In the matter of an Application by Kevin Maher under Section 218 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 in relation to elections in National Construction Branch of the Australian Workers' Union [1997] FCA 1622

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JUDGMENT No. Lima Zu

IN_THE INDUSTRIAI, RELATIONS COURT )

QF AUSTRALIA ) No. VI 2339 of 1996 VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY )

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY KEVIN MAHER UNDER SECTION 218 OF THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 1996 IN RELATION TO ELECTIONS IN NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION BRANCH OF THE AUSTRALIAN WORKERS' UNION

Coram: Ryan J - Date: 5S May 1997 ' Place: Melbourne REASONS FOR JUDGMENT RYAN_J: This inquiry concerns an election to fill a casual

vacancy or casual vacancies, the term of which will expire on _30 June this year. Nominations for elections to fill the same and other offices for the full term of four years to commence on 1 July 1997 closed on $3 April 1997. There is evidence that for most, if not all, of those offices, including those held by persons whose elections to fill casual vacancies in them have been challenged, there are not sufficient nominations to

require the returning officer to conduct a ballot.

The basis of the present inquiry went to the constitution of the rolls of voters used in the election to fill the casual vacancies. Irregularities were said to have occurred in the failure to transfer members from other Branches of the Union to the National Construction Branch ("the NCB") in accordance

with Rule 36(n). As well, it was asserted that certain members

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-~2- of other Branches who were not eligible for membership of the

NCB and some fifty-two other persons who are not financial members of the Union had been included on the NCB roll for the

election to £111 the casual vacancies,

Finally, it was asserted that other persons who had validly become members of the NCB had not been included on the roll. In these circumstances, having regard to the very short time which will elapse during which the casual Vacancies will continue to be filled, I consider it a proper exercise of the Court's discretion to terminate the inquiry pursuant to Ss, 223(5). However, because of the prima facie force of the evidence on which the applicant relied, which has not so far been the subject of a complete challenge in these proceedings and which was sufficient to persuade a Judge of this Court to institute the inquiry, I consider it appropriate to certify pursuant to s. 343 that the applicant acted reasonably in