Federal Court of Australia
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Troiani v Peldan & Lane (Trustee), in the matter of Troiani (Bankrupts) [2005] FCA 842 SANTE TROIANI AND RITA TROIANI v PELDAN AND LANE AS TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF SANTE AND RITA TROIANI QUD 145 OF 2004 DOWSETT J 1 JUNE 2005 BRISBANE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY QUD 145 OF 2004
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SANTE TROIANI
FIRST APPELLANT
RITA TROIANI
SECOND APPELLANT
AND: PELDAN AND LANE AS TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF SANTE AND RITA TROIANI
RESPONDENT
JUDGE: DOWSETT J
DATE OF ORDER: 1 JUNE 2005
WHERE MADE: BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The appeal be dismissed 2. The appellants pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, including reserve costs. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY QUD 145 OF 2004
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SANTE TROIANI
FIRST APPELLANT
RITA TROIANI
SECOND APPELLANT
AND: PELDAN AND LANE as Trustee in Bankruptcy of SANTE AND RITA TROIANI
RESPONDENT
JUDGE: DOWSETT J
DATE: 1 JUNE 2005
PLACE: BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 As I have observed, the decision under appeal is a decision pursuant to s 146 of the Bankruptcy Act. It was a decision in exercise of a discretion. The reasons for making the order appear in all respects to be entirely orthodox. The appellants failed to file statements of affairs. An application was made under s 146 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). In the circumstances I cannot see that there was any miscarriage of the discretion in making the appropriate order. 2 The only basis upon which the appellants seek to challenge the decision is the assertion, which they have been making for many years, that they were not indebted to the bank at the relevant time and that therefore judgment ought not have gone against them in the Supreme Court, the bankruptcy notice ought to have been set aside and the sequestration orders ought never to have been made. They say that the bank has been fraudulent and that they have only now come to understand either the nature or the extent of such fraud. As I have already observed in connection with the application for an adjournment, it seems that there has been more than adequate opportunity to raise all relevant issues. An allegation of fraud of some sort was made against the bank, at the very latest, in the Court of Appeal in 2002, following the judgment of the Chief Justice in 2001. In those circumstances, it cannot be credited that there is now a new and viable allegation of fraud by the bank, leading to a loss of $4 million. I can come to no conclusion except that, once again, these proceedings are being used as a method of delay, for what reason, I do not know. 3 No viable ground of appeal is advanced, and the appeal must be dismissed. I certify that the preceding three (3) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Dowsett .
We try to embed the page this law was scraped from. If the site blocks framing, you still get the link and a local excerpt.
Last checked with source on —
Checking whether the official page can be embedded…
Plain-English simplify of this law: a short summary, key points, and both sides of the argument. Generated on first view via Replicate, then cached. Vote on what helps your study.
No study brief is cached for this law yet. Sign up to generate a plain-English brief.
Sign up to generate