AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section. Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series Aeroplanes AD/F100/96 Landing Gear - Brake 11/2009 DM Quick Disconnect Couplings Applicability: Fokker Aircraft B.V. F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if Part Number (P/N) AE70690E, P/N AE70691E, P/N AE99111E or P/N AE99119E brake Quick-Disconnect (QD) couplings are installed. Requirement: 1. Inspect the brake QD couplings in accordance with Part 1 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Services SBF100-32-156 (the SB). 2. Thereafter, repeat the inspection in accordance with Part 1 of the Accomplishment Instructions of the SB. 3. If, during any inspection as detailed in Requirement 1 or 2 of this AD, the wear found on any QD coupling exceeds the definition as specified in the SB, replace the affected QD coupling with an improved unit with P/N AE73059E or P/N AE73091E, as applicable, in accordance with Part 2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of the SB. 4. Replace all remaining P/N AE70690E, P/N AE70691E, P/N AE99111E and P/N AE99119E brake QD couplings with the improved units in accordance with Part 2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of the SB. 5. Do not install P/N AE70690E, P/N AE70691E, P/N AE99111E or P/N AE99119E brake QD couplings on any aeroplane. Modification of an aeroplane by installation of improved QD couplings P/N AE73059E and P/N AE73091E at all locations terminates the repetitive inspection requirements of this AD for that aeroplane. Previous replacement of the QD couplings on an aeroplane at all locations in accordance with Fokker SBF100-32-127 (at any revision) also terminates the repetitive inspection requirements of this AD for that aeroplane. The use of later approved revisions of this document is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD. Note: EASA AD 2009-0176 dated 6 August 2009 refers. Compliance: For Requirement 1 - Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD. For Requirement 2 - At intervals determined by the amount of wear found, as defined in the SB. For Requirement 3 - Before next flight. For Requirement 4 - Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD. For Requirement 5 - After 20 August 2011. This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 24 September 2009. Background: During 1995, several reports were received of brake QD couplings loosened and/or disconnected during operation. In a few cases, residual brake pressure was trapped in the affected brake, causing asymmetric braking and/or resulting in hot brakes. Loosened couplings may cause a hydraulic leak with the risk of a brake fire. Investigation revealed that the installation of the brake QD couplings must be done with care and that the locking teeth on the light alloy sleeve are prone to wear. The Fokker 70/100 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) has been revised to include additional information to ensure correct removal and installation of the couplings. In 1997, Fokker Services issued SBF100-32-106, recommending the introduction of QD couplings with corrosion resistant steel (CRES) sleeves that would prevent excessive wear of the locking teeth on the light alloy sleeve. In response to more reported cases of loosened QD couplings resulting in brake problems, further improved QD couplings were introduced in 2001 through SBF100-32-127. These couplings increase the reliability of the brake system. Recently, a brake fire was reported which was caused by a ruptured brake piston. The fire was quickly extinguished but caused damage to the paint and hydraulic/electrical harness and its components. Detailed investigation showed that a hydraulic lock must have been present close to the affected brake creating enough internal pressure to rupture the piston. The most probable scenario for the hydraulic lock is a loosened (not necessarily disconnected) brake QD coupling. Further investigation of the service experience files at Fokker Services showed that more brake fires have occurred on aeroplanes in a pre-mod SBF100-32-127 configuration. In order to reduce the probability of a fluid fire as described in CS 25.863, additional action is deemed necessary. For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive inspections of the affected brake QD couplings and replacement of the QD couplings with improved units. Installation of the improved QD couplings terminates the repetitive inspections requirements. James Coyne Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 18 August 2009