AD/AMD 50/36 - Segregation of ADS/IRS Wiring (Cth)

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

AMD Falcon 50 and 900 Series Aeroplanes AD/AMD 50/36 Segregation of ADS/IRS Wiring 8/2006

Applicability: Falcon 900EX EASy S/N 97, 120 and subsequent (including S/N 601 & subsequent, also known as "DX" aeroplanes) Requirement: 1. For F900EX EASy aeroplanes in the applicability range and without modification M5143 - Incorporate IRS 2 wiring modification M5143 and test the GP bus IRS entry in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of Service Bulletin SB-F900EX-274 or later revisions approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). 2. For all F900EX EASy aeroplanes in the applicability range - Amend the Falcon 900EX EASy Maintenance Manual to introduce MP 34-209 "test of general purpose bus IRS entry" at 5000 FH intervals by inserting Revision 2 of Chapter 5.40 into the manual. 3. For all F900EX EASy aeroplanes in the applicability range - Amend the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) to reflect the dispatch conditions for 'one IRS failure' contained in the Dassault Aviation Master Minimum Equipment List temporary change TC 3. Note: EASA AD 2006-0157 refers. Compliance: For Requirements 1, 2 and 3 - At the earliest opportunity but no later than three months after the effective date of this Directive. This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 3 August 2006. Background: During a flight test performed on an EASy aircraft, and subsequent to an air data probe failure, the crew realized that the Flight path vectors and the Vertical speeds that were displayed on pilot's and co-pilot's PDU were identically wrong.