FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA BNR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border protection [2017] FCA 1011 Appeal from: BNR15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 550 File number: NSD 552 of 2017 Judge: YATES J Date of judgment: 30 August 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal affected by jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed Cases cited: Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18; [2007] HCA 40 VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588; [2004] FCAFC 158 Date of hearing: 22 August 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 56 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J King Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen Counsel for the Respondents: Mr H Bevan Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS NSD 552 of 2017 BETWEEN: BNR15 Appellant AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION First Respondent ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL Second Respondent JUDGE: YATES J DATE OF ORDER: 30 AUGUST 2017 THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The appeal be dismissed. 2. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT YATES J: Introduction 1 The appellant appeals from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the Federal Circuit Court) given on 22 March 2017, which dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review of a decision of the (then) Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) not to grant the appellant a protection (Class XA) visa. The Tribunal thereby affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister). 2 The background to the matter is conveniently provided by the following findings of fact made by the Tribunal at [8] of its Decision Record: (a) The applicant was born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1985, to parents from Kunduz, Afghanistan. In accordance with Afghanistan's nationality laws, as his parents were both Afghan nationals at the time of his birth, he is also a national of Afghanistan. He was issued a passport by the Afghan Embassy in Saudi Arabia. (b) His status in Saudi Arabia was that of a 'temporary resident', which, until he was 18 was dependent on his father's status, and, after he turned 18 years of age, was renewed annually on application. His most recent residency permit has expired and he does not have a right to enter or reside in Saudi Arabia. (c) He is a Tajik Sunni Muslim and the eldest of nine children. Both of his parents are Tajik Sunni Muslims. He has no remaining relatives in Afghanistan. (d) From soon after his birth until his departure from Saudi Arabia in 2012, he lived with his family in the Awali area of Al Madinah. (e) He completed about six years of education in Saudi Arabia. He is fluent in Arabic and Dari and has basic-level English language skills. (f) In January 2003 he married Haji, a Tajik Sunni woman who, like him, was born in Saudi Arabia to parents from Afghanistan, and is a national of Afghanistan and not Saudi Arabia. Following their marriage, his wife began to live with his family. Their three children were born in 2005, 2006 and 2011. (g) From about 2003 to 2012, he worked as a sales person in a retail shop in Bazaar Haram, Al Madinah. (h) In about the middle of 2011, he began a friendship that developed into an intimate relationship with a Pashtun Sunni woman named Munira, who attended his shop most Thursdays after prayers at the Mosque near his shop with her family. He did not know her family but he knew they were originally from Afghanistan and he would see her father in the area near the Mosque from time to time. (i) For the first two to three months, he and Munira spoke in the shop or on the phone, and, then for about the next two, he sometimes met her in public places outside the city, including parks and cafes. After that, for about the final six months he was in Saudi Arabia, they would often go to a private hotel on a Thursday evening, where he registered her as his wife, and they were physically intimate. (j) On all of these occasions, whenever they met in public, she wore a niqab and he carried his wife's ID card in case the police or religious authorities ever questioned them, which never happened. He only ever saw her face in the hotel. They took great risks in conducting their relationship, which was purely physical and intimate. He had no expectations that he and Munira would have a future together. (k) In April 2012, Munira told him that she was pregnant. Approximately, two weeks before his departure, he took her to the Safa Al Madina Hospital and registered her as his wife and a test confirmed that she was pregnant. (l) He became terrified about the consequences, which he knew could include public flogging and imprisonment, and possibly public execution, which he had often attended. He told his father what had happened and they discussed the options and agreed it was best for him to leave the country as soon as possible. (m) Prior to his departure, he had no contact with Munira's family, and, since he left, he has had no contact with her or any member of her family. He does not know if she had the baby but assumes she did not. (n) His father helped him to arrange his travel to Australia and he departed Saudi Arabia in May 2012. A smuggler took his passport from him in Indonesia. He arrived in Australia by boat on 8 June 2012 without a visa or passport. (o) While he was in Indonesia, the Saudi religious police contacted his family and called his father to their office to question him about the applicant and his location. No one in his family has been subjected to any legal proceedings or adverse treatment since he left, and no legal proceedings or warrants have been commenced or issued in relation to the applicant. (p) Since arriving in Australia, he has been in regular contact with his wife and children, and his parents and siblings. He has maintained a good relationship with all of his family since his departure. (q) He has worked as a Security Guard in Australia since early 2013. He completed a related training course before he commenced that work. He has completed English language courses in Australia and can speak basic-level English. The Tribunal 3 The appellant claimed that he feared persecution in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. The Tribunal did not consider further the appellant's claims concerning feared persecution in Saudi Arabia because the appellant had no right to enter and reside in that country. 4 As to Afghanistan, the appellant claimed that he feared persecution at the hands of Munira's brother. The appellant also said that he feared persecution from Pashtuns in Kunduz—who had driven his family out of Kunduz and were likely to have possession and control of his family's ancestral land there—and, more generally, by the Taliban and other extremist groups. 5 The Tribunal was persuaded that there was a small but nonetheless real chance that the appellant would suffer serious harm in Kunduz for reasons relating to his membership of particular social groups, which the Tribunal identified as "Tajik returnee land owners" or "Tajik land owners" or "land owners" or "Tajik returnees". 6 Having accepted the existence of that risk, the Tribunal considered whether it extended throughout Afghanistan and, if not, whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to "relocate" to another part of Afghanistan where there was no appreciable risk of persecution. 7 As to the first matter, the Tribunal concluded (at [45]) that : 45. … on the evidence and information before it, the Tribunal does not accept that there is an appreciable risk of the applicant suffering persecution for reasons of his race, religion, nationality, political opinions (real or imputed) or membership of a particular social group, either singularly or cumulatively, outside the Kunduz province, including in Kabul, if he returns to Afghanistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. 8 As to the second matter, the Tribunal concluded (at [53]) that: 53. … on the evidence and information before it, the Tribunal considers that, in his particular circumstances, it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Kabul if he returned to Afghanistan. 9 In the context of both matters, and specifically with respect to whether he could relocate to Kabul, the appellant claimed he would be at risk of harm from generalised violence, including explosions and attacks by the Taliban and other insurgents. 10 The Tribunal noted that, while reports had indicated a number of security incidents in Kabul in the recent past, these incidents were not directed towards Tajiks or Tajik Sunnis or returnees. 11 At [44], the Tribunal said: 44. Having carefully considered the information and evidence before it, including the submissions of the applicant's migration agent, while it accepts there is a chance of a person in Kabul being subjected to serious harm through 'collateral damage' by being 'in the wrong place at the wrong time' and being present when an attack was directed at other persons, the information does not indicate that such incidents occur with such frequency, regularity or are so widespread to suggest that all people in Kabul are at real chance of suffering serious harm in that way, and, for these reasons, the Tribunal does not accept the chance of him suffering serious harm in Kabul through 'random' or generalised violence or through an attack directed at other persons is more than remote, and, accordingly, does not accept there is a real chance he would suffer serious harm in Kabul, for these, or any other reasons, in the event he returned to Kabul in the reasonably foreseeable future. 12 At [49], the Tribunal said: 49. With regard to his claim that there is 'generalised violence' in Kabul, for the reasons noted above, the Tribunal does not accept there is a real chance he would suffer serious harm in Kabul for the reasons he has claimed, nor does it accept on the evidence and information before it, including the submissions of his agent and the sources referred to in those submissions, that there is a real chance of him suffering serious harm from generalised violence, as noted above. The Tribunal has also considered whether the available information indicates that there is a real chance of him being subjected to harm that might fall short of being serious harm for the purposes of s.91R but that would nevertheless make relocation not reasonable; however, having carefully considered the evidence and information before it, including the submissions of his agent and the sources referred to in those submissions, the Tribunal does not accept that the available information indicates that the generalised violence which exists in Kabul is sufficiently widespread or endemic or significant to justify a finding that there is a real chance of the applicant suffering harm that would make relocation not reasonable for the applicant. 13 When dealing with whether, in his particular circumstances, it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Kabul, the Tribunal recorded the appellant's objection that "he does not know anyone there and would not know the first thing to do, or where to live, or anything". The Tribunal had earlier recorded, with apparent acceptance, the appellant's evidence that he had never been to Afghanistan ([10]), had never resided in Afghanistan and had no real link with any particular part of the country ([12]), and had no familiarity with any place in Afghanistan ([15]). 14 In considering the appellant's objection, the Tribunal (at [47]) referred to a submission by his migration agent which included extracts from a UNHCR report. The Tribunal noted that the extracts were concerned primarily with the difficulties faced by internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan who have no work skills, little or no money or assets, and no access to money. 15 The Tribunal distinguished the appellant's position from the position of these people, finding (at [47]) that the appellant: 47. … has a number of skills and attributes that would assist him to find work, and, importantly, if necessary, the support and assistance of his family in Saudi Arabia. The evidence before the Tribunal is that the applicant is fluent in Arabic and Dari, and has basic-level English language skills, has worked as a sales person in a retail shop in Saudi Arabia for 10 years, and, since arriving in Australia, has worked as a Security Guard for two and a half years after completing a related training course. Relevantly, he has the full support of his family in Saudi Arabia, and, on one view, through his travel to and relocation in Australia, he has demonstrated he has the skills and ability to successfully adjust and adapt to a new environment. 16 At [50], the Tribunal said: 50. The Tribunal appreciates and understands that the applicant does not want to relocate to Kabul and that he would face difficulties in establishing life in the city, where, according to DFAT, there is relatively high unemployment and, for many IDPs, difficulties in accessing housing, and poor access to running water, sanitation and health care. However, DFAT assess that men of working age are more likely to be able to return to Kabul and reintegrate successfully, and that internal relocation to urban areas is more likely to be successful for single men of working age. … 17 The Tribunal quoted from the DFAT report and, at [52], concluded: 52. Having carefully considered the information and evidence before it, the Tribunal considers that, in his particular circumstances, as a Tajik Sunni Muslim who can speak Dari, Arabic and some English, who has considerable work experience, who has been able to adapt to life in a foreign country such as Australia, who comes from a relatively wealthy family (in Afghan terms) who are supportive of him and his situation, in all the circumstances, as a matter of practical reality, it would be reasonable for him to relocate to Kabul if he returned to Afghanistan. In making this finding the Tribunal has considered his claim that it would not be as easy for him to find work or housing in Kabul as it had been in Australia; however, while it accepts that he might not be able to receive the same type of work or standard of housing in Kabul as he had in Australia, the information before the Tribunal does not indicate, and the Tribunal does not accept that, he would suffer harm or be discriminated against in being denied access to or not being able to engage in employment or find housing and it does not accept that, on the available evidence and information, those factors would make relocation to Kabul not reasonable for him in his particular circumstances. 18 In the same vein, the Tribunal said at [56]: 56. In relation to the issue of relocation, in light of its earlier reasons with regard to him being a Tajik Sunni Muslim who can speak Arabic, Dari and some English, who has work experience and the capacity and ability to obtain and perform work in a number of roles, who has been able to adapt to life in a foreign country such as Australia, who comes from a relatively wealthy family who are supportive of him and his situation, in these circumstances, having carefully considered the evidence and information before it, for all of the above reasons the Tribunal considers that, in his particular circumstances, it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Kabul if he returned to Afghanistan. The Federal Circuit Court 19 As events transpired, the appellant's application for judicial review before the Federal Circuit Court proceeded on a very limited basis. With reference to [52] of the Tribunal's Decision Record, quoted at [17] above, the appellant's solicitor submitted that the Tribunal misinterpreted or misapplied the law because the Tribunal required that there be an element of discrimination in relation to the appellant being denied access to housing or not being able to be employed in Kabul, when there is no requirement that such additional element exist when considering whether internal relocation is reasonable. 20 In this connection, the appellant's solicitor submitted that, by requiring that there be an element of discrimination, the Tribunal diverted itself from the inquiry required in SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18; [2007] HCA 40 (SZATV) where, at [24], Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ said: 24 What is "reasonable", in the sense of "practicable", must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant for refugee status and the impact upon that person of relocation of the place of residence within the country of nationality. 21 The primary judge rejected that contention, finding that, when fairly read, [52] of the Decision Record was not requiring an additional element of discrimination to exist when considering whether relocation to Kabul was reasonable for the appellant. In this connection, the primary judge held at [23]: 23 As stated above, a fair reading of the Tribunal's decision record makes clear that the Tribunal did not impose into its consideration of relocation that there be an element of discrimination in relation to the applicant being denied housing or work in Kabul. The Tribunal was doing no more than noting that although the applicant may not be able to receive the same type of work or standard of housing in Kabul as he had in Australia, no discrimination existed that would prevent him from obtaining housing or employment in Kabul. I accept the submission of the counsel for the first respondent, Mr Martin Smith, that the Tribunal's finding was to the effect that the applicant would be able to obtain housing and employment. 22 The primary judge concluded, therefore, that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error. The appeal 23 The notice of appeal contains two grounds, expressed as follows: 1. The primary judge erred in holding that the second respondent's (Tribunal) decision was not affected by jurisdictional error. The Tribunal erred in law in considering whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Kabul. Particulars a. The appellant claimed and the Tribunal found that the appellant "has never been to Afghanistan" (at [10]); "has never resided in his country of nationality and has no real link with any particular part of the country" (at [12]); and "has no familiarity with any place in Afghanistan" (at [15]). b. The Tribunal failed to consider whether those findings required or permitted the conclusion that it would not be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Kabul. c. The Tribunal erred in assimilating the appellant to the class of "internally displaced persons" generally (at [50]) without taking account of the special characteristics above that were particular to the appellant and were not shared with internally displaced persons, being characteristics that impacted upon the reasonableness of relocation. 2. The primary judge erred in holding that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error. The Tribunal erred in law in considering the risk of harm faced by the appellant in Kabul insofar as it misapplied the "real chance" test and its conclusion was irrational, illogical, or unreasonable. Particulars a. The Tribunal expressly found (at [44]) that "there is a chance of a person in Kabul being subjected to serious harm through 'collateral damage' by being 'in the wrong place at the wrong time' and being present when an attack was directed at other persons". b. The Tribunal did not accept (at [44]) that "all people in Kabul are at real chance of suffering serious harm in that way". c. It necessarily follows from the Tribunal's findings above that some people in Kabul face a real chance of suffering serious harm in that way. In those circumstances, without more, the Tribunal could not lawfully exclude the possibility of a real chance of serious harm: see, e.g., SZSZO v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 242 at [28]-[36]. d. There was no evident and intelligible justification for the Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant would not face a real chance of serious or significant harm in Kabul by reason of collateral damage or attacks directed at other persons. 24 The Minister submitted that the appellant requires the leave of the Court to rely on these grounds because they do not reflect the case that the appellant brought before the Federal Circuit Court. 25 The appellant accepted that leave is required for Ground 2. Whilst accepting that Ground 1 does not reflect the argument advanced in the Federal Circuit Court, the appellant submitted that it nevertheless attacks the same paragraph of the Tribunal's reasons—namely, [52] of the Decision Record—and raises issues "in the same ballpark" as the issue raised in the Federal Circuit Court. The appellant submitted that, in the circumstances, leave of the Court to rely on Ground 1 is not required. 26 I do not accept the appellant's submission. The case that the appellant seeks to advance on appeal is not the case he advanced before the Federal Circuit Court. Therefore, leave to rely on both grounds is required. The requirements for leave 27 Leave to rely on a ground of appeal directed to an issue not raised before the trial court should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so. 28 In VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588; [2004] FCAFC 158 the Full Court said (at [48]): 48. The practice of raising arguments for the first time before the Full Court has been particularly prevalent in appeals relating to migration matters. The Court may grant leave if some point that was not taken below, but which clearly has merit, is advanced, and there is no real prejudice to the respondent in permitting it to be agitated. Where, however, there is no adequate explanation for the failure to take the point, and it seems to be of doubtful merit, leave should generally be refused. … 29 In the present case, the only explanation given for not agitating in the Federal Circuit Court the issues identified in the grounds of appeal is the fact that the appellant is now represented by counsel. This is not a satisfactory explanation. 30 The primary judge's reasons record that the appellant was represented in the Federal Circuit Court by a firm of solicitors whose name signifies that they practise in immigration law. There is no reason to think that they were not competent to act for the appellant in that capacity. Counsel for the appellant did not suggest otherwise. 31 The primary judge's reasons also record that, at the hearing below, the solicitor who argued the case for the appellant—who appears to be a principal in the firm concerned—confined the appellant's case to the single ground of judicial review addressed by the primary judge and abandoned the other grounds pleaded in the Application. 32 In making this observation, I make no criticism of the forensic decision made in that regard. On the contrary, I would assume that, after due deliberation, it was considered that the other pleaded grounds did not provide an arguable basis on which to contend that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error. Thus, if anything, the practitioner concerned is to be commended for confining the appellant's case to the matter truly in contention. 33 In the event, the ground advanced was not successful. This did not provide an occasion for the appellant to then look for other possible points of argument to arrive at new grounds of judicial review that might achieve greater success than the ground advanced at trial. In Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7, Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ observed: It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish. 34 The Minister does not point to any particular prejudice if leave were to be granted to the appellant to rely on the two grounds in the notice of appeal. But the Minister submitted that no satisfactory explanation has been given for not raising these grounds below and that each ground is without merit. The Minister submitted that, for these reasons, leave should be refused. 35 Before ruling on the question of leave, I propose to consider the merits of each ground. The appellant's submissions Ground 1 36 In oral argument, the appellant submitted that this ground reveals two errors. 37 The first error is that at [47] of its Decision Record, when considering the UNHRC report, the Tribunal treated the appellant as an IDP or as a person whose characteristics were comparable to an IDP. The appellant submitted that he was not an IDP and had none of the cultural advantages, instincts or assumed knowledge of a person who has lived his whole life elsewhere in Afghanistan before locating to Kabul. 38 The appellant submitted that the Tribunal accorded him the same status when placing reliance on the DFAT report at [50] of the Decision Record. He submitted that the evidence from the DFAT report was directed only to the circumstances faced by IDPs who had lived substantially their whole lives in Afghanistan, and could not be applied to the appellant without accounting for his "special characteristics", by which the appellant meant that he had never been to Afghanistan and had no familiarity with, and no relatives or contacts in, Kabul: see [13] above. The appellant submitted that the absence of a reference to those characteristics at [47] and [50] in the Tribunal's Decision Record meant that the Tribunal did not consider them, or did not consider them to be material, which, the appellant submitted, reveals an error of law. The appellant submitted that the Tribunal erred by using the experience of internal relocation within Afghanistan to conclude that it would be reasonable for the appellant to locate to Kabul. 39 The second error concerns the Tribunal's consideration of the difficulties in obtaining housing in Kabul. The appellant submitted that it was incumbent on the Tribunal to satisfy itself that there was a reasonable place for him to live or reasonable means by which he could find a reasonable place to live. 40 In this connection, the appellant directed attention to [52] of the Tribunal's Decision Record and argued that the Tribunal misunderstood his claim in a fundamental respect, which concerned the question of whether he could reasonably find a place to live in Kabul, not whether it would be as easy for him to find housing in Kabul as it had been for him in Australia. 41 The appellant argued that it was notorious that housing was difficult to access in Kabul and that if IDPs experienced these difficulties, then the difficulties for the appellant in this regard would be even greater. The appellant submitted that, to the extent that the Tribunal considered housing at all, it once again failed to take into account his "special characteristics". The appellant submitted that there was no consideration by the Tribunal of how, in a practical sense, the appellant could be expected to find a place to live in Kabul. The appellant submitted that, in this regard, the Tribunal misunderstood its function and did not proceed by reference to correct legal principles. Ground 2 42 This ground is directed to the Tribunal's findings concerning "generalised violence" in Kabul, in particular the findings at [44] of the Decision Record. 43 The appellant submitted that, in this paragraph of its reasons, the Tribunal accepted that there was a chance that a person in Kabul could be subjected to serious harm—"collateral damage"—by being present when other persons are attacked. The appellant submitted that the Tribunal was bound by this finding, notwithstanding the other findings it made in the balance of the paragraph. In this connection, the appellant submitted that the Tribunal could not exclude the risk to the appellant if he were to locate in Kabul, by reasoning that not all people in Kabul face that risk. The appellant submitted that the Tribunal's conclusion was not supported by logical grounds and lacked an evident and intelligible justification. Analysis 44 Each ground advanced by the appellant is without merit. 45 As to Ground 1, I do not accept that the Tribunal considered the appellant to be an IDP. Plainly, the Tribunal understood that the appellant was not an IDP. The only reason the Tribunal had cause to consider the position of IDPs at [47] of the Decision Record was because, on the question of relocation, the appellant's own migration agent placed a submission before the Tribunal which quoted from the UNHRC report as follows: Conflict and insecurity continue to be major drivers of displacement in Afghanistan, affecting all areas of the country. By the end of 2012 about 486,000 Afghans were internally displaced by conflict, a seven per cent increase over 2011. The total number of conflict-displaced people included about 94,000 people who were newly displaced in 2012. By the end of June 2013, the figure for the total number of conflict-related internally displaced people (IDPs) had risen to 574,327. However, official figures for the number of IDPs are widely considered to underrepresent the scale of the displacement problem in Afghanistan, as they exclude those dispersed in urban and semi-urban areas as well as those displaced to rural locations in areas inaccessible to humanitarian actors. IDPs are among the most vulnerable groups in Afghanistan; many are beyond the reach of humanitarian organizations. Urban IDPs are more vulnerable than the non-displaced urban poor, as they are particularly affected by unemployment, limited access to adequate housing, limited access to water and sanitation, and food insecurity. 46 Following this quotation, the submission concluded as follows: Accordingly, it is my believe [sic], in relation to the above mentioned reports, that it will be unreasonable to ask the review applicant to relocate to another part of Afghanistan, if we to take [sic] all the personal circumstances of his case. 47 The appellant certified the submission by stating: I … confirm that the content of this submission was read back to me and I confirm that it reflects the true accounts of my circumstances and the reasons for my claim for protection from Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. 48 Two matters should be noted. First, at [47] of the Decision Record, the Tribunal was dealing with the submission which the appellant had advanced. Secondly, it was the appellant who advanced the quoted passage from the UNHRC report as pertaining to his circumstances. Thus, at [47] of the Decision Record the Tribunal was considering the question of relocation according to the claims and evidence advanced by the appellant—in other words, the framework provided by the appellant himself. The appellant's submissions on appeal sit discordantly with that framework and appear to be a reinvention of his case. 49 As noted at [45] above, the appellant's submission also asked the Tribunal to take all his personal circumstances into account. This is precisely what the Tribunal did. It is the reason why the Tribunal recorded the appellant's objection with respect to relocating to Kabul that "he does not know anyone there and would not know the first thing to do, or where to live, or anything". These words were, no doubt, a reflection of the matters I have noted at [13] above, which the Tribunal accepted. However, it was by taking the appellant's personal circumstances into account that the Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that it would be reasonable for him to relocate to Kabul. This is demonstrated by, for example, the Tribunal's finding at [47], echoed at [56], of the Decision Record that, through his travel to and relocation in Australia, the appellant had demonstrated that he has the skills and ability to successfully adjust and adapt to a new environment. This finding was directly responsive to the appellant's objection to relocating to Kabul because of his "special characteristics" (to adopt the expression used by the appellant in this appeal). 50 So far as the Tribunal's reference to the DFAT report at [50] of the Decision Record is concerned, I accept the Minister's submission that the quoted passage, while referring to IDPs, is wider in scope. It discusses a range of matters relating to life in Kabul since 2001 that are relevant not only to IDPs but also returnees and new arrivals. It is not confined to a consideration of internal relocation, although it makes some particular observations in that regard. 51 With respect to difficulties with housing, I do not accept the appellant's submission that it was incumbent on the Tribunal to satisfy itself that there was a reasonable place for the appellant to live or that there were reasonable means by which the appellant could find a reasonable place to live. The notion of "reasonableness" in this context is not so directed or confined. Although, strictly speaking, the present case is not one of internal relocation, I see no reason why the notion of reasonableness discussed in SZATV at 27 (see [20] above), does not apply in relation to the appellant's relocation to Kabul. The consideration is whether relocation is reasonable in the sense of practicable. As Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ said in SZATV, this must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant for refugee status and the impact of relocation upon that person. Here, the Tribunal was conscious of the difficulties of life in Kabul. It recognised (at [50]) that the appellant did not wish to relocate to Kabul and that he would face difficulties in establishing life there. But, for the reasons it gave, it nevertheless concluded that relocation to Kabul was practicable for the appellant having regard to his particular circumstances. The Tribunal's conclusion does not reveal jurisdictional error. 52 The appellant argued that by focusing at [52] of the Decision Record on "harm" and "discrimination" with respect to housing, the Tribunal failed to consider other barriers to, or difficulties in, finding housing in Kabul. I do not read [52] in that way. I think it is tolerably clear that, in this part of its reasons, the Tribunal made a finding that, based on the evidence before it, it did not accept that the appellant would not be able to find housing or that he would be denied access to housing in Kabul. I note that at [23] of her reasons, the primary judge read and understood [52] of the Decision Record in a similar way: see [21] above. 53 Ground 2 of the notice of appeal is based on a disjointed reading of [44] of the Decision Record (see [11] above), which does not reflect its purport. In context, this paragraph of the Tribunal's reasons deals with whether there was an appreciable risk of the appellant suffering persecution for a Convention reason outside Kunduz province. As the Minister correctly submitted, it is not clear that the appellant's claim to fear harm from random or generalised violence in Kabul reveals a Convention nexus. In any event, properly read, [44] of the Decision Record is a finding that the chance of the appellant suffering harm through random acts of violence or generalised violence was no more than a remote chance. Put the other way, the Tribunal said that it did not accept that there was a real chance that the appellant would suffer serious harm in Kabul for those or any other reasons if he were to relocate to Kabul in the reasonably foreseeable future. This finding was repeated at [49] of the Decision Record (see [12] above), where the Tribunal was considering the reasonableness of the appellant's relocation to Kabul. As the Tribunal made clear, on the information available to it, it did not accept that the generalised violence that exists in Kabul was sufficiently widespread or endemic or significant to justify a finding that relocation to Kabul would not be reasonable for the appellant. 54 For these reasons, Grounds 1 and 2 do not reveal the errors for which the appellant contends. Conclusion and disposition 55 Leave to rely on Grounds 1 and 2 should not be granted. No reasonable explanation has been given for not raising them before the Federal Circuit Court. They are, in any event, without merit and do not identify jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. 56 The appeal should be dismissed. The appellant should pay the Minister's costs. I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Yates. Associate: Dated: 30 August 2017