Johnson v Native Title Registrar [2014] FCA 577

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Johnson v Native Title Registrar [2014] FCA 577 Citation: Johnson v Native Title Registrar [2014] FCA 577

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Johnson v Native Title Registrar [2014] FCA 142

Parties: ARTHUR CHARLES JOHNSON v NATIVE TITLE REGISTRAR and STATE OF QUEENSLAND

File number(s): QUD 117 of 2014

Judge(s): DOWSETT J

Date of judgment: 4 April 2014

Date of hearing: 4 April 2014

Place: Brisbane

Division: GENERAL DIVISION

Category: No Catchwords

Number of paragraphs: 3

Solicitor for the Applicant: The Applicant did not appear

Solicitor for the First Respondent: Holding Redlich Lawyers

Solicitors for the Second Respondent: Crown Law

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION QUD 117 of 2014

BETWEEN: ARTHUR CHARLES JOHNSON

Applicant

AND: NATIVE TITLE REGISTRAR

First Respondent

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

Second Respondent

JUDGE: DOWSETT J DATE OF ORDER: 4 APRIL 2014 WHERE MADE: BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. the application be refused. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION QUD 117 of 2014

BETWEEN: ARTHUR CHARLES JOHNSON

Applicant

AND: NATIVE TITLE REGISTRAR

First Respondent

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

Second Respondent

JUDGE: DOWSETT J DATE: 4 April 2014 PLACE: BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 This is an application for an extension of time in which to apply for leave to appeal against a decision by a Judge of the Court, upholding an application for summary judgment. In the proceedings in question, the applicant sought the removal of the details of an ILUA from the register maintained by the National Native Title Tribunal. A perusal of the papers and his Honour's reasons indicates that the ground upon which he sought to rely was that of duress. His Honour concluded that duress could not be made out on the evidence. 2 The applicant initially filed a notice of appeal but was advised that, because his Honour's decision was interlocutory, leave was necessary. He was, at that stage, out of time in which to apply for leave to appeal and so, on the advice of the Court, applied for an extension of time in which to apply. The matter was listed for hearing today. Prior to the hearing, the applicant contacted the Court, asking whether or not he would be allowed to appear by telephone. In view of the nature of the proceedings, I considered that course to be inappropriate. He may also have indicated a desire to be represented by somebody other than a legal practitioner. I may well have discouraged him from doing so. Nobody has, today, sought to appear for him. 3 He has, however, provided submissions in the form of an affidavit. Neither the purported notice of appeal nor the affidavit takes the matter any further than the evidence which was before his Honour. No basis is demonstrated for challenging his Honour's finding that a case based on duress enjoyed no reasonable prospects of success. In those circumstances I consider that, although he was just out of time, there being no reasonable prospects of success, the application should be refused. I certify that the preceding three (3) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Dowsett.