Malcolm Richard Harrison v NSW Wheelchair Sports Association Incorporated [1995] IRCA 171

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT OF AUSTRALIA SYDNEY DISTRICT REGISTRY No. NI 1127 OF 1994 BETWEEN MALCOLM RICHARD HARRISON Applicant AND NSW WHEELCHAIR SPORTS ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED Respondent COURT: Patch JR PLACE: Sydney HEARING DATES: 28, 29, 30 & 31 March 1995 DATE ORDER MADE: 31 March 1995 MINUTES OF ORDER THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $5,523.28 within twenty-one days of today. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Industrial Relations Court Rules.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

No. NI 1127 of 1994

BETWEEN:

MALCOLM RICHARD HARRISON

Applicant

AND:

NSW WHEELCHAIR SPORTS ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED

Respondent BEFORE: PATCH JR PLACE: SYDNEY HEARING DATES: 28, 29, 30 & 31 MARCH 1995 ORDER MADE: 31 MARCH 1995

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application under 170EA of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 ("the Act") In his application, filed 18 November 1994, the applicant, Mr Malcolm Richard Harrison, seeks the following orders: 1. An order requiring the respondent to reinstate him in employment. 2. An order that the respondent pay compensation to the employee. Since the application was filed, the applicant has found another job. Consequently, during the trial of the matter, his counsel indicated that he no longer sought reinstatement. In those circumstances, I find that it would be impracticable for the Court to order that the applicant be reinstated. There were only two broad issues before the Court. They were the question of whether or not the applicant was excluded from the operation of the Act by virtue of section 170CC and regulation 30B (ie, was the applicant a probationary employee) and, if that first question was answered in the negative, what level of compensation should be awarded to the applicant. These were the only "live" issues, as, during the hearing of the matter, counsel for the respondent conceded that, if the first issue was decided against the respondent, the employment of the applicant had been unlawfully terminated. This concession was quite proper, and soundly based. IS THE APPLICANT EXCLUDED FROM THE OPERATION OF THE ACT BY VIRTUE OF REGULATION 30B? The respondent argues that the applicant is excluded from the operation of subdivisions B, C, D & E of Division 3 of Part VIA of the Act because he falls into one of the categories of employees excluded from the operation of those subdivisions of the Act by virtue of regulation 30B, in particular, regulation 30B (1)(c). Regulation 30B(1) reads: "[Excluded employees] Subject to subregulation (2), for the purposes of section 170CC of the Act, the following employees are excluded from the operation of Subdivisions B, C, D and E of Division 3 of Part VIA of the Act: (a) .................. (b) ................ (c) an employee serving a period of probation or a qualifying period of employment, if the duration of the period or the maximum duration of the period, as the case requires: (i) is determined in advance; and (ii) is reasonable, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the employment." (d) ................". In order to determine whether the applicant is excluded from the operation of the relevant Parts of the Act, it is first necessary to answer another question: Was the applicant told, before he commenced work, that he was to be a probationary employee for the first six months of his employment? An employee can only be covered by the effect of Regulation 30 B(1) (c) if he or she has been told, in advance, that the employment is to be probationary. This follows from the wording of the Regulation itself, which requires that the duration of the period be "determined in advance". An arbitrary decision of an employer, after the employee has commenced work, to "make" the employee's employment probationary cannot be effective. Likewise, if an employer forgets to inform a prospective employee that the employment is to be probationary, and tries to impose a period of probation after the commencement of the employment, that too would be ineffective. The applicant commenced work as the General Manager of the respondent on 10 May 1994. This followed a selection process. Coopers & Lybrand, consultants, had been hired by the respondent to find suitable applicants for the position. As a result of the efforts of Coopers & Lybrand, two suitable persons were found, one of whom was the applicant. The applicant was interviewed by Ms Kate White, a consultant from that organisation, on 8 April 1994. Following that interview, two interviews were held with officials of the respondent association. One of the principal issues in the case was whether or not the applicant had been told that he was to be employed on probation (or words to that effect) for the first six months of his employment with the respondent. The respondent asserted that that was the case, and the applicant denied that. There was a direct conflict between the evidence of the applicant on the one hand, and the evidence of Mr David ("Rob") King, the President of the respondent association and Mr William Dudenhoeffer, formerly the Honorary Secretary, and now the General Manager, of the respondent association. Mr Christopher Sparkes, now the Vice-President of the respondent association, and a long time member of its executive, was also called by the respondent, but he gave no evidence of any conversations with the respondent concerning whether or not he was to be employed on probation (or words to that effect). I should note here that it was neither the respondent's nor the applicant's case that he was present during any such conversations. It is thus necessary to determine which version is to be accepted. The applicant responded to an advertisement (Exhibit "A") in a newspaper when he initially applied for the job. That advertisement had been placed by Coopers and Lybrand. The advertisement made no mention of any period of probationary employment. Nor were there any words which could be construed as meaning that the applicant would be initially employed on probation. It is also important to note that, in reference to the remuneration that the successful job applicant would receive, the advertisement said, "Package valued at approx. $70K". As directed by the advertisement, the applicant contacted Ms Kate White, from Coopers and Lybrand. He was interviewed by her. She gave him a four page document provided by the respondent which was called "General Manager Job Specification". That document became exhibit "E". It made no reference to a period of probationary employment, and, in reference to remuneration, it said "a salary package in the vicinity of $70,000.00 will be offered to the successful applicant." When the applicant commenced employment with the respondent he was receiving a remuneration package valued at $56,000.00 - substantially less than the package which had been referred to in the advertisement and Job Specification. The significance of that will be canvassed below. The initial interview between the applicant and Ms White occurred on 8 April 1994. Ms White, on a standard form prepared for that purpose, made notes of that interview. That document became exhibit "G". It is clear from those notes that the interview (as was to be expected) was a comprehensive one. The applicant apparently impressed Ms White with his qualifications for the position, and she recommended him. In an apparent reference to the applicant's long term perspective in relation to the job, Ms White wrote, "3 yrs from now prefer stability L/Term goal +ve returns from employment Not a passing transitional opportunity." The applicant commenced work with the respondent on 10 May 1994. In early June 1994 he received a letter from Mr Bill Dudenhoeffer, Honorary Secretary of the respondent. That letter became exhibit "B", and was as follows: "Dear Malcolm, I am pleased to confirm your appointment to the position of General Manager and note your commencement date as 10 May 1994. I am confident that you experience and skills will be a valuable asset to our Association. In this position it is expected that your initial primary focus will be on fundraising management and promotions. However, you will have, in totality, the broad responsibility for managing all staff and overseeing all aspects of our Associations activities. In relation to your remuneration package and general conditions of employment, the following conditions apply; Your salary will be $46,000 per annum. additionally, a 3% superannuation contribution of $1,300 per annum will be paid into an approved fund as utilised by the WSA. Non-salary allowances will be $10,000 per annum. The specific details of this allowance will be subject to negotiation between yourself and Board member Rob King. Standard provision for 10 days per annum sick leave and 4 weeks per annum annual leave will apply. After a preliminary 6 month trial period from the date of your commencement we will conduct a performance and salary review. On behalf of the Board and members I am very pleased to have you on the team and look forward to a long and rewarding relationship. Yours sincerely Bill Dudenhoeffer Honorary Secretary" The salient points of that letter are: 1) The applicant's remuneration package was only $56,000.00 (as opposed to the advertised $70,000.00); 2) The sentence "after a preliminary six month trial period from the date of your commencement we will conduct a performance and salary review"; and 3) The concluding paragraph "On behalf of the Board and members I am very pleased to have you on the team and look forward to a long and rewarding relationship." In cross-examination the applicant was asked: "Q. Was it your assumption that new employees would have a six month trial period?" He answered as follows: "A. The assumption I had was that at the end of six months there would be a performance and salary review." He was also asked whether the phrase "trial period" was used in conversations with him before his employment started. He answered as follows: "I don't recall that phrase being used. The phrase "performance and salary review" was used." The applicant also gave evidence that he did not recall Mr King and Mr Dudenhoeffer linking the two concepts of a performance and salary review, and a trial period. The applicant was adamant that he was not aware, and was not told, that his position was on trial for six months. He also said: "If the word "probation" had been used, I certainly would have reconsidered taking the job." When asked about the sentence in exhibit "B" referring to a six month trial period, he said that that sentence "was consistent with discussions prior to the commencement of his employment", but the phrase "six month trial period was never specifically referred to." In this context, he repeatedly asserted that his understanding was that the only purpose of a performance and salary review at the end of the initial six month period was to re-assess his salary - particularly in light of the fact that he had commenced at only $56,000.00 per annum as opposed to the advertised $70,000.00 per annum - and not to consider the question of his continued employment. He said that he expected his salary to increase at the end of the six month period, if his performance had been satisfactory. Mr King also gave evidence about the conversations with the applicant prior to the commencement of his employment. He said that he and Mr Dudenhoeffer had an interview with the applicant in April 1994. In his evidence-in-chief, Mr King said (referring to the question of whether or not the applicant had been told that he was to be a probationary employee): "I said that there would be a period in which the successful applicant would have to satisfy the Board that he was capable of carrying out the tasks." He also gave evidence that he had said words to the applicant to the following effect: ".....that he would have to satisfy the Executive and Board as to his suitability and that a six month trial period was required for any successful applicant." In cross-examination, the following question was put to Mr King: "You did not tell Mr Harrison that he was on a six month trial to see if he was capable of satisfying the executive and that he was capable of carrying out the tasks of the job?" He answered: "You said 'six months'. I don't have a specific recollection of six months being said, but I do have a specific recollection of stating that there was a trial period during which he'd have to demonstrate that he was capable of performing the tasks." The contradiction between his assertion, in evidence-in-chief, that the applicant had been told "that a six month trial period was required for any successful applicant" and his disavowal, in cross-examination, of any recollection of a reference to a six month period was immediately apparent to me. Mr King was then shown exhibit "B" (the letter dated 2 June 1994 from Mr Dudenhoeffer to the applicant) and it was put to him that at the interview with the applicant the same terminology as in exhibit "B" was used. That is to say the phrase, "after a preliminary six month trial period from the date of your commencement we will conduct a performance and salary review" was used. Mr King answered: "No - I reject the terminology in that letter." Mr Dudenhoeffer also gave evidence about the interview with the applicant. He said: "Rob King said that the position would be a trial position, to allow the General Manger to feel his way into the job. Rob indicated that six months would be the appropriate time. I said that the previous General Manager had been on a six month trial period, and had resigned shortly after the end of that period. Mr King said at the end of the six month trial period, if the position is made permanent, the association will conduct a review of the performance to see if the association would increase the salary to a higher range. To see if you are comfortable in the position, and if we are comfortable with you." In reference to exhibit "B" (the letter of 2 June 1994) Mr Dudenhoeffer said that it was: ".....primarily the letter we'd used for other positions, including Malcolm's predecessor. It was first drafted in 1990." By this he meant that the letter to the applicant was a redraft of the letters, copies of which were held in the respondent's computer, to the applicant's predecessors. The significance of this is that it raises the possibility that the letter was not actually a reflection of anything that had been said at the interview with the applicant, but was simply a straight out copy of the terminology used in previous letters. If the letter had been a freshly created document, rather than a copy, this possibility would not have arisen. The events leading up to the termination of the applicant's employment, and Mr Dudenhoeffer's employment as General Manager of the respondent. Both Mr Dudenhoeffer and Mr King were extensively cross-examined as to their credit. This was not at all surprising, in view of the sharp conflict between the applicant and them on the question of whether or not he had been employed initially as a probationary employee. In particular, they were cross-examined about the events leading up to the termination of the applicants employment. In his evidence-in-chief, Mr Dudenhoeffer said that he resigned as the Honorary Secretary of the respondent on 11 November 1994, and that he had been General Manager since that date. In cross-examination, Mr Dudenhoeffer was shown a letter signed by Mr King, addressed to him, dated 6 December 1994. That letter became exhibit "J". The first paragraph of that letter reads as follows: "I am pleased to confirm your appointment to the position of General Manager and confirm your commencement date as 11 October 1994." Mr Dudenhoeffer, upon seeing that document, said that the date of 11 October 1994 was wrong, and re-stated that he had commenced as General Manager on 11 November 1994. It was then put to him that he knew, in September, that he was going to be the new General Manager. He emphatically denied that. He then said: "I resigned, effective 11 November 1994, by (as I recollect) letter of that date." It was then put to him that he had resigned by way of a letter dated in September. He denied that. He was then shown a letter dated 11 September 1994, addressed to Mr King, and signed by Mr Dudenhoeffer. That letter reads as follows: (RESPONDENT'S LETTERHEAD) 11 September 1994 Mr Rob King President Dear Rob Please accept my resignation from the position of Honorary Secretary and Board Member as of 11 September 1994. The regret that I feel in tendering my resignation is only tempered by the honour and excitement of being offered a senior appointment with the Association. There are many carry-over items that I am continuing to address in an honorary capacity in the interim and will await your advice as to the appropriate time and manner in which to advise members and others of my new circumstance. Yours sincerely (signed) Bill Dudenhoeffer The following exchange then occurred: "Q. How do you explain that letter? A. It's the wrong date - it should have been November. Q. You're lying. A. No, I'm not. Q. You and Mr King had made a secret agreement, some time in September, that you would be the new General Manager? A. I deny that." Mr Dudenhoeffer went on to say that the original of that letter would have been found with the September minutes of the Executive. When I asked him how that could be, if the correct date of the letter was 11 November, he corrected himself to say, "Sorry, I meant November". But that cannot be true. As was subsequently revealed, (following a subpoena served during the course of Mr Dudenhoeffer's evidence), the original of that letter of Mr Dudenhoeffer's is to be found, as part of Exhibit "Y", filed with the minutes of the meeting of the respondent's Executive which was held on 1 November 1994. It is therefore impossible that that letter could have been made on 11 November 1994. I note here that, at this stage of his evidence, Mr Dudenhoeffer was still insisting that the correct date of the letter was 11 November 1994, and that the correct date of his resignation from the position of Honorary Secretary was 11 November 1994. But that was to change. At the close of evidence on 29 March 1995, when Mr Dudenhoeffer was still under cross-examination, I granted leave for the short service of a subpoena on the respondent. That subpoena sought the production of, amongst other things, the original time and wages records of the respondent for the applicant and Mr Dudenhoeffer for 1994, and the original minutes of meetings of the Executive and Board of the respondent for September, October, November and December 1994, together with the originals of any documents produced to, or tabled at, those meetings. At the commencement of proceedings on 30 March 1995, those documents were produced. The time and wages book became exhibit "S". Mr Dudenhoeffer was shown the records relating to himself, which revealed that he had commenced being paid as General Manager on 11 October 1994, with a salary of $40,000.00 and $8,000.00 allowances. He then changed his evidence. He said that he was mistaken the day before regarding what he had said about the dates in exhibits "N" & "J". In respect of exhibit "J", he changed his evidence so that the reference in the letter to the commencement date of his employment as General Manager as being "11 October 1994" was now said by him to be correct. In respect of exhibit "N", he still asserted that the date at the top of the letter, and the date within the text of the letter (both dates being 11 September 1994) were wrong, but, instead of insisting that the dates should have been 11 November 1994 (as he had several times the day before), he now asserted that the correct date should have been 11 October 1994. The second paragraph of exhibit "N" reads: "The regret that I feel in tendering my resignation is only tempered by the honour and excitement of being offered a senior appointment with the association." Mr Dudenhoeffer was asked what he meant by that paragraph, and he answered: "This is a reference to a conversation in the second week of Malcolm Harrison's holidays, in which Mr King asked me if I would be willing to step into Malcolm Harrison's position." He went on to say: "I resigned as Honorary Secretary even though it was not clear that Malcolm Harrison's position was to be vacant." He then re-stated that the true date of exhibit "N" should have been 11 October 1994. The third paragraph of exhibit "N" reads as follows: "There are many carry-over items that I am continuing to address in an honorary capacity in the interim and will await your advice as to the appropriate time and manner in which to advise members and others of my new circumstance." In reference to that third paragraph Mr Dudenhoeffer was asked this question: Q. You knew before 11 October 1994 that Mr Harrison was to be dismissed? A. No. In my view, that third paragraph means that Mr Dudenhoeffer knew that there would be a gap in time between his resignation and the taking up of his duties as General Manager. If that is so, the letter must have been written before the employment of the applicant had been terminated - ie: before 11 October 1994. I note here that Mr King insisted that the dismissal of Mr Harrison was (on Mr King's initial version) discussed at a special meeting of the Executive in late September, or (on Mr King's subsequent version) at the meeting of the Executive on 4 October 1994. Mr King's evidence (whichever version one accepts - if any) and Mr Dudenhoeffer's evidence cannot stand together. It was then put to Mr Dudenhoeffer that the applicant's superannuation payments had been stopped on 6 October 1994. This was a reference to a form signed by Mrs Daphne Stimson, the Treasurer of the respondent association, and dated 6 October 1994. That form had to do with the superannuation fund, and was apparently sent by Mrs Stimson to Mercantile Mutual, which ran the respondent's superannuation fund. The form referred to both the applicant and Ms Magregor, an employee whose employment had finished on 30 September 1994. It was part of exhibit "H". On that form, in a column "date left service" the date in respect of Mr Harrison is written as "10/11/94". In my opinion, the fact that Mrs Stimson signed and dated this form on 6 October 1994, is convincing proof that the decision to terminate the employment of the applicant had been made on or before that date. Further in his cross-examination, Mr Dudenhoeffer said that Mr King had first approached him about taking over the position of General Manger in the first week of the applicant's holidays, probably late September. (The applicant went on holidays for three weeks, returning to work on 11 October 1994.) He went on to say that he had been informed by Mr King that he (Mr King) had spoken to the applicant on 11 October 1994 about his continued employment, and that he (Mr Dudenhoeffer) had prepared exhibit "N" after that conversation with Mr King. Mr King also gave evidence about these events. Mr King said that he came to the decision to terminate the employment of the applicant when the applicant was overseas. In his evidence-in-chief he said that he discussed that matter with the Executive (individually) in mid September. He specifically stated that he had discussed it with Mr Dudenhoeffer. Mr King went on to say: "Subsequently, in the third or fourth week of September, we had a special meeting of the Executive to discuss it and other problems." Mr King said that he spoke to Mr Dudenhoeffer about Mr Dudenhoeffer taking over the applicants position in the third of fourth week of September, "prior to the special Executive meeting". Mr King also said: "I did not want to put it to the Executive until I had a case to present to the Executive." He explained that, by this, he meant that he had a successor, or that there was a process in place to get a successor. He then said: "I got a successor - Mr Dudenhoeffer." Interestingly, Mr King was shown exhibit "N" (the letter from Mr Dudenhoeffer) and said that he had never seen it before. This is despite that fact that it was filed with the minutes of the Executive meeting of 1 November 1994 at which Mr King was present. Mr King was cross-examined. He said that the "special Executive meeting" to which he had made reference in his evidence-in-chief, had occurred in late September or early October, and that there was one topic, which was Mr Harrison's termination. He was then shown the original Executive minutes and attached documents (part of exhibit "Y") of 4 October 1994. He agreed (as is apparent on the face of the documents) that there was no mention of the termination of the applicant's employment. He said that there was a particular reason for this, and went on to say that "it was an attempt to hide it from the staff - an attempt to keep an element of dignity and secrecy for Mr Harrison." He stated that Mr Dudenhoeffer was present at that meeting. It is interesting to note that, although Mr King had referred to a "special Executive meeting" at which only "one topic" - Mr Harrison's termination - was discussed, there was a lot of other business discussed at the October meeting, which was apparently a normal meeting of the Executive. In reference to when Mr Dudenhoeffer was appointed as General Manager, Mr King said, "I would have thought that the meeting in November or December would have appointed Mr Dudenhoeffer." At the conclusion of cross-examination, in response to a question from myself, Mr King agreed that the October meeting was a normal meeting - not a special one. Mr King and Mr Dudenhoeffer gave evidence which cannot stand together. Both of them changed their evidence on several occasions in order to fit in with what became clear, during the course of the case, as objective facts, supported by documentary evidence. As a result, where their evidence conflicts with that of the applicant, I prefer the applicant's version. In saying this, I do not ignore exhibit "B", the letter of employment from Mr Dudenhoeffer to the applicant, dated 2 June 1994. In particular, I do not ignore the paragraph in that letter which reads: "After a preliminary six month trial period from the date of your commencement we will conduct a performance and salary review." In Nicolson -v- Heaven and Earth Gallery Pty Limited 126 ALR 233, Wilcox CJ, in reference to the approach that he would adopt on the facts of that particular case to resolve the question of whether or not the applicant had been informed that he was to be employed on probation, said, at 238: "It is not easy to resolve the conflict of evidence on the question whether there was a stipulated trial period. There was nothing about the demeanour of any witness that would cause me to reject his or her evidence. None of the witnesses gave self-contradictory evidence or changed his or her story under cross-examination. If I had had to determine whether or not there was an agreement for a trial period as a preliminary matter, without having the benefit of the other evidence in the case, I would have found this an impossible task. However, having that wide perspective, I think it probable that Mr Holt did specify a two month trial period. There are two reasons for my conclusion. The first is that I think the respondent's version of the sequence of conversations more likely than that of the applicant. the second is that I have doubts about Mr Nicolson's credit-worthiness, whereas I see no reason to doubt the truthfulness of Mr Holt and Mrs Naughton." At page 241 in the same case, his Honour said: "But evidentiary conflicts turning on different versions of conversations are notoriously difficult to resolve. With the best will in the world, the court may wrongly find against the employer's claim that there was an oral arrangement making the contract one to which reg 30B applied. By contrast, a contemporaneous letter, clearly specifying the terms of employment, would probably ensure the employer's success in defending the claim. Indeed, its mere existence may persuade the applicant not to bring, or persist with, the claim." On the facts of this case, both Mr Dudenhoeffer and Mr King gave "self contradictory evidence" , and each of them "changed his story in cross-examination." This leaves me to have doubts about their credit-worthiness as witnesses. I have no such doubts in respect of the applicant. I accept what the applicant says about what was said to him at the initial interview. In particular, I accept that there was no specific reference to any trial period in respect of whether or not he would be found suitable by the respondent association. Any reference to a trial period was only a reference to a reconsideration of the applicant's remuneration package, at the end of six months. I am reinforced in this finding by the complete absence of any reference to a trial period in the initial job advertisement, in the job description given to the applicant by Coopers & Lybrand and in the notes made by Ms White of Coopers & Lybrand at the first meeting with the applicant. I also take into account the fact that the applicant's starting remuneration package of a total of $56,000.00 per annum was substantially less than the $70,000.00 initially advertised. This makes it more likely that the purpose of the review was to consider the question of the applicant's salary package. For the above reasons, I find that the applicant was not employed on probation when he commenced his employment with the respondent, and is not a person to whom section 170CC and Regulation 30B of the Act applies. WAS THE TERMINATION OF THE APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT UNLAWFUL? Early in the course of the hearing of the matter, counsel for the respondent conceded that, if I were to find against the respondent on the question of whether or not the applicant had been a probationary employee, the termination of the applicant's employment would have been unlawful. I will not, therefore, canvas in the same detail as I otherwise would my reasons for finding that the termination of the applicant's employment was unlawful. I find that the termination of the applicant's employment was a breach of section 170DC and 170DE of the Act. The termination of the applicant's employment was a breach of section 170DC of the Act. The applicant was summarily dismissed. He was not given the opportunity to respond to the criticisms that the respondent had of him, and he was not put on notice that his employment was in jeopardy. It was in breach of 170DE of the Act, and deemed not to be for a valid reason, because the summary nature of the termination of his employment, and the failure of the respondent to put him on notice that his job was in jeopardy and to give the opportunity to respond to criticisms was "unjust", within the meaning of 170DE(2) of the Act. WHAT AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION SHOULD BE AWARD TO THE APPLICANT? The applicant was on a remuneration package of $56,000.00 per annum. He was unemployed from 12 November 1994 until 18 December 1994 - a total of 36 days. At the rate of $56,000.00 per annum, 36 days comes to $5,523.28. Counsel for the applicant argued that, as the applicant had entered into a car lease arrangement in order to acquire a car (which was required of him as a condition of his employment) he should be compensated in some way for the continuing lease payments. I do not agree with this. The applicant is paying off a car in the same way as anybody else. He is in the process of acquiring a substantial asset as a result of those payments. I therefore order that the respondent pay the sum of $5,523.28 to the applicant as compensation within 21 days of 31 March 1995. I certify that this and the preceding thirteen (13) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judicial Registrar Patch. Associate: Caroline Sternberg