended: "In the present case, the Tribunal has failed to explain its reasoning behind its statement that 'The Tribunal does not accept that LTTE cadres visited the [first] Applicant in Colombo prior to her departure for Australia. One reason for disbelieving her is that she has stated that she was hiding at a friend's place, disguised as a Muslim.(CB 147)' This statement is opaque. While the Tribunal has referred also to its assessment that 'it would be extremely risky for the LTTE cadres to expose their identity to the Applicants. … It is also inherently unlikely that the LTTE … would tell her [the first applicant] she could put off her return for 6 months because she "was very weak due to the birth of my last child and the extra judicial detention… (CB147), these are put by the Tribunal as supplementary reasons together with the issue of the first applicant's claim that 'she was in hiding at a friend's place disguised as a Muslim…'. It is simply not clear what the Tribunal means when it says that,this is the principal reason, or even any reason, for disbelieving this important claim. The most obvious reason for the applicant to be disguised as a Muslim and to move was to avoid further attention by the EPDP or other pro‑government forces." 14 In my view, the Tribunal has complied with the requirements of s 430 in relation to the alleged threat by LTTE cadres. The test is whether the reasons of the Tribunal expose its process of reasoning. The passage referred to is to be read in light of the passage from the Tribunal's decision extracted in par 8 of these reasons. There the Tribunal gave reasons why the first applicant was not suspected of having LTTE sympathies. It will be recalled that the Tribunal referred to the fact that the applicants had themselves gone to the authorities and to militant groups to vouch for friends and relatives who had come from Jaffna to avoid the fighting. The Tribunal also referred to the fact that the first applicant had not been approached by Government security forces despite the fact that her family had employed people believed to be LTTE operatives. Further, the Tribunal described the fact that the applicants were able to obtain a security pass to go to Colombo and to register there with the local police. The applicants were also able to obtain travel documents and leave the country. Then the first applicant's spouse later returned to Sri Lanka and was again permitted thereafter to leave and return to Australia for a second time. The Tribunal incorporated all those considerations in the discussion concerning the alleged threat by LTTE cadres when in the second last sentence of the passage extracted in par 12 of these reasons it referred to reiterating that the applicants do not face a real chance of persecution. 15 In addition to those factors, the Tribunal relied upon the fact that the first applicant had said that she had left her place of residence in Colombo and fled in disguise to a place of hiding. While the first applicant described that reason as opaque, the Tribunal then suggested that there was an inconsistency in the suggestion that the LTTE had approached the first respondent and the allegation that she had fled her place of residence in disguise and had sought a place of anonymity. 16 Then the Tribunal reasoned that the visit from LTTE cadres was unlikely because such people would not wish to expose their identity to the applicants in Colombo. The Tribunal then added "… when the applicants had given no indication that they supported the LTTE." This again was a reference to the Tribunal's underlying findings that the first applicant did not have the connection with the LTTE which she had asserted and was of no interest to the authorities by reason of a LTTE connection. Furthermore, the Tribunal regarded the account as inherently unlikely due to the alleged fact that the first applicant was told she could delay her return because of her weakness from the birth of her last child. Finally, the Tribunal found that even if the first applicant felt anxious by reason of perceived danger from LTTE members, she could effectively avail herself of State protection. 17 It is not the function of the court to survey the reasons of the Tribunal for the purpose of the court itself assessing the merits of an applicant's case. Rather, on this ground of review, the question is whether the Tribunal set out the reasons for its decision, the findings on any material questions of fact and referred to the evidence or other material on which the findings were based. In my view, the Tribunal complied with s 430. It set out its reasons for its decision, its findings on the question of the alleged LTTE visit and the material upon which the findings were based. 18 In oral submissions Mr Krohn, who appeared as counsel for the applicants added an argument that the Tribunal had failed to set out its reasons for decision on the LTTE issue. He argued that there was such an inconsistency between different parts of the decision, and that different parts of the decision were so self-contradictory, that it became impossible to establish what the reasoning of the Tribunal was. The Tribunal found that the first applicant had been detained by the Indian Peacekeeping Force in 1987 and that the first applicant's brother-in-law had been killed in 1989 because of LTTE support. These elements, it was suggested, indicated a clear family link with the LTTE. Consequently, it was entirely inconsistent and contradictory for the Tribunal to find that there was no suspicion of LTTE sympathies. If the conclusion was adopted in the reasoning concerning the LTTE cadres, the reasoning incorporated that inconsistency and self‑contradiction so that it was not possible to determine the path of reasoning adopted by the Tribunal. 19 I do not accept this argument. There was no necessary inconsistency or contradiction in the findings concerning the detention by the Indian Peacekeeping Force and the murder of the first applicant's brother-in-law in the late 1980s and the analysis made by the Tribunal about the events in Colombo in April 1996. 20 Then Mr Krohn, in further amplification of his written submission, attacked the finding of the Tribunal that it was "inherently unlikely" that the LTTE would tell the first applicant that she could delay her return to captivity because of her weakness arising from childbirth. He argued that s 430 required the Tribunal to give reasons for this conclusion. Mr Krohn recognised that Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 and Pollocks v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1514 (Pollocks) stand against this argument. In Durairajasingham McHugh J said at 422-3: "Whenever rejection of evidence is one of the reasons for the decision, the tribunal must set that out as one of its reasons. But that said, it is not necessary for the tribunal to give a line-by-line refutation of the evidence for the claimant either generally or in those respects where there is evidence that is contrary to findings of material fact made by the tribunal.… The tribunal must give the reasons for its decision, not the sub-set of reasons why it accepted or rejected individual pieces of evidence. In any event, the reason for the disbelief is apparent in this case from the use of the word 'implausible'. The disbelief arose from the tribunal's view that it was inherently unlikely that the events had occurred as alleged." 21 Mr Krohn argued that the court should not follow these authorities insofar as they extend no obligation on the Tribunal to give reasons for conclusions on subordinate facts to make good a finding of "inherent unlikelihood" of a particular fact. 22 In the circumstances of this case the finding of "inherent unlikelihood" in relation to the delay in return to captivity is unremarkable. It does not depend on anything more than a common sense assessment of the facts surrounding the detention. It did not call for, nor depend upon, a determination of evidence that the LTTE would act in a particular way. It was a judgment made taking into account the circumstances of the captivity which were described by the Tribunal. There was no failure to comply with s 430 in this regard. 23 Next, I deal with the alleged errors in relation to the way the Tribunal dealt with the alleged assault and demand for money by PLOTE. The Tribunal's reasoning in relation to this issue was as follows: "It appears from the Applicant's evidence that pro-government militant groups such as PLOTE, TELO and the EPRLF have been operating in Vavuniya at least since the 1980's, and maintained a presence in the area even during the time the LTTE had a measure of control in the early 1990's. The Applicant was not harassed when her brother-in-law was killed by the EPRLF, nor did she claim that members of that group harassed her after that incident. She states that she was assaulted by PLOTE members in mid-1995 and that members of that group refused to issue a clearance to go to Colombo because she had no relative to vouch for her. The latter issue is of little significance, as she subsequently went to Colombo after a relative was able to vouch for her and she obtained the relevant clearance. She states that she obtained the clearance because she paid a bribe. There was some contrary evidence given in regard to when the bribe was demanded and paid, ranging from a week after the assault in July to several months and to the period between December 1995 and February 1996. It is plausible that paying a bribe may have been one of the conditions of obtaining a security clearance, but the fact that she was given such a clearance, waited for up to six or seven months in Vavuniya to respond to demands for payment and then registered her residence in Colombo with police, all indicate that she was not suspected of LTTE affiliations and did not fear she would be harmed for that reason. The Tribunal is satisfied that the PLOTE demand for payment to have a security clearance issued was merely financially motivated and was unrelated to Convention reasons. The Applicant said she had to sew for the LTTE when it was in Vavuniya and her husband added that they had to prepare food packages. In regard to the assault in July 1995, the sworn evidence of each Applicant was that members of PLOTE came to the house and demanded the use of a motorbike. They left in anger on the first occasion after the applicant spouse said that the person who wanted to ride the motorbike was too small and could not handle it. The evidence about events at that stage does not disclose that they were accused of LTTE connections. Some time later, they claim that many men returned in a van – somewhere between five and in excess of ten. The Applicants state that they became angry after the Applicant asked for identification or a search warrant, separated the Applicants and assaulted them. It is plausible that they then made or insinuated some accusations about the LTTE, but they left after a short time and did not attack the Applicants in the following six months before they left for Colombo. Nor, it seems, did they inform the government security officials that the Applicants might be associated with the LTTE, as those officials did not approach them over such a suspected connection before they left Vavuniya. In that respect, the delegate has pointed out that '[PLOTE's] role is to alert the security forces to people they believe are members of the LTTE'. That information is derived from a DFAT Country Information Report No. 520/97 of 23 October 1997 (CX26052), which provided information about the situation of PLOTE in the Vavuniya area. It observed that: 'PLOTE is active in the Vavuniya area. PLOTE cadres work with security forces personnel at checkpoints along the 'border' between government and LTTE – controlled areas, as part of a security arrangement with the military. Their role is to alert he security forces to people they believe are members of the LTTE. Unofficially, they also search, detain and question Tamil people they suspect of LTTE involvement. Politically, PLOTE (or DPLF) is aligned with the other former militant Tamil groups. In parliament, its members support the government on some issues.' Nor were the Applicants stopped during the security checks in Vavuniya that accompany leaving that town for Colombo. It is also apparent that the Applicants had people in Colombo to vouch for them for the purposes of obtaining a security clearance, and their evidence discloses that they had the money needed to pay relevant bribes to obtain that clearance (or could easily have raised it), yet they remained in Vavuniya for six months or so after the assault. In that regard, the Tribunal notes that the Applicant's father afforded a subsequent trip to Australia and the Applicant claims that she raised over $8,000 in ransom. The delay in leaving Vavuniya supports the conclusion that the incident with PLOTE was an isolated attack and the Applicants did not fear further attacks. That conclusion is borne out by the fact that no such further attack was made. The Tribunal has some doubts about the medical certificate the Applicant produced in support of her claims of assault in Vavuniya. It was not submitted until almost three years after it was written and the explanation that there was confusion between the Applicant and her adviser was not particularly convincing, partly because there seemed to be no need to reproduce it if each of those people believed it had already been submitted. It is written in two hands and the information it contains about being struck in the chest with a club is at odds with the Applicant's claim that she was kicked in the stomach. It makes no referrals to other practitioners, although the Applicant says she was referred, but did not follow up that advice. Despite the misgivings about the medical evidence, the Tribunal is satisfied, in all of the circumstances, that PLOTE members assaulted the Applicants after they refused to bow to their demands of use their motorbike. It is not satisfied that the assault was motivated by any Convention reason, notwithstanding the insults and threats directed at the Applicants. While the Tribunal accepts that the Applicant and others had to vacate their houses while PLOTE and other groups searched for LTTE suspects, the Applicant were not harmed during those episodes. Given that members of PLOTE did not harm the Applicants either before or after the assault in mid-1995, despite having ample opportunity to do so, and in light of the discussion above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the assault was an isolated incident that was unrelated to the Convention and concludes there is not a real chance the Applicants face persecution for a Convention reason from PLOTE or other militant groups that operate in Vavuniya." 24 The essence of the argument of the first applicant on this issue was set out in par 44 of her written contentions as follows: "In relation to this matter, there is nothing in the Tribunal's reasons which explains why an attack by PLOTE members is regarded by the Tribunal as not being motivated, even in part, by political opinion. The fact that the trigger for the attack may have been anger at the refusal of the second applicant to hand over a motorbike some 2 or 3 days earlier does not mean that the serious assaults by PLOTE, conducted in the course of a raid on the applicant's house, were not for a Convention reason, namely, imputed political opinion. The Tribunal itself has noted that the PLOTE members during the raid made reference to the death of the first applicant's brother‑in‑law because of his connection with LTTE and threatened that the same would happen to the applicants. The applicants submit that there is nothing in the Tribunal's reasons which explains the Tribunal's conclusion that the PLOTE attack had nothing to do with the Convention ground at all. This is a matter of crucial importance, because the attack by PLOTE members on the house of the applicants is one of the two most serious events claimed to have been suffered by the applicants. It is clearly sufficiently serious to amount to persecution. If there was a mixture of motives, then this may also affect the probability that such an event might occur again. The failure of the Tribunal to explain properly why it regarded the attack by PLOTE as solely a matter of private revenge completely unrelated to the Convention, and why it regarded the extortion of money as purely a matter of financial gain entirely unrelated to the Convention is a serious breach of the Tribunal's obligations pursuant to section 430 of the Act. The applicants are left not understanding how the Tribunal reached this position. It may be that the Tribunal had reasons or it may be that the Tribunal has presumed that if there was a motive of private gain or revenge, then this excluded a Convention motive." 25 This passage from the Tribunal's reasons explains amply and in conformity with s 430 why it reached the decision that the demand for payment was not politically motivated. Firstly, it pointed to the fact that there was no previous history of harassment of the first applicant despite the murder of her brother-in-law in 1989. The Tribunal then relied upon the fact that the first applicant was given clearance to travel south to Colombo and that she waited in Vavuniya for six or seven months before leaving. It also relied upon the fact that she registered her residence in Colombo with the police. Each of these matters was used by the Tribunal to explain why it determined that the demand for payment was not politically motivated. The reasons for the conclusion are expressed. Whether they are cogent or not is not in issue. It is not for the Court to determine the merits of the claim. 26 In relation to the conclusion that the assault on the first applicant was not politically motivated, the Tribunal went to some considerable length to explain its reasons for this conclusion. It explained that there was no reference to LTTE connection at all when the members of PLOTE first visited the house. The Tribunal relied upon the fact that there was a period within the six months after the last alleged assault in which there was no further attack on the first applicant. It further recorded and relied upon the fact that PLOTE, whose function it was to report LTTE connections, did not inform the authorities of such a connection in relation to the applicants. The Tribunal also relied upon the fact that the first applicant was not stopped on her way to Colombo and that she remained in Vavuniya for a number of months following these events. 27 Again, Mr Krohn, orally in amplification of the written submissions on this issue, argued that the reasons were so internally inconsistent that they should lead the court to conclude that the reasoning of the Tribunal was not exposed. In effect, it was argued that the Tribunal was bound to explain why political motivation was not regarded as at least one of the reasons for the actions of PLOTE. This overstates the obligation on the Tribunal. It was sufficient for the Tribunal to provide reasons for its view that the motivation for the attack, and the demand for money, were not politically motivated. Those reasons were provided. There was no failure to comply with s 430 on these issues. 28 Finally, in relation to the detention by the EPDP, the reasoning of the Tribunal was as follows: "The Tribunal does not accept that the Applicant was detained by the EPDP in Colombo and that she was forced to disguise herself as a Muslim after her release. According to her evidence, the Applicant had not travelled around Sri Lanka like her husband, so she was far less likely to be able to identify LTTE cadres than her spouse. Yet he was not abducted, despite being in Colombo. Nor had she been requested to make similar identifications in Vavuniya, where she was much more vulnerable to pro-government forces. The initial submission of the Applicant makes no claim about being forced to go into hiding in disguise. On the other hand, as mentioned above, it states that LTTE cadres came to her residence after her release. Nor does that submission refer to the visit made to her home after one week of detention, and accompanied by her captors who negotiated a ransom price. It is implausible that she would be accompanied to her home to see her children a week after her alleged abduction, when it was apparent that there would be a risk that her husband had alerted the authorities. Indeed, it is implausible that neither the Applicant nor her spouse would report the EPDP harassment to the authorities, despite the claim that the "EPDP was harassing me continuously from the day of reaching Colombo." In that respect, the delegate has referred to information that indicates that authorities act to protect citizens against breaches of law by the security forces. DFAT reported in its Country Information Report that: 'Tamil people, like anyone else, continue to have the protection of the law against unlawful activities by security services. The government's demonstrated willingness to prosecute members of the security services who breach the law is important here, as is the access detained persons and their families have to the government's own human rights task force, HRTF, and to an international humanitarian organisation.'" 29 The written contentions of the first applicant on this question stated: "In relation to the claim that the first applicant was detained by the EPDP in 1996, the Tribunal is in breach of section 430 by failing properly or at all to set out its reasons or to refer to the evidence upon which its reasons were based. The Tribunal apparently considers that the second applicant would have been a more likely target for the EPDP as, having travelled more widely than the first applicant, he would have been more likely to be able to identify LTTE cadres to the EDPP [sic]. On the other hand, the Tribunal makes no reference at this point to the fact that it was the first applicant's brother-in-law who was murdered for his connection with the LTTE. The Tribunal especially seems to base its decision on this part of the claim upon its observation that it was 'implausible' that the first applicant would be accompanied to her home to see her children a week after her alleged abduction and it was 'implausible' that neither the applicant nor her spouse would report the EPDP harassment to the authorities. The reference by the Tribunal to an extract from a report by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is merely a general and brief reference about recourse of Tamils to the protection of the authorities. It is not specific evidence for the proposition that the applicants could without fear have reported detention by and fear of the EPDP to the authorities. Especially there is no evidence at all referred to by the Tribunal for the alleged implausibility of the way the EPDP dealt with the applicant in accompanying her to her home to see her children taking her away again. To the extent that this part of the decision is based upon assumption rather than evidence, the Tribunal is in breach of its obligations pursuant to section 430(1)(b) and (d)." 30 The contentions themselves betray that the Tribunal did provide reasons for its decision. The contention rightly refers to the Tribunal finding that the second applicant, the husband of the first applicant, would have been a more likely target because of his wide travel. Against this, the first applicant complained that the Tribunal failed to refer to the death of the first applicant's brother-in-law. This complaint amounts to a disagreement with the Tribunal's assessment of the merits of the case and its judgment as to the evidence which is relevant to the issue to be determined. There is no obligation on the Tribunal to make reference to evidence which might be inconsistent with the finding it makes; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 845; (2000) 98 FCR 469 at par 46 (Black CJ, Sundberg, Katz and Hely JJ). By complaining that the Tribunal failed to refer to the possibly inconsistent evidence of the murder of the first applicant's brother-in-law, the first applicant made a complaint which does not amount to a breach of s 430 of the Act. 31 The first applicant then contended that the Tribunal's characterisation of two elements of her claim, namely, that she would be permitted leave to visit her children and that she would not report the harassment, as implausible constituted a breach of s 430. In neither case did the finding call for reference to any further evidence. In relation to the first element, the conclusion was open on the facts recorded by the Tribunal. The conclusion was a matter of assessment of the situation recorded by the Tribunal, namely alleged detention and alleged leave after one week. It was unnecessary for the Tribunal to refer to evidence of the way in which the EPDP worked to test whether such leave would have been permitted. Similarly, in relation to the complaint about the finding of implausibility concerning the failure to report the harassment, the Tribunal referred to the free ability of Tamils to make such reports. That was sufficient evidence, taken with the other circumstances assessed by the Tribunal, upon which to base its conclusion. Thus, the question which arose in Pollocks does not arise on this aspect of this case. 32 Finally, Mr Krohn explained that the remaining grounds of review, namely, that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to make the decision, that the decision was not authorised by the Act or the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) and that the decision involved an error of law were all dependent upon the decision at first instance of Merkel J in Anthonypillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1368. In that case his Honour determined that there was a ground of review available if the Tribunal failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the applicant's claims. Mr Krohn formally made the submission in reliance upon the decision of Merkel J. He recognised that I was bound by the decision of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai [2001] FCA 274 which rejected the argument that the failure to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the applicants' claims gave rise to a ground of review under s 476(1) of the Act. 33 In the result the application is dismissed. I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice North. Associate: Dated: 13 June 2001 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Krohn Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr K Aravindan Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J Gibson Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz Date of Hearing: 2 May 2001 Date of Judgment: 2 May 2001