SUPREME COURT OF NORFOLK ISLAND Menghetti v Official Trustee Under The Provident Act 1958 (NI) [2006] NFSC 12 EMPLOYMENT LAW — appellant employed by Administration of Norfolk Island under series of separate contracts of employment — appellant's entitlement upon resignation or retirement to payments under Provident Account Act 1958 (NI) dependent upon "period of continuous service" — whether separate contracts of employment preclude finding of "continuous service" WORDS AND PHRASES — "continuous service" Provident Account Act 1958 (NI) ss 10, 14 Public Sector Management Act 2000 (NI) Public Service Act 1979 (NI) Public Service Ordinance 1941 (NI) Bell v Gillen Motors Pty Limited (1989) 24 FCR 77 followed Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 followed F W Hercus Pty Ltd v Sutton (1994) 51 IR 475 followed Jackson v Larrakia Nation Aboriginal Corporation (unreported, PR952967, 5 November 2004) referred to Printing and Kindred Industries Union of Employees, Queensland Branch v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1992) 49 IR 58 cited Reidel Investigation Services Pty Ltd v Wall (unreported, I49/1992, 5 May 1992) followed Stewart v Port Noarlunga Hotel Ltd (1980) AILR ¶289 followed PAUL ANTHONY MENGHETTI v OFFICIAL TRUSTEE UNDER THE PROVIDENT ACT 1958 (NI) and ADMINISTRATION OF NORFOLK ISLAND SC10 OF 2006 WEINBERG CJ 21 DECEMBER 2006 MELBOURNE IN THE supreme court of norfolk island SC10 OF 2006 BETWEEN: PAUL ANTHONY MENGHETTI Appellant AND: OFFICAL TRUSTEE UNDER THE PROVIDENT ACCOUNT ACT 1958 (NI) First Respondent ADMINISTRATION OF NORFOLK ISLAND Second Respondent JUDGE: WEINBERG cJ DATE OF ORDER: 21 DECEMBER 2006 WHERE MADE: MELBOURNE THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. The appeal be allowed. 2. The order of the Court of Petty Sessions dismissing the appellant's plaint in matter CS17 of 2006 be set aside. 3. In lieu thereof there be judgment in favour of the appellant against the second respondent in the sum of $6,885.55 together with any applicable amount of interest. IN THE supreme court of norfolk island SC10 OF 2006 BETWEEN: PAUL ANTHONY MENGHETTI Appellant AND: OFFICAL TRUSTEE UNDER THE PROVIDENT ACCOUNT ACT 1958 (NI) First Respondent ADMINISTRATION OF NORFOLK ISLAND Second Respondent JUDGE: WEINBERG cJ DATE: 21 DECEMBER 2006 PLACE: MELBOURNE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Petty Sessions ("the court below"). The court below dismissed a plaint brought by Mr Menghetti, the appellant, that alleged that the respondents were indebted to him in the sum of $6,885.55 for payments owing to him under the Provident Account Act 1958 (NI) upon his resignation. Both before this Court and the court below, the parties agreed that the matter would proceed by way of written submissions. Mr Menghetti's employment history 2 It is necessary for the purposes of this appeal to set out Mr Menghetti's employment history in some detail. 3 According to the statement of agreed facts filed in the court below, Mr Menghetti is a resident of Norfolk Island who was employed by the Administration of Norfolk Island, the second respondent, from 24 February 1970 until 10 February 2006. 4 The particulars of his employment set out in the statement of agreed facts, are as follows: Date Employment Event Legislation 24.02.70 Commenced as junior assistant mechanic Public Service Ordinance 1941 (NI) 12.3.70 Transferred from Australian apprenticeship to the Administration Public Service Ordinance 1941 (NI) Sept 1972 Commenced as contributor to the Provident Account Provident Account Act 1958 (NI) 01.4.76 Promoted to Qualified Tradesman FT79 Public Service Ordinance 1941 (NI) 19.7.78 Abolition of all offices Public Service Act 1976 (NI) 01.9.79 Appointment to new offices Public Service Act 1976 (NI) 06.10.80 Promoted to Foreman Mechanic FT78 Public Service Act 1979 (NI) 27.9.95 Resignation as an officer under s 19 effective 20.9.95 Public Service Act 1979 (NI) 02.10.95 Plaintiff received amount equal to his contributor's A and contributor's B entitlements Provident Account Act 1958 (NI) 27.9.95 Appointed as an employee under s 20 effective 21.9.95 3 years to 20.9.98 Pursuant to contract paid gratuity in lieu of superannuation Public Service Act 1979 (NI) 15.10.98 Appointed as an employee under s 20 effective 21.9.98 to 20.9.99 Pursuant to contract paid gratuity in lieu of superannuation Public Service Act 1979 (NI) 16.6.00 Appointed as an employee under s 20 effective 21.9.99 to 20.9.02 Pursuant to contract paid gratuity in lieu of superannuation Public Service Act 1979 (NI) 3.12.02 Employed 21.9.02 to 20.3.03 Pursuant to contract paid gratuity in lieu of superannuation Public Sector Management Act 2000 (NI) 21.3.03 Appointment as permanent employee effective. Commencement as contributor to Provident Account effective. [Notified by internal memorandum dated 3.6.03] Public Sector Management Act 2000 (NI) Provident Account Act 1958 (NI) 10.2.06 Resignation as employee Public Sector Management Act 2000 (NI) 18.4.06 Mr Menghetti received $4,303.47 being an amount equal to his contributor's A account Provident Account Act 1958 (NI) 5 There is no explanation in the statement of agreed facts as to what took place in the period from 19 July 1978 until 1 September 1979 when all offices were said to be "abolished". However, having regard to the preface to the statement that Mr Menghetti "was employed by the second defendant from 24 February 1970 until 10 February 2006", I proceed upon the assumption that there was no discontinuity of employment during the earlier period. 6 The statement of agreed facts also explains that the Official Trustee under the Provident Account Act ("Official Trustee"), the first respondent, has not paid Mr Menghetti an amount equal to his "contributor's B account" under that Act. Funds equal to the credit of Mr Menghetti's "contributor's B account" have, however, been paid by the Official Trustee to the Administration. The legislative scheme 7 The Provident Account Act is stated to be: "An Act to make provision for the payment of benefits on the retirement of officers employed by the Administration of Norfolk Island, and for purposes connected therewith". 8 The Act defines an "eligible employee" as: "each employee (as defined in section 4 of the Public Sector Management Act 2000) — (a) that is engaged for an unspecified period; or (b) that is engaged for a specified period of not less than 4 years and, at the commencement of that engagement had been continuously employed as such an employee for not less than two years". 9 The Public Sector Management Act 2000 (NI) in turn defines "employee" as "a person appointed to the public service". 10 Section 3 of the Provident Account Act defines a "contributor's A account" as the account kept pursuant to subsection 11(1). That subsection provides: "A separate account shall be kept, in relation to each contributor, of the moneys in the Provident Account representing the contributions of that contributor." 11 The "contributor's B account" is then defined as the account kept pursuant to subsection 11(2), which provides: "A separate account shall be kept, in relation to each contributor, of the moneys in the Provident Account representing the contributions of the Administration in respect of that contributor." 12 Sections 8 and 9 require "eligible employees" to contribute to the Provident Account. They are in the following terms: "Contributors to the Provident Account 8. (1) Subject to this Act, an eligible employee must contribute to the Provident Account on each pay day. (2) The executive member may, by instrument in writing, exempt from the provisions of subsection 8(1) an eligible employee who has applied in writing to the Official Trustee to be so exempted. (3) A person — (a) who has a vested or contingent right to a pension, superannuation allowance or gratuity under a law of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory relating to the payment of superannuation benefits; or (b) who has been paid a gratuity under any such law, shall not be required or permitted to contribute to the Provident Account. (4) A refund of — (a) the contributions paid under any such law; or (b) those contributions together with interest on those contributions, shall, for the purposes of subsection 8(3), be deemed not to be a gratuity. Payment of contributions by eligible employees 9. (1) An eligible employee must, in respect of a pay day, contribute to the Provident Account an amount equal to 5% of the base salary payable to that employee at the date of that pay day. (2) A contribution referred to in subsection 9(1) may be deducted from the employee's salary. (3) An employee — (a) on leave without pay; (b) on leave at less than full pay, is eligible, but not liable, to contribute to the Provident Account in respect of a pay day during that period an amount not greater than 5% of the base salary payable to that employee at the date of that pay day." 13 Section 10 determines the amount to be paid by the Administration, and is in the following terms: "(1) The Administration must, in respect of each pay day of an eligible employee, contribute to the Provident Account — (a) if the period of continuous service of the eligible employee does not exceed 12 years —100%; or (b) if the period of continuous service of the eligible employee exceeds 12 years but does not exceed 18 years — 130%; or (c) if the period of continuous service of the eligible employee exceeds 18 years —160%, of the amount contributed by the eligible employee in respect of that pay day. (2) A contribution must be paid by the Administration within 30 days of the pay day in respect of which it is payable. (3) Subsection 10(1) does not apply in respect of an amount contributed by an employee under subsection 9(3)." (Emphasis added) 14 Section 14 sets out payments to be made on a person's retirement or resignation: "(1) Subject to this Act, where a contributor retires, is retired or resigns before he has completed 6 years service, an amount equal to the amount standing to the credit of the contributor's A account is payable to the contributor. (1A) For the purposes of subsection 14(1), a person will not be taken to retire, be retired or resign if, at the time of that retirement or resignation, there is an agreement in place for the re-employment of that person. (2) Where a contributor retires, is retired or resigns before he has completed 6 years service and the executive member is satisfied that he retired, was retired or resigned — (a) on the ground that by reason of physical or mental infirmity he was unable to discharge or incapable of discharging the duties of his office efficiently; or (b) by reason of the invalidity of a dependant who habitually resided with him on Norfolk Island, an amount equal to the amount standing to the credit of the contributor's A account is payable to the contributor and, with the approval of the executive member, such further amount as the Official Trustee determines, being an amount not greater than the amount standing to the credit of the contributor's B account, is also payable to the contributor. (3) Subject to this Act, where a contributor retires, is retired or resigns on or after completing 6 years service, an amount equal to the sum of the amounts standing to the credit of the contributor's A account and the contributor's B account is payable to the contributor. . . . . (5) In this section, "service" means service after 1 March 1941." 15 "Service" is defined in s 3 to mean "continuous service". Accordingly, subsection 5 must be read as defining "service" for the purposes of s 14 as continuous service after 1 March 1941. The court below 16 Mr Menghetti claimed before the court below that following his resignation on 10 February 2006 he was entitled to receive the amounts in his "contributor's A account", being the $4303.47 already paid to him, plus an amount of $6,885.55 being 160% of his contribution. The latter figure representing what he submitted should have been retained in his "contributor's B account" in the period from 21 March 2003 until 10 February 2006. 17 The court below rejected this submission. In its very brief reasons it stated: "Mr. Menghetti ceased to be an eligible employee when he resigned. He did not acquire eligible employee status again until 23rd [sic] March 2003. During the three periods he was a contracted worker for the Administration, he received a loading on his salary to compensate for his not being allowed to contribute to the Provident Fund. It would be against the scheme of the legislation for the applicant to accrue time for Provident Fund purposes and at the same time receive a gratuity. Indeed it would be a form of "double dipping". The finding of this Bench is that When Mr. Menghetti resigned initially as an employee of the Administration his employment with the Administration terminated. When each of the contract periods expired his employment with [the] Administration ceased each time. Thus there was no continuity of employment. Mr. Menghetti therefore was not continuously employed for over eighteen years. At his last resignation Mr. Menghetti had worked continuously for the Administration between 23rd March 2003 and 10 February 2006, a period that does not qualify for any payment from the Provident Fund other than his own contributions." Mr Menghetti's submissions 18 Mr Menghetti submits that the court below was in error in so holding. 19 He submits that there is no "double dipping" because he is not claiming any contributions for service prior to his appointment as a permanent employee in March 2003. Instead, he is claiming contributions that the Administration should have made to the "contributor's B account" pursuant to ss 10 and 14 of the Provident Account Act as and from the date when gratuity payments ceased to be paid to him, in March 2003, until 10 February 2006, the date of his resignation. 20 Mr Menghetti submits that "continuous service" in the relevant sections refers to the "period of the employment relationship between an employee and the Administration whether pursuant to one or more separate contracts". He contends that the term does not require "continuous service as an eligible employee", "continuous services under one contract or appointment as an eligible employee", or "continuous contribution". Rather s 10(1)(c) speaks of the "period of continuous service of the eligible employee". He says that the normal meaning of the term should be used and places reliance on Reidel Investigation Services Pty Ltd v Wall (unreported, I49/1992, 5 May 1992), a judgment of the Full Court of the Industrial Court of South Australia, where it was said: "The word 'service' is, as a matter of ordinary language, apt to describe the nature of the relationship between two persons, i.e. of employee and employer. The words 'continuous service' are as a matter of ordinary language appropriate to cover the period of that relationship, whether pursuant to one or two separate contracts. … In our view there is nothing incongruous about treating the period of service with a single employer as one continuous period of service, where an employer and employee have entered into a whole succession of new contracts, whether upon promotion or demotion. In ordinary speech one would regard the service with the employer in those circumstances as continuous." 21 Mr Menghetti further submits that having been "continuously employed by the Administration" since February 1970, he is entitled to contributions at a rate of 160% pursuant to s 10(1)(c) of the Provident Account Act. He contends that this would be consistent with the purpose and objects of the Act, which he says is "beneficial in nature". The respondents' submissions 22 The respondents' written submissions set out in detail what they contend is the correct manner in which Mr Menghetti's employment history should be analysed. 23 In their analysis, the respondents seek to rely upon the distinction drawn in the Public Service Ordinance 1941 (NI), and its successors, between "officers" and "employees". That distinction has a long history in employment law. See, for example, the discussion in G J McCarry, Public Sector Employment Law (1988) 11-22. It is therefore worthwhile to set out the legislative schemes and distinctions upon which they rely as they become relevant. 24 The respondents submit that Mr Menghetti was an "officer" of the public service pursuant to the Public Service Ordinance 1941 when he resigned with effect from 20 September 1995. An "officer" was defined in that Ordinance as "any person permanently employed in the Public Service other than as a part-time employee or for a period of time specified in the instrument of appointment". An "employee" was then any person employed in the Public Service other than an "officer". 25 The 1941 Ordinance, along with the Public Service Ordinance 1976 (NI)and the Public Service (Amendment) Ordinance 1976 (NI), was repealed by the Public Service Act 1979 (NI). However, a distinction between "employees" and "officers" was maintained. The 1979 Act defined an "employee" as a person engaged under s 20 (which was concerned with temporary employees), or under a corresponding provision of the repealed Ordinances. An "officer" was a person appointed under s 19 of the Act, or under a corresponding provision of the repealed Ordinances. Section 19, in turn, detailed the process by which the Public Service Board of Norfolk Island made appointments to "offices" in the Public Service. 26 Section 4 of the Public Service Act 1979 set out the transitional provisions. It provided that all offices and appointments made under the repealed Ordinances, and in existence immediately before the commencement of the Public Service Act 1979, continued as if they had been created under the 1979 Act. 27 The respondents submit that following his resignation on 20 September 1995, Mr Menghetti was engaged pursuant to four separate contracts. The first being effective from 20 September 1995 until 20 or 21 September 1998, and pursuant to which Mr Menghetti was engaged as an "employee" under s 20 of the Public Service Act 1979. The second contract, pursuant to which Mr Menghetti was engaged for 12 months, again as an "employee" under s 20, was entered into on 15 October 1998, but backdated to have effect from 21 September 1998. The third contract was backdated to have effect from 21 September 1999 and approved the engagement of Mr Menghetti for three years as an "employee" under s 20. 28 During the period of the third contract, the Public Sector Management Act 2000 (NI) came into force and repealed the Public Service Act 1979. The distinction previously drawn between "officer" and "employee" was abolished and replaced by the new definition of "employee", discussed at [9] above. The transitional provisions of the Public Sector Management Act 2000 stated that each person who was an officer or employee under the old Act, at the time of commencement, would become an "employee" subject to the new Act. 29 When the third contract expired, the respondents submit that Mr Menghetti was engaged for "temporary" employment under a fourth contract that commenced on 21 September 2002 and concluded on 20 March 2003. 30 According to the respondents' submissions, all four contracts contained the following term: "Gratuity in Lieu of Superannuation The employee shall receive a gratuity in lieu of superannuation and long service leave. The amount of the gratuity shall be 6.5% of the actual salary payable at the end of each completed year or, if termination is prior to the completion of a full year, then on a pro rata basis for that incomplete period calculated in completed months." 31 The respondents contend that the reference to "superannuation" in this term is a reference to entitlements under the Provident Account Act and not some other form of superannuation. According to the respondents' written submissions, Norfolk Island does not have, and never has had, a superannuation scheme in place for public servants. 32 Mr Menghetti received payment of the "gratuity" when each of the first three contracts expired. The respondents submit that because he was engaged under each of those contracts as an "employee" and not an "officer", Mr Menghetti was not obliged or permitted to contribute to the Provident Account and was not entitled to receive any benefit. 33 According to the respondents, Mr Menghetti also received payment of a gratuity at the expiration of the fourth contract. They acknowledge that at the time of that contract s 14(1A) of the Provident Account Act had come into force. However, they contend that there was no agreement in place for Mr Menghetti's re-employment in any capacity and thus no question arises as to whether, at the conclusion of the fourth contract, he could be taken to have retired. They submit that even if that was a possibility, the fourth contract was only entered into for a period of six months and even if that period could be added to the subsequent service as a permanent employee the total period was still less than six years and thus precluded payment of any amounts held in the "contributor's B account". 34 In summary, the respondents contend that during the periods of each of the four contracts, Mr Menghetti: · was at no relevant time an "officer"; · did not at any time between 27 September 1995 and 16 June 2000 (the date they say the relevant provisions of the Public Sector Management Act commenced) enjoy what the respondents describe as "continuous service as an officer"; · after 16 June 2000 until the conclusion of the third contract, did not change his status by reason of the transitional provisions of the Public Sector Management Act; · during the term of the fourth contract was a temporary employee only; · was not at any relevant time a contributor entitled to contribute to the Provident Account; · did not make, was not entitled to make, or permitted to make, contributions to the Provident Account; · was contractually entitled to be paid, and was indeed paid, a gratuity in lieu of superannuation; and · was not entitled to have any period of the four contracts counted as service because at no time during that period was he a "contributor", an "officer" or an "eligible employee" and it is only if he was one of those things and continually qualified that his "period of service" could be treated as entitling him to receive the amounts held in the "contributor's B account". 35 The respondents submit that the Provident Account Act does not entitle persons to receive benefits on the basis of having continuous service of any kind. Instead they submit that the Act requires that the service be by what they describe as a "qualifying person". This in turn requires the person to have undertaken continuous service as an "officer" and could not, by definition, be a person employed under a contract for a specific term. 36 In relation to s 14(3) of the Provident Account Act, the respondents contend that itonly entitles payment of any amounts held in the "contributor's B account" to a contributor who retires, is retired or resigns on or after completing six years service whereas Mr Menghetti was only a contributor for three years. They contend that if Mr Menghetti's submissions are correct, he would be entitled to payments for the period from September 1995 and not simply a payment for the final period of his employment. 37 The respondents further say that the decision in Reidel, and the Australian Industrial Relations Commission decision of Jackson v Larrakia Nation Aboriginal Corporation (unreported, PR952967, 5 November 2004), is of no assistance to Mr Menghetti. In their submission this is because a distinction should be drawn between ordinary language and the special language of the statute. In that regard they repeat their assertion that the statute requires continuous service as an officer. 38 Finally, the respondents submit that Mr Menghetti's claim could properly be described as "attempted double dipping". In their submission, by seeking to assert a right to be paid amounts held in the "contributor's B account" on the basis of a period of employment when he was paid gratuities in lieu, Mr Menghetti's claim is "unconscionable" and "not justified by anything in the legislation". Consideration 39 Whether Mr Menghetti is entitled to any amounts held in a "contributor's B account", depends solely upon the provisions of the Provident Account Act. It is worth noting that the terms of that Act have not been changed since before Mr Menghetti was employed as a permanent employee on 21 March 2003. This is also true of the relevant provisions of the Public Sector Management Act 2000 (NI). 40 It is clear from the statutory definitions outlined above that in the period relevant to this appeal, namely 21 March 2003 until 10 February 2006, Mr Menghetti was an "eligible employee" for the purposes of the Provident Account Act. He was appointed to the public service and was therefore an "employee" as defined in s 4 of the Act. As he was employed on a permanent basis, he also satisfies the requirement of being "engaged for an unspecified period". 41 The central issue to this appeal is therefore, in light of his history of employment, for what period of time Mr Menghetti was engaged in the "continuous service" of the Administration for the purposes of ss 10 and 14 of the Provident Account Act. 42 The respondents submit that this issue must be resolved by examining each separate contract of employment entered into by Mr Menghetti and the Administration. They have also made submissions based on whether Mr Menghetti was employed at any one time as an "officer" or an "employee" pursuant to the various statutory schemes that have applied since 1970. In their submission that analysis demonstrates that Mr Menghetti's only "period of continuous service" was from 21 March 2003 until 10 February 2006. 43 In my opinion the respondents' submissions must be rejected. 44 Mr Menghetti was employed by the Administration from 24 February 1970 until 20 September 1995. As outlined above, on 21 September 1995, he was engaged by the Administration pursuant to the first of four contracts. Each of those contracts commenced the day after the previous contract expired, and in the case of the first, the day after Mr Menghetti's initial resignation took effect. The fourth contract expired on 20 March 2003 and the following day Mr Menghetti was appointed a permanent employee. He continued as such until his resignation on 10 February 2006. 45 The employment history therefore shows that although Mr Menghetti acted in different roles and pursuant to different agreements, there was not a single day in the period from 24 February 1970 until 10 February 2006 when he was not engaged by the Administration as either an officer or an employee. 46 Contrary to the respondents' submissions, the Provident Account Act does not accord a "specific meaning" to the term "continuous service". Further, the term "service" is simply defined as "continuous service". The Act does not require "continuous service as an officer". Nor does it require an "eligible employee" to have been engaged pursuant to a continuous contract of service, or continuously employed in any particular capacity. If the legislature had intended the Act, and particularly ss 10 and 14, to operate in such a narrow and specific manner, it could easily have done so through express wording. Instead, it chose the expression "continuous service", in s 10(1)(c), within the context of the broader expression "the period of continuous service of the eligible employee". 47 In my view, Mr Menghetti has correctly submitted that the term "continuous service" should be construed according to its ordinary meaning. He based that submission on the reasoning in Reidel, which was extracted above. That reasoning is, in turn, consistent with other judicial consideration of the expression "continuous service". 48 In Bell v Gillen Motors Pty Limited (1989) 24 FCR 77 Wilcox J considered the meaning of "period of continuous service". His Honour held that, in the context of the Vehicle Industry — Repair, Services and Retail — Award 1983, there was no ambiguity created by the use of the term "service". As a matter of ordinary English, the relevant sub-clause required "account to be taken of the whole period of continuous service: both the period of apprenticeship and the period of service thereafter". His Honour stated (at 83): "However, whatever may be the position in relation to the termination of an apprenticeship during the course thereof, it does not follow that a past period of apprenticeship should be disregarded for the purpose of computing the "period of continuous service" of a person who has served as an apprentice and then continued in the service of the ex-master as a qualified tradesman. The award, except for those parts of it which relate to the rights and duties of apprentices and masters during the period of apprenticeship, governs the rights and duties of all employees, including ex-apprentices. In the present case, as is common ground, cl 6(d)(i)(1) applied to the relationship between Mr Simpson and Gillen Motors. The question is, in its application, what did cl 6(d)(i)(1) mean by the words "period of continuous service"? As a matter of ordinary English the noun "service" is apt to describe the relationship of an apprentice to a master." 49 In F W Hercus Pty Ltd v Sutton (1994) 51 IR 475, Von Doussa J agreed with Wilcox J's reasoning in Belland held it was applicable to the equivalent provisions of the Metal Industry Award 1984. 50 In the context of long service leave entitlements set out in the Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Cth) it has been held that "continuous service" does not require full-time continuous service. Nor does it require a continuous contract of service or a single unbroken contract. 51 Of particular relevance is the judgment of Olsson J, then President of the Industrial Court, in Stewart v Port Noarlunga Hotel Ltd (1980) AILR ¶289. In that case, his Honour said: "(1) That there is no compelling reason for applying to the Act a limited construction restricting eligibility for long service leave only to a person employed by an employer under a single ongoing contract of service. (2) That having regard to the terminology of the sections of the Act the emphasis is essentially upon continuous service and not upon the continuance of a single unbroken contract." (Emphasis added) 52 This reasoning was subsequently followed by the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission in Printing and Kindred Industries Union of Employees, Queensland Branch v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1992) 49 IR 58. 53 In my view, according to its ordinary meaning, the word "service" is apt to describe the engagement of Mr Menghetti by the Administration for the entire period from 24 February 1970 until 10 February 2006. As his employment history demonstrates, it is clear that that service was "continuous". Accordingly, upon his resignation on 10 February 2006 Mr Menghetti was entitled to be paid the amounts held in his "contributor's B account". Pursuant to s 10(1)(c) the amounts that should have been contributed to that account were 160% of Mr Menghetti's contribution in respect of each pay day. 54 Although in light of that finding it is not strictly necessary to do so, for the sake of completeness, I reject the respondents' contention that s 14(3) of the Provident Account Act only enables payment of any amounts held in the "contributor's B account" to a contributor who has contributed for more than a period of six years. The section simply provides that where a contributor retires or resigns after completing six years service, the amount held in his or her "contributor's B account" account is payable to that contributor. Self-evidently, if the contributor has been contributing for less than six years, the amount in question will be less than would be the case had the contributions extended over that entire period. However, the only requirement for payment to be made out of the "contributor's B account" is that which is set out in the section itself, namely that the person be a contributor when he or she retires, and that he or she has completed six years service. 55 I am therefore satisfied that the court below erred in finding that Mr Menghetti did not qualify for any payment from the Provident Account other than his own contributions. Further, because Mr Menghetti is only claiming for the final period of his employment this is not a case of "double dipping" and therefore does not run "against the scheme of the legislation". 56 The appeal should be allowed. 57 Having regard to the fact that Mr Menghetti was not legally represented, he is not entitled to any order for costs: see Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403. I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Weinberg. Associate: Dated: 21 December 2006 The Appellant was self-represented Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Mr R Holdsworth, Crown Counsel Date of Submissions: 30 October 2006 and 27 November 2006 Date of Judgment: 21 December 2006