FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2003] FCA 253 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE application for waiver of security for costs – whether perceived bias – whether appropriate to transfer registry Federal Court Rules O 1 r 8, 62 r 46(3)(a)(d), 63 r 46(3)(d) Dudzinski v Kello [2000] FCA 740 applied Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2000] FCA 1091 cited IVAN ANTONOV MAZUKOV v UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA T14 OF 2000 and T28 OF 2002 HEEREY J 19 MARCH 2003 HOBART IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY T14 OF 2000 T28 OF 2000 BETWEEN: IVAN ANTONOV MAZUKOV APPLICANT AND: UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA RESPONDENT JUDGE: HEEREY J DATE OF ORDER: 19 MARCH 2003 WHERE MADE: HOBART THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The application by notice of motion dated 20 February 2003 is dismissed. 2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY T14 OF 2000 T28 OF 2000 BETWEEN: IVAN ANTONOV MAZUKOV APPLICANT AND: UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA RESPONDENT JUDGE: HEEREY J DATE: 19 MARCH 2003 PLACE: HOBART REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 There is before the Court a notice of motion by the applicant, Mr Mazukov, who appears in person. The notice of motion is dated 20 February 2003 and seeks an order quashing the decision of Registrar Mussett made on 31 January 2003, which dismissed an application by Mr Mazukov for waiver of the requirement that he lodge $750 as security for costs required by Federal Court Rules O 62 r 46(3)(d) for taxation of a bill of costs. 2 Mr Mazukov raised two preliminary objections. First he submitted that I should not deal with the matter because there were circumstances disclosing perceived bias; secondly, he submitted that the matter should be transferred to another registry. 3 The submission of perceived bias, rested on two grounds. First, he said that I had a relationship with the respondent, the University of Tasmania. He said that there was a picture of me at the University Law School. 4 That is in fact correct. I am a graduate of the Law School of the University of Tasmania and there is a picture of myself at the Law School along with pictures of all other graduates who have become judges. Since it is to be expected that any State judge (or magistrate) sitting in Tasmania is likely to have been a graduate of the University of Tasmania Law School it is hardly likely that that could ground an application for perceived bias merely because the University was a party to litigation. It seems to be no different in principle when the judge in question is a judge of the Federal Court. 5 The second ground of alleged perceived bias arises from a decision I gave on 5 October 2000 in matter T17 of 2000 when Mr Mazukov brought an application against the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. The complaint in that matter alleged unlawful discrimination by the University of Tasmania and Professor Donald Chalmers of the University's Law School. 6 I accepted the submission on behalf of counsel for the Commission that the correct respondent was not the Commission but the University and/or Professor Chalmers. I accepted the submission of counsel for the Commission that I should dismiss the application. There was no appeal by Mr Mazukov against that decision and I am not persuaded that it was incorrect. That ground, in my view, does not perform any basis for perceived bias. 7 Turning then to Mr Mazukov's submission that the matter should be transferred to another registry, he asserted from the bar table that he "does not feel safe here". He said he had made complaints to Mr Philip Kellow of the Principal Registry in Sydney. Mr Mazukov complained that in discussing his case with him, Mr Alan Parrott, the District Registrar of the Tasmanian Registry, had given an example to him of an allegation in pleading or some other document and used the expression, "If I beat you up". Also Mr Mazukov said Mr Parrott held up papers that Mr Mazukov had filed, "as if he were going to tear them up". 8 I am not satisfied that Mr Parrott has behaved in any way inappropriately or in any physically threatening way towards Mr Mazukov. Mr Mazukov may have misunderstood Mr Parrott's reference to a hypothetical explanation to explain some procedural point. I am not satisfied that there is any satisfactory basis for moving this litigation to another registry given that plainly the litigation does not have any connection with any State or Territory other than Tasmania. 9 I now turn to the merits of Mr Mazukov's notice of motion. On 5 July 2000 Mr Mazukov filed an application for extension of time in which to bring an application for an order of review of a decision of the University of Tasmania's Discipline Appeals Committee. The Committee was constituted by Mr A M Blow OAM QC, as his Honour then was. On 4 August 2000 Marshall J dismissed the application for extension of time on the ground that the proposed application had no prospects of success. The decision of Mr Blow was not a decision made "under an enactment" since it was not made under a Federal Act: Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2000] FCA 1091. 10 A subsequent appeal to the Full Court was dismissed. Apparently Mr Mazukov has brought an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court but that has not yet been dealt with. 11 On 21 October 2002 the respondent filed a bill of costs. In accordance with O 62, r 46(3)(a) the taxing officer, Mr Parrott, made an estimate of the approximate total for which, if the bill were to be taxed, the certificate of taxation would be likely to issue. Mr Parrott advised both parties of that estimate. 12 Mr Mazukov filed a notice of objection to that estimate within the time prescribed. Order 63 r 46(3)(d) requires that an amount of $750 as security for costs also be filed at the same time as a notice of objection is filed. As already noted, Mr Mazukov requested that the amount be waived. 13 In her decision Registrar Mussett noted that the amount of security for costs is not a fee payable under the Federal Court of Australia Regulations, thus the waiver provisions in the Regulations do not apply to that amount. However, the Registrar noted that in Dudzinski v Kello [2000] FCA 740 Spender J held that O 62, r 46(3)(d) is subject to the general power conferred on the Court by O 1 r 8 to "dispense with compliance with any of the requirements of the Rules". Thus, the Registrar held that she had jurisdiction to entertain Mr Mazukov's application. 14 The Registrar applied Spender J's view at [37] that: "Having regard then to the purpose of the rule requiring the payment of security for the costs of taxation, any reasons proposed for waiving such a payment would have to be very compelling." 15 The Registrar considered in detail the arguments advanced by Mr Mazukov. I will not repeat these. His arguments and the consideration the Registrar gave to them are set out in her written reasons. Mr Mazukov repeated his arguments on the appeal but this is a review of a discretionary decision and I am not persuaded that the Registrar erred in the exercise of her discretion. I am not satisfied that she took into account any irrelevant consideration or failed to take into account any relevant consideration. 16 The only matter that I should mention specifically is that on 6 January 2003 Mr Parrott wrote to Mr Mazukov, advising him that an estimate of $3580.45 had been made. The letter draws the attention to the provisions of O62 r 46 and says: "Please note that the sum of $750 is payable on the lodgement of any objection. As this amount is set by the rules there is no provision to waive this fee or exempt you from paying this fee, therefore if you wish to object to the assessment the fee must be paid upon lodgement of any objection." 17 That advice was not strictly correct. However, since Registrar Mussett applied the decision in Dudzinski and proceeded to deal with the application for waiver on its merits, Mr Mazukov has not suffered any detriment. I do not consider the letter supports in any way Mr Mazukov's allegations of apparent bias. 18 The motion will be dismissed. I order that the applicant, Mr Mazukov, pay the respondent's case. I certify that the preceding eighteen (18) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Heerey. Associate: Dated: Counsel for the Applicant: In person Counsel for the Respondent: E Bullard Solicitor for the Respondent: Dobson Mitchell & Allport Date of Hearing: 19 March 2003 Date of Judgment: 19 March 2003