Federal Court of Australia Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council NSW [2020] FCA 1617 File number: NSD 1295 of 2019 NSD 34 of 2020 Judgment of: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 6 November 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal decision of the Federal Circuit Court summarily dismissing the matter on the basis that the applicant had no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings and that the proceedings were otherwise frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process of the Court – whether decision attended by sufficient doubt to grant leave – application dismissed Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 13.10, 16.05 Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Chau Chak Wing [2019] FCAFC 125; (2019) 371 ALR 545 Bellamy's Australia Limited v Basil [2019] FCAFC 147 BPL20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1207 Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; (1981) 147 CLR 246 Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 EBT17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 200 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564 King v Lintrose Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 140; (2001) 4 VR 619 MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585 Nationwide News Pty Limited v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70 Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238 Snowside Pty Ltd as trustee for the Snowside Trust, in the matter Boart Longyear Ltd [2019] FCA 2159 Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 53 Date of hearing: 1 July 2020 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First and Fourth Respondents: Mr S Kettle Solicitor for the First and Fourth Respondents: Hicksons Lawyers Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Ms S Burnett of Clayton Utz Counsel for the Third Respondent: Ms P Thew Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Moray & Agnew ORDERS NSD 1295 of 2019 BETWEEN: SHARMAIN DAISY CLARKE Applicant AND: NURSING AND MIDWIFERY COUNCIL NSW First Respondent NURSING AND MIDWIFERY BOARD Second Respondent NURSES AND MIDWIVES ASSOCIATION Third Respondent MS VIOLET STOJKOVA Fourth Respondent order made by: ABRAHAM J DATE OF ORDER: 6 NOVEMBER 2020 THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. Leave to appeal is refused. 2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the first, second, third and fourth respondents, as agreed or taxed. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. ORDERS NSD 34 of 2020 BETWEEN: SHARMAIN DAISY CLARKE Applicant AND: NURSING AND MIDWIFERY COUNCIL NSW First Respondent NURSING AND MIDWIFERY BOARD Second Respondent NURSES AND MIDWIVES ASSOCIATION Third Respondent MS VIOLET STOJKOVA Fourth Respondent order made by: abraham j DATE OF ORDER: 6 NOVEMBER 2020 THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. Leave to appeal is refused. 2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the third respondent, as agreed or taxed. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ABRAHAM J: 1 The proceedings to which these applications for leave to appeal relate were commenced by an application filed in the Federal Circuit Court on 28 November 2018. On 15 February 2019 an order was made permitting the applicant to file an amended application, which she did on 8 March 2019. To the application which had been filed on 28 November 2018 all respondents filed responses contending that the application was not amenable to a response, seeking summary dismissal under r 13.10 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). By Application in a Case filed on 27 March 2019, the first and fourth respondents sought dismissal of the amended application. By Application in a Case filed on 4 February 2019 the second respondent also sought dismissal of that application. 2 The claims against those respondents who were pursuing the Applications in a Case were as follows: for the first respondent, the Nursing and Midwifery Council New South Wales, a claim of breach of duty of care from professional negligence causing harm and loss for which the applicant claimed she was entitled to aggravated and exemplary damages; as to the second respondent, the Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia, a claim of fraudulent and misleading conduct for which the applicant sought aggravated and exemplary damages; and as to the fourth respondent, Ms Stojkova, a claim that as the principal solicitor at Hicksons Lawyers acting for the South Eastern Sydney Local Heath District in legal proceedings commenced by the applicant, "intentionally and knowingly repeated dishonest conduct to the Supreme and District Courts" for which the applicant sought aggravated and exemplary damages. The applicant appears to have attempted to invoke, inter alia, the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), the National Consumer Protections Act 2009 (Cth), the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the Health Practitioner National Law 86 in support of her claims. 3 On 23 July 2019, the primary judge dismissed the applicant's claims against the first, second and fourth respondents on the basis that the applicant had no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings and that the proceedings were otherwise frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process of the Court: [2019] FCCA 2127. 4 On 18 October 2019, the primary judge ordered that the applicant pay the first and fourth respondents' costs and disbursements of the proceeding in the gross sum of $10,000, within thirty days; the applicant pay the second respondent's costs and disbursements of the proceeding in the gross sum of $24,000 within thirty days; that the proceeding against the third respondent be dismissed pursuant to r 13.10 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) because the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding and the proceeding is otherwise frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court, with the question of costs being reserved and set down for hearing on 27 November 2019: [2019] FCCA 3035 (second judgment). The primary judge did not enter those orders at that stage as the applicant filed an Application in a Case on 23 October 2019 seeking to reargue the application. 5 On 25 October 2019, the primary judge ordered that the Application in a Case filed on 23 October 2019 be dismissed, that the applicant pay the third respondent's costs of the Application in a Case, and that the orders made on 18 October 2019 be entered: [2019] FCCA 3159 (third judgment). 6 On 27 November 2019, the primary judge ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the second respondent in the gross sum of $28,000 within thirty days: [2019] FCCA 3639 (fourth judgment). As explained below, the reasons of the primary judge make clear that this order relates to the third respondent, not the second respondent, and that a slip has occurred. 7 For the reasons below, leave to appeal in respect to each judgment is refused. Judgments 8 In light of the number of applications for leave to appeal it is necessary to recite the contents of each judgment in some detail. I note at the outset the primary judge in his reasons for judgment referred to the caution necessarily exercised in considering applications in the nature made, and by the fact that the applicant was a self-represented litigant. Primary judgment: [2019] FCCA 2127 9 The primary judge summarised the factual background to the application at [8]-[20]. 10 At [22], the primary judge concluded: I have come to the clear view that the Points of Claim as against the First, Second and Fourth Respondents, should be struck out. The Points of Claim are incoherent, do not properly and meaningfully plead the material facts relied upon and do not properly and meaningfully set out any legal claims cognisable by the law. They are embarrassing in the technical sense. 11 And further at [24]-[26]: It would be wrong, in my view, to require the First, Second and Fourth Respondents to plead to the Points of Claim. They are argumentative, conclusionary and, as I have said, do not properly and coherently plead material facts. It is not the role or obligation of the Respondents to disentangle the Points of Claim and to divine and spell out the claim which is intended to be made against them. Further and in particular with respect to the claim of fraud against the Second Respondent, the Points of Claim do not comply with the principles relating to the pleading of a claim in fraud…. Accordingly, the Points of Claim should be struck out as bad in form as against the First, Second and Fourth Respondents. Further, in my view the evidence led by the First and Second Respondents clearly establishes that all their actions of which complaint seems to be made by the Applicant merely constituted their carrying out of statutory duties and obligations under statutory procedures that required them to act in the way in which they did. A claim of fraud against the Second Respondent could not succeed. The Second Respondent only carried out a merely ministerial function authorised by the Law. In the whole body of the evidence relied upon by the Applicant there is nothing which would base a cause of action against the Fourth Respondent. Accordingly, the Points of Claim should also be struck out on the basis that there are no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding against the First, Second and Fourth Respondents. 12 And finally, at [30]-[31]: In my view, the proceeding as against the First, Second and Fourth Respondents should be summarily dismissed pursuant to s.17A of the Act and r.13.10 of the Rules because the Court is satisfied that the Applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding against them and the proceeding against them is otherwise frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court. It is often the case that when a pleading is struck out the Court gives leave to replead. However, in this case I decline to give leave to replead. First, I do not consider that the Applicant would be able of herself to produce a proper pleading and there is no suggestion that she intends to retain a lawyer. Second, the Applicant is not able to refer me or point to a skerrick of wrongdoing which would give rise to a cause of action or proper legal complaint against the First, Second or Fourth Respondents. 13 The primary judge granted the first, second and fourth respondents' applications that the matter be summarily dismissed. Second judgment: [2019] FCCA 3035 14 This related to the issue of costs of the first, second and fourth respondents as a result of the orders made in the primary judgment. This judgment also addressed the third respondent's application for the proceedings against them to be summarily dismissed. 15 In respect to the costs of the first and fourth respondents the primary judge concluded, based on the evidence, that despite the respondents incurring significant costs the respondents took a very moderate and commendable position of only seeking an order for costs limited to the amount of $10,000. The second respondent, on the evidence also took a very moderate position claiming only an order in an amount of $24,000. After referring to various authorities relating to costs against unrepresented parties, including Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25 at [27] and Kennedy v Secretary, Department of Industry (No 2) [2015] FCA 884 at [12] the primary judge concluded that the costs sought by these respondents to be completely reasonable, and an order was made accordingly. 16 The primary judge concluded at [24]: From [41] to [74] of the Points of Claim the Applicant makes conclusory assertions against the Association, alleging breaches of duty of care, negligence and breaches of privacy under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), without pleading in any proper, coherent or meaningful form any material facts. I note in this connection, and find on the balance of probabilities, that she has not responded to a letter from the Association's solicitor requesting further and better particulars dated 13 August 2019, to which I had ordered her on 9 August 2019 to respond by 27 August 2019. 17 The primary judge, based on evidence before him, rejected the applicant's assertion that she had not received the request: at [25]-[26]. 18 The primary judge concluded at [32]-[34]: I have come to the clear view that the Points of Claim as against the Association should be struck out. The Points of Claim are incoherent, do not properly and meaningfully plead any material facts relied upon and do not properly and meaningfully set out any cognisable legal claims. They are embarrassing in the technical sense. It would be wrong, in my view, to require the Association to plead to the Points of Claim. They are argumentative, conclusionary and, as I have said, do not properly and coherently plead material facts. It is not the role or obligation of the Association to disentangle the Points of Claim and to divine and spell out any claim which is intended to be made against it. Further, in my view the evidence clearly establishes that the Association, vis à vis the Applicant, acted reasonably and responsibly and attempted to help and assist the Applicant in connection with her post-employment dealings with the SESLHD. In the whole body of evidence before me, there is nothing which would base a cause of action against the Association. Accordingly, the Points of Claim should also be summarily dismissed on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect of the Applicant successfully prosecuting the proceeding against the Association. 19 The primary judge concluded that the proceeding against the third respondent should be summarily dismissed pursuant to r 13.10 being satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding, and that the proceeding is otherwise frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court. The primary judge declined to allow the applicant another opportunity to replead her case because he did not consider that the applicant would be able of herself to produce a proper pleading and there is no suggestion that she intends to retain a lawyer and the applicant had "not been able to refer [the primary judge] or point to a skerrick of wrongdoing which would give rise to a cause of action or proper legal complaint against the [third respondent]": at [38]. Third judgment: [2019] FCCA 3159 20 Before the orders made in the second judgment had been entered, the applicant sent emails to the chambers of the primary judge indicating that she wanted to move the Court to reopen the decision or have a rehearing of the hearing that had taken place on 18 October 2019. Accordingly, the orders were not entered at that time. The applicant filed an Application in a Case on 23 October 2019, supported by an affidavit of the same date and a further affidavit filed on the day of the hearing, which were admitted into evidence. The applicant sought the setting aside of the orders and judgment of 18 October 2019 under r 16.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). The applicant made submissions in support of her application. The primary judge concluded that there was nothing in the affidavits relied upon by the applicant which would ground any relief under r 16.05 in setting aside the orders of 18 October 2019, nor was any basis advanced in oral submissions. The primary judge concluded that "[m]ost, if not all, of her submissions this morning have been in relation to the main case and her grievances against the Third Respondent, which I have already dismissed and will be the subject of any appeal to the Federal Court": at [7]. 21 The primary judge went on to state at [9]-[10]: Nothing that has been put by the Applicant grounds the relief which she seeks in her Application in a Case. She had no objection to the hearing being set down for 18 October 2019 when I set that date on 27 September 2019. She has had considerable litigation experience in a number of tribunals and Courts in this State, including this Court and the Supreme Court of New South Wales. She has appeared before me in this proceeding on some seven occasions, with the hearing in relation to the summary dismissal application brought by the First, Second and Fourth Respondents on 23 July 2019 extending over a period of four hours and the hearing on 18 October 2019 extended over about two and a quarter hours. It is clear to me from her appearances in Court, and she agreed, that she is a "very intelligent" and articulate woman. She tells me today that she is "a highly articulate woman in terms of my own area of expertise". She was a registered nurse at the Royal Hospital for Women and obtained a Diploma of Nursing in South Africa in 1994. She was well able to put her case, as she saw it, to her advantage at the hearing last Friday and I believe I gave her a full opportunity to meaningfully put that case. 22 The primary judge dismissed the application. Fourth judgment: [2019] FCCA 3639 23 This judgment addressed the costs of the third respondent. The respondent relied on an affidavit setting out costs incurred, but took the "moderate and commendable" view of being prepared to accept fifty percent of those costs. The primary judge stated at [4] that he had "no hesitation in accepting that the amount sought is reasonable and that it should be ordered to be paid by the applicant to the third respondent". The applicant accepted an amount must be ordered against her for costs but raised that the costs should be limited to an amount of $10,000; and that a gross sum costs order should not be made but rather an order should be made in conventional terms that costs should either be agreed or assessed. The primary judge rejected both contentions. 24 The primary judge noted that "unfortunately" he had to address an issue which arose as to whether, as the applicant claimed during the hearing, she had not received the affidavit material relied on by the respondent. He referred to the evidence which established that the material had been served and that the applicant had sent an emailing acknowledging receipt. The primary judge concluded at [9] that "[r]egrettably the Applicant had told the Court a mistruth." 25 A costs order was made in the amount of $28,000. Legal principles 26 The discretion to grant leave to appeal is an unfettered one, with each case being determined on its merits. Nonetheless the discretion is informed by well-established principles including that generally an applicant must establish: (1) that, in all the circumstances of the case, the decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered; and (2) that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 (Décor Corporation) at 398-400; Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564 (Johnson Tiles) at [44]; Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238 at [26]-[30]. The two factors are cumulative and bear upon one another: see Décor Corporation at 398-399; Nationwide News Pty Limited v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70 at [3]. When considering the grant of leave a distinction has been recognised between a "common interlocutory decision on a point of procedure", and a decision determining a substantive right, where leave will more readily be granted: Décor Corporation at 400. 27 This Court must exercise the power to grant leave to appeal in a way that best promotes the overarching purpose in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), being to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: Nationwide News Pty Limited v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70 at [2]; Bellamy's Australia Limited v Basil [2019] FCAFC 147 at [6]. 28 The decision being challenged is a discretionary one. It will not be enough to show that the exercise of discretion under challenge could have been different, such that for the grant of leave to appeal, reasonably arguable error must be established in accordance with House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-5. It is necessary for an applicant to demonstrate error in the orders under challenge, and not merely the reasons for decision: King v Lintrose Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 140; (2001) 4 VR 619 at [22]; and Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Chau Chak Wing [2019] FCAFC 125; (2019) 371 ALR 545 at [3]. 29 The evaluation of the prospects of success of the proposed appeal grounds is conducted "at a reasonably impressionistic level" and enquires whether a ground "is sufficiently arguable" or "has reasonable prospects of success": EBT17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 200 at [4] citing MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585 at [62]-[63]; Snowside Pty Ltd as trustee for the Snowside Trust, in the matter Boart Longyear Ltd [2019] FCA 2159 at [58]. Preliminary issue 30 Before addressing the application for leave to appeal it is appropriate to record that the applicant filed an interlocutory application in this matter on 12 May 2020 with a supporting affidavit dated 12 May 2020, which was heard on 5 June 2020 when the applicant made oral submissions in support of the orders sought. They related to the underlying proceedings. 31 The orders sought by that application were refused on 5 June 2020. The first two orders sought "the order be granted to appeal" the primary judge's decision on the basis that it was affected by mistakes of fact and that leave be granted to provide the facts in the matters complained of. That order could not be an interlocutory order, but is the order sought in relation to the application for leave to appeal. The third order sought that Hicksons Lawyers be recused from defending the matters for the first and fourth respondents. In oral submissions the applicant contended that she has instituted proceedings against Hicksons Lawyers and the other respondents in other courts alleging misconduct in the various proceedings, some of which the applicant appeared to contend, may relate to this matter. Counsel for the first and fourth respondents submitted that there have been no findings of impropriety or misconduct by Hicksons Lawyers in any of the proceedings commenced by the applicant against it or its employees. As explained to the applicant, there is no basis to make such an order. That she has made allegations against Hicksons Lawyers is something for them to consider, but it does not provide a basis in this case that they be prevented from acting. The fourth order sought that leave be granted to the applicant to serve various subpoenas and summons on all respondents. Leave to issue the subpoenas was refused on the basis that they did not relate to the matters before this Court. On that day an order was made, at the applicant's request, that the proceedings in relation to the fourth judgment be heard at the same time as the proceedings in respect to the other judgments. 32 I note also that towards the end of the hearing, after her interlocutory requests had been refused, the applicant made an oral submission that she be given an opportunity to make an application to transfer the proceedings to another court under the "Cross Vesting Act". This was put by the applicant on the basis that she has been told by another (or others) that the underlying proceedings may be in the incorrect jurisdiction. The respondents confirmed that no jurisdictional issue has ever arisen in relation to these matters and lack of jurisdiction was not the basis of the respondents' applications for summary dismissal. Despite that, the applicant then made an oral submission seeking a certificate for pro bono legal assistance to get advice only on the issue of transferring the proceedings and whether this Court was the correct jurisdiction. As no jurisdictional issue arose on the application, the request was refused. The applicant also then made a submission that she should be granted pro bono assistance generally in relation to these matters, with the respondents opposing such an order. These proceedings are one of many that have been brought by the applicant in various courts, many interrelated: see for a summary: Clarke v South Eastern Sydney Local Health District [2020] FCA 1616. The respondents, inter alia, listed a number of lawyers who had previously had dealings with the applicant. I considered that a pro bono referral would not be appropriate and as such, declined to make a referral. A hearing date for this matter was set shortly after this interlocutory hearing, as the parties had indicated the matter was ready for hearing and provided available dates accordingly. The applicant had already filed her written submissions and the nature of the applications, being applications for leave to appeal in relation to a summary dismissal and costs orders, raised discrete questions before the Court. There had been no suggestion up until this stage that the applicant wanted assistance on this matter, and she appeared unrepresented in the Court below. These matters were listed to be heard on the same day as the leave to appeal applications from Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council of New South Wales [2019] FCA 1782, a matter in which the applicant expressly acknowledged she did not seek legal assistance. It was also apparent that the applicant has previously had pro bono assistance and spoken to a number of legal practitioners about aspects of her various proceedings (although it is not clear that this included the current proceedings). 33 I note also that both before and after the hearing of the interlocutory application the applicant sought leave to issue a number of subpoenas to persons involved in the respondents directed to providing documents and/or to give evidence in relation to factual matters in relation to her underlying complaints. Such evidence, not before the primary judge, is not relevant to the issues in these proceedings, and nor is there a basis for witnesses to give evidence. Leave was not granted to issue the subpoenas. Consideration 34 The applicant alleges 21 grounds of appeal which appear to challenge the primary judgment, although some appear relevant to the second and fourth judgment in relation to costs. In addition the applicant has filed additional grounds in respect to the fourth judgment which relates only to the costs ordered to be paid to the third respondent, which are addressed below. 35 In addition, lengthy affidavits dated 14 August 2019, 30 January 2020 and 15 June 2020 were filed by the applicant in support of her application. I note at this stage that after the completion of the hearing the applicant sent many emails to the Court, many of which appeared unrelated to these proceedings. The applicant was not given leave to file any further submissions or material in relation to this matter. Therefore, any material and emails received by the Court after the hearing which attempted to reargue this matter have not been considered: see for example, Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; (1981) 147 CLR 246 at 258; BPL20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1207 at [43]. 36 Each of the respondents in opposing the application contended, inter alia, that none of the grounds are coherently articulated such as to be able to be properly understood. The grounds are variously described as confusing, misconceived, disordered and suffering significant flaws. They were said to be reflective of the same problems as the documents filed in the proceedings which were struck out by the primary judge. Those descriptions of the grounds are to be accepted. 37 The first and fourth respondents also took issue with the affidavits of the applicant sworn and dated 14 August 2019 and 30 January 2020 filed in support of the application, on the basis that the terms are "incoherent, incomprehensible or objectionable, not relevant and replete with conclusions, bald allegations and submissions in generally unhelpful terms that appear to be unrelated to the identified grounds of appeal set out within the Amended Draft Notice of Appeal". 38 The applicant's written submission filed in support of the application does not assist. Rather most of the submission is conclusory assertions as to what she contends are the facts and repeats her grievances as to how she was dealt with. The applicant takes issues with facts in the evidence relied on by the respondents. The submission recites alleged wrongs against her. Much of the submission are bare assertions as to facts or conduct. This submission appears to be in support of the contention that it was a "clear cut" case of the application for summary dismissal being an "abuse of process". 39 Further, what does appear from the grounds, as best as can be ascertained, is that they do not identify any error in the reasoning of the primary judge. Rather, at best, they involve assertions that the primary judge was wrong to characterise her case as having no reasonable prospects of success. 40 Given the limitations in respect to the grounds described above, as best as can be ascertained, the complaints appear to fall within three categories with overlap between the assertions (and some grounds involving all three): first, that the primary judge failed to consider the evidentiary material, failed to accept her evidentiary material or give consideration to her "intimate familiarity" of the matters complained of (grounds 1, 2, 3, 6, 20, 21); second, the primary judge failed to apply (or consider) the law in relation to various matters (grounds 5, 8, 14, 16-19); and third, procedural unfairness, breaches of natural justice and human rights (grounds 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18). 41 The applicant made oral submissions which, while referring in part to the grounds that had been filed, focussed on certain aspect of her complaints (which were not necessarily readily apparent from the grounds). Each judgment was not addressed separately. 42 I have considered the applicant's submissions against each of the judgments separately. 43 The applicant contended during the hearing, that the primary judge acted on erroneous factual material which she identified as being contained in the affidavits of Aaron Moss affirmed 30 January 2019 and Kyle Robson affirmed 14 March 2019, relied on by the second respondent which related to the primary judgment. The applicant also took issue with the affidavit of Ashleigh Clancy dated 15 March 2019 relied on by the first and fourth respondents in relation to the primary judgment. The particular paragraphs the applicant referred to in oral submissions appear to merely state the claims on foot in the District Court against the first respondent and summarise the claims raised in the applicant's amended originating application. The applicant submitted these were false statements. She did not provide any basis in support of this assertion. The applicant also contended the primary judge erred in law which was an argument that he wrongly applied the facts to the law. Underlying the submissions was really two propositions, first, that a reading of the evidence the applicant relied on clearly shows that she has a proper case and that the proceedings should not have been dismissed; second, in that context, that the respondent and the primary judge knew that she had a proper case and therefore she should have been given an opportunity to re-plead her case (as it would eventually be correct). 44 In relation to the factual complaints, which are that the applicant's submissions, assertions and evidence are correct, that the primary judge ought to have accepted that to be so, in part seem to be based on the applicant's assertion she has intimate knowledge of the matters and that she is correct. Although the grounds include assertions that the judgments are inconsistent with the evidence, that is said to be on the basis that her assertions are correct. The primary judge had before him evidence from the respondents. Nothing that was put by the applicant gives rise to any reasonably arguable ground. 45 In relation to the complaints referring to the law, some of the grounds merely refer to statutes and provisions. There is no basis to suggest the primary judge was not aware of and did not consider the relevant legal principles. Moreover, some complaints are factually incorrect, for example, the applicant's complaint that the primary judge did not consider the objectives of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law No. 86a (NSW), which is plainly considered at [11]-[18], [26] of the primary judgment. 46 In so far as the grounds and submissions assert denial of procedural fairness or natural justice, the proceedings before the primary judge do not bear that out. The applicant does not identify any proper basis for the allegations. The applicant had an opportunity to amend her originating application with evidence in support, which she did. A time table was put in place to enable the parties to file written submissions in respect to the strike out application, and the application for summary dismissal, which was to be heard on 23 July 2019. The applicant filed submissions in opposition to the applications. At the hearing the applicant appears to have been provided with an opportunity to present her submissions orally. Certainly the applicant does not contend otherwise. The applicant appears to resort to allegations of denial of procedural fairness and natural justice when dissatisfied with the outcome. In relation to the second judgment, as referred to at [20] above the primary judge also provided the applicant with an opportunity for further argument in the matters despite the fact that such argument had already been advanced (which led to the third judgment). 47 Although not a ground of appeal, the applicant now submits that she should have been given an opportunity to re-plead her case as occurs in other cases. However, the primary judge considered that and declined, in the exercise of his discretion, to allow that to happen. Given the factual findings he had made, and the state of the pleadings, it could not be argued that his conclusion was not open. The applicant does not point to any error in that conclusion, rather, she takes issue with it. Moreover, that would only address part of the applicant's problem, as it would not address the issue of there being no reasonable prospects of success. There is no basis to contend that re-pleading would alter that. 48 In relation to the contention that the applicant had filed an interlocutory application which the primary judge failed to consider, the submission is misconceived. The respondents made applications for the matters to be struck out and dismissed, filed 15 March 2019 (by the first and fourth respondents) and later by the second and third respondents. The applicant's interlocutory application dated 17 April 2019 sought orders that the actions in these proceedings be transferred in whole or part to the Supreme Court or District Court, "or to any other jurisdictions applicable for the purposes in the administration of justice". As noted above, no jurisdictional issue has ever arisen in relation to these matters. There is no basis to assert that the applicant's interlocutory application should have been heard before the respondents' applications, or that it could have in any way affected the outcome of those applications. Costs judgments 49 As noted above, the applicant appeals the costs orders in the third and fourth judgments, with particular focus on the latter. Four additional grounds are alleged in respect to the fourth judgment which can generally be described as alleging the judgment is "affected from overbearing and oppressive prejudices and a miscarriage of justice" because of the affidavit relied on by the respondents, and that there was a failure by the primary judge to exercise his discretion. 50 At the hearing of the applications the applicant submitted that although she accepted that costs orders would be made against her the amounts sought and the orders made were designed to bankrupt her, particularly as the orders were to pay within thirty days. The applicant submitted the orders could have been varied, that she is unrepresented and there are four respondents and it was unreasonable of them to have briefed counsel (as she was unrepresented). 51 The evidence before the primary judge in respect to each respondent was that the amounts sought were substantially less than the costs incurred by them in the conduct of the proceedings. The amounts the subject of the costs orders is a discretionary judgment. There is no arguable basis to challenge the decisions. 52 In respect to the fourth judgment, the applicant submitted that the orders erroneously refer to the second respondent. That is correct. It is plain from the primary judge's reasons that the only application before him that day was the cost application for the third respondent and that is the order he made. There is a slip in the orders on the coversheet of the judgment, and I am informed by the third respondent, in the orders entered. That could be easily rectified, and ought to have been done before now. I am informed by the third respondent that they will take steps to rectify the slip in the order. In that context, I direct that if not already done, the third respondent take steps to formalise the order. In that context, this slip does not provide a basis on which to grant leave to appeal. Conclusion 53 In reality, the applicant's applications for leave to appeal primarily complain about the result of the exercise of the discretion by the primary judge in each case. Even providing allowance and latitude for the fact that the applicant is unrepresented, none of the grounds argued, either in writing or orally, provide a proper basis on which to grant leave to appeal from any of these orders made. In all the circumstances of the case, the applicant has not established that the decisions are attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered. In those circumstances, and given the basis of the primary judge's conclusions, the applicant could not establish that substantial injustice would occur if leave were refused. The applications for leave to appeal are dismissed with costs. I certify that the preceding fifty-three (53) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Abraham. Associate: Dated: 6 November 2020