CKV16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 342

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CKV16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 342 Appeal from: CKV16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1449

File number: VID 759 of 2018

Judge: BESANKO J

Date of judgment: 14 March 2019

Catchwords: MIGRATION — where a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa — where the Immigration Assessment Authority affirmed the decision of the delegate — where Authority not satisfied that the appellant would face a real chance of harm by reason of having provided assistance to Syrian refugees in Lebanon — where the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review of the decision of the Authority PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — application for leave to raise new grounds of appeal not raised before the Federal Circuit Court — consideration of the principles governing an application for leave to raise new grounds — where new ground relates to allegation of apprehended bias and is fundamental to the proper execution of the procedure laid down in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — whether Federal Circuit Court erred in failing to find that the decision of the Authority was affected by jurisdictional error by reason of apprehended bias — where the delegate had before him information from Victorian police about an investigation regarding the appellant's possible involvement in an offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice — where the Authority had before it the same information by reason of s 473CB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) — where the Authority made no reference to the information in its decision — consideration of the principles governing apprehended bias in the context of administrative proceedings — whether a fair-minded lay observer, acting reasonably, might apprehend that the Authority might have been affected by the information — whether it is necessary for information to be highly prejudicial in order for apprehended bias to arise, or whether it is sufficient that the information is adverse or prejudicial — where the first respondent conceded that the information was irrelevant — where the credit of the appellant was a key consideration