DAVID-JON ROY DAWN - v - PREMIER REAL ESTATE [1996] IRCA 12

DECISION NO: 12/96 C A T C H W O R D S INDUSTRIAL LAW - UNLAWFUL TERMINATION - whether TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT at the initiative of employer - whether extension of TIME required for filing of APPLICATION - whether applicant terminated during period of PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT - claim for commission in accrued JURISDICTION - COSTS claim when principal claim dismissed. Industrial Relations Act 1988 ss. 170EA, 170EE, 347 and 418 Industrial Relations Regulations Regulation 30B CASES: Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Limited, (Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia, 28 November 1995). DAVID-JON ROY DAWN - v - PREMIER REAL ESTATE No. VI 5118 of 1995 Before:Judicial Registrar Murphy Place: Melbourne Date: 17 January 1996.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY VI 5118 of 1995 B E T W E E N : DAVID-JON ROY DAWN Applicant AND PREMIER REAL ESTATE Respondent MINUTES OF ORDERS Judicial Registrar Murphy 17 January 1996 THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The application for a remedy under Division 3 of Part VIA of the Act is dismissed. 2. The respondent is to pay the applicant the sum of $385 within 21 days. 3. The respondent's application for costs is dismissed. NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the Industrial Relations Court Rules. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY VI 95/5118 of 1995 B E T W E E N : DAVID-JON ROY DAWN Applicant PREMIER REAL ESTATE Respondent Before:Judicial Registrar Murphy Place: Melbourne Date: 17 January 1996 EX-TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT In these proceedings under Part VIA of the Industrial Relations Act ("the Act") the applicant seeks a remedy arising out of the alleged termination, on 26 July 1995, of his employment on as a sales representative with the respondent. It was the applicant's case that he had been unlawfully terminated from his employment when he was forced to leave the employment he had held for some 10 days. The respondent denied that it had ever terminated the applicant's employment. It further alleged that the applicant was out of time to make his application pursuant to section 170EA(3) of the Act. The respondent also alleged that if the applicant was granted an extension of time the applicant was in any event excluded from the jurisdiction as he was on probation pursuant to Regulation 30B of the Industrial Relations Regulations ("the Regulations").