FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA Chu v Telstra Corporation Limited [2005] FCA 1730 ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL – appeal from decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – refusal of access to personnel files – s 24A Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)– preliminary question - whether "all reasonable steps" is a jurisdictional fact ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL – appeal from decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – numerous requests for access to personnel file – access refused on the basis that no further documents could be located – interpretation of s 24A – whether respondent took all reasonable steps – whether Tribunal applied the correct test in determining what constitutes "all reasonable steps" Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 24A Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 cited Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 297 cited CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 followed Network Ten Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2004) 205 ALR 1 cited Cabal v Attorney-General (2001) 113 FCR 154 considered Timbarra Protection Coalition Inc v Ross Mining NL (1999) 46 NSWLR 55 cited Santa Sabina College v Minister for Education (1985) 58 ALR 527 cited Morales v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 60 FCR 550 cited RICHARD CHU v TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED No VID 1443 of 2004 FINN J ADELAIDE 1 DECEMBER 2005 IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY VID 1443 OF 2004 BETWEEN: RICHARD CHU APPLICANT AND: TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED RESPONDENT JUDGE: FINN J DATE OF ORDER: 1 DECEMBER 2005 WHERE MADE: ADELAIDE THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The application be allowed. 2. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 28 October 2004 be set aside. 3. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal for re-determination. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY VID 1443 OF 2004 BETWEEN: RICHARD CHU APPLICANT AND: TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED RESPONDENT JUDGE: FINN J DATE: 1 DECEMBER 2005 PLACE: ADELAIDE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 The conduct of Telstra Corporation Ltd ("Telstra") in the events giving rise to this application, was an understandable source of frustration for the applicant, Richard Chu. Likewise, the reasons of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") impugned in the application provide reason for pause. Suffice it to say at the outset that they betray an error of law. 2 The application challenges a decision of the Tribunal affirming a decision of Telstra under s 24A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) ("the FOI Act") to refuse Mr Chu access to his personal and personnel files that had not previously been provided to him. 3 Section 24A, insofar as presently relevant, provides: "Requests may be refused if documents cannot be found or do not exist An agency or Minister may refuse a request for access to a document if: (a) all reasonable steps have been taken to find the document; and (b) the agency or Minister is satisfied that the document: (i) is in the agency's or Minister's possession but cannot be found; or (ii) does not exist." A PRELIMINARY QUESTION 4 Mr Chu has represented himself in this matter. At the hearing I raised a preliminary question with counsel for Telstra relating to the proper construction of s 24A of the FOI Act, that question going to the extent of my jurisdiction in this matter. It was whether the reference in s 24A(a) to "all reasonable steps have been taken" was to a jurisdictional matter as to the existence of which it was ultimately for the Court to be satisfied: cf Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135; or whether it was a matter about which Telstra was required to be satisfied: cf Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 297. 5 The text of this provision, considered in isolation, does suggest that the Parliament was intending the question of "all reasonable steps" to be one ultimately for the Court. While the Minister or agency is expressly required to be satisfied that the document cannot be found or does not exist for s 24A(b) purposes, there is no like express requirement of satisfaction that all reasonable steps have been taken in s 24A(a). If Parliament had intended to premise both s 24A(a) and (b) upon the satisfaction of the Minister or agency, it could have expressed this intent by the simple expedient of inserting the words "if the Minister or agency is satisfied" in the section prior to pars (a) and (b). The indication that the requirement has an objective character also draws some support from the use of the emphatic word "all" in "all reasonable steps". This usage suggests that whether such steps have been taken is not a matter upon which varying opinions may be entertained. 6 Statutory construction, though, is not an exercise in literalism to be engaged in without regard to the text and purpose(s) of a statute and to the context of the provision in question. Given that s 24A is a provision with a known provenance, the relevant principle to be applied was that stated by Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ in CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 in terms later reiterated in the majority judgment of the High Court in Network Ten Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2004) 205 ALR 1 at 4. In CIC Insurance their Honours said (at 408): "It is well settled that at common law, apart from any reliance upon s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), the court may have regard to reports of law reform bodies to ascertain the mischief which a statute is intended to cure. Moreover, the modern approach to statutory interpretation (a) insists that the context be considered in the first instance, not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise, and (b) uses 'context' in its widest sense to include such things as the existing state of the law and the mischief which, by legitimate means such as those just mentioned, one may discern the statute was intended to remedy. Instances of general words in a statute being so constrained by their context are numerous. In particular, as McHugh JA pointed out in Isherwood v Butler Pollnow Pty Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 363 at 388, if the apparently plain words of a provision are read in the light of the mischief which the statute was designed to overcome and of the objects of the legislation, they may wear a very different appearance. Further, inconvenience or improbability of result may assist the court in preferring to the literal meaning an alternative construction which, by the steps identified above, is reasonably open and more closely conforms to the legislative intent." 7 Section 24A had its genesis in the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs' "Report on the Operation and Administration of The Freedom of Information Legislation" of 1987. The FOI Act, as it stood at that time, made no specific provision for the way in which an agency should respond to an access request for a document which the agency may have had good reason to believe that it possessed, but which could not be located. As was said of this situation in a submission from the Department of Health to the Committee: "The current framework in which the FOI Act operates makes it difficult to explain the situation to members of the public. The Department considers that it would be preferable to all concerned, and far more practical, to include a provision in the Act allowing an agency, after reasonable steps have been taken to locate the document, to find that the particular document cannot be located, giving reasons for that finding. The finding could then be subject to review by the AAT": emphasis added. 8 Accepting the burden of this submission, the Committee recommended that (at 7.87): "… the Act be amended to provide that an agency may formally respond to a request for access by stating that it has reason to believe it possesses the requested document, but is unable to locate the document having taken all reasonable steps to do so. The Committee further recommends that the decision to respond in this manner be able to be reviewed in the same ways as are decisions to refuse access": emphasis added. 9 I would note the important difference in the two formulations highlighted above: the Committee's recommendation, but not the Department's proposal, contains the emphatic requirement "all". 10 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Freedom of Information Bill 1991 which led to the enactment of s 24A is in turn instructive. It stated (at cl 15, par 35) that the Bill: "… inserts a new section 24A to implement a Senate committee recommendation that an agency be able to respond to a request by stating that it is unable to locate the documents requested by the applicant having taken all reasonable steps to do so. New section 24A provides that an agency may refuse a request if the agency, having taken all reasonable steps to find the document, is satisfied that the document cannot be found or that the document does not exist. The agency's decision is subject to internal review (s 54(1)(a)), and review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (s 55(1)(a)). The AAT has the power to require the agency to conduct further searches for the document (s 55(5))." I note in passing, that s 55 of the FOI Act was amended in the same amending legislation to give the Tribunal the power referred to in the last quoted sentence. I return to it below. 11 Turning to the scheme of the FOI Act more generally, it is fair to say that at many places it requires evaluative judgments to be made and interests to be balanced (particularly in the exemption provisions): see e.g. ss 36, 39, 43 and 44; and on occasion it employs "reasonableness" as a judgmental yardstick of action taken or to be taken or of anticipated consequences of action: see e.g. ss 24, 27, 33, 41. Nonetheless, it is equally fair to say that the Act is somewhat indiscriminate in its use of formulae such as "is satisfied" to indicate explicitly that the particular evaluation or judgment required to be made is that of the Minister or agency and that it is not one ultimately for a court: cf ss 24, 33, 39, 40 and 41; but see also s 58. 12 However, what the scheme of the Act does suggest in general terms is that in a matter, (i) in which the Minister or agency is expected to balance the general right of access to documents against another designated public interest; and (ii) in respect of which that Minister or agency is to be taken by virtue of function or responsibility to possess the necessary particular knowledge or experience to make the required judgment, then (whether or not the judgment to be made is circumscribed by other requirements for example, designated relevant considerations) the judgment will be that of the Minister or agency and not of the Court. Given the inquiry posed by s 24A's "all reasonable steps" requirement this provides some – albeit slight – support for the view that the requirement being one tied to intra departmental or agency structures, practices and record keeping policies and practices, its fulfilment is one of which the Minister or agency is to be the judge. 13 It is unnecessary in this proceeding to rehearse again in any detail the case law on jurisdictional facts. As was observed by Weinberg J in Cabal v Attorney-General (2001) 113 FCR 154 at 172, there is nothing special about the task of determining whether a fact, or for that matter a state of affairs, is or is not jurisdictional: "all the normal rules of statutory construction apply": see also Timbarra Protection Coalition Inc v Ross Mining NL (1999) 46 NSWLR 55 at 64. 14 I have already indicated what, in the language of s 24A itself, could be taken as suggesting that the requirement of all reasonable steps having been taken is itself jurisdictional in character. Nonetheless, I am satisfied, that in the context both of the Act and its purposes and of the known provenance of the section itself, the judgment to be made is for the agency in question and, upon review, for the Tribunal and not ultimately for the Court. 15 The object of s 24A is clear enough when regard is had to its context and in particular the Senate Report. It was to enable a Minister or agency to inform a party requesting a document that the document could not be found or did not exist. But as the Senate Report made plain the ground of refusal was to be a quite circumscribed one, hence the "all reasonable steps" requirement. What the antecedents of the section do not betray is an intent to take away from the Minister or agency concerned, the judgment as to whether that requirement had been satisfied. The indications in the Report, the Explanatory Memorandum and the amending legislation are to be contrary. The Report expressly recommended that a decision to respond in the way the proposal contemplated, should be subject to Tribunal review. Implicit in this was that the review would extend to the Tribunal's satisfying itself that the "all reasonable steps" requirement had been fulfilled. The Minister's or agency's decision on that matter was part of the decision to be reviewed. If there could be any doubt on this, the Explanatory Memorandum for the amending Act made plain that, on review, the adequacy of the steps taken was a matter for the Tribunal to decide – hence its now s 55(5) power "to require the agency or Minister concerned to conduct further searches for the document". 16 Considered in the scheme of the Act, but more particularly in light of the provenance of s 24A, I am satisfied that the section does not ascribe a jurisdictional character to the all reasonable steps requirement. That requirement is merely an element, admittedly important, in the making of the decision that s 24A purposes the document cannot be located. 17 The applicant, in consequence, cannot succeed on this ground. FACTUAL SETTING Employment history 18 In 1989 the applicant commenced employment with the respondent at Production Engineering Victoria. This company subsequently became Telecom Industries and then Telstra Corporation. In 1992, the applicant was put through the first of what seem to be a number of redundancy procedures. At that time, a redundancy agreement was reached and, in 1994, pursuant to that agreement the applicant was transferred to Corporate Catalogue Service, a department within the Company. In May 1996 the applicant underwent the redundancy process for the second time, however the decision to proceed with the redundancy was withdrawn in March 1997. A third and final redundancy process followed soon after and on 8 September 1997 the applicant was retrenched. Requests for access 19 In 1996 the applicant made his first request for access to his personal file. He requested access to both his personal file and the file kept by the Promotions Appeal Board ("PAB"). Relevantly, this Board was also known as the Involuntary Redundancy Review Board. ("IRRB"). Before the Tribunal the applicant claimed that this request was ignored. 20 Following his retrenchment in 1997, Mr Chu instructed solicitors to make a request for information under the FOI Act. In a letter dated 13 November 1997, access was sought to the following documents: "All files held by you containing personal information concerning your employee Richard Chu including documents relating to our clients work performance, education, background, promotions, achievements, health, training records, job applications, performance records and any other documents you hold in relation to Richard Chu." 21 Included in the letter was a request for the payable fee to be waived on the basis of financial hardship. The fee waiver request was denied on two occasions by Telstra and the fee eventually was paid on 13 February 1998. 22 Prior to payment of the FOI request fee, numerous communications passed between the applicant's solicitor and the respondent. Primarily, they were concerned with the "categories" of documents requested. On two separate occasions Telstra indicated that the documents sought were insufficient for an effective search to be conducted. At each request, Mr Chu's solicitors provided a more detailed list of the documents they were seeking. These categories included documents relating to in-house and self-education; background information; achievements and accomplishments in the workplace and training records. Further, Mr Chu sought information relating to his job applications in the four different Telstra areas he had worked in. The files released 23 On the 20 April 1998, Telstra collated and released to Mr Chu a legal file compiled in anticipation of an unfair dismissal case; all paperwork dealing with his redundancy payout and a copy of all system reports dealing with leave and pay history details. In early July, unhappy with the documents that had been released, Mr Chu sought further information believing that his personnel files had still not been released. No reply was forthcoming until March 1999, when it was communicated that a comprehensive search had taken place and all documents had been released in full. Numerous contacts were made by the applicant during this time to access his personal file. 24 On 21 October 2003, the applicant sought internal review by the respondent of the decision of 9 March 1999. A fresh search was undertaken by Mr Sutton, the manager of Telstra's Information Access Unit. In a communication dated 26 November 2003 he responded as follows: "I have reviewed [the original decision dated 20 April 1998] in accordance with s 54 of the Act and confirm the decision to release the personnel records located at that time. Given the time that has elapsed, I undertook a fresh search for any documents relating to your employment with this company. I also examined the search notes relating to [the original decision]. The following are my findings. It is evident from [the original decision-maker's] file that initially two files were received from Brian Hayes of Telstra's Corporate Distribution Services. A file note dated 28 November 1997 indicates that the files related to your redundancy. A further note in February 1998 records comment by Brian Hayes that the only papers in the possession of the Corporate Distribution Service Group related to two periods of registration with the NSSC, IRRB hearings and other email messages related to these topics. A copy of these papers were sent to Telstra's Legal HR Group in late 1997 as an Unfair Dismissal application with AIRC had been lodged. The Payroll Services Group advised that they had forwarded a file in November 1997 to Corporate Distribution Services. The Manager of Corporate Distribution Services, Peter Ferris responded on 23 February 1998 that he did not have your 'personnel file'. The advice was that the HR Group did send some papers but these were the ones described above. Further comment was made by Mr Ferris that the 'personnel file that was created by Telecom/Telstra when Richard joined the company has never been provided to me or my staff by the HR Unit and I believe this is what Richard is after. Richard was with the EPS and came to us from the NSSC. The file would either be with the EPS or more likely has been archived by HR'. Further file notes indicate that searches were made for any files in your name at Payroll services in Dubbo, Queensland, Hobart and Melbourne but no files or documents could be located. It is also evident from documents released to you contained in Telstra's Legal File that you made a request to the CEO in August 1997 for your personnel file and a response to you on 3 September 1997 from Rob Cartwright indicated that some documents had been provided and your Line Manager Mr Brian Hayes was following up. Mr Hayes comment in response has been noted above. I note that Mr Simpson wrote to your lawyers again on 9 March 1999 responding to their query regarding the adequacy of searches undertake [sic]. In this letter Mr Simpson advised that 'a comprehensive search took place which involved Mr Chu's business manager, the personnel area and also the legal area'. He further advised that the existence of any other personnel documents could not be established. As advised above in reviewing the matter I decided to arrange for another search to be undertaken for any personnel documents relating to you. I contacted Telstra's Payroll Group in Sydney to coordinate a search. The following was the result. There were two red manila folders located – one inside the other. The file was numbered 37879/VIC#02. The outer folder was headed Chu Richard Yim – DOB 07/09/40 COB 08/09/97 – Redundancy 8/9/97. The inside folder was headed '(Temp File) Original unable to be located'. I have also been provided with 'Perkins History Report for Separated employees as at 10/10/97 and RAPS Employee Extract – Telstra Payroll System'. I have enclosed a full copy of both folders described above together with the Perkins Report and RAPS Extract. I note the majority of the documents contained in the two folders were provided to [sic] with the previous decision. I also contacted Telstra's Legal Group in order to retrieve Telstra's Legal File and compare with the documents released to you. I was advised that as a result of water damage to the archives that this file had been destroyed. Accordingly, I was not able to pursue this line of inquiry any further. I have made a decision in accordance with section 3 of the Act to release the documents located from my search as described above to you in full with the exception of one document which contains the name of another staff member whose file was also the subject of a search note. I have deleted the name of the staff member in accordance with section 41 of the Act on the basis that disclosure of this information would be an unreasonable release of personal information. I considered consulting the employee in accordance with section 27A of the Act but decided that it was impracticable, as it appears this individual is no longer in the company. I have attached a yellow tag to this document for ease of identification. Given your period of employment with this organisation it is very likely that there would have been an individual personal file relating to you. I understand the file was sometimes called the 'blue file'. It is evident that there have been numerous inquiries which have been made over the years attempting to locate this file and any other documents relevant to your employment. I am satisfied that all reasonable steps have been taken to locate this file. Pursuant to section 24A of the Act I have therefore decided to refuse access to this file as it cannot be found or does not exist." 25 On or about 28 January 2004, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the respondent's decision on internal review. In the course of preparing for the hearing of the review, Telstra conducted some further searches in an attempt to identify any further relevant documents. As a result of those searches, Telstra located an Occupational Health Medical file of the applicant which had in fact been earlier discovered, but not released to, Mr Chu. It was sent to him on 9 June 2004. The Tribunal Hearing 26 Both parties before the Tribunal provided detailed documentary evidence regarding the applicant's FOI request, his employment with the respondent, his retrenchment and his in-house training. In particular, the affidavits of Mr G Sutton outlined all the attempts made by the respondent to find and provide the applicant's personal file. He indicated that searches had been made in various Telstra departments as well as their archive and documents warehouse. Mr Sutton also acknowledged the existence of a "blue-folder" (the term dating from the time of PMG, Telstra's predecessor). Further, Mr Sutton agreed with the applicant that there would be more than one file relating to his employment. It would appear from the reasons of the Tribunal and Mr Sutton's letter dated 26 November 2003 that searches were made for the applicant's file at Payroll services in Dubbo, Queensland, Hobart and Melbourne. 27 Mr P Boland, the Group Manager of Telstra's Payroll Services, also gave evidence before the Tribunal. He indicated that it is standard practice for an employee's file to follow him in his placement throughout the corporation. He could not guarantee that the applicant's file had in fact been transferred as required. Mr Boland claimed to have made enquiries with the State Manager and Human Relations Manager regarding the applicant's file and felt he had exhausted all areas in the search. THE TRIBUNAL'S REASONING AND DECISION 28 The Tribunal did not indicate expressly what it considered to be the burden of the all reasonable steps requirement in reaching its conclusion on the review. It set out submissions by Telstra on this matter under the heading "Submissions". It appears, though, from the manner in which it dealt with previous Tribunal decisions on s 24A that it adopted and acted upon the following three paragraphs of its account of Telstra's submissions: "19. In Re Cristovao and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1998) 53 ALD 138, Deputy President McDonald stated at paragraph 19: '(19) The requirements of s 24A of the FOI Act are twofold, namely, reasonable steps must have been taken to find the document and that the document is in the possession of the agency but cannot be found or, alternatively, does not exist. … The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary provides five meanings for the word "reasonable", of which the following is, in the opinion of the tribunal, most "appropriately applied": … 4. Not going beyond the limit as signed by reason; not extravagant or excessive; moderate.' 20. Deputy President Forgie has considered this question in several cases and concluded that the first limb in s 24A requires that the agency take such steps as to discover the requested documents as are appropriate in these circumstances (re Simmons and Secretary, Department of Defence (2000) AATA 491, paragraph 48; re Langer and Telstra Corporation Limited (2002) AATA 341, paragraph 95; re Meschino and Centrelink (2002) AATA 611, paragraph 22). 21. The respondent submitted that the steps required to be taken generally do not have to be exhaustive (re Viewcross Services Pty Ltd and Telstra Corporation Limited [2003] AATA 1025; re Beesley and Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2001) AATA 476, paragraph 69)." 29 I also infer from what the Tribunal said in its conclusions about Mr Chu's failure to give reasons for his request for documents, that it relied as well on the following Telstra submission as to a particular "consideration" necessary to "be made" in assessing whether a search has been reasonable in a particular case. This was: "… the purpose for which the request for documents was made (re Mester and Centrelink (2004) AATA 354, where Senior Member Dwyer stated '… under s 24A of that Act, the reasons for requesting documents provides information relevant to a consideration of the reasonableness of further steps which may be proposed to find further documents')." 30 Having previously referred to the evidence of Mr Sutton and Mr Boland, the Tribunal expressed its conclusion in the following paragraph: "31. The Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent has conducted an exhaustive search for the applicants personal and personnel files, both during 1998, 1999 and from October 2003 until May 2004, and has been unable to find any files other than those already released to the applicant. The respondent has met the requirements of s 24A of the FOI Act within the limitations imposed by its practises and procedures relating to its collection and retention of employee data. The Tribunal takes note of Deputy President Forgie's findings that 'it is not it's [sic] role to conduct an inquiry into the adequacy or otherwise of (in this case, Centrelink) investigatory process or record keeping' (re Meschino and Centrelink (2002) AATA 611, paragraph 28). The Tribunal welcomes the respondent's introduction, as of 4 August 2004, of a centralised computer database dealing with employee's employment records and the site at which these are held": emphasis added. THE APPLICATION TO THIS COURT 31 On 15 November 2004, the applicant filed a notice of appeal in the Federal Court. That notice sets out 16 "questions of law" said to be raised on appeal. These relate in various ways to four general issues – (i) the construction and application of s 24A of the FOI Act (Questions 1-5); (ii) the merits of the Tribunal's decision in relation to the findings of particular facts (Questions 6-9, 12, 14 and 15); and (iii) taking irrelevant considerations into account and not taking relevant considerations into account (Question 10, 11 and 13); and (iv) issues concerning natural justice and procedural fairness" (Question 16). 32 I mean no disrespect to Mr Chu in not setting out his questions of law in full. For the most part they do not raise questions of law at all. Rather, I intend to deal with one matter which is sufficient to determine this application. It relates to the interpretation of s 24A of the FOI Act. 33 At the hearing before me, and in his questions, Mr Chu put into issue whether Telstra did actually take all reasonable steps and whether the Tribunal could be satisfied that it did. Understandably his focus primarily was upon what further could reasonably have been done, and not directly with the anterior question as to proper construction of "all reasonable steps have been taken". Nonetheless, I am satisfied that the latter question has been raised sufficiently in this appeal. 34 As I indicated above, the Tribunal appears to have adopted views expressed in earlier Tribunal decisions relating to the requirements of s 24A. From its reasons it appears also to have accepted that the steps required to be taken generally "do not have to be exhaustive". What the Tribunal did not do is ask itself what the section in express terms required of it. This was not that "reasonable steps must have been taken" – to use the language of an earlier Tribunal decision relied upon. Rather it was that "all reasonable steps" be taken. As is apparent from the tenor of the Senate Report, the difference between the two formulations is fundamentally important. The Committee added the emphatic word "all" to the proposal put to, and accepted by, it in the submission it expressly accepted. 35 It is understandable, where the decision as to the taking of all reasonable steps is left to agency or Minister concerned (subject to Tribunal review), why this more stringent requirement has been imposed. A person requesting access to a document that has been in that agency's or Minister's possession should only be able to be denied on the s 24A ground when the agency (or the Minister) is properly satisfied that it has done all that could reasonably be required of it to find the document in question. Taking the steps necessary to do this may in some circumstances require the agency or Minister to confront and overcome inadequacies in its investigative processes. Section 24A is not meant to be a refuge for the disordered or disorganised. 36 The Tribunal's failure to appreciate the significance of "all" has, in my view, led it to adopt a tempered and erroneous view of what is required to be done for s 24A purposes. 37 In saying this I infer, as I earlier indicated, that it adopted the approach to s 24A espoused in earlier Tribunal decisions. In consequence I am not satisfied that the Tribunal properly understood the critical evaluation it was required to make of the steps taken by Telstra. 38 Even though the Tribunal characterised the various searches undertaken by Telstra as being "exhaustive" (seemingly in the case of each such search), I am not satisfied that this finding in fact nullifies the significance of the error it has committed. Given the Tribunal's misunderstanding of the judgment it was required to make, it would be unsafe to assume that, properly instructed, it would necessarily adopt a like characterisation of Telstra's conduct in any event. It is possible for reasons of change of mind, re-appraisal of the evidence or otherwise that a different result could ensue: Santa Sabina College v Minister for Education (1985) 58 ALR 527 at 540; see also Morales v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 60 FCR 550. 39 I express no view on what the Tribunal's conclusion might be, although I would note that every stage in the review process bought forth further discoveries. 40 I am also concerned with the possible significance that some parts of Telstra's submissions may have had in the Tribunal's determination in any event. I refer in particular (a) to Telstra's reference to Mr Chu being unable to suggest "any further areas that may be searched" and (b) to his not having stated "the reasons why he requires access to his personnel file". The Tribunal noted the latter of these in the paragraph immediately preceding that quoted above in which it made its "exhaustive search" finding. The significance of that noting is not made apparent in the Tribunal's reasons. 41 I would make the following comments on the above two matters. 42 First, while an applicant might be able to help an agency in its attempt to locate a document, that person is hardly to be disadvantaged if he or she cannot. The reasons for this, one would hope, are glaringly self-evident. 43 Secondly, while an applicant's stated reason for seeking access to a document might add to an agency's appreciation of the efforts it ought properly take to find the document, a failure to state a reason provides no justification at all for not taking all reasonable steps to find the document. A person's right of access ought not be affected adversely because no reason, or no apparently satisfactory reason, is given for the access sought: cf FOI Act, s 11(2). 44 I will allow the application, set aside the decision of the Tribunal, and remit the matter to the Tribunal to be heard and decided again. I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Finn . Associate: Dated: 1 December 2005 The Applicant appeared in person. Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R M Niall Solicitor for the Respondent: FOI Solutions Date of Hearing: 25 July 2005 Date of Supplementary Written Submissions: 22 August 2005 Date of Judgment: 1 December 2005