FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA SZOXY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 904 Citation: SZOXY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 904 Appeal from: SZOXY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FMCA 285 Parties: SZOXY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 670 of 2011 Judge: GREENWOOD J Date of judgment: 2 August 2011 Catchwords: MIGRATION - consideration of an appeal from the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia raising grounds of illogicality, irrationality, unreasonableness and a failure to consider foundation facts Cases cited: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 Date of hearing: 2 August 2011 Date of last submissions: 2 August 2011 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 70 Counsel for the Appellant: Appellant appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent: J Pinder, DLA Piper Australia IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION NSD 670 of 2011 ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA BETWEEN: SZOXY Appellant AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP First Respondent REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent JUDGE: GREENWOOD J DATE OF ORDER: 2 AUGUST 2011 WHERE MADE: SYDNEY THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The appeal be dismissed. 2. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal, to be taxed or agreed. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION NSD 670 of 2011 ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA BETWEEN: SZOXY Appellant AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP First Respondent REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent JUDGE: GREENWOOD J DATE: 2 AUGUST 2011 PLACE: SYDNEY EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia constituted by Cameron FM. The judgment was delivered on 27 April 2011 in which the court dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the 'Tribunal') made on 15 December 2010. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of the delegate of the First Respondent (the 'Minister') to refuse the grant of a Protection (Class XA) Visa to the appellant. The appellant's application of 19 March 2010 for a protection visa was supported by a statutory declaration, which is at AB 65 of the record. In that declaration the appellant said the following things. 2 The appellant is a national of Nepal born on 1 December 1984. He said that he cannot stay in Nepal safely due to Maoist threats towards his life and liberty. He says that he was an active member of the Rastriya Prajatantra Party ("RPP") from 2006 to 2008. 3 The appellant says that he left Nepal because of repeated threats from Maoists who persisted in those threats which caused him to flee Nepal. At para 3 of his declaration he says that he believes that the continuing inability of the Nepal government to restore law and order has rendered anti-Maoists extremely vulnerable to acts of violence by Maoist militias. He also says at para 4 that Maoists killed six of his friends who were members of the RPP in October 2007 because of their opposition to the Maoists. He says that he holds a fear of being murdered in the same way as his friends were murdered. He says that the Maoists engage in pervasive and systematic abuse of human rights. He says at para 10 that he is afraid to go home because he believes that it is inevitable that he will endure further threats "on account of [his] political opinion." 4 In the course of the hearing this morning the appellant was self-represented although assisted by an interpreter. The appellant also filed with the court on 27 July 2010 written submissions which address various matters and I will comment upon those shortly. 5 In the course of oral submissions the appellant made submissions, much along the lines of the factual matters asserted in the statutory declaration, at AB 65. The appellant says that he has suffered greatly in Nepal. He is in fear of his life which is why he came to Australia. He says that he explained his concerns, which go to the question of whether he holds a well-founded fear of persecution, clearly to the Minister's delegate and the Tribunal. He says that unfortunately, no one believed him and his case was refused because he was not believed. He says that is why he is here today and he seeks justice from this Court about those matters. 6 At AB 108 and AB 109 of the record the delegate describes some documents which were put before the delegate and they are set out at AB 108. At AB 109 the delegate refers to three photographs which were submitted by the appellant in support of his claims of a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (that is, by reason of his political opinions). I will describe those photographs from the description apparent at AB 109, and it is this: 1. A photograph said to depict the appellant at a political rally during a convention three years prior to September 2007 (approximately) holding the flag of the RPP; 2. A photograph said to depict the appellant (at the right hand side of the photo) with Kamal Thapa who was RPP chairman of the relevant District; and 3. A photograph said to depict the appellant with the current chairman of the RPP, Pashupapa Samser JBR. 7 Those three photographs became a matter of considerable significance in the course of the proceedings before the Tribunal. The photographs are set out at AB 130 and further described in that document. The document at AB 130 is a "Forensic Document Examination Report" which was available to the Minister's delegate. It describes the three photographs I have just described as Q1, Q2 and Q3. The photographs were examined forensically because a concern emerged before the delegate that the photographs may not have been genuine and may have been altered to transpose an image of the appellant into the photographs so as to provide support for the protection visa application. It is not necessary in these reasons to describe the content of the forensic analysis. It is simply sufficient to observe that at AB 131 the report concludes: Based on the observations listed above, I am of the opinion that photographs Q1, Q2 and Q3 are composite images due to the evidence of manipulation present in all of the images. 8 The delegate expressed concern about that matter and although, of course, the delegate's decision is no longer relevant it has some slight relevance in the sense that the reasons of the delegate reflect a comment made about those photographs by the appellant when asked about them. The delegate observed that as a result of his concerns, he put to the appellant during the interview concerns about manipulation of the images. At AB 114 the delegate notes: The applicant [appellant] responded that it is not that his face has been placed into the photographs but it may appear like that because of when they had cleaned the photos. He also said that it could be because of the modern technology of the computer that somewhere the photo has become brighter in spots where there are patches. He stated that the photographs had not been superimposed and that they are genuine. [emphasis added] 9 The delegate then refers to the report I have just mentioned. Having regard to those matters, the delegate rejected the application. 10 The appellant then applied for review of that decision before the Tribunal on 12 October 2010. On 26 October 2010, at AB 126, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant inviting the appellant to attend a hearing on 13 December 2010 and give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues raised by his case. On the following day, on 27 October 2010, (AB 128 and AB 129) the Tribunal, no doubt in anticipation of the hearing on 13 December, wrote to the appellant, consistent with section 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and said this: In conducting its review the Tribunal is required by the Migration Act to invite you to comment on or respond to certain information which the Tribunal considers would, subject to your comments or response, be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. 11 The Tribunal then observed that the appellant had submitted three photographs in support of his claim to be an active and committed supporter of the RPP in Nepal. The Tribunal noted that the photographs had been submitted to the 'Document Examination Unit' of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship for examination and a report suggested that the photographs had been manipulated and were fraudulent. The Tribunal invited the appellant to comment upon those concerns by 19 November 2010. 12 The forensic report at AB 130 attaches reproductions of photographs Q1, Q2 and Q3. I mentioned earlier the response that the appellant had made to the delegate's questions because the Tribunal notes at AB 153 at para 27 that the appellant did not respond to the letter of 27 October 2010 inviting a commentary upon the proposition that the photographs had been manipulated and were fraudulent. It follows that this quite important matter was not addressed by the appellant and, of course, that matter went to the heart of the Tribunal's decision. 13 As to the Tribunal's decision these matters should be noted from AB 156 and AB 157 which sets out the way in which the Tribunal approached the matter and the findings it reached. 14 At para 38 the Tribunal observed that two significant issues arose in the appellant's case. The first concerned the credibility of his claims and the Tribunal noted that it would have to consider whether the applicant had provided a truthful account of his circumstances in Nepal and whether it could be satisfied that he was an active member of the RPP as he had contended. The Tribunal noted in that paragraph aspects of the appellant's knowledge regarding the history of the political party. 15 At para 39 the Tribunal noted that if the Tribunal accepts the appellant's claim that he was involved with the RPP it would then have to consider whether his fear of harm from the Maoists is a "well-founded" fear. The Tribunal then at para 43 observed that it was not satisfied that the applicant had provided a truthful account of his circumstances in Nepal. As to the methodology in dealing with questions of credibility the Tribunal at 43 said this: The Tribunal does not consider it appropriate to take an overly stringent approach to questions of credibility, but neither does it consider it appropriate to accept all claims uncritically. 16 At para 45 the Tribunal said this: However, in the present matter, the Tribunal has formed the view that the applicant fabricated the claims relating to his involvement with the RPP-N in Nepal. 17 That conclusion is then elaborated in paras 46, 47 and 48. Some of these observations need to be noted because they provide the ultimate underlying foundation for the conclusion at 45 which was put in challenge before the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia and on appeal in this Court. At para 46 the Tribunal said this: The applicant claims he was an active and committed member of the RPP-N political Party in Nepal. When the Tribunal discussed the party's history, its aims, and its prominent members in parliament, he had limited knowledge regarding these matters. The applicant was aware that the party was formed in 2006, he could name the leader, and he was aware that it supported the monarchy in Nepal, but he did not know why the political party was formed, its particular aims which differentiate it from other PP party, or the persons which represented the party in parliament. 18 At para 46 the Tribunal further found that information about the political party which was not known by the appellant was "basic information" which, would in the Tribunal's view, be commonly known by any member who was involved with the party. At 46 the Tribunal said this: The Tribunal finds that he contrived these claims to enhance his application and it does not accept as credible his claim that he was a member of the RPP-N in Nepal. 19 It is apparent from para 46 that one of the grounds upon which the Tribunal was unable to accept the version of events given by the appellant was that the appellant did not seem to understand or have a knowledge of basic information about the party to which he said he was committed. 20 The second aspect of the conclusions concerned the matter of the documentary evidence, and at para 47 the Tribunal said this: The Tribunal noted the documentary evidence by the applicant in support of his claim that he attended political rallies in Nepal. He submitted three photographs to the department which he claims were taken during RPP-N rallies. The DEU found that the photographs were altered to insert the applicant's image after the photographs were taken. 21 At 47 the Tribunal concluded that it accepted the forensic report and found as a fact that the photographs had been fabricated by the appellant to support his claim that he attended political rallies in Nepal. At para 47 the Tribunal found that it did not accept that the applicant attended those political rallies and found that the photographs were fabricated to enhance the application. 22 Accordingly, the second basis upon which the Tribunal formed an adverse view on credibility was an acceptance of evidence before it from the forensic unit which concluded that the photographs had been fabricated. The Tribunal found that the submission of the fabricated evidence was a matter adversely reflecting upon the credibility of the appellant and the Tribunal was not willing to accept the evidence of the appellant having regard to that matter. 23 At para 48 a third matter is raised in more general terms where the Tribunal found that it could not accept as credible, related claims that the appellant had been targeted by Maoists while living in Nepal because of his involvement with the political party and nor could the Tribunal accept the oral evidence that the appellant faced harm in the reasonably foreseeable future for that reason. At para 48 the Tribunal found: The Tribunal does not accept as credible the applicant's claim that he has been or will be a person of interest to Maoists in Nepal for reasons of political opinion. 24 It followed for the Tribunal that the application for review must be rejected, having rejected comprehensively the evidence of the appellant on grounds of credibility for the reasons I have just mentioned. 25 The appellant applied for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision before the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia on the footing that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction. The grounds relied upon before the Federal Magistrates Court were these. First, the appellant contended that the Tribunal's decision is vitiated by error of law as the evidence relied upon by the Tribunal is "so unreasonable or so inadequate" that the only inference open is that the Tribunal member failed to discharge the statutory review function. 26 Second, the Tribunal member failed to "complete the exercise of jurisdiction" as the Tribunal member made a decision "without having considered all claims" and further, the "use of evidence by the Tribunal member is so illogical [in its analysis] … that the Tribunal member did not act in good faith." 27 Third, it was contended that jurisdictional error arose in the way the Tribunal failed to make "a proper, genuine and realistic assessment of the real risk of serious harm in light of the country information" and the appellant's "[c]redibility should not an issue in my case as I explained my problems in a lucid manner". 28 Fourth, the appellant contended that the "structure of the [Tribunal's] decision clearly showed" that the Tribunal had not discharged the review function properly and the Tribunal's statement of reasons show that the appellant's claims were 'overlooked by the Tribunal member'. 29 Fifth, the appellant contended that there was no evidence upon which the Tribunal could rely so as to be confident that documents in support of the appellant's application were not genuine whereas, the documents, so the appellant contends, are genuine. The appellant contended that the evidence put before the Tribunal had been construed adversely to his claims and "[t]his is injustice". 30 Those five matters were the grounds of appeal before the Federal Magistrates Court although in the course of the hearing before that court the appellant relied upon the two additional grounds. First, the Tribunal relied upon country information rather than the evidence which had been put before it by the appellant. Second, the Tribunal had discharged the review function by deciding the review application by reference to information sourced from the internet rather than by reference to "what he had said", which I take to mean his oral evidence, the statutory declaration and other documents. 31 As to those various grounds, federal Magistrate Cameron dealt with them in this way. 32 As to ground 1, Cameron FM concluded at [14] that it was open on the evidence before the Tribunal to find, as it did, that the appellant had fabricated the factual basis of his claims to hold a well-founded fear of persecution for the Convention reason advanced. It was open to the Tribunal to form a view about whether the state of knowledge of the appellant as to the affairs of the political party was such that his claims might not be regarded as truthful and, secondly, at [15] it was open to the Tribunal to conclude on the evidence of the forensic report before it that the photographs had been fabricated. Federal Magistrate Cameron concluded that it was not unreasonable or illogical for the Tribunal to reach a conclusion that if photographs submitted in support of the appellant's claim were fabricated, then the appellant lacked fundamental credibility which logically and reasonably provided a basis for the Tribunal's determination that it could not be satisfied that the appellant held a well-founded fear of persecution. The Tribunal found itself unable to accept the appellant's claims. 33 These questions of a factual foundation for an adverse credit finding, of course, affect the totality of the claim in a central way. The Federal Magistrate found that the allegation of unreasonableness was, therefore, unsustainable and to the extent that it was suggested that the decision was, in essence, illogical, the decision was nevertheless supported by the material before the Tribunal. The Federal Magistrate observed that consistent with a decision of the High Court in Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 647-648 [130] where Crennan and Bell JJ had observed that in order to sustain a contention of illogicality, it would be necessary to demonstrate that there was no rational or logical basis for the decision. 34 Plainly enough, it was open to the Tribunal to form a view about the factual evidence going to the appellant's state of knowledge of the political party and a view about whether the photographs, if manipulated, reflected adversely upon the appellant's credibility. As to ground 2 before the Federal Magistrates Court, that ground also went to illogicality. In addition, ground 2 suggested that the Tribunal did not conduct the review "in good faith" by reason of its illogical treatment of the evidence. Federal Magistrate Cameron concluded at [17] that an inference of lack of good faith could not arise out of contended illogical treatment of the evidence as the appellant had not demonstrated any illogicality and had failed to identify which claims made by him were not considered by the Tribunal. 35 Cameron FM concluded at [18] that the analysis of the Tribunal's findings suggests that the Tribunal was aware of and considered the claims which had been made. During the course of the hearing today, written submissions were put before the court by the appellant, to which I will return. However, one of the observations in those submissions is that the Tribunal failed to have regard to the matter I mentioned at the outset in the appellant's statutory declaration which concerned the killing of a number of the appellant's friends by Maoists which itself has caused him to hold, he says, a well-founded fear of persecution for the Convention reason advanced. He contends that the Tribunal did not consider that matter. 36 The question of the circumstances in which the appellant's friends were killed by Maoists, as he alleged, were not specifically addressed by the Tribunal in precisely those terms. However, the Tribunal engaged with the question of whether it could accept and believe the foundation allegations made by the appellant in his statutory declaration. The Tribunal was conscious of the particular allegations because it recited those claims at para 22: "The applicant claimed that six of his RPP friends were killed by Maoists. He stated that he feared similar harm in the future because of his political activities." 37 The foundation matters went to whether the appellant was a member of the political party, as he contended; whether his activities attracted the attention of the Maoists; whether he was familiar with the events of the political party, its history, its activities, its dogma and other matters; and, whether he had sought to bolster his claims by putting before the decision-maker and, ultimately, the Tribunal, manipulated photographic evidence. 38 The Tribunal was entitled to make its credibility findings on the footing indicated and it is not necessary for the Tribunal to deal with each and every factual allegation. The fundamental matter was to come to grips with the essential foundation of the claim itself. As to the second ground of appeal before the Federal Magistrates Court, Cameron FM found at [18] that the appellant's claims were not complex or particularly detailed and the Tribunal's decision demonstrates that it dealt with them with seriousness. 39 In those circumstances, the bald allegation of a lack of good faith was simply not sustainable. 40 As to ground 3 before the Federal Magistrates Court, that ground involved an allegation that the Tribunal failed to make a proper, genuine and realistic assessment of the real risk of serious harm faced by the appellant. The appellant contends that the Tribunal made an incorrect finding as to his credibility and in so doing, failed to properly assess the risk of harm he faced. Cameron FM concluded that ground 3 essentially involved a re-agitation of the factual foundation for the conclusions. 41 That seems to me to be correct and at its centre is the notion that the finding of the Tribunal on credibility is not correct. The appellant contends that his explanation of the foundation facts ought to have been accepted. 42 There can be no doubt that the finding of the Tribunal as to credibility, having regard to the matters I have mentioned, was plainly open to the Tribunal. It considered the factual foundation of the claims and it took account of the balance needed to be addressed in making findings on credit. Having regard to the matters reflected in its reasons, the Tribunal's findings on credibility were open. By ground 3 before Cameron FM, the appellant raised a matter which has been raised again in this Court that the appellant's evidence concerning these foundation factual matters was put lucidly and coherently to the Tribunal and ought therefore to have been accepted by the Tribunal: "[c]redibility should not be an issue". 43 Federal Magistrate Cameron observed correctly that the lucidity of the appellant does not necessarily mean, or mean at all, that the evidence is cogent. The question to be determined is whether the various factual matters put to the Tribunal could satisfy it that the appellant held a well-founded fear of persecution for the Convention reason advanced. Federal Magistrate Cameron's conclusions in relation to ground 3 are correct. 44 The fourth ground of appeal concerned a general proposition that the "structure" of the decision clearly showed that the Tribunal member did not "complete its required review function". Ground 4 essentially reasserts the matters which were raised under grounds 1, 2 and 3, which go to the unreasonableness of the decision, the illogicality of the decision and the failure to make a realistic assessment of the harm. It is those matters which are said to underlie the structure of the decision. However, each of those matters has been dealt with properly by the Federal Magistrates Court and no error is demonstrated in the treatment of those matters. 45 Ground 5, before the Federal Magistrates Court, challenged the Tribunal's findings on the genuineness of the documents the appellant put before the decision-maker and the Tribunal. 46 The findings concerning the genuineness of the photographs were plainly open to the Tribunal. It had before it a forensic report which called into question the correctness of the photographs. It had also written a letter on 27 October 2010 to the appellant inviting the appellant to comment on that quite central concern and the appellant did not responded to the letter. The forensic report was evidence enough on which the Tribunal could have concluded that the photographs were manipulated, thus giving rise to the credit finding. 47 The two remaining grounds which were raised orally before Federal Magistrate Cameron concerned the question of the use of country information and the use of information sourced from the internet. Both of these grounds miss the point because the basis upon which the Tribunal concluded that the application for review must be dismissed was that the Tribunal could not be satisfied about the fundamental factual allegations concerning the appellant's engagement in the political party and secondly, the Tribunal's concern about the manipulation of the photographs put before it by the appellant. 48 That being so, the foundation of the decision rests upon the credit findings based on those two matters and not reliance upon country information or references to internet searches. The Tribunal in any event was entitled to have regard to that material. However, the important point to observe is that the decision of the Tribunal was not based upon that material. The decision was based upon a rejection of the credibility of the appellant and those credit findings were open. It is not open to this Court or the Federal Magistrates Court to substitute its own view about those findings unless it can be demonstrated in the course of supervisory judicial review of the decision of the administrative tribunal that there is simply no basis for the credit findings. That is not this case. 49 The appellant has appealed to this court from the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court and the grounds of appeal before this court are these: First, the appellant says: I do not agree with the purported judgment of the Federal Magistrate Cameron in my case, as I believe the learned Federal Magistrate Cameron expressed reluctances in discerning the error of law on the part of the Tribunal's decision in connection with the Refugee Review Tribunal's decision, which I firmly believe that it has been affected by an error of law. 50 That ground starts with an observation that the appellant does not agree with the decision. However, I take the ground to mean that the appellant says that the Federal Magistrates Court failed to identify error of law giving rise to jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, and that in itself demonstrates an error before this court. 51 The second ground is in these terms: It is contended that his Honour, Magistrate [Cameron] expressed reluctances and failed to discern the fact that the Tribunal failed to confer common law, natural justice in determining my application. 52 That ground seems to be a general statement of a failure to reach a finding that the Tribunal ought to have been satisfied that the appellant held a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, and, again, the reference to "reluctances" is taken to mean that the Federal Magistrates Court failed to find error on the part of the Tribunal in the way in which it dealt with the matters before it. 53 The third ground is a contention that the Tribunal member failed to exercise good faith and make a bona fide attempt to exercise the statutory power of review conferred upon the Tribunal by the Migration Act. At ground 3 the appellant says that he believes that the Tribunal was incorrect in concluding, first, that certain country information gave rise to a certain consequence, and, secondly, that the appellant's evidence was unreliable. The conclusion said to arise out of the Tribunal's use of country information and the Tribunal's approach to the question of the appellant's credibility is that it indicates a lack of good faith on the part of the Tribunal. 54 These matters were also agitated before Federal Magistrate Cameron. The foundation of the Tribunal's decision was a rejection of the evidence of the appellant on grounds of credibility for the two reasons earlier mentioned, first, that the appellant did not appear to understand basic information about the RPP, and, secondly, the submission by the appellant of three manipulated and false photographs. 55 Those findings were open. The making of those findings on credibility does not give rise to an inference of lack of good faith on the part of the Tribunal. Rather, they reflect the analytical discharge of the Tribunal's function on the facts to determine whether or not it could be satisfied that the appellant holds a well-founded fear of persecution for the Convention reason advanced. 56 The fourth ground of appeal before this Court is that the appellant believes that the Tribunal decision was affected by jurisdictional error. That is simply a threshold statement. Ground 4 goes on to say that the Tribunal significantly misstated the effect of important country information, and, in addition, it: … presented unsupported, unreasonable and capricious adverse conclusions to justify its decision, and failed to address significant evidence, which it did not reject, providing support for my claims. 57 Ground 4 also goes on to assert: … Moreover, its reasoning and conclusion ignored the substantial support given to my claims by the country information. 58 As to those matters, it is not correct to say that the Tribunal acted capriciously or unreasonably, or relied upon unsupported information before it. The reasons demonstrate a consideration of the claims made by the appellant and an assessment of matters relevant to those claims. The findings upon which the Tribunal said it could not be satisfied of the statutory matters were open to it and do not reflect a capricious or unreasonable approach to the assessment of the matters in issue. 59 The appellant, apart from the oral submissions which I have already mentioned, has filed written submissions with the Court in support of each of the grounds of appeal to this Court. The first contention is that Federal Magistrate Cameron failed to examine the "role of the Tribunal" and the manner in which it exercised its statutory function in the appellant's case. That is a general unparticularised contention and it is apparent from the reasons of Cameron FM that each of the grounds of challenge to the Tribunal's decision before that court was examined. There is nothing in the reasons of Cameron FM which suggest that Cameron FM did not properly examine the statutory review function to be discharged by the Tribunal. 60 The second contention in the appellant's written submissions suggests that the Tribunal addressed the appellant's claims in a generic way and did not have regard to the specific problems the appellant faced with the Maoists, and relied upon country information which required a more thorough analysis on the part of the Tribunal. The appellant contends that the country information was inadequate in all the circumstances and in relying upon that material, the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error. 61 The central matter, of course, is that the Tribunal reached its decision by making an adverse credit finding based upon the circumstances that the appellant did not appear to the Tribunal to be sufficiently knowledgeable about "basic information" relating to the RPP of which he said he was an adherent, and secondly, the appellant put documents before the Tribunal which were shown forensically to be manipulated and false. The Tribunal rejected the review application for these central reasons and not matters going to use of country information. 62 At contention 3 of the appellant's written submissions, the appellant observes that the Tribunal did not address an integer of the claim concerning the killing by the Maoists of six of the appellant's friends who were members of the RPP. The Tribunal considered the claims of the appellant to a well-founded fear of persecution for the Convention reason advanced and took account of the statutory declaration. The Tribunal recites that factual assertion in its reasons. The entirety of the factual assertions made by the appellant were taken into account and as I have indicated, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to make independent findings about each and every factual contention. 63 By para 4 of the appellant's written submissions the appellant contends that jurisdictional error occurred in the way in which the Tribunal failed to make a proper, genuine and realistic assessment of the real risk of serious harm the appellant would face upon return to Nepal. The appellant contends that he fled Nepal seeking protection because he felt it was inevitable that he would be harmed or killed by the Maoists should he return. He observes that his credibility should not be an issue in this case as he explained his problems in a lucid or clear manner. That matter was raised before the Federal Magistrates Court. It was directly dealt with by observing that even though the claims may have been identified in a lucid way, the problem for the Tribunal was that it simply did not accept the foundation for the claims for the reasons it gave. Those conclusions were, on any view of the matter, open to the Tribunal. 64 At contention 5 the appellant asserts that the Tribunal did not have regard to the broader circumstances of the appellant's engagement in activities as an anti-Maoist. However, that matter was addressed by the Tribunal in terms of the statutory declaration and the conclusions it reached were open to it. 65 Again, at contention 6, the appellant seeks to argue that the Tribunal failed to examine the appellant's actual circumstances in Nepal and failed to reach a conclusion about past persecution. The appellant observes that the absence of past persecution does not mean that there is not a real chance of persecution in the future. The appellant says that the Tribunal paid no attention to the risk of his suffering persecution upon his return. However, all of these matters concerning the question of whether the appellant might face a risk of harm and whether that risk provides a basis for a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason go to the underlying factual circumstances dealt with by the Tribunal. There is no basis for concluding that the Tribunal acted 'perversely' or acted 'in bad faith' or failed to deal with the foundation contentions about engagement in the political party giving rise to the attention of the Maoists. 66 The Tribunal dealt with those matters and was, in its review, confronted with the additional matter that the appellant had sought to bolster the claims by the submission of manipulated evidence which led, in one sense inevitably, to the conclusion that the appellant was not reliable and once that conclusion was open and reached, the allegations going to a well-founded fear of persecution fell away in the mind of the Tribunal. 67 At contention 7 of the appellant's written submissions, the appellant observes that the Tribunal did not apply its mind to the persecution the appellant might suffer by reason of ethnicity, religious or imputed political opinion if he was to return to Nepal. As a consequence of that matter, the appellant contends that it is apparent that the Tribunal's determination is: … based on illogical or irrational findings or inferences of fact towards the nature of my fear of being seriously harmed or killed by the Maoists upon my return to Nepal. 68 This, again, is a question of contended jurisdictional error arising simply out of adverse findings concerning the underlying factual matters. The references to ethnicity, religious and imputed political opinion, of course, all seek to raise a Convention ground but the Convention ground asserted by the appellant is that he attracted the attention of the Maoists because of his participation in the affairs of the RPP and thus he claims to hold a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his political opinions. All of those matters were addressed by the Tribunal and the way in which it dealt with them cannot be characterised as 'illogical or irrational' or in a way which suggests that 'inferences' were drawn which were not open. 69 In fact, the Tribunal reached its conclusion by rejecting the direct evidence of the appellant. It follows that the grounds of appeal before this Court do not demonstrate error on the part of the Federal Magistrates Court with the result that the Federal Magistrates Court correctly determined that the appellant has failed to demonstrate jurisdictional error in the way in which the Tribunal exercised its statutory review function, or error on the part of the Federal Magistrates Court in failing to find jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. 70 It follows from these observations that the appeal must be dismissed with an order that the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent of and incidental to the appeal. I certify that the preceding seventy (70) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Greenwood. Associate: Dated: 9 August 2011