HOLMES V. THE UNION TRUSTEE COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED & ORS.
High Court of Australia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
THE UNION TRUSTEE COMPANY OF
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judgment delivered at__ Sydney
HL B, Dav, Gor. Print, Mab on_Friday, 3rd August, 1951.
6.19880/45
HOLMES
ss
Ve
=
HE UNION TRUSTEE COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED & ORS.
ORDER
Appeal dismissed. Costs of al] parties as between
solicitor and client to be paid out of the estate of Mary Ellen
Dafgard deceased.
HOLMES
ve
IUDGMENT
DIXON J.
WILLIAMS J.
KITTO J.
HOLMES
ve
THE UNION TRUSTEE COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED
& ORS,
DIXON J.
JUDGMENT WILLIAMS J.
KITTO J.
The question for decision on this appeal is
whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales in its equitable
jurisdiction (Sugerman Je) was right in declaring that upon the
true construction of the will of Mary Elien Dafgard and in the
events which have happened the appellant is not entitled to a
legacy of 100 shares in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. but
is entitled to a legacy of 50 shares in such company.
The testatrix died on 14th March 1950. She
was the widow of Carl August Dafgard who died on 23rd July 1927.
By his will dated 9th October 1925 he appointed the Union Trustee
Co. of Aust. Ltd. and the testatrix his executors and trustees and
divided his residuary personal estate into two parts, one of which
he bequeathed to the testatrix absolutely and the other of which
he settled on trust for the testatrix for life with remainder over.
Included in his residuary personal estate were 100 shares in the
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. Soon after his death the testatriz
became registered in the register of members of the Colonial Sugar
Refining Co. Ltd. as the sole holder of 50 shares forming part of
the portion of residue bequeathed to her absolutely and registered
as the holder jointly with her co-trustee, .the Union Trustee Co. of
Aust. Ltd., of 50 shares forming part of the settled portion of
residue. In the year 1934 the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltde
made a bonus issue of shares to shareholders in the company on the
basis of one new share for every share then held and the testatrix
thereupon became registered as the sole holder of 100 shares and as
the joint holder with the Union Trustee Co. of Aust. Ltd. of 100
shares in that company.
By her last will and testament dated 16th January
1949 the testatrix appointed the Union Trustee Co. of Aust. Ltd.
and the appellant, who is her nephew, her executors and trustees
and devised and bequeathed to them the whole of her estate real and
personal wheresoever situated or over which she had any disposing
power whatever upon the conditions and trusts thereinafter set oute
She gave and bequeathed free of all death duty and federal estate
duty or any other duty payable by reason of her death a number of
specific and pecuniary legacies. The pecuniary legacies included
the legacy the extent of which is at issue on this appeal. The
bequest is in the following terms - "To the said John Dashwood Holmes
one~half of the shares held by me at the time af my death in the
Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited." As to the rest and
residue of her estate the testatrix directed her trustees to pay
the income derived therefrom to the appellant during his life and
on his death to divide the capital between four charities. The
testatrix also directed that the cash legacies excluding the
specific bequest to the appellant should be subject to the condition
that her estate was sworn for probate at the nett value of £11,000.
If her estate was less than £11,000 then the cash legacies were to
ebate proportionally. .
The nett value of the estate was in fact sworn for
probate purposes at £15,760, so that the direction did not become
operative. The intention of a testator must be ascertained from
a consideration of the whole will read in the light of any surround-
ing circumstances that are relevant and admissible and the meaning
of the will and all its parts determined according to that intention.
If the direction in question could throw any light upon the extent
to which the testatrix intended to benefit the appellant by the
specific bequest it would be necessary to unravel its meaning. But
it does not appear to us to do S80. The solution of the problem
depends entirely upon the meaning to be attributed to the language
of the bequest itself and the only surrounding circumstances that
appear to be material are those already mentioned, namely that the
testatrix, as we have said, was registered throughout her widowhood
as the holder of shares in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co, Ltd., one
half of which were in her sole name and belonged to her absolutely
and the other half of which were in the joint names of herself and
the Union Trustee Co. of Aust. Ltd. and were part of the settled
estate of her late husband in which she had a life interest only.
The bequest to the appellant does not contain any
technical words and is subject to the general rule of. construction
that the words of a will, like any other instrument, must prima
facie be given their ordinary natural grammatical meaning. It
appears to us that in the ordinary use of language a reference to
shares held by a person in a company as "shares held by me" would
naturally refer to shares registered in the sole name of that person
and not to shares of which that person is a joint holder, It would
be natural to refer to shares held in joint names as shares held by
the two holders, The instrument in which the expression occurs
in the present case is a will referring to shares held by the
testatrix which prima facie means shares registered in her sole
name. She is referring to shares of which she has power to dispose.
The natural meaning of the bequest is that she is intending to
bequeath one half of the shares of which she has power to dispose.
It is a bequest of shares in the Colonial Sugar
Refining Co. Ltd. held by her at the date of her death so that the
will contemplates that. the number of shares might alter between the
date of the will and her death. It may be that the testatrix did
not contemplate that any of her own or the trust shares would be
sold or that further shares would be purchased on behalf of herself
or the trust during that period, and that the only alteration might
be a further issue of shares which would be taken up by herself and
the trust,so that the number of shares registered in her sole name
and in the joint names would remain the same. Be that as it may,
the circumstance that the testatrix was registered as the joint
holder for the same number of shares as she was registered as the
-4e-
sole holder could not justify an assumption that she was bringire
the former shares into account in the calculation of the number of
shares bequeathed to the appellant. Cases relating to the
respective interests of sole and joint holders of shares in
companies and of the nature of holdings required to qualify share-
holders to become directors of companies under articles of
association such as Grundy ve Briggs 1910 1 Ch. 444, Permanent
Trustee Co. of N.S.W. Lid. vs Palmer, 42 C.L.R. 277; and Avon Downs
Pty. Ltd. v. The Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 78 C.L.R. 353,
were cited to us but they do not appear to throw any light upon the
meaning of the bequest.
In our opinion it is not possible to construe the
bequest as referring to one half of the shares held by the testatrix
in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. either solely or jointly
at the time of her death and therefore,in the events which have
happened, as a legacy of the whole of the shares of which she was the
beneficial owner,
For these reasons we are of opinion that His Honour
was right and that the appeal must be dismissed. His Honour
concluded by saying that it was difficult to express with complete
confidence a view as to the testatrix's intentions and that his
mind had fluctuated during the course of the argument. Before us
the argument for the appellant was supported by counsel for the
trustee company which leaves us with the feeling that perhaps the
intention of the testatrix has miscarried. In all the
circumstances we think the case is one in which the costs of all
parties as between solicitor and client should be adered to be
paid out of the residuary estate of the testatrix.