FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ELA18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2020] FCA 782 File number: NSD 253 of 2019 Judge: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 5 June 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for non-publication and suppression order over reasons for judgment Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AE, 37AF, 37AG Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 91X, 473EC Cases cited: AB (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym) [2019] HCA 6; (2019) 364 ALR 202 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 1) [2015] FCA 607; (2015) 331 ALR 68 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Limited (No 3) [2012] FCA 1430 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 5) [2016] FCA 741 AVN20 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2020] FCA 584 AWU15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2019] FCA 2132 Chen v Migration Agents Registration Authority (No 1) [2016] FCA 649 C7A/2017 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 70 EAU17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 2086 Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; (2010) 240 CLR 651 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 R v Kwok [2005] NSWCCA 245; (2005) 64 NSWLR 335 Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim [2012] NSWCCA 125; (2012) 83 NSWLR 52; (2012) 293 ALR 384 WZAUP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 116 Date of hearing: The matter was determined on the papers Date of last submissions: 20 April 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 38 Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr D Taylor of Sydney West Legal and Migration Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz ORDERS NSD 253 of 2019 BETWEEN: ELA18 Appellant AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS First Respondent IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY Second Respondent JUDGE: ABRAHAM J DATE OF ORDER: 5 June 2020 THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The application for a suppression and non-publication order is dismissed. 2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent's costs to be agreed or taxed. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ABRAHAM J: 1 This is an application for non-publication and suppression orders under s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Federal Court Act) to suppress aspects of my judgment in this matter on the basis it is said to reveal the identity of the appellant: ELA18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1482. 2 The appellant attempted to file an interlocutory application in this Court on 9 March 2020 which sought an order in relation to the suppression of the judgment of this Court and an order pursuant to "s 88G(1)(a) and (c) of Part 6A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) prohibiting the publication of so much of the reasons as may tend to reveal the identity of the applicant". As a consequence of an issue which arose with filing that application a further interlocutory application was filed on 20 April 2020 applying for "non-publication orders … supressing so much of the reasons as may tend to reveal the identity of the applicant". 3 The Federal Circuit Court delivered its reasons for dismissing the application for judicial review on 4 February 2019: see ELA18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 213. The judgment has been published online, and presumably that was done on or shortly after that date. The judgment in this Court was delivered on 10 September 2019, and again the judgment has been published online from about that date. That judgment repeats the factual matters now complained of, which were in the Circuit Court judgment. The appellant applied for special leave to appeal this judgment to the High Court, and I note from the respondent's submission that the appellant sought in that application to agitate similar issues as to whether he was identifiable in both judgments. Special leave was refused by the High Court on 20 February 2020: ELA18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2020] HCASL 18. From at least the hearing in the Circuit Court the appellant has been represented by the same solicitor as now makes this application (although counsel also appeared on the hearing in this Court). 4 The appellant sent by email a letter to the Federal Circuit Court and this Court dated 21 October 2019, requesting that the publication of the judgments be reconsidered on the basis that it must be assumed that the Sri Lankan authorities already have accessed the judgments, and explained that suppression had not previously been sought as "it is of doubtful utility", however that there "may still be utility" in suppressing the publication of any information, only referring to and relying on s 91X of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) and s 473EC of the Migration Act. The request was put on the basis of viewing the judgments cumulatively. As explained below, neither judgment breaches either provision. The Federal Circuit Court rejected the informal application on 21 October 2019. The application now advanced is broader than matters referred to in that letter. 5 In support of this application the appellant relied on two affidavits of Aminata Soriena Conteh, dated 9 March 2020 and 1 April 2020 respectively. The first annexes correspondence by the appellant's solicitor to this Court and the Federal Circuit Court. The second annexes a document prepared by the appellant's solicitor which appears to be a list of migration related judgments of this Court and the Circuit Court, delivered in the months this judgment was delivered, which lists some information from each judgment (said to be identifying features). Also annexed is a generic redacted travel document application (not suggested to be a document related to the appellant), with circles marked around two categories, the date and method of entry. The respondent opposed the admission in these proceedings of the second of the affidavits, on the basis of relevance. 6 After the submissions and proposed evidence had been filed, the parties confirmed that the matter could be resolved on the papers, being of the view that the Court would not be assisted by an oral hearing. After that confirmation, the respondent, with the consent of the appellant drew to my attention the decision of C7A/2017 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 70 (C7A/2017), which had been delivered on 21 April 2020. The appellant then filed an affidavit from himself, dated 23 April 2020. No explanation was provided as to the timing of this affidavit, and why it does not comply with the Court's orders as to the filing of evidence. Leave was not sought to file additional material. The respondent opposed the admission of this affidavit on the basis that it is speculative, contains opinions and is hearsay. It contends that, in any event it is of limited probative value in the context of s 37AF and leave to rely on it ought to be refused. I will address this affidavit below. 7 The respondent opposed the application for a suppression and non-publication order. 8 For the reasons below, the application is refused. Consideration 9 The appellant seeks a non-publication and suppression order over the whole of the judgment or in respect of what is said to be unique personal information included in the judgment and the claims for protection. 10 While the appellant's submission asserted that his identity could be established given the fact of his detention, the bulk of the submission thereafter is based on the date of arrival of the appellant in Australia to identify him. From that it was submitted, together with other documents, the Sri Lankan authorities could analyse judgments of this Court (and the Circuit Court) to narrow down the persons on the same boats (because of the same arrival date) which could then be the basis of a manual search against their records. It was submitted that that there may be dozens of persons from the same boat does not make it less likely that the appellant could not be identified, because the date of arrival is only used as a process of reduction. It is this submission to which the material in the second affidavit was said to be relevant. 11 I note that the appellant's submission asserts (and relies on in support of his argument) that the judgment contains details of the appellant's family composition, marital status and whether he has children, which is incorrect. The submission also proceeds on certain factual assumptions not in the judgment. 12 Much of the appellant's submission was in very broad terms and included matters which are plainly irrelevant to the resolution of this application. In so far as the affidavit was directed to addressing those matters, it is irrelevant. 13 The respondent opposed the orders being made and submitted that the critical question was whether the making of the order was warranted under s 37AF, noting that the appellant's submission raised a number of matters which are beyond what is necessary or appropriate to consider, and to a large degree was based on speculation and bare assertion. The respondent referred to relevant provisions of the Migration Act, and relevant legal principles to be applied when determining an order under s 37AF. In particular, reliance was placed on the decision of AWU15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2019] FCA 2132 (AWU15) where Kerr J considered an application for a non-publication and suppression order over aspects of his judgment in relation to a judicial review application in a migration matter. In light of those matters, the respondent submitted that the appellant had failed to establish that an order was necessary, as required by s 37AF. The respondent submitted that if, contrary to his submission that I were minded to make any orders the better course would be to recall the judgment and make an order to vary and reissue the judgment, to which he would consent. 14 The relevant provisions, ss 37AE, 37AF and 37AG are in the following terms: 37AE Safeguarding public interest in open justice In deciding whether to make a suppression order or non-publication order, the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice. 37AF Power to make orders (1) The Court may, by making a suppression order or non‑publication order on grounds permitted by this Part, prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of: (a) information tending to reveal the identity of or otherwise concerning any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court or any person who is related to or otherwise associated with any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court; or (b) information that relates to a proceeding before the Court and is: (i) information that comprises evidence or information about evidence; or (ii) information obtained by the process of discovery; or (iii) information produced under a subpoena; or (iv) information lodged with or filed in the Court. (2) The Court may make such orders as it thinks appropriate to give effect to an order under subsection (1). 37AG Grounds for making an order (1) The Court may make a suppression order or non‑publication order on one or more of the following grounds: (a) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice; (b) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the interests of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory in relation to national or international security; (c) the order is necessary to protect the safety of any person; (d) the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a party to or witness in a criminal proceeding involving an offence of a sexual nature (including an act of indecency). (2) A suppression order or non‑publication order must specify the ground or grounds on which the order is made. 15 Suppression and non-publication orders can be made at any time during a proceeding or after a proceeding has concluded: ss 37AF(1), 37AH(3). 16 As s 37AE makes clear, the public interest in open justice is a primary consideration in deciding whether to make a suppression or non-publication order. 17 The relevant principles in relation to the making of suppression or non-publication orders under s 37AF of the Federal Court Act are well settled. While the appellant has not identified which limb of s 37AG is relied on in support of his application, it is presumed it is s 37AG(1)(c). The question therefore in this instance is whether the making of a suppression or non-publication order is "necessary to protect the safety of any person": s 37AG(1)(c). The word "necessary" in that context is a "strong word": Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; (2010) 240 CLR 651 (Hogan) at [30], although it is not to be given an unduly narrow construction: Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim [2012] NSWCCA 125; (2012) 83 NSWLR 52; (2012) 293 ALR 384 at [8], citing Hodgson JA in R v Kwok [2005] NSWCCA 245; (2005) 64 NSWLR 335 at [13]. The threshold which an appellant must satisfy is high. Mere embarrassment, inconvenience, annoyance or unreasonable or groundless fears will not suffice to found a suppression or non-publication order: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 1) [2015] FCA 607; (2015) 331 ALR 68 at [30]; Chen v Migration Agents Registration Authority (No 1) [2016] FCA 649 at [11]. Although an appellant is not required to prove that the harm which he or she fears would be an inevitable consequence in the absence of such an order: AWU15 at [32] citing AB (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym) [2019] HCA 6; (2019) 364 ALR 202 at [15] per Nettle J. Once the court is satisfied that an order is necessary, it would be an error not to make it: Hogan at [33]. There is no exercise of discretion or balancing exercise involved: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Limited (No 3) [2012] FCA 1430 at [21]. The onus is on the appellant to persuade the Court to make the order has been described as "a very heavy one": Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 5) [2016] FCA 741 at [8]. 18 This application is also to be decided in the context of the Migration Act. The only provision of the Migration Act which specifically constrains the Federal Court's (and Federal Circuit Court's) duty to publish reasons is s 91X which prohibits only the publication of a "person's name": EAU17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 2086 per Besanko J at [27]. 19 In AWU15 Kerr J observed at [28]-[29]: Section 91X is to be contrasted with s 431 of the Migration Act. The latter prohibits in wider and more general terms the Administrative Appeals Tribunal from publishing anything which may identify an applicant for a protection visa in its written statement of decision. Having regard to those two quite differently expressed legislative provisions, I am satisfied that Parliament has not sought (I infer having regard to the quite different underlying constitutional principles) to constrain the duty of this Court to publish reasons explaining its decisions in protection visa cases beyond those constraints which apply directly in consequence of s 91X, together with those which apply to all litigants having regard to the terms of ss 37AE, 37AF and 37AG of the FCA Act. I note that Besanko J recently came to the same conclusion in EAU17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 2086. 20 As the respondent noted, the Migration Act also restricts the publication of "identifying information": s 336C-336FD, and see definition in s 336A. That term is narrowly defined and referable to what are termed "personal identifiers" (fingerprints, handprints, height, weight, photographs, audio/video recordings, iris scan, and signatures): s 5A(1). 21 There has been no breach of the Migration Act: there has been no publication of the appellant's name or "personal identifiers" or "identifying information" as defined, in either judgment. As the respondent correctly submitted, the date of arrival, place of arrival, place of birth, ethnicity and protection claims are neither "personal identifiers" nor "identifying information". 22 In that context, the appellant's reliance on WZAUP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 116 (WZAUP) is misplaced. Contrary to the appellant's submission, that decision did not purport to impose any additional publication prohibitions. Rather, Rares J made comments as to the potential consequence of publication of the date of birth of that particular individual which critically, arose because the appellant in that case had been the subject of the 2014 data breach event, and it had to be assumed that personal information, such as date of birth, had been accessed by authorities in the receiving country, with the consequence that the inclusion of the date of birth in the judgment could allow an authority to link that judgment to the information accessed by reason of the data breach. As to the effect of a breach of s 91X see the recent discussion in AVN20 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2020] FCA 584. Such a breach is not a jurisdictional error. 23 The observations by Rares J in WZAUP about Courts having "become very cautious" about including identifying details of persons, related to reasons for judgment in general as is apparent from paragraph [11]: In recent years, since the advent of the internet, Courts ordinarily have become very cautious about including in reasons for judgment details of matter that may identify a person or enable others with malicious intent either to impersonate that person or be in a position to otherwise cause him or her harm or distress. Therefore, most Courts have adopted a practice of not including in reasons for judgment published on the internet or in open Court material such as a person's full name, date of birth or actual address. That is because, first, that information is, in ordinary circumstances, not necessary, relevant or material to the determination of the proceeding, secondly, it could be used by third parties to the detriment of those persons or the administration of justice and thirdly, revelation of such material might make it more difficult for persons to feel confident that they would not be inadvertently exposed to harassment or to being impersonated by third parties who are able to use search engines or other means to download or aggregate material from the internet for their own purposes, contrary to the best interests of the persons concerned. This applies to reasons for judgment generally, including in respect of persons being sentenced for criminal conduct or otherwise caught up in civil or other litigation. 24 So much may be accepted. To state the obvious, the appellant's name, date of birth or actual address are not in this judgment. I note also that those comments were made in the context of considering an appeal from the Federal Circuit Court and not whether suppression/non-publication orders were required. The observations do not advance the submission that a non-publication or suppression order is necessary in the circumstances of this case, in light of the principles referred to above at [14]-[17]. 25 In AWU15 Kerr J considered an application for non-publication orders on an aspect of his judgment in a context where he had determined to remit the claim the subject of his judgment to be reheard. Kerr J concluded inter alia at [38], [40], [41] and [42]: I accept that it is arguable that AWU15's safety may be compromised if he were to return to Pakistan and the warrant for his apprehension executed. Indeed, that hypothesis was the premise of the Court upholding AWU15's appeal. However, I am entirely unpersuaded that the extensive redactions to the Court's published reasons sought will, if he returns to Pakistan, shield him from that risk or lessen it. A party that brings proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia must do so on the understanding that the Court has a duty to safeguard the public interest in open justice. While the Appellant in this case brings a proceeding relating to a claim for protection, the public nonetheless must be confident, and the law requires, that that the hearing and determination of his appeal be conducted in an open and transparent manner except where necessity dictates otherwise. …. I will also not order the redaction of the text … That paragraph refers to the Appellant's submissions in terms of which the public is entitled to be informed, so as to comprehend the Court's reasons. Further, insofar as it refers to correspondence from the Navy it refers to matters already known by the Pakistan authorities. I will not redact the reasons of the primary judge in the court below where I have cited them at [21]. It would be an exercise in futility to do so. The reasons of the primary judge in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) were published in unredacted form on 15 March 2019. I note that the Minister consents to the redaction … of the Court's reasons. However, those paragraphs cite and refer to the submissions of the parties considered by the Court. Accepting that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice, those paragraphs should be published unless a clear necessity has been established to the contrary. The rationale for those redactions, although not expressly stated, would appear to relate to the Appellant's earlier claim that if returned to Pakistan he would be subject to the death penalty. It can be accepted that that submission was not pressed in these proceedings. However, the reference to that subject matter is contextually relevant to the Appellant's criticisms of the reasons of the primary judge, and as noted above at [41] the FCCA decision which is the subject of this appeal has been in the public domain for more than eight months and contains copious references to that earlier claim. Notwithstanding the Minister's consent, I would therefore decline to make those redactions. 26 WZAUP was the only case referred to by the appellant in his submission. Notably, there was no reference to any of the provisions or legal principles relevant to determining an application for a suppression or non-publication order. Nor was there any submission advanced by reference to those principles as to how the relevant criteria is satisfied in this case. This is in the context where the appellant bears the onus of establishing the criteria and the onus is a heavy one. 27 Also, I note that the appellant only provided what he considered to be proposed redactions sought after all the submissions had been filed. Initially the appellant had not done so, asserting rather at the conclusion of his submission that "if the Court were minded to remove the date of arrival and most serious claims of the appellant as were not necessary and incidental to the judgment the appellant would be in a position to review such redactions and advise as to whether he was satisfied with that course of action". Given the onus on the appellant, that submission misunderstands the obligation on him. It is not for this Court to come up with proposed redactions, and then to give him an opportunity to advise if he is "satisfied" with the orders. I note the redactions now provided do not really accord with the breadth of the written submission, and they primarily relate to the dates, including the date of arrival in Australia (which commonly appears in judgments of this nature). I note also that the Court was provided with a proposed redacted version of the Circuit Court judgment, and the redactions in that do not entirely accord with those suggested from the judgment of this Court. 28 Moreover, as noted above, much of the appellant's submission is in very broad terms, addressing matters not relevant to the disposition of this application. The issue is whether the making of such an order is warranted in this case. That necessarily is decided in the context of the timing of the application and the reasons of the Tribunal, which were not disturbed on appeal (and which has not been addressed by the appellant). 29 In the particular circumstances the appellant has not established that an order is necessary. 30 First, if the appellant's identity is as readily identifiable as he contends, it would have been expected that an application for a suppression or non-publication order would have been made at the time, or shortly after delivery of the Circuit Court judgment. It is to be assumed that no application for non-publication was then considered necessary. This is particularly so where, as noted above, the appellant's solicitor on this application appeared for him in the Circuit Court, and thereafter and that he was also represented by counsel in this Court. This is also in the context where the content of the Circuit Court judgment was plainly considered at least close to the time of its delivery, as an appeal was filed in this Court specifying grounds of appeal. I note also in that context that the matters relied on by the appellant have varied over time. 31 Second, the appellant acknowledged that any order would be of doubtful utility. Even on the appellant's case, he has not established that an order is "necessary" given the material now complained of has been online since at least the publication of the Circuit Court judgment. AWU15 reflects the obvious relevance of the fact that the material the subject of a suppression or non-publication application has already been in the public domain. 32 The appellant submitted that the information "must be assumed" to already have been accessed by the Sri Lankan authorities but that there "may be some utility" if the order was made. In his correspondence the appellant explained that suppression had not previously been sought as "it is of doubtful utility". The appellant contended that the entire judgment should be suppressed (as his primary position). Leaving aside the basis for the appellant's assumption, he has not advanced any submission as to how the orders are "necessary" within the meaning of s 37AG. The appellant said the delay in making the application was because an order is of doubtful utility which reflects that, even on the appellant's case, it cannot be established that the order is necessary. Indeed, that and the appellant's descriptions for the basis of the orders, tells against the order being necessary. 33 Third, in any event, the appellant has not established that matters in the judgment relied on by the appellant (which as noted above have varied over time) is "information tending to reveal the identity of the appellant": s 37AF(1)(a). Also, as noted above, the reasoning in the submission includes an assertion as to some factual matters not in the judgment and proceeds on the basis of an assumption of matters not in the judgment. At its highest, the submission is based on potential investigations being undertaken in respect of a number of matters, taken in combination. The submission based on the date of arrival is not information in this judgment which tends to reveal the identity of the appellant. The submission rather, at its highest (and taking into account the affidavit material) is that, some information in the judgment, if it is put together with information in other documents and information in other unrelated judgments (with the use of excel spreadsheets and manual searches) might provide a means by which the authorities could identify the appellant. This is in a context where the date of arrival on the appellant's submission is only used as a process of reduction and not identification. It is a "sifting process of both elimination and matching" of information, necessarily from a number of different unrelated sources. The submission is speculative in nature and its reasoning remote from the judgment. As the appellant did not address s 37AF (or s 37AG) or any of the principles relevant thereto, he did not advance any argument as to how this submission satisfied the criteria in s 37AF(1)(a). Even leaving aside the remoteness, at its highest, the appellant's submission is based on information which "might" tend to reveal the identity, which is also insufficient: C7A/2017 at [11]. 34 Finally, "there must be some material before the court upon which it can reasonably reach the conclusion that it is necessary to make an order prohibiting publication" and "[m]ere belief that the order is necessary is insufficient": John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 at 477 per McHugh JA, with whom Glass JA agreed; C7A/2017 at [14]. It is not enough that the suppression is considered desirable: C7A/2017 at [14]. The evidence originally relied on was of a general nature, including the solicitor's analysis of other cases. Indeed, the crux of the appellant's submission was that the evidence sought to be suppressed in this case ought to be suppressed in all cases. By doing so the appellant failed to properly focus on the circumstances of this case, which is the only application to be determined. As noted above at [11], where he did, some of the information he said was in the judgment is incorrect. 35 The late affidavit from the appellant may have been an attempt to address those remarks in C7A/2017 about the lack of evidence. However, the appellant always bore the onus, and C7A/2017 simply applied the law to the facts of that case. In any event, this affidavit, in some respects, is the appellant repeating what was in the written submission, that the authorities could identify him and his fears on returning. The affidavit, does not address many matters. I note one paragraph in the affidavit is only a partly completed sentence. The affidavit commences by providing a detail not referred to in the judgment and proceeds from that position. The affidavit contains assertions as to what it is said the authorities would have done (or been able to do). As the respondent contends, in relation to this matter, the affidavit is speculative. I note also that the information the appellant says identifies him does not accord entirely with what was in the proposed redactions filed by the appellant. 36 The appellant bears the onus of persuading the Court that it is necessary to make the order and it is "a very heavy one" (see the principles referred to above at [14] – [17]). It has not been satisfied in this case. 37 I note for completeness that while the appellant asserted that this Court had power to make a suppression order in relation to a judgment in the Circuit Court, no basis for that was identified. The appellant, having received the submissions from the respondent which contended that there was no power, submitted that he no longer pressed that aspect of the claim. Rather, it appears that the appellant has now adopted the approach if orders were obtained in this Court he would approach the Circuit Court for similar orders. Significantly, the appellant has not made an application in the Circuit Court. Conclusion 38 For the reasons above, the appellant has not established that a non-publication or suppression order should be made over the judgment, or any aspect thereof. I certify that the preceding thirty-eight (38) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Abraham. Associate: Dated: 5 June 2020