AD/A119/11 Amdt 1 - Pilot and Co-Pilot Doors Emergency Release System (Cth)

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE On the effective date specified below, and for the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD/A119/11 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Agusta A119 Series Helicopters AD/A119/11 Amdt 1 Pilot and Co-Pilot Doors 2/2008 DM Emergency Release System

Applicability: Model A119 helicopters, all serial numbers. Requirement: Inspect in accordance with Agusta Alert Technical Bulletin 119-25, or later EASA approved revision.

If any interference is found between the lower hinge and the housing on the helicopter structure, before further flight, accomplish the corrective actions in accordance with Part II of Alert Technical Bulletin 119-25, or later EASA approved revision.

If no interference is found between the lower hinge and the housing on the helicopter structure, before 30 June 2008, accomplish the corrective actions in accordance with Part II of Alert Technical Bulletin 119-25, or later EASA approved revision.

Note: EASA Emergency AD 2007-0295R1-E refers. Compliance: Inspect within 5 flight hours after 4 December 2007, but not later than 31 December 2007, whichever occurs first.

The compliance time remains unchanged by this issue of the Directive. This Amendment becomes effective on 7 December 2007. Background: During a ground test of the emergency door release system, the Pilot doors failed to disengage. Investigation determined that the reason for the malfunction was interference between the lower hinge and the fuselage structure. This condition, if not corrected, creates the risk of non-disengagement of the Pilot-and/or Co-pilot doors during an emergency, inhibiting the evacuation during an emergency, with possible injuries to the occupants.