Federal Court of Australia
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Klewer v Department of Health and Ageing [2004] FCA 745 LUCY P KLEWER v COMMONWEALTH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING N 101 OF 2004 GYLES J 21 MAY 2004 SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY N 101 OF 2004
BETWEEN: LUCY P KLEWER
APPLICANT
AND: COMMONWEALTH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING
RESPONDENT
JUDGE: GYLES J
DATE OF ORDER: 21 MAY 2004
WHERE MADE: SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The application for extension of time be dismissed. 2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY N 101 OF 2004
BETWEEN: LUCY P KLEWER
APPLICANT
AND: COMMONWEALTH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING
RESPONDENT
JUDGE: GYLES J
DATE: 21 MAY 2004
PLACE: SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 This matter was set down for hearing today when it was last before me on 9 March. The Registrar of the Court received yesterday a communication from the applicant by facsimile in which, amongst other things, she says she cannot attend today. The only explanation given was that 'there has been some significant events with this family lately' and the applicant sought what she described as a telephone hook up. 2 Having consulted informally with the solicitor for the respondent and ascertaining that there was no objection to that course, I agreed in principle to it and arrangements were made by a Registrar of the Court with the applicant, for her to be at a particular number at 10.15 am today. It is now 10.20 am. A number of attempts have been made to make telephone connection with the applicant but an answering machine was the only answer that was received. 3 The case has a considerable history. I do not need to recite it all. The solicitor for the respondent has filed an affidavit setting out that history and I have received comprehensive submissions from the respondent's solicitor as to why this application for extension of time is doomed to failure. 4 I have taken into account the written response by the applicant. Although it is not necessary for me to come to any final decision about the matter today in the absence of the applicant, all I need say is that the barriers to a successful application for extension of time are very high indeed. 5 When the matter was last before me on 9 March I endeavoured to ensure that the applicant understood that it was her task to have the matter ready for hearing and for her to appear and present her case. It was, I endeavoured to persuade her, not simply a matter of turning up unrepresented and throwing herself upon the mercy of the Court so the Court would conduct the case for her. 6 At the moment I find it difficult to see any legal merit underlying the present application no matter what merit there may or may not be in terms of the course of events. In view of the absence of the applicant I simply propose to dismiss the application. 7 I order that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent. I certify that the preceding seven (7) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gyles.
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