Mitsopoulos v Comcare [2012] FCA 627

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mitsopoulos v Comcare [2012] FCA 627 Citation: Mitsopoulos v Comcare [2012] FCA 627

Parties: FOTINI MITSOPOULOS v COMCARE

File number: NSD 1835 of 2011

Judge: EMMETT J

Date of judgment: 5 June 2012

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44 Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 19, 21

Date of hearing: 5 June 2012

Place: Sydney

Division: GENERAL DIVISION

Category: No catchwords

Number of paragraphs: 45

Counsel for the applicant: MR Aldridge SC, SP Brennan

Solicitor for the applicant: Maxwell Berghouse & Ives

Counsel for the respondent: T Giugni of the Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION NSD 1835 of 2011

BETWEEN: FOTINI mitsopoulos

Applicant

AND: COMCARE

Respondent

JUDGE: EMMETT J DATE OF ORDER: 5 JUNE 2012 WHERE MADE: SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The application be dismissed. 2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION NSD 1835 of 2011

BETWEEN: FOTINI mitsopoulos

Applicant

AND: comcare

Respondent

JUDGE: EMMETT J DATE: 5 JUNE 2012 PLACE: SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 The applicant, Mrs Fotini Mitsopoulos, appeals from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 7 July 2011. The proceeding concerns the entitlement of Mrs Mitsopoulos to compensation under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (the Act). The question before the Tribunal concerned the entitlement of Mrs Mitsopoulos to compensation in respect of the work-caused disease of reactive depression. The decision made by the Tribunal on 7 July 2011 was to set aside a reviewable decision made on 29 June 2009 by the respondent, Comcare. 2 Mrs Mitsopoulos began to suffer from reactive depression in the course of her employment with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (the Bank). On 28 May 1999, the Tribunal, differently constituted, set aside a decision then under review, and remitted the matter before it to Comcare, with directions that Mrs Mitsopoulos was suffering from the work-caused disease of reactive depression, and that she was totally incapable of work for the period 2 July 1996 to 9 January 1998 and was capable of earning 50 per cent of her normal weekly earnings from 9 January 1998 to the date of the decision, being 28 May 1999. 3 It appears that Mrs Mitsopoulos made a claim for incapacity payments from 29 October 1999 and ongoing. As at 6 November 2008, Comcare was satisfied that other factors had contributed to Mrs Mitsopoulos' condition, making her totally unfit for work. Comcare considered that, on the evidence then before it, 50 per cent of Mrs Mitsopoulos' incapacity for work was due to her employment. A determination was therefore made under s 19 of the Act that she was capable of earning 50 per cent of her normal weekly earnings. 4 Mrs Mitsopoulos sought reconsideration of the determination of 6 November 2008. On 29 June 2009, Comcare made a decision varying the determination of 6 November 2008 and determining that Mrs Mitsopoulos was entitled to compensation for incapacity, pursuant to s 21 of the Act, based on the finding that she was able to earn 50 per cent of her normal weekly earnings. By application for review dated 26 August 2009, Mrs Mitsopoulos sought review of the decision of 29 June 2009, on the basis that she asserted that she was totally unfit for work, that she was entitled to a finding that she was unable to earn any income and that she was entitled to receive the full weekly rate by way of compensation. 5 The Tribunal, by its decision of 7 July 2011, set aside the reviewable decision, and found in substitution that, as of 7 July 2011, Mrs Mitsopoulos' reactive depression does not result in incapacity. By notice of appeal filed on 2 May 2012, Mrs Mitsopoulos now appeals, under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) from the decision of 7 July 2011. An appeal under s 44 may be brought only on a question of law. The notice of appeal of 2 May 2012 purports to identify some eleven questions of law and specifies some seven grounds of appeal. 6 Grounds 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 may be grouped together. They are concerned with the process of reasoning adopted by the Tribunal in reaching its ultimate conclusion. Ground 4 is that the Tribunal gave insufficient reasons for its finding that reactive depression was no longer an operative cause of Mrs Mitsopoulos' incapacity. Ground 5 asserted that the Tribunal erred in law in preferring the opinion of one medical practitioner over that of another medical practitioner, against the weight and strength of the evidence. Before dealing with the grounds, it is necessary to say something more about the reasons of the Tribunal. 7 Under Division III of Part II of the Act, compensation is payable where an injury results in an employee being totally or partially incapacitated for work. Incapacity for work means incapacity to engage in any work or incapacity to engage in work of the same level that the employee was engaged in immediately before the relevant injury happened. The Tribunal stated that its task was to determine whether Mrs Mitsopoulos' reactive depression remains an effective or operative cause of her incapacity for employment. No quarrel is raised with that formulation of the Tribunal's task, which it repeated later in its reasons. 8 The Tribunal then set out in some detail the evidence as to the medical history of Mrs Mitsopoulos since she left the Bank in 1996. The Tribunal observed that both parties placed considerable weight on that history, although the medical evidence before the Tribunal in its original decision was not available to the Tribunal as then constituted. The reasons for the original decision disclosed that, at the time of that proceeding, the consensus of medical opinion was that Mrs Mitsopoulos suffered from reactive depression caused by her employment at the Bank. It appeared that the only issue of note between the experts was whether the condition was a result of reasonable disciplinary action taken against Mrs Mitsopoulos, thus disentitling her to compensation. 9 The Tribunal referred first to evidence of Dr Gerard Gibney, a psychiatrist, who assessed Mrs Mitsopoulos shortly after the original decision of the Tribunal. In a report of 13 September 1999, Dr Gibney described Mrs Mitsopoulos' manner and presentation on interview as extraordinary. He concluded that if her manner of presentation was genuine, then she would certainly be suffering from a psychiatric illness with paranoid features. He said, however, that that was a provisional diagnosis, because the information he received was so jumbled and imprecise. 10 In a report of 10 November 2000, Dr George Takas, Mrs Mitsopoulos' treating psychiatrist from 1999 until mid-2002, stated that, in his opinion Mrs Mitsopoulos suffered a severe adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood. He said that her condition had been showing a fluctuating course with periods of improvement and relapse, and that there were no psychotic phenomena or evidence that Mrs Mitsopoulos might be suffering from any formal thought disorder. Dr Takas recorded various symptoms, which are set out in the Tribunal's reasons. 11 A few days after that report, Dr Takas said in a letter to Mrs Mitsopoulos' general practitioner that Mrs Mitsopoulos had developed a certain paranoia, in that she believed the Bank would send people to harm her and that her husband was also part of the plot. He said that he did not think that to be a "true psychosis" but rather "overvalued ideas as part of her severe depression". The Tribunal observed that it appeared that, at least by April 2001, Dr Takas had commenced treating Mrs Mitsopoulos with a drug commonly used to treat psychosis. In subsequent reports, Dr Takas commented that Mrs Mitsopoulos appeared more settled. 12 Next, the Tribunal recorded that in 2002 Mrs Mitsopoulos had come under the care of Dr Howard Napper. In a letter to Mrs Mitsopoulos' general practitioner in February 2002, Dr Napper wrote that it was difficult to make a proper diagnosis because of the lack of reports from past treating psychiatrists. He reached the tentative conclusion that there was evidence of a psychotic process that could well be schizophrenia. In a report of April 2004, Dr Napper stated that, since leaving the Bank, Mrs Mitsopoulos had continued to suffer chronic panic attacks almost daily, which had not improved, even with psychiatric care and medication. Dr Napper admitted in evidence that, some time before he had prepared that report, he had diagnosed Mrs Mitsopoulos as suffering from schizophrenia, notwithstanding that he made no mention in the report of that diagnosis, or of Mrs Mitsopoulos exhibiting psychotic symptoms. 13 The Tribunal then summarised a number of other medical reports, before referring to an assessment made in January 2010 of Mrs Mitsopoulos by Dr Yvonne Skinner, a psychiatrist retained at the request of the Bank. In a report of 18 February 2010, Dr Skinner wrote that the interview with Mrs Mitsopoulos proved difficult, since throughout the examination Mrs Mitsopoulos had gesticulated, waved her arms around, frequently made facial grimaces, and often appeared distracted. Dr Skinner had terminated the interview when Mrs Mitsopoulos became extremely distressed and agitated and began weeping after the topic of hospitalisation was raised. The Tribunal noted that Dr Skinner had also interviewed Mrs Mitsopoulos' husband, who said that his wife had become worse over time and did not want anyone coming into their home. 14 The Tribunal then referred to a report of 21 October 2010 by Dr Napper, who said that, although he agreed with Dr Skinner's diagnosis of chronic paranoid schizophrenia, the principal condition for which he had been treating Mrs Mitsopoulos since she came under his care was panic disorder, with agoraphobia and major depressive disorder. He said that, while she continued to suffer from chronic depressed mood and recurrent panic attacks, some improvement was evident after trialling her on various anti-depressants. He said that Mrs Mitsopoulos' paranoid delusions had gone into remission in about October 2009, and were no longer a feature in her mental state examination. 15 The Tribunal referred to further examinations during 2009 and 2010 and then dealt with medical opinion on the cause of Mrs Mitsopoulos' incapacity. The Tribunal considered that the best evidence about the cause of Mrs Mitsopoulos' current incapacity was that given by Dr Napper and Dr Skinner, each of whom prepared detailed reports and gave concurrent oral evidence before the Tribunal. They agreed that Mrs Mitsopoulos suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and that the condition is constitutional and unrelated to employment. They also agreed that the condition had developed by the time Mrs Mitsopoulos was seen by Dr Gibney in September 1999. The Tribunal observed that, while there was much about which Drs Napper and Skinner agreed, they disagreed on two critical points, namely, whether Mrs Mitsopoulos continues to suffer from a reactive depression, and whether she is incapacitated for employment by schizophrenia. Dr Napper was of the opinion that Mrs Mitsopoulos' schizophrenia is largely in remission. Dr Skinner, however, disagreed, and said that while so-called positive symptoms were not present at all times, it is likely that they have and will continue to come to the fore when Mrs Mitsopoulos comes under stress or is not taking the appropriate dosages of medication. Dr Skinner pointed to her first-hand observation of florid symptoms being exhibited by Mrs Mitsopoulos during her interview in early 2010. 16 The Tribunal recorded that a further point of difference between Drs Napper and Skinner was whether Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms of depressed mood and panic attacks are attributable to schizophrenia. Dr Skinner believed that they are, and that the symptoms are largely negative symptoms of schizophrenia and/or caused by the condition. Dr Napper disagreed, and believed that they are caused by the compensable condition, which he considered had evolved over time into a panic disorder with agoraphobia and major depressive disorder. 17 The Tribunal then explained its understanding of the distinction between positive symptoms and negative symptoms, based on the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Positive symptoms include delusions, hallucinations and grossly disorganised behaviour. Negative symptoms include restrictions in the range and intensity of emotional expression, in the fluency and flattening of thought and speech, and in the initiation of goal-directed behaviour. 18 The Tribunal observed that both Dr Napper and Dr Skinner agreed that depressed mood and anxiety can present as symptoms of schizophrenia. Dr Skinner did not dispute that schizophrenia can coexist with other psychiatric conditions, but considered that, in this case, the better explanation for the entrenchment and treatment-resistant depression and anxiety of Mrs Mitsopoulos was that the symptoms were attributable to schizophrenia. Dr Napper believed it to be highly relevant that Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms of anxiety and panic attacks predated the onset of schizophrenia. 19 The Tribunal then observed that Dr Napper and Dr Skinner each agreed that Mrs Mitsopoulos is unfit for any employment. In Dr Skinner's opinion, that incapacity is solely attributable to her schizophrenia. Dr Skinner considered that Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms of hallucinations and delusions, thought disorder and behavioural disturbance are disabling, in that they result in impaired concentration and cause Mrs Mitsopoulos to feel anxious and threatened, and might lead to aggressive behaviour. Dr Napper, on the other hand, thought that there was nothing in Mrs Mitsopoulos' schizophrenia that stopped her working. In his opinion, her inability to work was entirely the result of her chronic depressed mood, anxiety, panic attacks and agoraphobia. 20 The Tribunal then restated its understanding of its task, namely, whether reactive depression remains an operative or effective cause of the incapacity of Mrs Mitsopoulos. Clearly, the Tribunal was faced with the conflicting opinions of Dr Skinner and Dr Napper. The Tribunal explained that the question before it was a complex one for a number of reasons. 21 First, it reiterated that both parties attached significance to the history of Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms since 1996. Comcare contended that significant weight should be given to the change in her symptoms, whereas Mrs Mitsopoulos said that significant weight should be given to the lack of change in her symptoms. The difficulty is that the evidence available to make such an assessment was limited. Apart from referring to Mrs Mitsopoulos' suffering from anxiety, depression and stress, the reasons of the original Tribunal in 1999 provided little detail about the nature of her illness or the symptoms of her condition. 22 Secondly, the Tribunal observed that, at best, the evidence consisted of snapshots of Mrs Mitsopoulos' condition and was not necessarily representative. Thus, despite Mrs Mitsopoulos suffering from schizophrenia since at least 1999, a number of practitioners who had examined her saw no evidence of psychosis. On the hand, when seen by Dr Gibney, in 1999, and Dr Skinner, in early 2010, she was exhibiting florid symptoms. 23 The third matter that leads to complexity in the question before the Tribunal is that there can be a degree of overlap between the symptoms of a depressive disorder and some of the negative symptoms of schizophrenia. Both Dr Napper and Dr Skinner agreed that that was the case. 24 The fourth matter is that the only expert in a position to provide any degree of longitudinal assessment of Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms, Dr Napper, first saw her some six years after she had left her employment with the Bank. By that time, she was already being treated for schizophrenia. Thus, Dr Napper had not had the benefit of a comprehensive psychiatric history in respect of the first six years after Mrs Mitsopoulos left the Bank. 25 Finally, the Tribunal observed, Mrs Mitsopoulos had displayed what it described as a "constellation of fluctuating symptoms". That fact added to the complexity of the question before it. 26 The Tribunal then stated the basic contention advanced on behalf of Mrs Mitsopoulos, namely, that the Bank had not established that there had been a fundamental change in the nature of Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms since she left the Bank and that Comcare could not point to a break in her symptoms. Therefore, the submission went, it was likely that those symptoms continued to be caused by the original illness, namely reactive depression, rather than that those symptoms had been commandeered, as Comcare contended, by schizophrenia. 27 The Tribunal considered that the best evidence about Mrs Mitsopoulos' initial symptoms was the list of symptoms recorded by Dr Takas in his report of 10 November 2000, which the Tribunal accepted largely persisted to the time of its decision. The Tribunal considered, consistent with the opinion of Mrs Mitsopoulos' husband, as recorded by Dr Skinner, that it was likely that those symptoms had significantly worsened over time. That, however, the Tribunal observed, was not fatal to Mrs Mitsopoulos' contentions. A finding that a person's incapacity is a result of compensable disease does not require that the person establish that the symptoms of the disease remain unchanged. The symptoms of many illnesses improve or worsen over time, but remain attributable to the same cause. 28 The Tribunal then set out several steps in its reasoning that were critical to its decision and are critical to the grounds of appeal presently before me. The Tribunal said that not only had Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms worsened since she left the Bank, but that new symptoms had emerged, namely, auditory hallucinations, thought disorder and paranoid delusions. While Dr Takas' report indicated that, at least by early 1999, Mrs Mitsopoulos was experiencing a degree of paranoia, the delusional paranoia later observed, of auditory hallucinations and thought disorder, plainly involved new symptoms and was not attributable to the reactive depression. 29 It is with that conclusion that Mrs Mitsopoulos takes issue. She contends that that finding is not supported by the evidence of Dr Skinner and is inconsistent with the report of Dr Gibney. That, she contends, is not merely a mistake of fact but an error of law. I shall return to that question. 30 The Tribunal then went on to say that, while it is possible that Mrs Mitsopoulos continues to suffer from a depressive disorder and that her symptoms of anxiety and depression are a result of that condition, it was more probable that they were now attributable to schizophrenia. While the Tribunal accepted that the fact that her symptoms had not followed the "usual course" of "resolving after a reasonable period" was not determinative, it raised the question as to whether the symptoms remained attributable to the original compensable condition. The Tribunal considered that a more plausible explanation for the increase in, the durability of, and the apparent resistance to treatment, of Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms is that they are attributable to schizophrenia. The Tribunal attributed that view to Dr Skinner. Mrs Mitsopoulos contends that that attribution was unsupported by the evidence. 31 The Tribunal then observed that it was unable to accept Dr Napper's opinion that no part of Mrs Mitsopoulos' incapacity was attributable to schizophrenia. While the Tribunal accepted that the symptoms are not always present, it said that the symptoms break through from time to time. Whether that is the result of difficulties in finding an appropriate dosage of medication or, possibly, of Mrs Mitsopoulos' long history of not taking her medication, the Tribunal considered that it was highly probable that, in an employment environment, those symptoms would emerge from time to time. The Tribunal considered that Dr Napper had overstated the extent to which Mrs Mitsopoulos' positive symptoms of schizophrenia were under control. In the light of that reasoning, the Tribunal concluded that Mrs Mitsopoulos' reactive depression was no longer an effective or operative cause of her incapacity for employment. 32 The grounds of appeal principally relied on by Mrs Mitsopoulos might be summarised as follows: 1. The Tribunal misconstrued the onus of proof, such that it proceeded on an inquiry into the nature of Mrs Mitsopoulos' disability rather than asking itself whether Comcare had satisfied it that the reactive depression did not remain an operative or effective cause of her incapacity. 2. The Tribunal went behind the original decision of the Tribunal in 1999 and then sought to re-determine the issue on the basis of more recent evidence. 3. The Tribunal failed to apply the test of causation correctly, in that, in finding that the schizophrenia was the cause of incapacity, the Tribunal failed to have regard to the previous findings of the original Tribunal that the reactive depression was a cause of incapacity. The Tribunal failed to take into account the evidence of Dr Napper that the symptoms of schizophrenia were largely in remission, and the Tribunal found that auditory hallucinations and thought disorders were plainly new symptoms and not attributable to the reactive depression, without any evidentiary basis for such finding. 4. The Tribunal failed to take account of the evidence that there could be overlap between symptoms of reactive depression and symptoms of schizophrenia. 5. The Tribunal erred in not considering whether Comcare had discharged its onus at law to show that the cause of the symptoms had changed. 33 Clearly, there is some overlap in those grounds, and they were effectively argued as a single ground. The basic proposition advanced on behalf of Mrs Mitsopoulos was that Comcare had the onus of establishing that reactive depression had ceased to be an effective or operative cause of her incapacity and that the Tribunal had erred in not actually approaching the matter in that way. Rather, Mrs Mitsopoulos said, the Tribunal simply found that a more plausible explanation for the increase in, durability of, and apparent resistance to treatment of, Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms was that Dr Skinner believed that they were attributable to schizophrenia. Thus, Mrs Mitsopoulos contended that the Tribunal approached the matter as being one of whether or not her symptoms were caused by schizophrenia, without having regard to the finding made by the earlier Tribunal. 34 Mrs Mitsopoulos contended that Comcare must establish a discontinuity between current symptoms and symptoms in respect of which liability had previously been accepted. The basic thesis of the contention was that Dr Skinner's evidence suggested that it was her view that Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms were always caused by schizophrenia and that the Tribunal accepted that evidence. Instead, it was put that the Tribunal should have commenced with the proposition that Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms were caused by reactive depression, and should then have considered whether it was satisfied by Comcare that there had been a change in causation. Mrs Mitsopoulos contends that there was no evidence of such a change or how such a change might have arisen or have been caused. 35 Mrs Mitsopoulos contends that the base evidentiary position was that, in 1999, she was suffering from reactive depression. At the time of the earlier hearing, at the latest, she was suffering from schizophrenia. That schizophrenia must have developed at some time, and the finding that the auditory hallucinations and thought disorders, that is, the diagnosis of schizophrenia, must have developed at some time, is logically inevitable. She says that the fact that those symptoms appeared and that the schizophrenia developed does not establish that the cause of her problems was not reactive depression, or that the reactive depression had ceased to be an operative cause of her incapacity. Thus, she says, the Tribunal approached its task in an entirely flawed way. 36 It is difficult to discern precisely what question of law is raised by this group of grounds. If the Tribunal did not base its findings on probative evidence, that would involve an error of law. Comcare points out that it did not seek a finding that the original decision in 1999 was wrong, or that it should be revisited. Indeed, the Tribunal did not purport to overturn that finding, or make any finding inconsistent with it. That would have been an improper approach. It was common ground that the period of incapacity up to Comcare's present reviewable decision was not a matter for the Tribunal. The parties accepted that the scope of the Tribunal's review was confined to incapacity from 6 November 2008 and onwards. It was therefore unnecessary for the Tribunal to make any finding as to a particular time at which it could be said that Mrs Mitsopoulos' incapacity was no longer attributable to her compensable condition. 37 The task of the Tribunal, as was common ground, was to determine whether the reactive depression that the original Tribunal found she had suffered, remained an effective or operative cause of her incapacity for employment. Comcare accepts that it was not open to it to terminate incapacity payments arbitrarily as a practical matter. Rather, there must be some change in circumstances to justify taking such a step. The finding by the Tribunal was that there was a change in circumstances, being the diagnosis of a serious mental illness. There was no finding that there had been no reactive depression. The finding, in effect, was that in the light of the evidence of Dr Skinner, a new condition had developed and that the symptoms of that new condition were the cause of Mrs Mitsopoulos' incapacity and not the earlier depressive condition. 38 It was common ground between Dr Skinner and Dr Napper that Mrs Mitsopoulos suffers from schizophrenia and that that was not a work related condition. There was disputation about precisely when the schizophrenia developed. That, however, was irrelevant, since, by 2008, it was beyond doubt that the condition was present. Dr Skinner gave evidence that some of the symptoms, such as hallucinations, delusions, thoughts of being controlled, are definitely symptoms of schizophrenia, but are not symptoms of other disorders. The Tribunal made a positive finding that those symptoms gave rise to Mrs Mitsopoulos' incapacity, and that those symptoms do not result from her compensable condition. 39 There is some lack of precision in the critical paragraphs of the Tribunal's reasons to which I have referred. However, it seems to me that the complaints made by Mrs Mitsopoulos are complaints about the fact-finding process of the Tribunal that do not amount to errors of law. It is clear enough that the Tribunal reached a conclusion, based on its preference for its understanding of Dr Skinner's evidence, that Mrs Mitsopoulos' condition exhibited new symptoms. However, there is material before the Tribunal, in my view, on which it could base its conclusion that there were new symptoms that were not attributable to the reactive depression that had been the subject of the finding made by the original Tribunal. I do not consider that there was an error of law involved in the fact-finding process undertaken by the Tribunal that led to its conclusion that the increase in durability of, and apparent resistance to treatment of, Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms were attributable to schizophrenia rather than to the compensable disease found by the original Tribunal. 40 The second ground of appeal is insufficiency of reasons. To satisfy the requirement of giving reasons, the reader must be able to understand the thought processes involved. Mrs Mitsopoulos contends that the Tribunal does not explain why a more plausible explanation for her symptoms is that they are attributable to schizophrenia. 41 I do not consider that that criticism is made out. The Tribunal correctly identified the question before it. It considered and recorded its findings about the answer to that question. I have summarised in some detail the findings of the Tribunal and the summary of the evidence contained in its reasons. It is not appropriate to examine the reasons of an administrative tribunal minutely and finely, with an eye keen on the perception of error. In the present case, the reasons must be read as a whole, and the reasoning in the critical paragraphs must be understood in the context of the medical history and the comparison of the views of the two experts that are set out. I do not consider that a fair reading of the reasons would leave the reader in a state of ignorance as to the basis for the decision that the Tribunal reached. 42 Finally, there is the ground that the Tribunal erred in law in preferring the opinion of one witness over that of another, against the weight and strength of the evidence, without the application of common sense, and the logic of the experts' opinions. This ground seems to me to be no more than an invitation to the Court to engage in the task of fact-finding, something that is not permissible in an appeal under s 44. 43 Mrs Mitsopoulos suggests that Dr Skinner's evidence needs to be approached cautiously, in that she saw Mrs Mitsopoulos only once in what was a very difficult and stressful consultation. It is contended that the Tribunal did not take that fact into account or weigh Dr Skinner's report against the other evidence, which was extensive. Mrs Mitsopoulos invites the Court to examine a plurality of other reports, with a view to concluding that the overwhelming weight of evidence was that there was a long-standing, well-established history of depression with some paranoid elements but no symptoms of psychosis. 44 However, it appears to have been common ground that Mrs Mitsopoulos was suffering from schizophrenia. The complaint that Dr Skinner is the only medical practitioner who took the view that Mrs Mitsopoulos' symptoms were not caused by depression, at least part, is said to be unjustified. I consider that the criticisms based on this ground are no more than an invitation to the Court to reach a different finding on the facts, and, as I have said, that is not a permissible ground of appeal under s 44. 45 In my view, Mrs Mitsopoulos has not established that there was any error of law on the part of the Tribunal in making its decision of 7 July 2011. Accordingly, the application must be dismissed. I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Emmett.