Costa Hanziandonakis v Hair Restoration Centre Pty Ltd Katerina Gregory v Hair Restoration Centre Pty Ltd [1995] IRCA 220

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY VI 1155 of 1995 B E T W E E N : COSTA HANZIANDONAKIS Applicant AND HAIR RESTORATION CENTRE P/L Respondent & VI 1156 of 1995 KATERINA GREGORY Applicant AND HAIR RESTORATION CENTRE P/L Respondent Before: Judicial Registrar Millane Place: Melbourne Date: 15 & 16 May 1995 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT By an application made on 17 January 1995 Katerina Gregory (now known as Michael), the First Applicant, and Costa Hanziandonakis (the Second Applicant) seek compensation from the Respondent arising out of alleged breaches of Part VIA Division 3 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (the Act). The First and Second Applicants live in a de-facto relationship, the former being a hair technician and the latter working as a hair consultant. The Respondent operates a Hair Restoration Centre and employed both Applicants in its business until January 1995. The First Applicant's Contract of Employment The first Applicant was employed by the Respondent pursuant to a written contract (Exhibit R1) from 14 July 1994. That contract provided for:- a) a period of 12 months of service; b) an employment classification as a "Temporary" for hours "as required"; c) an express agreement that the First Applicant was not entitled to holiday leave or annual leave; d) payment of $15 per hour; and e) an express agreement that the First Applicant "can be laid off at any time with one week's notice, for whatever reason". The First Applicant's uncontested evidence is that for the 2 weeks preceding the contract referred to above, she worked for the Respondent for a trial period without pay. The concept of notice as provided for in paragraph e) above, is inconsistent with a contract of employment for a specified period. Therefore, the contract is not excluded for the purpose of Section 170CC of the Act from the operation of sub-divisions B, C, D and E of Division 3 of Part VIA of the Act. (See Regulation 30B(1)(a) and (3) and Cooper v Darwin Rugby League Inc (1994) 57 IR 238, and Anderson v Umbakumba Community Council 126 ALR 121). Because the right to terminate the contract was not conditional on any breach of contract, the period of the contract was indeterminate. Although the Respondent in its evidence repeatedly referred to the Applicant as a "casual" employee, it was never seriously contended by the Respondent that this Applicant was excluded from the benefits of the relevant divisions of the Act because she was a casual employee engaged for a short period (see Regulation 30B(1)(c)(3).) On the facts it is clear that the written contract allowed for a minimum period of 12 months temporary employment, subject to a period of one week's notice to terminate employment; thereby creating a continuing contract between the First Applicant and the Respondent, subject to a notice period given by the Respondent for "whatever reason". The evidence shows that:- i) the First Applicant worked regularly in the period up to Christmas 1994, increasing her hours in the months of November and December 1994 to exceed 30 hours per week; ii) she was required to obtain permission from the Respondent if she sought leave, and otherwise had a continuing obligation to attend for work; iii) there was a reasonable expectation that work would be available and that the contract was continuous and would continue beyond a 12 month period. Taking into account the abovementioned matters, it is arguable that the First Applicant's employment should be characterised as "part-time employment" (see Shop Assistants etc (Metropolitan) Award and Shop Assistants etc (Newcastle) Award 1951 AR 337). Alternatively, if the 2 week trial period is taken into account, the First Applicant satisfies the minimum requirements of Regulation 30B(1)(c) and (3) inasmuch she was engaged on a regular and systematic basis for a period of at least 6 months. On 28 December 1994 the First Applicant was granted a bonus of $150.00, having arranged time off from work until 3 January 1995. No provision was made for holiday pay. The Second Applicant's Contract of Employment There was no written contract of employment entered into between the Respondent and the Second Applicant. However, it was agreed at hearing that the Second Applicant had been employed by the Respondent from the beginning of July 1994 as a full-time Consultant with the responsibility of generally running the Respondent's business whilst he was answerable to and his work was overseen by Marcus Robert White (Marcus White) the son of the Directors of the Respondent company, Dr Barry White (Dr White) and Beverly Anne White (Mrs White). In his evidence Marcus White denied any financial interest in or Directorship of the Respondent company. Interestingly enough the Second Applicant's Employment Separation Certificate (Exhibit A4) is signed "Marcus White, Director". Whatever his true status was, it was never seriously contended that Marcus White did not have the authority to grant extended leave to both Applicants if so requested. The Second Applicant as at December 1994 received $700.00 gross per week, as well as a 10% commission calculated against the writings of the business each month less his gross weekly wage. Accordingly, the Respondent's wages book (Exhibit R3) shows commission payments as well as wages paid to the Second Applicant in the months of September and November 1994. The Respondent's wages book shows that the Second Applicant worked and was paid to 28 December 1994. Although it was agreed that he would take leave until 3 January 1995, he did not receive any holiday pay. It was not disputed at hearing that he was entitled to holiday pay, at least for the period for which he had permission to take leave. The Respondent offered no explanation for its failure to make this payment. In any event, the Second Applicant now seeks a further order from this court for payment of his holiday leave entitlement, which for the 6 months worked amounts to 2 weeks pay giving a total of $1,400.00. On the evidence available I am satisfied that such an order should be made irrespective of any question of unlawful termination. In his submissions to the court, counsel for the First Applicant raised for the first time the question of the payment of holiday leave entitlements to the First Applicant, if her employment was characterised as part-time employment. Given the written terms of employment, the hourly rate at which she was paid, and her uncertain status as either a part-time or casual employee, I am not satisfied that the First applicant demonstrated to the court a similar entitlement. The Facts It is not disputed that as at the Christmas shut-down of the Respondent's business the Applicants had been given permission to and were expected to resume their respective duties with the Respondent on Tuesday 3 January 1995. The Applicants contend that on about 31 December 1994 a number of attempts were made to ring the Brighton home and the Sorrento holiday home of Dr White to ask for an extension of their period of leave to 9 January 1995. They did not leave a message on Dr White's answering service because they wanted to discuss the leave arrangements directly. The First Applicant then rang Marcus White and left a message on his paging system, resulting in contact with him on 31 December 1994. During this call it is alleged that the Second Applicant was present, although he did not communicate directly with Marcus White. The First Applicant contends that the purpose of the call to Marcus White was to extend the holiday leave period for both Applicants to 9 January 1995, and apart from what was described as "chit chat" this was central to the discussion between her and Marcus White. The First Applicant alleges and, so far as her side of the telephone conversation is concerned she is corroborated by the Second Applicant, that during the call she told Marcus White that:- a) both Applicants were intending to go to Brisbane; b) she was unwell; c) they had had a "rotten" Christmas; d) she wanted to visit sick relatives in Brisbane; e) in response to a query from Marcus White she asked him to re-schedule any fittings she had in the relevant period and give her refusion appointments to another stylist, Catriona; f) in response to a further query from Marcus White about the Second Applicant's work in the extended period, by referring the Second Applicant's diary in front of her, she was able to tell Marcus White that the Second Applicant had no consultations in the following week and a half. The First Applicant alleges that Marcus White "said it was fine" and further that she advised him to ring them if there were any problems. The exhortation to ring was appropriate because the Applicants have an answering machine which they are able to contact directly to obtain any messages left on the machine. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the Respondent's witnesses were aware of the extent of this additional facility for making contact with the Applicants, even if they had left Melbourne. The expectation was that Marcus White would transmit the information given to him to Dr White and take steps to reschedule any appointments. The Second Applicant confirms that whilst engaged in the abovementioned telephone call the First Applicant had his diary in front of her, and at one stage asked him "Do you have any consultations in for that week?". His diary, which was not produced in court, was apparently clear of appointments for that period. The Applicants allege that having received Marcus White's permission to extend their leave, they did not as at first expected go to Brisbane because the First Applicant, who was by then some months pregnant, was unwell. As a result they remained at home during the relevant period, without receiving any telephone call or message from the Respondent retracting the permission given to continue their leave. Their first intimation that all was not well was when a letter from Dr White addressed to the Second Applicant and dated 5 January 1995 was received by the Applicants on 6 January 1995 (Exhibit A2). One other incident of significance occurred between the call on 31 December 1994 and the receipt of the abovementioned letter. That was a second telephone call, again by the First Applicant to Marcus White's home on the afternoon of 31 December 1994. The Applicants explained this further call by saying that after discussing the First Applicant's call to Marcus White it was decided that they should confirm the arrangement because, in effect, their experience of Marcus White had shown him to be unreliable - Marcus White "doesn't listen too well". They wanted to confirm the arrangements so that in the Second Applicant's words there would be "no mishaps". Marcus White concedes that he received the first phone call on 31 December 1994 from the First Applicant, and as a result he gave the First Applicant permission to remain on leave until 9 January 1995. Otherwise, he disputes a number of matters regarding that call. His recollection is that the First Applicant told him she wanted extra time off to visit a sick relative in Brisbane, and that she did not have "much" work booked in over the relevant period. Because in his view the First Applicant was a casual employee he did not "feel I had the right to say no, and I said sure you can go". He does say that if he had known of the number of fittings and refusions booked in the additional week he may not have given that permission. Nevertheless I am not satisfied on the evidence that there was a significant number of bookings or that these played a part in his decision. Marcus White, however, denies any mention of the Second Applicant's intention to also take the additional period of leave, or that there was any discussion of the Second Applicant's bookings, if any, for that period; much less permission given to him to extend his leave. There was no suggestion at hearing that Marcus White was not authorised to grant either Applicant additional time off, even though it was clear from Dr White's evidence and his actions once he realised that the two employees would not be returning to work before 9 January 1995 that he was more than a little aggrieved that they had not consulted him directly. Indeed, it would be fair to say that Dr White was in control of a number of hair businesses operating from the Respondent's premises even though his son was employed by the Respondent to oversee the general operation of the Respondent's business and look after the books. Mrs White, another Proprietor and Director of the Respondent company was also engaged in secretarial duties at the same premises but worked for a different business entity. The reasons given for the second call to Marcus White on 31 December 1994 are challenged by the Respondent who asserts that it was only during this call that a message was left notifying the Respondent the Second applicant would also be absent until 9 January 1995. The Applicants' describe it as a confirmatory call based primarily on their mistrust of Marcus White's ability to handle the situation. The First Applicant went so far as to suggest that because she was a "Virgo" she does "that sort of thing". Whatever the virtues or shortcomings she believes the stars endow her with, this is not an explanation the court could give any weight to. It is alleged by Marcus White that he was not at home when the second call was made to his home and a message was given by the Applicants to Sarah Jane Philmore (Philmore). Marcus White alleges that he was told by Philmore about the call at approximately 9.30pm on New Year's Eve and, on that occasion, informed for the first time that the Second Applicant was going to Queensland and would not be returning until 9 January 1995. However, the First Applicant had also told Philmore and this was not disputed by the Applicants that they would contact the Respondent on Tuesday 3 January 1995. This was the date upon the Respondent resumed its business operation in the New Year. Based on his belief that the Applicants had gone to Queensland and his ignorance of the extent of their answering service facility Marcus White did not attempt to contact the Applicants at home despite his concern about the Second Applicant's actions. Perhaps more importantly Marcus White did nothing to inform Dr White of the events nor did he take the steps one would expect a manager of the business to take and make arrangements to check and cover the business appointments for the additional week. At the time of the second call Philmore was the girlfriend of Marcus White's flat mate. She presented as a straightforward young woman. There is no reason to doubt her recollection of the events to which she deposed. She alleged that she took the First Applicant's message which she wrote down but subsequently disposed of. The message she received and passed on to Marcus White on New Year's Eve was that the Applicants' "were going to Queensland and would be back next week and would give a call next Tuesday regarding clients". The First Applicant also told Philmore that she was in a hurry because she was on the way to the airport and that she worked for Marcus White and the Second Applicant was her boyfriend. Philmore further recalled that on the same afternoon Marcus White had gone to his parent's home in Brighton to escape the summer heat. She told the First Applicant where Marcus White was and agreed to convey the message given. When Philmore relayed the contents of the message to Marcus White she recalls he "was very angry", swore and asked her to repeat the message. It is always difficult to reconcile conflicting evidence particularly when the evidence of a witness such as Philmore suggests that Marcus White was very much surprised by the contents of the second call, such behaviour being consistent with his claim to have no knowledge of the Second Applicant's plans for additional leave until Philmore conveyed the message she had taken. Nevertheless, other conflicting evidence emerged during the hearing suggesting that Marcus White and Dr White were not entirely consistent and truthful when giving their evidence. Accordingly, the evidence of the Applicants is to be preferred to that of Marcus White and Dr White. Marcus White represented the company in court and instructed the company's counsel from time to time. The Applicants' cases were not closed until the morning of the second day of the hearing. At the conclusion of his cross examination Marcus White at first denied discussing the evidence of the previous day with his father Dr White. Eventually he conceded that because he hadn't been warned he had told his father "some of the things" that had occurred in court "and the evidence of the Applicants". He also said that his mother Mrs White had heard some of the conversation with his father however he had not discussed any of the evidence or the case with Philmore following the first day of the hearing. Dr White, when asked the same questions denied any discussions at all of the evidence given during the period of the hearing. In contrast Philmore told the court that on the morning of her attendance at court Marcus White asked her what she was going to say and she informed him that "the message was all I knew". She believed that she was not reminded of anything by her discussions with Marcus White. It was contended by both Marcus White and Dr White that Marcus White informed his parents at about 9.00am on 3 January 1995 that the Applicants would not be attending work until 9 January 1995 because they had gone to Queensland. Mrs White was the last witness to give evidence and she too impressed as a straightforward witness. It was her evidence that her son did not convey the news of the Applicants' change of plans to her or her husband until either the evening of 3 January 1995 or the following morning at which stage the Respondent had resumed its business and had been required to make makeshift arrangements to deal with the fittings and refusions booked in for the First Applicant and any people attending to consult the Second Applicant, whether they were booked in or not. She expressed the belief that her son had been upset by what happened and had waited for the Applicants' promised telephone call, which call was never made, before he informed his parents. Mrs White told the court that her son had told them that the First Applicant had a sick child and he had said the Applicants "could go". It was Mrs White's evidence that her husband expected to be consulted for holiday leave and was very angry on receiving the news from his son. Dr White's evidence is that he was "ropeable". January was the business's busiest month, clients had been frustrated and disappointed and he had been required to shift a stylist from another business operation to cover for the First Applicant's appointments. The thrust of the evidence from both Marcus White and Dr White was that the First Applicant was a good employee however they had reason to be disgruntled with the way the Second Applicant handled staff (he was a "disaster") and clients, not to mention his lack of punctuality. Moreover according to Dr White the Second Applicant "would tell any lie to make a sale". Despite the Second Applicant's serious shortcomings in the eyes of Marcus White and Dr White it appears that his sales performance meant that the Respondent's "figures were up" and the Respondent was sufficiently grateful to reward the Applicants with a dinner out in about November 1994 and a night at the Hilton Hotel in December 1994, as well as have them as visitors to their Sorrento holiday home between Christmas and New Year. I conclude from his evidence that Dr White's business scruples were such that he was prepared to retain a consultant whom he knew lied to customers so long as he business returns were healthy. Even if there was some basis for being critical of the Second Applicant's work performance or conduct, which is not a conclusion I am able to draw from the evidence, it was never contended that the Second Applicant's employment was terminated for any other reason than his alleged abandonment of his employment in not attending for work on 3 January 1995. So far as the First Applicant was concerned it was denied that her employment was terminated by the Respondent; rather once her de-facto husband's employment was terminated she chose not to return to her employment. The Alleged Termination On making enquiries of the company's Accountant and the Department of Labour and Industry Mrs White was informed that the Applicants had abandoned their employment. The decision was then made to forward a letter (Exhibit A2) addressed only to the Second Respondent which she typed and her husband signed. The letter received by the Applicants on 6 January 1995 states:- "Dear Costa, I am extremely disappointed and upset that you and Caddy did not commence work on Tuesday, 3rd January as previously arranged. You knew where I was and my phone number and made no effort to contact me. Your actions have cost me loss of business and customer goodwill. We have a very busy operating schedule and appointments booked every day, including fittings, for the Hair Restoration Centre and could not afford to spare Catriona to cover Caddy's work. After consultation with our Accountant and the Department of Labour and Industry, who advise that this is regarded as 'abandonment of one's position', I wish to advise that your position with this Company is terminated. Please contact Marcus for your final cheques, group certificates and return of keys." On reading the letter both Applicants formed the view that the letter terminated their employment. Even though it was nominally directed to the Second Applicant the letter clearly complains about the First Applicant's failure to attend work on 3 January 1995 and refers to "final cheques" and "group certificates". It must also be kept in mind that Dr White was very put out by the Respondent's need to cover the First Applicant's appointments. Dr White denied any intention to terminate the First Applicant's employment or any words or acts to that effect following 3 January 1995. Somewhat inconsistently, Dr White agreed that he knew that because the Applicants worked together and lived in a de-facto relationship the First Applicant would not return to work once he terminated the Second Applicant's employment. He claimed to have telephoned the First Applicant on one occasion and to have heard a recorded message that the Applicants' telephone had been disconnected. Exhibit A1 is a letter from Telecom confirming that the Applicants' telephone service was connected during the relevant period. In any event Dr White told the court that he doubted "that I would have wanted her back because of her relationship with Costa" even though he would have preferred to have her back because of the difficulty in replacing her as a stylist. Other than the alleged telephone call to the First Applicant he made no further effort to communicate with her to discuss her return and this stance was maintained when she returned to the Respondent's premises after 7 January 1995 to collect the Applicants' belongings. It is the Applicants' evidence that after the receipt of the letter they left a number of urgent messages on Dr White's answering service and late on the evening of 6 January 1995 Dr White rang them at which time there was initially a three way conversation between both Applicants using different telephone extensions and Dr White. Dr White concedes that the Second Applicant's opening remarks were that there had been "a terrible mistake...a terrible misunderstanding". And at all times the Second Applicant maintained that Marcus White had given them permission to take the extra leave. He denied that the First Applicant participated in this conversation. When faced with the choice between his son's version of events and the Second Applicant's version he chose to accept the former's story. Both Applicants allege and it was not denied that Dr White swore and was extremely abusive during this telephone call. The First Applicant claims that she felt unwell and distressed and hung up and shortly afterwards the Second Applicant had to terminate his conversation with Dr White in order to take the First Applicant to hospital. She eventually suffered a miscarriage. It is alleged by the Applicants that during the call to Dr White on 6 January 1995 the First Applicant asked Dr White when he had found out about the holiday arrangements, to which he replied not until "fucking Tuesday". When the Second Applicant rang Dr White to tell him he was taking the First Applicant to hospital Dr White told him to speak to Marcus White on the next day. On the following day the Second Applicant spoke to Marcus White who, amongst other things, said he was led to believe that only the First Applicant was taking the extra time. The Second Applicant asked him to explain what had happened to his father and offered to ring on the following Monday. When he made this further call he was told by Marcus White that "the letter stands". This response was not denied by Marcus White neither was the response of Dr White whom the Second Applicant asked to speak to and, despite his offer to come in and explain what had occurred, was told "no I don't like these types of situations - the letter stands". When the First Applicant attended by arrangement to collect the Applicants' belongings and, she says, return her uniform she received an employment separation certificate and group certificate for the Second Applicant only. According to Dr White the decision to terminate the Second Applicant's employment had been made in discussions with his wife prior to sending the letter dated 5 January 1995. Whatever else this action on the part of the Directors amounted to it is clear that it was a breach of the provisions of Section 170 DC of the Act inasmuch as the Second Applicant was never given an opportunity to properly defend himself and properly explain his conduct. Dr White makes no mention of his son's neglect in not telling his parents or indeed, as a senior employee of the business, failing to take any steps to arrange for staff to cover any appointments on 3 January 1994. On any view of events Marcus White's omissions and their effect on the business operation would have to be considered mitigating factors to be considered in favour of the Second Applicant. So far as the Second Applicant is concerned on the evidence I find that the Respondent has not discharged the onus of proof in showing that it was more probable than not that the Second Applicant had by his conduct abandoned his employment and such conduct was serious misconduct allowing the Respondent to terminate his employment immediately, without any period of notice being given as is required by Section 170 DB of the Act. In the Second Applicant's case that minimum period is one week's wages of $700.00. Even if it is accepted that the Second Applicant's performance as an employee from time to time caused his employer sufficient concern for the employer to ask him to correct his behaviour the evidence suggests that the Respondent was fully prepared to accept the Second Applicant's flawed performance or conduct in circumstances where his presence in the business had improved its takings sufficiently for him to earn commission on top of wages and be otherwise rewarded by the Respondent. The Second Applicant's intention was to remain with the Respondent and build its business and there is no basis for saying that the Respondent had any plans for or reason to bring his employment to an end. Both Applicants moved from Brisbane to Melbourne to take their respective jobs with the Respondent. The Second Applicant deposed to efforts to find further employment which have not been successful as yet. He produced to the court verification (Exhibit A5) of a job search allowance paid to him since 3 February 1995 at the rate of $146.05 per week. The employment separation certificate (Exhibit A4) completed by Marcus White on 10 January 1995 states that the Second Applicant's net final payment including holiday leave was $1,230.00. The evidence at hearing was that no holiday pay was paid to the Second Applicant and Marcus White could give no explanation for this irregularity. Accordingly, apart from an order for damages pursuant to Section 170 DB in the sum of $700.00 and an order for payment of $1,400.00 for two weeks holiday leave entitlement I propose to make a further order for the payment of appropriate compensation to the Second Applicant totalling $10,000.00. In deciding to order the payment of compensation I have acceded to the Second Applicant's application not to be reinstated having determined that, because of the small size of the operation of the Respondent's family business and the close working relationships, it would be impracticable to do so. Whether or not Dr White and the Respondent thought they were terminating the First Applicant's employment as well as that of the Second Applicant's has to be judged in the light of the Respondent's conduct, its knowledge that the First Applicant would be deterred from returning because of the Respondent's actions against her de-facto husband and the Respondent's reluctance to have her back because of her relationship with the Second Applicant. The authorities in this court clearly point to termination at the initiative of the employer as being any act or acts purporting to bring the contract of employment to an end (see Siagon v Sanel, 122 ALR 333, APESMA and others v Skilled Engineering and others, 122 ALR 471 and Veljanoska v Lalor Child Centre VI 2901 of 1994 at page 7, Judicial Registrar Parkinson). On the evidence I am satisfied that, first the letter of 5 January 1995 whether it was intentionally so or not conveyed the message that the Respondent was disaffected by the First Applicant's absence and was terminating her employment. Even if the letter is viewed more favourably from the Respondent's point of view the Respondent took no significant steps after sending that letter to make direct arrangements with the First Applicant to return to work. Whether or not Dr White did make an abortive call to her home, and the letter from Telecom suggests this was unlikely, he agreed that because he was busy he did not take any other steps to indicate to her that she was welcome to return to her employment or indeed to ascertain directly from her whether she was returning or not. It is more probable than not that whilst he was inconvenienced by her absence it suited him to not have her return at all. The Respondent relies on the absence of any words or specific statement terminating her employment. Its actions or lack of action provide the basis for saying that this was a termination at its initiative and was certainly not a voluntary act on the part of the First Applicant who, along with the Second Applicant, was concerned to keep her job and explain to the Respondent what had occurred. The First Applicant was pregnant until she miscarried in January 1995 however there is no evidence to suggest that she was not intending to remain at her employment other than to reduce her commitment to 2 days per week in 1995. Since the termination of her employment the First Applicant has not been employed. She readily conceded that after her miscarriage she did not actively seek employment until March 1995 and when she was not successful in gaining employment on or about 26 March 1995, and after consultation with her family, she determined to establish her own business as she is clearly a skilled stylist. This business is to commence in the next couple of weeks. Since 3 February 1995 the Second Applicant has received a partner's allowance of $146.05 per week (see Exhibit A3). Because of her impending business venture the First Applicant has only applied for compensation and on this evidence I find that reinstatement would be impracticable. In the two months preceding the termination of her employment the First Applicant earned approximately $500.00 gross per week excluding the $150.00 bonus paid to her at Christmas. Her contract provided for one week's notice of termination and this was not given. Accordingly she is entitled to $500.00 representing the notice period together with appropriate compensation. Her counsel sought compensation only to the date of hearing and this together with other matters already mentioned have persuaded me that appropriate compensation is $2,500.00. MINUTES OF ORDERS THE COURT ORDERS: 1. That the Respondent pay to:- (a) the First Applicant compensation in the sum of $2,500.00; (b) the Second Applicant compensation in the sum of $10,000.00. 2. That the Respondent pay to:- (a) the First Applicant damages pursuant to s170 EE(5) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 in the sum of $500.00; (b) the Second Applicant damages pursuant to s170 EE(5) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 in the sum of $700.00. 3. That the Respondent pay to the Second Applicant the sum of $1,400.00. NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the Industrial Relations Court Rules. I certify that this and the preceding twenty-two (22) pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judicial Registrar Millane. Associate: Dated: Solicitors for the Applicant: Galbally & O'Bryan Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A McNabb Solicitors for the Respondent: Verna A Cook Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Jones Date of hearing: 15 & 16 May 1995 Date of judgment: 24 May 1995