AD/B737/302 - Passenger Service Unit Chemical Oxygen Generators (Cth)

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes AD/B737/302 Passenger Service Unit 5/2007 Chemical Oxygen Generators

Applicability: Model 737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700, -800 and -900 series aeroplanes, as identified in either Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins (SB) 737-25-1545 Revision 1 dated 30 November 2006 or 737-25-1548 dated 22 November 2005. Requirement: If not previously accomplished, modify the activation mechanism in the chemical oxygen generator of each passenger service unit (PSU) in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of SB 737-25-1545 Revision 1 or 737-25-1548, as applicable. Modifications accomplished before the effective date of this Directive in accordance with SB 737-25-1545 original issue dated 8 September 2005, are acceptable for compliance with this Directive. Later revisions of the above SB(s), approved by the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as an Alternate Method of Compliance (AMOC) to FAA AD 2007-07-02, are considered acceptable for compliance with the equivalent Requirements of this Directive. Note: FAA AD 2007-07-02 Amdt 39-15002 refers. Compliance: Within 60 months after the effective date of this Directive. This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 10 May 2007. Background: The United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has received several reports indicating that some chemical oxygen generators failed to activate during in-flight decompression events. These failures were due to fracture of components between the passenger oxygen mask and the release pin in the oxygen generator.