QUEENSLAND FORESTS LIMITED V. UNION TRUSTEE CO. OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED
High Court of Australia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
UNION. TRUSTEE, CO. OF AUSTRALIA
LIMITED.
4.2 Gourley, Gort, Print., Merb,
7103/81
QUEENSLAND FORESTS LIMITED
Ve
UNION TRUSTEE COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED
ORDER
Appeal allowed with costs. Order of the Full
Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland set aside, and in lieu
thereof order that the appeal to that court be allowed with
costs and that the order of Townley J. and the judgment entered
pursuant thereto be set aside and that judgment in the
consolidated action be entered for Queensland Forests Limited
for the sum of £27312:10 (being the amount claimed by that
company in action No. 246 of 195%) together with the costs of
the action No. 246 of 1954, the costs of the action No. 1337 of
1953 subsequent to the entry of the final judgment already
entered therein, and the costs of the consolidated action.
Further order that reserved costs (if any) be
Sek
included in each awit" case.
QUEENSLAND FORESTS LINITED
UNION TRU:
IAL
HB COMPANY OF AU
QUEENSLAND FORESTS LIMITED
Ve
UNION PRUSTEE COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED
This is an appeal from an order of the Full Court
of the Supreme Court of Queensland affirming a judgment given by
Townley J. at the trial of two actions which had been consolidated.
In one action the present respondent sued, and in the other it
was sued, as being the trustee of a certain deed made in 1927
between the appellant therein called the company and itself
therein called the trustee. The purpose of the deed, as appears
from its recitals, was to make provision for the protection of the
purchasers of an issue of 18,000 bonds at £5 each, which the
company was about to make as a means of obtaining the necessary
financial resources to enable it to afforest an area of 3000
acres in the Johnstone River district of Northern Queensland.
The land was referred to as Section A, and the operations to be
carried out included improving, regenerating, cultivating and
preserving the indigenous trees on the land, and planting thereon
trees of substantial commercial value, with a view to pulp-making,
sawmilling and the sale and export of timber.
The material provisions of the deed must first
be mentioned. Clause (1) contained a covenant by the company
with the trustee (subject to a qualification not material to the
case) to observe and perform the obligations imposed upon or
undertaken by it in the deed and the bonds, and it provided
(in clause 19) that the bonds should be read with and be deemed
to form part of the deed. It also contained a covenant by the
company with every reasonable despatch to regenerate, cultivate
and preserve the indigenous trees existing on Section A and to
plant and afforest the same with trees of commercial value
according to the best principles and practice of forestry
cultivation, and to complete such operations in respect of the
2.
whole 3,000 acres of Section A within five years of the sde of
the first bond: (clause 3).
By clause ll the company covenanted to pay and
defray all expenses of management and maintenance of Section A
until such time as the marketable trees or timber thereon should
have reached maturity or been sold realised marketed or converted
as provided by the conditions endorsed on the bonds. This
obligation was subject, however, to the right of the company to
have a sum of £15,000 and interest mentioned in clause 5 of the
bonds paid to it in the manner specified in that clause to provide
and be applied by the company for the proper maintenance and
protection of the trees on Section A from the fifth year to the
end of the twentieth year after planting.
By clause 15 the trustee was given a right to
commission at the raté of 5% on the "income of sums invested, and
at the same rate on all moneys received by it from the sale of
Section A or any part of it and the produce of any kind thereof.
Clause 16 gave the trustee wide powers exercisable
in the event of default being made by the company
performance
of
its covenants or of the company's ceasing to carry on business
or going into winding-up or of a receiver of its undertaking being
appointed prejudicially to the interests of the bondholders.
These pov
rs included a power to sell Section A and the timber
and produce thereof, and it was provided by clause 17 that the
money to arise from any such sale should be held upon trust to pay
or retain the costs charges and expenses incurred and to apply the
residue in or towards payment of all sums payable to the
bondholders in respect of the bonds and in payment of any surplus
to the company.
It is convenient nw to turn to the bonds.
Endorsed upon them are a number of conditions which, as already
stated, are to be read with the deed. The first and ninth clauses
of the conditions define the main rights of the bondholders.
Clause (1) describes each bond as part of a series of 18,000
3.
bonds all of which are to share equally in the whole of the net
proceeds of the produce of Section A without any preference or
priority as between themselves. Then, after intervening clauses
have dealt with the afforestation of Section A for five years,
the maintenance and protection of the trees for another fifteen
years, the sale realisation marketing and conversion of the
timber, amd the payment of the net proceeds to the trustee, clause
(9) provides that the bondholders shall be entitled to receive
the net vroceeds from the trustee until £100 for each £5 bond
(exclusive of interest) shall have been paid to them, when the
bonds are to be deemed fully paid and satisfied and to be cancelled.
It is not specifically said that any surplus shall belong to the
company, but that is the plain inference, and indeed it is put
beyond doubt by clause 17 of the deed, which has already been
mentioned.
Stopping there, it may be said at once that so
far as appears the company duly fulfilled its obligations in
respect of afforestation, and as trees began to reach maturity it
comuenceG the operations which were necessary to turn them into
money in the interests of all parties according to their respective
rights urder the deed and the bonds. A difference of opinion,
however, arose between the company and the trustee as to whether
the company was entitled to deduct from the gross proceeds of
sale of timber the wages and allowances of one of the company's
employees, one McConaghie, and the purpose of the actions was to
have the point of disagreement decided. The issue depends upon
the meaning of two clauses of the bonds and upon the facts
concerning the work which McConaghie did. :
The clauses are numbered (7) and (8), and before
setting them out it is desirable to mention briefly some of the
provisions which precede them. Clause (3) expresseS with
additiomal particularity the company's obligation to afforest
Section A, and clause (4) provides that the company shall safeguard
and protect the growing trees until marketed, converted or other~
wise disposed of "for the benefit of the bondholders." To provide
Be
for the proper maintenance and protection of the trees after
the early stages of cultivation or afforestation, clause (5)
requires that, after completion of the payment of two-thirds of
the £5 per bond by the purchasers of bonds, the balance as and
when received by the company shall be deposited with the trustee,
and that £15,000 of this amount shall be held on trust to be paid
(with interest thereon) to the company in equal yearly instalments
from the fifth year after lst June 1927 (i.e. in effect, the end
of the period within which the company bound itself to complete
the process of afforestation) to the end of the twentieth year
after that date, to provide for the proper maintenance and
protection expenses of the company. Then clause (6) provides that
the remainder of the one-third of the £5 per bond deposited with
the trustee shall be held by the trustee until such time after lst
June 1939 as the company shall determine to sell realise and
otherwise convert the produce of Section A, or, in default of its
doing so within one year after lst June 1947, then until such
time as the trustee by direction of a majority in value of the
bondholders shall instruct the company to sell, realise and
otherwise convert that produce. The company is then to be at
liberty to utilise such preportion of the fund as it shall think
fit (separately or in conjunction with trust funds of sections
other than Section A) to set up and establish pulp-mills, timber
mills and such other business or enterprise as it shall deem
necessary to ensure the sale realisation marketing and conversion
of the produce of Section A under conditions most favourable to the
bondholders.
Then follow the crucial clauses, which are in
these terms:-
"(7) All costs charges and expenses paid or incurred by
the Company in comnection with the sale realisation marketing
conversion of the timber produce and any produce of any kind
of Section A shall be paid or deducted from the gross proceeds
thereof and until such payment thereof shall be charged upon
such proceeds.
Be
(8) The Company alone shall direct and supervise all
selling realisation marketing and conversion operations and
shall be entitled to receive and be paid by the Trustee a
commission limited to and not exceeding a sum equal to Five
Pounds per centum of the gross proceeds as they accrue or are
ascertained from time to time. The net proceeds of all sales
realisation marketing and conversion shall from time to time
immediately upon the receipt thereof by the Company be paid to
the Trustee in trust for and on behalf of the Bondholders."
The deed had bound the company (by clause 9) to
render and deliver to the trustee statements showing the details
of all costs charges and expenses from time to time paid or
incurred by the Company in connection with the sale realisation
marketing or conversion of the produce of Section A. Accordingly,
after realisation operations commenced the company supplied to
the trustee periodical statements showing the gross proceeds of
sales of timber, the company's costs charges and expenses, and
the amount of the company's commission at 5% on gross proceeds.
In statements for the period May 1940 to June 1942 and the ensuing
period to June 1944 the company treated as a charge which it was
entitled to deduct from the gross proceeds under clause (7) of the
bonds amounts representing 124 per cent of the wages and allowances
which it had paid to MecConaghie. No similar item appeared in the
statement for the period July 19+ to June 1950, but by letter the
company made a claim in respect of that period for "logging
supervision" at the rate of 1/- per 100 superfeet, the reference
being again to the work done by McConaghie. Charges at the same
rate in respect of the same work but described as "supervision
charges", were made in the company's statements for the years ended
30th June 1951 and 30th June 1952 respectively. On 19th May 1953,
the trustee for the first time challenged the right of the company
to make these charges, contending in effect that the commission
of 5% of gross proceeds provided for by clause (8) of the
conditions endorsed on the bonds covered the work done by
MeConaghie. The company persisting in its attitude, the trustee
commenced an action against it for the recovery of a sum
consisting of the amount which the company had admitted as the net
proceeds ascertained in accordance with the provisions of the
6.
bonds, plus the amounts it had deducted in respect of McConaghie
in ascertaining such net proceeds. The trustee obtained liberty
to enter final judgment against the company for the sum claimed,
less £757:1l:1 which was the aggregate amount of the disputed
deductions. "As to that amount the company was given liberty to
defend the action. The company then commenced en action against
the trustee to recover the amount of its commission, the trustee
having declined to pay the commission while the amount sued for
in its action remained unpaid. These were the two actions which
were consolidated and came for trial before Townley J.
At the trial, McConaghie gave evidence describing
the work ich he had done and in respect of which the company had
made the deductions. He said that he had been the company's
logging superintendent since May 1941. He was concerned with
other properties of the company as well as Section A, the total
area being about 9,000 acres. The company had engaged contractors
to cut and fell trees and deliver the logs to mills, and McConaghie's
duties included pointing out to the contractors the type and
species of logs to be cut from time to time to meet the require-
ments of different markets. He had, of course, to keep a close
watch on market fluctuations in respect of the various types of
timber. He had to decide which logs should be discarded as faulty
and which sent, according to class, to sawmills or to plymills
or to particular buyers, and to instruct the contractors accord-
ingly. Then he had to keep a check on the branding and numbering
of logs, a process designed to identify each log and enable it to-
be traced from the time it was felled until it was disposed of at
a mill or condemned in the scrub. His work involved following
logs at each stage from the bush to the mill or rail siding and
seeing that each was accounted for. This included measuring odd
logs to see that the cutters' measurements were reasonably
accurate, as a check on the work of the man at the mill. It was
his responsibility to make up the statement on which the
contractors should be paid for their cutting, hauling and
2.
delivery, and to see that the loaders were paid where logs were
loaded on to railway trucks, and that the timber was properly
charged to the various mills. The general object of ali this
checking was to ensure that the contractor was not overpaid by
the company and that the company was not underpaid by the purchasers
from it. In addition to these duties, MeConaghie had to ensure,
by reference to the boundaries of each of the blocks into which
Section A was divided, that the contractors were keeping to the
company's land and that other persons were not taking timber from
ite
McConeghie expressed the opinion at the trial
that the charges made against the trustee in respect of his work
were reasonable, and so alm did the only other witness who was
called, a man named Young who had had experience as a cutter, a
log-hauler and a contractor. On this evidence the learned judge
found that in all the circumstances the charges were reasonable
in amount, and no challenge has been offered to this finding. If,
however, the company is entitled to make any deduction in respect
of McConaghie's work in connection with Section A, it must be a
deduction of that portion of the wages and allowances paid to him
as is properly attributable to that work; for no other amount ,
even though reasonable, fills the description (in clause (7) of the
bonds) of "costs charges and expenses paid or incurred by the
company in connection with the sale realisation marketing
conversion of the timber produce and any produce of any kind &
Seetion A." Except in the case of any allowances which may be
identifiable as relating specifically to Section A, the apportion-
ment between that Section and the other lands to which McConaghie
attended should presumably be on the basis of the time wich he
devoted to each.
It is possible that this was in the mind of the
company's managing director when he asked, in a letter which he
wrote to the trustee on 30th July 1953, whether the trustee would
prefer that, instead of a supervision charge, the company should
8.
charge the same or a higher amount as logging supervisor's wages,
adding that, after all, these were just as much an expense of
marketing as the cost of cutting and hauling logs to the point of
sale. But more provably he meant to suggest that clause (8) of the
bonds was irrelevant, and that the wages of the logging superinten-
dent, whom he described as ensuring on behalf of the bondholders
that every foot of their timber was correctly accounted for, formed
part of the costs charges and expenses covered by clause (7).
It may indeed be that, se (8) intends
to include direction and supervision in the services which the
company was to perform in return for its commission of 5% of the
gross proceeds, that clause is irrelevant because it should be
understood as referring only to the making, by the company's board
of directors or executive officers, of due provision for ensuring
the efficient performance of all the wrk involved in the processes
described as sale, realisation, marketing and conversion, and not
as referring to the actual performance of any part of that work -
not even to the performance of that part of it which may be called
supervisory in the sense that it consists in overseeing and
ehecking the wrk of others. There is much to be said for this
view. The broad scheme which the documents reveal is that the
company should bear the expense of bringing the timber on Section
A to maturity, being pt in funds to afforest the land by receiving
the first two-thirds @ the purchase moneys for the bonds and
being assisted to provide for the maintenance and protection of
the trees until maturity by the £15,000 mentioned in clause (5)
of the bonds. (Of course the trees would not all mature simultan-
eously, but clause (6) of the bonds enables a time for commencement
of the process of turning the timber to account to be fixed
either by a determination of the company or a direction of a
majority in value of the bondholders). In the proceeds of
realisation, the company the bondholders and the trustee would
all be interested, for it was out of those proceeds that each
would derive the financial return which their mutual participation
9.
in the scheme was designed to produce. But there was an obvious
practical necessity to entrust the ultimate control of the process
of realisation to one of the parties, to the exclusion of the
others though in the interests of alls and it may well be that the
whole office of the opening wrds of clause (8) is to entrust that
control exclusively to the company.
But even if it be assumed that the direction and
supervision to which clause (8) refers exteris to the detailed
field work done by the company's employees at the scene of each
operation, in. giving instructions to, and overseeing the work of,
contractors and others engaged in the actual performance of the
operation, it is difficult to see any sufficient reason for
concluding that the cost to the company of that work was intended
to be excluded from the indemnity provision nade/clause (7).
The order in which the two provisions pear in the bonds may be
thought to bend in favour of that conclusion, and some additional
support for it-may possibly be seen in the fact that clause (8),
after stipulating that the company alone shall direct and
supervise the operations referred to, proceeds immediately to
provide for the company's right to commission as if the two matters
were interrelated. But clause (7) is expressed in quite general
and comprehensive language. "All" costs charges and expenses are
covered which are "in connection with" the sale realisation
marketing or conversion operations concerning the produce of
Section A. No doubt the description excludes expenditure, such
as the cost of head office management, which relates to the
company's activities in general but has no specific relation to
any of the particular operations mentioned in the clause. But
McConaghie's wages and allowances are not of that character; and
between, on the one hand, py ments by a company to a person
outside its own organisation (e.g. a contractor) for wrk dne in
the sale of timber and, on the other hand, payments to an
employee on the company's own staff for work within the same
general description, there is no distinction wich can logically
10.
be regarded as taking the latter outside,while leaving the former
within, the conception of "costs charges and expenses in connection
with the sale" etc.. The payments to McConaghie are the cost to
the company of the actual work that McConaghie did} and an
identifiable portion of that work entered into and formed an
integral part of the operations by which timber grown on Section A
was sold, realised, marketed and converted. A corresponding
portion of those wages and allowances must therefore fall within
clause (7) unless clause (8) exhibits an intention to except them
from it. No such intention is expressed, and no sufficient reason
appears for inferring it. Clause (8) does not wear the stamp of
an exception or qualification to clause (7). It has every
appearance of a provision intended to be cumulative upon clause
(7), being drawn as it naturally would be drawn if the intention
was that in ascertaining the net proceeds to be paid to the trustee
for the bondholders there should be deducted from the gross proceais
the whole of the expenditure which clause (7) describes and, in
addition, the stipulated commission to the company.
In the Supreme Court, both Townley J. and the
_ Full Court read clauses (7) and (8) as meaning that the company
was to direct and supervise the operations referred to without
other remuneration than the commission, but was entitled to be
paid or to deduct from the gross proceeds any other costs charges
or expenses which it might pay or incur in connection with the
operations. This is by no means an impossible reading of the
provisions, but it reverses the order in which they appear, and
in effect it introduces words which neither the general scheme
of the instruments nor the context requires. The construction
which treats the 5% commission on gross proceeds as a reward in
the nature of gross profit to the company for undertaking the
responsibility of realisation, and therefore as additional to
the indemnity given by clause (7) against out-of-pocket
expenditure incurred in connection with the realisation, attributes
to the parties an intention which is neither irrational nor
il.
urbusinesslike, and it is to be preferred as giving effect to
to the language of the document in its natural sense.
Accordingly the decision of the Supreme Court should
be reversed. We understand it to be common ground between the
parties that the amounts deducted by the company in respect of
McConaghie's services do not exceed the proportion of his wages
amd allowances which relates to Section A.
The appeal will therefore be allowed with costs.
The order of the Pull Court will be set aside, and in lieu
thereof there will be an order allowing with costs the appeal
to that Court, setting aside the order of Townley J. and the
judgment entered pursuant thereto, and ordering that judgment
im the consolidated action be entered for Queensland Forests
Limited for the sum of £273:2:10 (being the amount claimed by
that company in action No. 246 of 1954) together with the costs
of the action No. 246 of 1954, the costs of the action No. 1337
of 1953 subsequent to the entry of the final judgment already
entered therein, and the costs of the consolidated action.
Reserved costs (if any) are to be included in each case.