FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA Dodd on behalf of the Gudjala People Core Country Claim #1 v State of Queensland [2011] FCA 690 Citation: Dodd on behalf of the Gudjala People Core Country Claim #1 v State of Queensland [2011] FCA 690 Parties: ELIZABETH DODD & ORS ON BEHALF OF THE GUDJALA PEOPLE CORE COUNTRY CLAIM #1 v STATE OF QUEENSLAND & ORS ELIZABETH DODD & ORS ON BEHALF OF THE GUDJALA PEOPLE CORE COUNTRY CLAIM #2 v STATE OF QUEENSLAND & ORS File numbers: QUD 80 of 2005 QUD 147 of 2006 Judge: LOGAN J Date of judgment: 17 June 2011 Catchwords: NATIVE TITLE – authorisation of claim group – where one of several persons authorised under s 251B of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) does not wish to remain as a member of the claim group – whether remaining authorised persons may apply to remove name of that member as a party – whether it is necessary under s 251B for native title claim group to authorise new persons to maintain and deal with matters arising in relation to application and for application under s 66B or O 6 r 9 of the Federal Court Rules (Cth) to replace applicant Held: (1) the authorisation has not been revoked (2) the authorisation was not conferred in terms of joint authority but was conferred on each person (3) s 66B of the Native Title Act (Cth) empowers the Court to grant the application sought as evidence has been provided that a member of a claim group is no longer willing to act in representative capacity – further amendment of the persons comprising the applicant was also authorised by O 6 r 9 of the Federal Court Rules (Cth) Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 6B, 61, 62A, 64, 66B, 223 Native Title Amendment (Technical Amendments) Act 2007 (Cth) High Court Rules 1953 (Cth) O 16 r 4 Federal Court Rules (Cth) O 6 r 9 Cases cited: Butchulla People v Queensland (2006) 154 FCR 233 followed Chapman v Queensland (2007) 159 FCR 507 cited Doolan v Native Title Registrar (2007) 158 FCR 56 cited FQM Australia Nickel Pty Ltd v Bullen (2011) 191 FCR 261 considered Lennon v State of South Australia [2010] FCA 743 followed Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 considered Mabo v State of Queensland [1992] 1 Qd R 78 considered Sambo v Western Australia (2008) 172 FCR 271 distinguished Keon-Cohen BA, The Mabo Litigation: A Personal and Procedural Account (2000) 24 MULR 893 Date of hearing: 8 April 2011 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 QUD 80 of 2005 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Preston Solicitor for the Applicant: North Queensland Land Council Counsel for the State of Queensland: Ms H Bowskill Solicitor for the State of Queensland : G Cooper, Crown Solicitor for Queensland Counsel for the Commonwealth of Australia: Ms N Kidson (written submissions by Ms R Webb QC and Ms Kidson) Solicitor for the Commonwealth of Australia: Australian Government Solicitor QUD 147 of 2006 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Preston Solicitor for the Applicant: North Queensland Land Council Counsel for the State of Queensland: Ms H Bowskill Solicitor for the State of Queensland: G Cooper, Crown Solicitor for Queensland IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION QUD 80 of 2005 BETWEEN: ELIZABETH DODD & ORS ON BEHALF OF THE GUDJALA PEOPLE CORE COUNTRY CLAIM #1 Applicant AND: STATE OF QUEENSLAND & ORS Respondent QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION QUD 147 of 2006 BETWEEN: ELIZABETH DODD & ORS ON BEHALF OF THE GUDJALA PEOPLE CORE COUNTRY CLAIM #2 Applicant AND: STATE OF QUEENSLAND & ORS Respondent JUDGE: LOGAN J DATE OF ORDER: 17 JUNE 2011 WHERE MADE: BRISBANE THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. Ms Elizabeth Dodd, Mr Andrew (Smokey) Anderson, Ms Gloria Santo, Ms Christine Hero and Ms Priscilla Michelle Huen jointly replace the current applicant for the application. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court's website. IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION QUD 80 of 2005 BETWEEN: ELIZABETH DODD & ORS ON BEHALF OF THE GUDJALA PEOPLE CORE COUNTRY CLAIM #1 Applicant AND: STATE OF QUEENSLAND & ORS Respondent IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION QUD 147 of 2006 BETWEEN: ELIZABETH DODD & ORS ON BEHALF OF THE GUDJALA PEOPLE CORE COUNTRY CLAIM #2 Applicant AND: STATE OF QUEENSLAND & ORS Respondent JUDGE: LOGAN J DATE: 17 JUNE 2011 PLACE: BRISBANE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 In the course of the trial of questions of fact in the Supreme Court of Queensland (reported as rulings on evidence and burden of proof in Mabo v State of Queensland [1992] 1 Qd R 78; otherwise unreported, Moynihan J, Supreme Court of Queensland, 16 November 1990), on remitter from the High Court of Australia, in the litigation which has passed into history under the name Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Mabo (No 2)), two of the plaintiffs, a distinguished but by then elderly and ailing leader amongst the Meriam people, Mr Sam Passi MBE and his younger brother, Father David Passi, another leader amongst his people, decided that they no longer wished to be plaintiffs: Mabo v State of Queensland [1992] 1 Qd R 78 at 81 (Mabo v State of Queensland); see also B A Keon-Cohen, The Mabo Litigation: A Personal and Procedural Account (2000) 24 MULR 893 at 933 (Keon-Cohen). They filed notices of discontinuance and ceased to be plaintiffs: ibid. Later, Father David Passi sought again to become a plaintiff: ibid. Following a controversy during the trial as to the extent of the powers exercisable by the trial judge, Moynihan J, an application relative to that question was heard in the High Court by Toohey J in chambers: Keon-Cohen at 935 incl fn 306 & 307. His Honour ruled 'that the Supreme Court of Queensland may make orders and give directions as may be appropriate for amendment of the parties and the pleadings and for the giving of further particulars in respect of the pleadings in this action': ibid. Thereafter, Moynihan J made an order readmitting Father Passi as a plaintiff Mabo v State of Queensland [1992] 1 Qd R at 81; Keon-Cohen at 935. 2 The statement of claim in Mabo v Queensland recited that the plaintiffs 'bring this action [on] their own behalf, and on behalf of the members of their respective family groups': Keon-Cohen at 911 incl fn 141. The proceeding therefore had a representative quality. After the determination of facts by the Supreme Court, and following amendments made in the course of final submissions before the High Court by the plaintiffs to the declaratory relief sought, (qv Keon-Cohen at 941), the declaratory relief granted by the High Court reflected a representative claim and, subject to exceptions noted in the order, declared that "the Meriam people are entitled as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the Murray Islands": Mabo (No 2) at 217. 3 Mabo (No 2) was a claim brought at common law. It serves as an example of the facility with which, in the exercise of judicial power pursuant to an authority conferred on a court in general terms, persons were able to withdraw from being and be joined as plaintiffs in a proceeding of a representative nature. 4 Under the then prevailing High Court Rules, High Court Rules 1953 (Cth), a justice of that court had power, inter alios, to make orders joining as plaintiffs such persons whose presence may be necessary to enable that court or a justice to "effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions arising": O 16 r 4. Like power of joinder was conferred under the then rules of the Supreme Court of Queensland and of this Court. It is not necessary expressly to refer to those rules. It is desirable, though, additionally to make express reference to O 6 r 9 of the Federal Court Rules (Cth) which, then as now, provides: Removal of parties If a person: (a) has been improperly or unnecessarily joined as a party to a proceeding; or (b) has ceased to be a proper or necessary party to a proceeding; the Court may order that the person cease to be a party and make orders for the further conduct of the proceeding. 5 The rules of court to which I have made reference were and are of general application and apt to deal with all manner of claims and change of parties to claims within the jurisdiction of the respective courts. 6 Thus, if the application in the present proceeding were, like Mabo (No 2), one brought in the High Court at common law in which a representative claim was made in respect of the lands presently in question and the High Court had remitted it to this court for trial or even just determination of issues of fact, and a plaintiff decided that he or she no longer wished to continue in that role, ample power would exist either to permit the proceeding to continue with the remaining plaintiffs or, if another interested person wished to become a plaintiff, to join that person as a plaintiff, always providing that the interests of justice so required. That power would be derived either from the Federal Court Rules if the matter were remitted for trial or, if the remitter were more limited, from the terms of the remitter. 7 The present, though, is not a claim at common law but, necessarily now, in light of the Commonwealth Parliament's response to Mabo (No 2), one made under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (Native Title Act). Further, the submission made on behalf of the Commonwealth is that, in circumstances where, like Mr Sam Passi in Mabo (No 2) before him, Mr William Santo no longer wishes to be a member of the group termed "the applicant", but the other members of that group do wish to continue to prosecute the application for native title, they may not do so unless they are freshly authorised so to do because that is the effect of s 66B of the Native Title Act. The remaining members of the group are Ms Elizabeth Dodd, Mr Andrew (Smokey) Anderson, Ms Gloria Santo, Ms Christine Hero and Ms Priscilla Michelle Huen. They submit they s 66B has no such effect and that either that section or O 6 r 9 of the Federal Court Rules empowers the Court to grant their application jointly to replace the current applicant. In this endeavour they are supported by the State of Queensland. 8 There is no doubt that to convene an authorisation meeting would entail considerable expense, probably from public funds, and introduce yet further delay in the final determination of an application that has been delayed enough in its progress already. 9 The point is not one free from authority, although none of the authorities is binding upon me. Further, there is a conflict on the authorities. 10 Some of the authorities predate amendments made to the Native Title Act by the Native Title Amendment (Technical Amendments) Act 2007 (Cth) (the 2007 Amendment Act). Materially, the 2007 Amendment Act repealed then s 64(5) and also made amendments to s 66B. 11 Prior to the 2007 Amendment Act Kiefel J (then a judge of this Court) had held in Butchulla People v Queensland (2006) 154 FCR 233 (Butchulla) (at [42] to [45]) that: 42 It follows, in my view, that the authorisation referred to in the NTA is not of the persons authorised collectively making up the "applicant", but of each of them personally. There being no express term concerning the authorisation as to the authority to the contrary, statutory or otherwise, the presumptions usually applied to personal appointments would operate. That is to say, their authorisation will continue until revoked and whilst they are willing and able to act in their representative capacity. The requirement of the NTA, that persons authorised act together, is not a term or condition of appointment. It is a statutory requirement having as its purpose the efficient prosecution of claims. 43 Once the authority given by the claim group is seen to be directed to each of the persons authorised and subject to those terms it follows that the inability of one to continue does not affect the authorisation of the others. It is not an approach which cuts across any statutory provision or purpose. Unlike the respondents' approach it is consistent with the nature of the rights associated with claims to native title determination. The authorisation given by the claim group must be seen in this light. This view of authorisation does not however prevent revocation if it were considered to be necessary. 44 It is of some importance that the preferred approach also allows the Court's rules to have effect in proceedings of this kind. Order 6, r 9 of the Federal Court Rules contemplates that there may be a need in some cases to remove a person as a party to the proceedings. A "party" in the context of a native title claim the "applicant", would be all persons who together make up the applicant, since the "applicant" referred to in the NTA is not an entity itself capable of suing. There seems to me to be good reason why the Court should be in a position to exercise the power given by O 6 r 9 in native title claim proceedings as it does in any other litigation. I do not think it could be suggested that the need to do so would not arise. 45 In my view s 251B should be understood to refer to the authorisation of each person who is to represent the claim group and act with others as the "applicant". The authorisation is personal to them and continues until revoked or whilst they are willing or able to act. Sections 66B(1) and 64(5), dealing with replacement and appointment respectively, should be read in a way consistent with this approach. The reference to the "current applicant" being no longer authorised would be taken to refer only to those persons whose authority has in fact been revoked. This may not be all persons comprising "the applicant". The "new applicant" referred to in s 64(5) is each person who is authorised to make up the applicant when a change is made to one or more of them. The evidence that the subsection requires about their authorisation would be satisfied by those persons not newly appointed referring to their prior authorisation and the fact that it has not been revoked. For administrative convenience and clarity, their authorisation might also be ratified at the same meeting which authorises the new appointment or appointments, but this is not necessary. I interpolate that all that the amendment to s 66B(1)(a) made by the 2007 Amending Act does is to replace the term "current applicant" with "person". 12 Butchulla was followed by Spender J in Doolan v Native Title Registrar (2007) 158 FCR 56 at [72] – [74]. In Chapman v Queensland (2007) 159 FCR 507 at [12] – [14] Kiefel J adhered to the views earlier expressed by her in Butchulla. 13 On the basis of these authorities, and had the issue arisen prior to the 2007 Amendment Act, I should have readily ordered that the application be amended so that the remaining members of the group jointly replaced the existing applicant. 14 Sambo v Western Australia (2008) 172 FCR 271 was an application under O 6 r 9 for the amendment of an applicant which came on before Siopis J following the amendments made by the (the 2007 Amendment Act). Having made reference to the Explanatory Memorandum which accompanied the Bill which became that Act, Siopis J stated at [28] to [30]: 28 The 2007 amendments and the comments in the Explanatory Memorandum that the proposed s 66B was to be the only mechanism through which any changes to the applicant could be made, are inconsistent with the observations of Kiefel J in Chapman 159 FCR 507 (see [24] above) that "it should not be inferred that it was intended that s 66B(1) be the only means" of making changes to the applicant. 29 Further, the 2007 amendments are inconsistent with the premise that underlies the decision in each of Butchulla People 154 FCR 233, Chapman 159 FCR 507 and Doolan 158 FCR 56, namely, that the authorisation given by the claim group is personal to each member of the applicant, rather than being given to the particular group of persons comprising the applicant collectively. This is evident, for example, from the inclusion of the death of a person comprising the applicant in the circumstances listed in s 66B(1)(a). When s 66B(1)(a)(i) is read with s 66B(1)(b) it is clear that even when a person comprising the applicant has died, it is Parliament's intention that there is to be an authorisation by the claim group of the replacement applicant, whether or not the deceased person is replaced by another person as part of the applicant. 30 It follows that since the passing of the 2007 amendments there is only one means whereby any changes can be made to the composition of the applicant and that is through s 66B of the Act. The decisions in the cases of Butchulla People 154 FCR 233, Chapman 159 FCR 507 and Doolan 158 FCR 56 have been superseded by the amendments. Accordingly, I reject the applicant movers' contention that it is open to the Court to remove Ms Wyatt and Mr Cooper as members of the applicant by reference to O 6, r 9 of the Rules on the basis that each is not a proper or necessary party. 15 In the result, his Honour dismissed the application for amendment because there was no evidence that those who sought to become the applicant had been authorised so to do by a meeting of the native title claim group. 16 A different view of the effect of the 2007 Amendment Act is evident in Lennon v State of South Australia [2010] FCA 743 (Lennon) in which at [22] – [26] Mansfield J stated: 22 In my view, s 66B does not in its terms cover the field so that it is the only means by which a native title claim group can prosecute an application once one of a number of persons who are authorised under s 251B to make and deal with the application has deceased. 23 I have referred above at [11] to the practical consequence of the contrary construction. They are obviously antithetical to the purposes of the NT Act. That is so, both at an aspirational level having regard to the Preamble to the NT Act and at the practical level of how the NT Act provides for Indigenous persons to make and maintain a claim under s 61. 24 The Preamble is clear. The NT Act is to ensure that Indigenous people " ... receive the full recognition and status within the Australian nation to which history, their prior rights and interests, and their rich and diverse culture, fully entitle them to aspire." 25 In Doolan, Spender J reflected that general approach in his Honour's determination. His Honour referred, inter alia, to the observations of McHugh J in Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1 at [124]-[125] as providing an appropriate way to construe the provisions of the NT Act. "It is also necessary to keep in mind that, in the Second Reading Speech on the Native Title Bill 1993, the then Prime Minister, Mr Keating, saw Mabo [No 2] as giving Australians the opportunity to rectify the consequences of past injustices. The Act should therefore be read as having a legislative purpose of wiping away or at all events ameliorating the "national legacy of unutterable shame" that in the eyes of many has haunted the nation for decades. Where the Act is capable of construction that would ameliorate any of those injustices or redeem that legacy, it should be given that construction. If the purpose of the Act was to recognise native title in any case where Aboriginal or Torres Strait Island people still possessed rights and interests in respect of land or water under their traditional laws or customs, the duty of the courts would be to ensure that that purpose was achieved. That would be so even if it meant giving a strained construction to or reading words into the Act. In an extrajudicial speech, Lord Diplock once said that "if ... the Courts can identify the target of Parliamentary legislation their proper function is to see that it is hit: not merely to record that it has been missed"." 26 When considering the terms of s 66B(1), a construction is available which reflects that approach and does not involve the potential frustration of the application for a lengthy period, with the consequential waste of resources both to the native title representative body and to members of the claim group. In the first place, s 66B(1) was, and is, permissive. It enables, but does not compel, a member of the claim group authorised under s 251B to apply to "replace" the current applicant. To adopt the approach of the High Court in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, the use of the word "may" can (but need not necessarily) be seen as indicating a legislative purpose that s 66B(1) provides a means, but not the only means in every circumstance, by which the persons as parties constituting the applicant may be changed: see eg per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [93]. Section 66B is in its terms empowering of the native title claim group. It is a power which clearly should exist. The claim group may wish to change the persons it authorises to deal with an application in any one or more of the circumstances referred to in subclauses (a)(i) to (iv). Sections 61(1) and 251B enable the claim group to decide who it wishes to authorise to make and deal with matters relating to its application. Section 66B(1) enables the claim group, if it wishes, to make changes to the authorised persons from time to time in the circumstances provided. It would in my view, be inconsistent with the autonomy of the claim group that - at considerable expense and delay and inconvenience - it should, in the event of one or more of the events set out in subclauses (a)(i) to (iv) of s 66B(1), be obliged to proceed under that provision. There is no apparent reason why the legislature would wish to impose upon a claim group such an obligation. An example may make the point. If (say) there were 20 authorised persons and one died and the claim group did not wish to change the remaining authorised persons, why would the legislature insist upon a further authorisation meeting? Or if, of those 20 authorised persons, one becomes incapacitated? The claim group has the power to enliven s 66B(1), but why should it have the obligation to do so in those circumstances, when s 62A of the NT Act or O 6 r 9 of the Federal Court Rules provides a ready and economical means of that change being made? 17 I find the reasoning of Mansfield J in Lennon compelling. With respect, I prefer it to that of Siopis J in Sambo. When one recalls the purpose of the Native Title Act and the facility with which before then, in Mabo (No 2), just this type of situation was able to be dealt, it would be an odd result if, in this regard, the effect of the Native Title Act was to make it procedurally more difficult for a claim for native title as defined by s 223 of the Native Title Act to be progressed than it was at common law before the passage of that Act. Further, as was submitted on behalf of the State and adopted by the remaining members of the group, the material intent of the 2007 Amendment Act was to address an apparent conflict as between the then s 66B and the then s 64(5) rather than radically to alter by restriction the meaning and effect of the authorisation of persons as "the applicant" as construed by Kiefel J in Butchulla. If anything, the effect of the amendment was nothing other than to widen the circumstances in which application under s 66B could be made. 18 The State further submitted that the reasoning of Mansfield J in Lennon could further be supported by the "overarching purpose" of this Court's civil practice and procedure provisions, which would include O 6 r 9, as stated in Pt VB of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). I disagree. If, truly, as the Commonwealth submitted, s 66B of the Native Title Act as now amended operates as a code requiring fresh authorisation in circumstances such as the present then, whatever may be the "overarching purpose" of O 6 r 9, its operation would be excluded by s 66B. 19 The Commonwealth sought to derive support for its construction of s 66B from the following passage in a recent judgment of the Full Court in FQM Australia Nickel Pty Ltd v Bullen (2011) 191 FCR 261 at [33] (FQM Australia Nickel): 33 Contrary to the appellants' submissions the primary judge was not in error by focusing on s 66B as an important part of the context for the resolution of this issue. When regard is had to the statutory provisions of the Native Title Act overall, it is apparent that the legislature, in s 66B, deals with the very question which the primary judge had to determine - the effect of the death of a registered native title claimant on their status as a registered native title claimant. The way in which the legislature dealt with the issue may be imperfect, at least from the appellants' perspective. For one thing, the Native Title Act does not provide a maximum period of time within which an application for replacement of an applicant who has died may be made. For another, it does not provide that a registered native title claimant ceases to have that status on expiry of that maximum time period if no order for replacement has been made. This, in truth, was the essence of the appellants' complaint. The fact that the statute does not deal with these matters is capable of causing inconvenience to persons in the position of the appellants. But potential for inconvenience is not a reason to avoid giving effect to the statutory scheme which the legislature has prescribed. The statutory scheme enables a member of the native title claim group to replace a registered native title claimant who has died. It enables this to occur without either the claim as registered or the deceased applicant's status as a registered native title claimant lapsing. On the order for replacement, the Registrar is to amend the Register. But there is no requirement, for example, for the Registrar to remove the claim, or the name of the applicant, from the Register on becoming aware of the death of an applicant. Nor is there any requirement for the Registrar to reassess a claim where, for example, a sole applicant and registered native title claimant has died. 20 As is evident from the passage quoted, the question before the Full Court arose in the quite different context of the effect of the death of a registered native title claimant on their status as such. There was no occasion in that case for the Full Court to consider the use, if any, which might be made of O 6 r 9 of the Federal Court Rules or whether the observations made by Kiefel J in Butchulla in relation to s 66B had continuing relevance in light of the 2007 Amendment Act. FQM Australia Nickel does not bind me to hold that Lennon should not be followed. 21 The Commonwealth's further submission was that it was, "only in circumstances where the authorisation itself makes express provision for the consequences of 'the vicissitudes that accompany joint action' that the previous authorisation from the claim group can be used to found a replacement applicant". It was submitted that an applicant might comprise a balance of different sectional interests such that, in the absence of express initial advertence to the prospect that such a representative might die or no longer wish to continue as a member of the applicant, fresh authorisation was not only required but in keeping with the intent of the Act. The short answer to this is that, in their references to the applicant, neither s 61(2), s 62A nor s 66B have anything at all to say about native title claim group sectional interest representation in the applicant. 22 The relevant authorisation appears in the minutes of the native title claim group meeting of 2 September 2009 exhibited to the affidavit of Moana Biddle filed on 25 September 2009. It authorises the named persons, which comprise the remaining members of the group and Mr William Santo to "make an application in the court". As was submitted on behalf of the remaining members of the group, the authorisation thus conferred was not expressed in terms of joint authority. Further, and again as submitted on their behalf, the authorisation was in the broadest terms and has not been revoked. It remains the case that, as Kiefel J held in Butchulla, such an authorisation is of each of the named persons personally. In the absence of any contrary indication either in the Native Title Act or in the terms of the appointment itself, and neither contains a contrary indication, the presumptions applied to personal appointments operates. The requirement that the authorised persons act together is a requirement of the Native Title Act not of the terms of their appointment. So far as the terms of each individual member's appointment are concerned, it continues to operate until it is revoked or until the person ceases to be willing and able to act in a representative capacity. Mr William Santo has given evidence that he is no longer willing so to act. 23 In these circumstances, s 66B of the Native Title Act empowers, rather than denies, the ability of the Court to make the order sought. 24 I am satisfied that Mr William Santo has consented to his removal. I am also satisfied that Ms Elizabeth Dodd, Mr Andrew (Smokey) Anderson, Ms Gloria Santo, Ms Christine Hero and Ms Priscilla Michelle Huen are authorised by the claim group to make the application and to deal with matters arising in relation to it. That being so, the requirements of s 66B(1)(a) and (b) of the Native Title Act are met and s 66B(2) permits the making of the order sought. 25 It also follows from the foregoing that the making of an order in the terms sought is additionally warranted by O 6 r 9 of the Federal Court Rules. 26 There will an order accordingly. I certify that the preceding twenty-six (26) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Logan. Associate: Dated: 17 June 2011