FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA Meyer v Falcone [2001] FCA 1497 TRADE PRACTICES ACT – Interlocutory relief – Application to stay proceedings in the Supreme Court of Tasmania – Lack of evidence Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Multiplex Constructions [2000] FCA 101, (2000) 95 IR 225 referred to JOHN ANDREW MEYER v JEFFREY JAMES FALCONE, VIVIEN MAY FALCONE, STOCKDALE & LEGGO (ACN 006 078 628) and A D PEARCE & CO T37 OF 2001 MARSHALL J HOBART 24 OCTOBER 2001 IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY T37 OF 2001 BETWEEN: JOHN ANDREW MEYER APPLICANT AND: JEFFREY JAMES FALCONE and VIVIEN MAY FALCONE FIRST RESPONDENT STOCKDALE & LEGGO (ACN 006 078 628) SECOND RESPONDENT A D PEARCE & CO THIRD RESPONDENT JUDGE: MARSHALL J DATE OF ORDER: 24 OCTOBER 2001 WHERE MADE: HOBART THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The application for interlocutory relief be dismissed. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY T37 OF 2001 BETWEEN: JOHN ANDREW MEYER APPLICANT AND: JEFFREY JAMES FALCONE and VIVIEN MAY FALCONE FIRST RESPONDENT STOCKDALE & LEGGO (ACN 006 078 628) SECOND RESPONDENT A D PEARCE & CO THIRD RESPONDENT JUDGE: MARSHALL J DATE: 24 OCTOBER 2001 PLACE: HOBART REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 On 16 October 2001, the applicant, Mr Meyer, filed an application in this Court claiming certain relief, including interlocutory relief, in purported reliance on the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Mr Meyer's application for interlocutory relief was listed before the Court on 24 October 2001. 2 In his application, Mr Meyer sought interlocutory relief in the following terms: "1. An order for a Stay of Proceedings in the matter No. 144 of 2000 in the Supreme Court of Tasmania, Launceston Registry s.86. 2. An order to Cross-Vest any State matters into the Federal Court in the interests of Natural Justice. 3. An order that A.D. Pearce immediately return with interest all funds sent from NZ to his Trust Account[.] 4. An order that judgement (M41 of 2000) of Underwood. J be reversed on the basis that the Supreme court of Tasmania did not have competent jurisdiction. s.67 TPA. 5. An Injunction s.80(4) restraining the Vendors from continuing & compounding their Misrepresentations by pursuing Breach of Contract in the Tasmanian Supreme court. Their action is an abuse of process." 3 The application for interlocutory relief was supported by an affidavit sworn by Mr Meyer and filed on 23 October 2001. The affidavit is entirely argumentative and consists of a series of conclusions and accusations. It does not state any facts in support of the application for interlocutory relief. 4 Mr Meyer's first claimed interlocutory order, in effect, seeks an anti-suit injunction. To grant relief in the nature of an anti-suit injunction is a serious step and should ordinarily be granted only in cases of clear need. See for example Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Multiplex Constructions [2000] FCA 101, (2000) 95 IR 225. None of the evidence presented in this matter reveals any such clear need. 5 It is inappropriate for this Court to stay proceedings in the Supreme Court of Tasmania where there is no evidence before this Court of any steps taken by Mr Meyer to use mechanisms available in the Supreme Court to stay those proceedings. 6 In respect of the second claimed interlocutory order, it is sufficient to say that this Court has no power to grant relief in the nature of cross-vesting "any State matters into the Federal Court in the interests of Natural Justice". 7 The order sought against an "A.D. Pearce" concerning the return to Mr Meyer of certain funds, is not an order that the Court can make given that "A.D. Pearce" is not a party to the proceeding. "A.D. Pearce & Co" is the third respondent in the proceeding. In any event, the affidavit merely visits the consequences to Mr Meyer of the non-return of the funds rather than whether he has legal right to have such funds returned to him. 8 It would be extraordinary for this Court to consider reversing a judgment of a judge of the Supreme Court at all, let alone in the absence of any information about the proceeding or any relevant appeal in the State jurisdiction. 9 Finally, it is a matter for a State Court to determine whether a matter before it is an abuse of process or not. It is not a matter for this Court. 10 The application for interlocutory relief is dismissed. I certify that the preceding ten (10) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Marshall. Associate: Dated: 24 October 2001 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Meyer appeared for himself Counsel for the 1st Respondent: Mr D Gunson Solicitor for the 1st Respondent: Gunson Williams Counsel for the 2nd Respondent: Mr K Procter SC Solicitor for the 2nd Respondent: Murdoch Clarke Counsel for the 3rd Respondent: Mr P Lunn Solicitor for the 3rd Respondent: Simmons Wolfhagen Date of Hearing: 24 October 2001 Date of Judgment: 24 October 2001