0.12980/45 HR, Dew, Gor. Print, Melb "+ on_Friday,.29th November, 1946. Judgment, delivered at... Sydney... ws ON Me IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA bs ORAL REASONS REASONS FOR JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUS New south Wales Regietrf } QORAM + LATHAM, C.J KRINGAS and ANOTHER RICH J. SPARKE J, ve DIXON J, MeTIERNAN J, TERRILL and OTHERS SUDHRL. 29th HOVEMBER. 19156 Pins ey LATHAM 0.3, + We are of opinion that this appeal should be aiemiased. I put my judgment upon the ground that the evidence shows a tenancy by estoppal between the occu- pants of the room in question in Grace Building and the Conmonwealth, There is a payment of rent as rent to persons who, in fact, were agents of the Commonwealth. The money was received as rent and receipts were given for it expressly as rent. There are accordingly, in my Opinion, all the elements of a tenancy by sstoppal. It may also he that under Section 22A of the landlord and Tenant Act there is the evidence which is sufficient to establish the presumptions whioh are referred toe I, however, consider it sufficient to base my conclusion upon the ground which I. have stateds It is suggested that there is some impropriety or Sllegality or legal impossibility in the Commonwealth beeseming a landlerd of land which has been compulsorily acquired under the Lands Acquisition Aot and which is not immediatley required forutilisation for a public purpose IT can see no authority for that propositions The practioal difficulty which hae been suggested in relation to the time limitation placed upon the warrant issued under Section 22 of the Landlord and Tenant Act does not appear to mechere to require any especial consideration by the Court. Apart from the proceedings in the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 59 of the Lands Acquisition Act would appear to form a speedy method of dealing with the Gabe, In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed with costs. é C i RICH Je 3 I agree that the appeal failse In my opinion the facts bring the case within the provisions of Sete 22A the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1899, New South Wales. STARKE J. 3 I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. 29/11/66 DIXON Je + & agrees It has not been contended that the Crow cannot take She penerit of Part ZY of taetlendlord and Tenant Act of 1899 (Now South Wales.) It appears to me that in a situation such ae arose from ths compulsory acquisition by the Commonwealth of such a building as that now in question it is competent for the Commonwealth, as an incident of the exercise of the power, to continue the existing tenants in occupation pending taking vaeant pee- session and to receive the rents pagable by them in respect of their ccoupation, Paragraph (a) of sece 22A of the Iandlord and Temnt Act creates, not an actual tenancy, but @ conclusive presumption for the purposes of Part iy, that is to say, wom the facts to whieh it applies occurring, the remedies provided by Part JY become avajiable. Those facts are the payment by a person of rent in respect of land. The receipt of rent by the agent of the Common- wealth involved payment by the appellants of rent in respect of the premises they occupied and I do not think that they have shown that the payment wes mde under any mistake or other invalidating circumstance that Would ys the attaching of Part JY pursuant to paragraph a) of sede 22h, Therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. MOTIERNAN J. : I agree that the appeal should be dismissed, ORDER LATHAM C.J, The appeal is dismissed with costs. | 29/11/46 2e JUDGMENT RICH, J. KRINGAS & ANOTHER TERRILL & OTHERS. I agree that the appeal fails. On my opinion the facts bring the case within the provisions of Section 22 (A) of the Landlord & Tenant Act 1899 New South Wales. JUDGMENT. STARKE, Je KRINGAS _& ANOTHER ve TERRILL & OTHERS. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. ----000---- KRINGAS AND ANOTHER v THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND _ OTHERS. ORAL JUDGMENT DIXON J. I agree. It has not been contended that the Crown cannot take the benefit of Part Iv of the Lendlord and Tenant Act of 1899 (N.S.W.). It appears to me that in a situation such as arose from the compulsory acquisition by the Commonwealth of such a building as that now in question it is competent for the Commonwealth,as an incident of the exercise of the power,to continue the existing tenants in occupation pending taking vacant possession and to receive the rents payable by them in respect of their occupation. Paragraph (a) of sec. 22A of the Landlord and Tenant Act creates,not an actual tenancy,but a conclusive presumption for the purposes of Part IV, 4 that is to say, upon the facts to which it applies occurring, the | remedies provided by Part IV become available. Those facts are the / payment by a person of rent in respect of land. The receipt of rent o by the agent of the Commonwealth involved payment by the appellents of rent in respect of the premises they occupied and I do not think that they have shown that the payment was made under any mistake or other invalidating circumstance that would prevent the attaching of Part IV pursuent to paragraph (a) of sec. 22A. Therefore,the appeal should be dismissed.