CHIPP V. CAMPBELL BEAUMONT TRADING PTY. LIMITED AND OTHERS
High Court of Australia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Vo
CAMPBELL BEAUMONT TRADING PTY.
LIMITED AND OT =
'REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judgment delivered at......
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them heave and
a) with respect
espect of each entry ex
the goods couprised in
consunption mentioned in
t of Clain.
ach of them have and has
Declare thet the defendants
been guilty of an offence under s. 234 (d) with respect
de.
to the entries referred to in the declaration already
mits, and each of them, to pay to the plaintiff
ne Gefend
of penalty under ss. 234 (&) and 240 of the
Act, 1901-1968 in respect of all the entries of
fer home conswaption as set forth in
of the Statement of Claim the total
doliers (1,000,000).
fhe defendants and each of them to pay to the plaintiff
by way of penalty under ss. 234 (@) and 240 of the said
r the offence in res:
Exhibits out ith usuel order.
By consent, no order for costs.
CAMPBELL BEAUMONT TRADING PTY. LTD. & ORS.
ey
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fs
te
BARWICK C.J.
CHIPP.
Ve
CAMPBELL BEAUMONT TRADING PTY. LTD. & ORS.
The plaintiff who is the Minister of State
for Customs and Excise for the Commonwealth of Australia
sues Campbell Beaumont Trading Pty. Ltd., a company
incorporated in New South Wales under the Company
legislation of that State, carrying on in Sydney at ail
material times the business of an importer; William
Patrick Bond, who during those times was that company's
managing director; Godfrey Phillips International Pty.
Ltd., a company incorporated in the State of Victoria
under the Company legislation of that State, at all
material times carrying on in Melbourne the business of
manufacturing and dealing in tobacco; and Cedric Malcolm
Paynter: and Derek Landon Smith during those times the
managing and the financial director respectively of the
last mentioned company for penalties under the Customs Act,
1901-1968 of the Commonwealth (the Act).
The plaintiff's statement of claim which at the
hearing of this matter was amended by consent and pursuant to
my order in that behalf made on 28th November last, alleged
that in respect of 1,360 entries of cigars ex warehouse for
home consumption, and 60 entries of cigarettes ex warehouse
for home consumption, the defendants had made, or had each
been party to the making of, an entry which was false in the
particulars furnished therein of the weight of the cigars or
cigarettes as the case may be the subject of the entry;
that the defendants had thereby evaded, or been party to the
2.
evasion in each instance of, a substantial amount of duty
payable in respect of such entry for consumption. The
plaintiff alleged that in respect of each such entry and
evasion, the defendants had an intent to defraud the
revenue. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants
had committed in relation to those cigars and cigarettes the
offence of smuggling under s. 233 (1)(a). The plaintiff
claims in respect of each entry or evasion and in respect of
such smuggling the penalties for which s. 234 and 240 of the
Act provide. The suit is thus a customs prosecution within
Part XIV of the Act: consequently the provisions of s. 255
are available to the plaintiff and by an appropriate para-
graph of the statement of claim he has averred the facts
which he relates in the statement.
The defendants by their statements of defence
admit the matters of fact relating to each of the 1,420
entries for home consumption but deny that they or any of
them had an intent to defraud the revenue or that they or any
of them smuggled any of the goods. The plaintiff joined
issue upon these statements of defence except in so far as
they contained admissions of fact.
Upon the proceedings being called on before
me for hearing, I was informed by counsel for the crown that
the defendants proposed with his concurrence to tender
statements setting out the facts relating to the entries
referred to in the statement of claim, which statements
would include transcripts of interviews between Customs
officers investigating the making of such entries and the
personal defendants. I was asked by both parties to accept
these statements as recording the evidence which the
defendants on the one hand and the investigating officers
on the other hand could give on oath. Counsel for the
plaintiff said that the plaintiff, whilst having no actual
3.
knowledge of all the matters stated in these statements of
fact, could agree that the statements were substantially
correct except as to the existence in Sydney of a list of
conventional weights and as to the communications said to
have passed between the defendants. He informed me that
full enquiry had not found in the possession of the Customs
in Sydney or in that of any of the officers there any such
list of weights as is mentioned in the statements of fact
and that upon departmental enquiries no Customs officer
connected with the passing of any of the above entries had
been found guilty of any offence other than negligence in
the performance of duty as such an officer. Counsel for
the plaintiff also informed me that the plaintiff had no
further material on which to base the allegation in his
statement of claim of an intent to defraud than what
appeared in the statements of fact and the transcript of
the interrogation of the defendants annexed to those statements
of fact. He tendered two series of documents, one relating
to the allegations in paragraph 10 of the statement of claim
and the other relating to the allegations in paragraph 11 of
the statement of claim. Each series of documents include
the commercial invoice of the manufacturers, the entry for
warehousing, the genuine invoice and the entry ex warehouse
for home consumption.
It would appear from these statements of fact
that the first defendant for some years during which some
person other than the third defendant was the agent in
Australia for the sale and distribution of cigars
manufactured by Ritméester Sigarenfabrieken N.V. of Holland
had arranged for shipments of such cigars on arrival in
Australia to be warehoused and for their entry ex warehouse
for home consumption upon the directions of the then agent
for their sale and distribution in Australia. According to
be
the statement of the first and second defendants, during
this time a practice existed in Sydney for the Customs to
accept an entry of cigars and cigarettes ex warehouse for
home consumption according to a conventional weight of the
cigars without actually weighing them, or a sample of them
at the time of passing that entry. When in 1948 the third
defendant succeeded to the agency for the sale and dis-
tribution in Australia of Ritmbester cigars, the first
defendant by the second defendant informed the third
defendant through the fourth defendant and fifth defendants
that because cigars were not weighed in Sydney by Customs
officers when entered for home consumption whilst they were
weighed in Melbourne on such entry, it was advisable and
would be profitable to import and enter Ritmsester cigars
through Sydney rather than through Melbourne. The third,
fourth ang fifth defendants agree that they were so
informed, that they realised that there could be a consider-
able saving in import duty, which on cigars and cigarettes
is levied according to weight, that the saving meant a
significant reduction in their costs; that with this
knowledge they authorised the first defendant to clear goods
through Sydney and that there was an arrangement by which
the first defendant was paid a commission which reflected
some part of the import duty thus saved.
From the documents tendered in evidence which
the parties agreed were symptomatic of all the entries
referred to in the statement of claim, the course of events
and the practice adopted in connection with the importation
of cigars is quite apparent.
The cigars were invoiced by the manufacturers
in Holland to the third defendant by what is referred to
in the documents as a commercial invoice. An invoice
5s
for the purposes of Customs, called a Genuine Invoice
(see s. + and 40B of the Act), was also furnished with
the goods. Each of these invoices specified a weight per
thousand of the cigars referred to in the invoice, such
weight being expressed in kilogrammes. There is no
challenge in this case to the propriety of those invoices
or to any of the particulars set out in them. The
specified weight was the same in each. On arrival of the
ship in Sydney the first defendant usually, though not
always, through the second defendant entered the goods for
warehousing in the Argyle Bond. In this entry for ware-
housing the weight of the cigars as particularised in the
genuine invoice was disclosed, the necessary conversion from
kilogrammes to pounds being accurately calculated. Indeed,
the genuine invoice setting out the manufacturer's weight
was produced. The shipments remained in warehouse for
various, and on occasions lengthy, periods of time. I was
given to understand by counsel during the hearing of this
case that the wight of cigars and cigarettes could be
expected to vary due to climatic influences and that their
weight at the point of entry ex warehouse for home con-
sumption would not necessarily be the same as the weight
particularised in the genuine invoice. In Melbourne,
according to what I was told, check weighing is done when
the cigars are so entered and the actual, or at least the
approximate actual, weight of the cigars at that time is
ascertained.
However, when the third defendant directed
the first defendant to enter a quantity of cigars for home
consumption and to arrange for their delivery to the
customer of the third defendant who was purchasing them,
the first defendant frequently, though not always, through
the second defendant prepared and submitted an entry of the
6.
required quantity of cigars ex warehouse for home con-
sumption. This entry contained a reference to the entry
for warehousing, identifying the subject matter of the
later entry with that of the former. But, the weight of
the cigars entered for home consumption was in every
instance less than that particularised in the entry for
warehousing. The first and second defendants say that
the weight set out in the entries for home consumption
accorded with a schedule of weights in their possession
which they derived from the Customs in Sydney many years
'ago. They do not know how the schedule originated but
they say that the weights it sets out were always accepted
by Customs officers in Sydney over many years, including
the years during which they entered for home consumption
cigars and cigarettes imported by the third defendant.
As I have said the plaintiff's counsel says that the
plaintiff knows nothing of such a list and that extensive
search and enquiry by officers in Sydney has not revealed
any such list.
However, in the case of every entry for home
consumption the appropriate Customs officer endorsed the
entries submitted by the first defendant with the legend
"Particulars Correct" and passed the entry. Different
officers followed this course over the years with which
this case is concerned. Each officer had in his possession
or readily available to him at the time of passing the entry
ex warehouse for home consumption the appropriate entry
for warehousing to which the entry for home consumption
expressly made reference. Thus the discrepancy, which was
in every instance considerable in the weight of the cigars
as between the two entries was patent to him because he had
need to verify the identity of the goods whether in whole
7.
or in part in each entry. I ought at this point to mention
that the entries for home consumption were passed in the
name of the first defendant as owner, though in truth it
was not. This is said by the second defendant to have
resulted from an arrangement with the Customs as a matter
of convenience. However, no significance is presently
said to attach to this irregularity.
Upon the goods being thus entered for home
consumption, the first defendant would pass to the third
defendant an account for the amount of duty paid and for
the amount of commission payable for the first defendant's
services, The third defendant had no other knowledge of
the details of the clearance of the goods for home con-
"sump tion.
It is quite apparent from this brief recital
that nobody now knows the actual weight of 'the cigars or
cigarettes at the point of entry ex warehouse for home
consumption. The exporters' weight according to its
invoice is known and duty for the difference between that
weight and the weight set out in the entries for home
consumption has been calculated. In respect of all the
entries to which the amended statement of claim relates, the
total amount of duty short levied on this basis is $343,326.
The whole of this sum along with a further sum of $230,235.
representing duty short paid on entries made outside the
period covered by this action has been paid to the Collector
of Customs for New South Wales by the third defendant "under
protest", I was informed by counsel for that defendant
that the protest was to cover particularly that part of the
amount claimed to have been short levied, the recovery of
which was statute barred according to the provisions of the
Act. But, though the actual weight of the cigars and
8.
cigarettes to which the offending entries relate is not
known, the admission by the defendants in their statements
of defence of the weights averred by the plaintiff as the
true weight of such cigars and cigarettes at the time of
entry for home consumption renders the third defendant
liable for duty on the basis averred by the plaintiff.
In any case it is agreed by the parties that for present
purposes I am entitled to assume and will assume that the
whole of the duty upon the importation of all the cigars
and cigarettes to which the statement of claim refers is
secured to the plaintiff.
The acceptance over a period of years of the
weights: shown in the entries ex warehouse for home consumption,
in the face of the particulars in the entry for warehousing,
indicates either that the Customs officers certifying the
correctness of the particulars in the entries for home
consumption were knowingly participating in a fraud on the
revenue or that they had the view that, because of the
likelihood of a variation due to climatic influences of the
goods the subject of the entries, acceptance of a conventional
weight would in general give a fair result taken over a
period of time. Or there may possibly be other explanations
of this irregular course of conduct on the part of the
different Customs officers who certified and passed the
entries. However, I would not be warranted upon the
material before me in finding the Customs officers guilty
of fraud in the acceptance of the entries ex warehouse for
home consumption. They were clearly negligent in accepting
conventional weights, if that is what they did; at least
they ought to have spot-checked such weights with some
frequency and the defendants cannot escape culpability for
taking advantage of this dereliction of duty on the part of
the various Customs officers. But I do not take the view
Py
that this conduct necessarily involved an intent to defraud
the revenue. No information was withheld from the Customs
and no act proved to have been done to persuade the Customs
officers to accept the weights in the entries for home
consumption.
In this situation I am disposed to accept the
statement of the first and second defendant that there was a
list of conventional rates of which both those defendants
and the Customs in Sydney were aware and by reference to
which the entries for home consumption were made, certified
and passed. But it is unnecessary to come to any final
conclusion on that matter. I find that the third, fourth
and fifth defendants were aware of the practice in Sydney in
relation to the passing of entries for home consumption of
cigars and cigarettes; that they preferred to clear cigars
and cigarettes imported on their account through Sydney
rather than through Melbourne as a means of involving the
third defendant in the payment of less duty than it might
otherwise be required to pay. But I am unable on the
material before me to conclude that in employing the first
defendant with the knowledge of the practice that defendant
followed in entering the cigars and cigarettes for home
consumption to arrange for the warehousing and subsequent
entry for home consumption of cigars and cigarettes it or
the third and fourth defendant had an intent to defraud the
revenue. No other act by those defendants in this respect
is established.
The case then is one in which on the admissions
in the pleadings there has been a systematic underpayment of
duty achieved by means of the making of entries ex warehouse
for home consumption which contained false particulars as to the
weight of the goods the subject of the entry. But no intent
to defraud the revenue is positively established. Therefore
10.
I am not concerned in this case as was my brother Kitto in
Anderson v. Vogel and Son pty. Ltd. 41 A.L.J.R. 264 with a
ease of smuggling. Smuggling is defined by s. & of the
Act as "any importation, introduction or exportation or
attempted importation, introduction or exportation of
goods with intent to defraud the revenue!' I have been
unable to make a finding as to intent which would satisfy
this definition. Further, the question whether the passing
of an entry for home consumption of goods already in the
country under bond in a warehouse would satisfy other parts
of the definition of smuggling would need close consideration.
The plaintiff seeks "convictions" of the
defendants both under s. 234 (a) - evasion of duty - and
s. 234 (d) ~ making a false entry. But the evasion was,
as I have said, achieved by the false entries. Thus,
though there may be a conviction under both subsections,
it is not proper, in my opinion, to treat the matter as
involving two separate and unrelated offences for which
substantial separate penalties should be imposed, though of
course in assessing a penalty for making the false entry if
that be taken as the principal offence the fact that thereby
duty was evaded must be a most important factor.
The value of the goods to which the'1,420
entries related was $1,872,000. The amount of duty evaded
$343 , 326.
I find all the defendants guilty of making
entries which were false in the particulars of the weight
of the goods to which the entries related and of evading
payment of duty which was payable thereon. The third,
fourth and fifth defendants are guilty of the offence under
s. 234 (a) by reason of the provision of s. 236 of the Act
and the first and second defendants are guilty of the
offence under s, 234 (a) by reason of s. 236. The maximm
1.
penalty for the offence under s. 234 (a) is by virtue of
s. 240 three times the value of the goods the subject of
the entries, i.e. $5,616,000.
Though an intent to defraud has not been made
out by the plaintiff, there has been a systematic course of
conduct on the part of the defendants by which payment of the
large sum of duty to which I have referred has been evaded
and advantage taken to the profit of the first and third
defendants of the negligence of Customs officers in the
passing of entries for home consumption of goods warehoused
under bond. I should mention at this point that since these
offences were committed there has been a substantial change
in the ownership of the shares in the third defendant and
in its management. Since that time the third defendant has
not only co-operated with the plaintiff and his officers but
has paid, though for the moment under protest, the whole
amount of the duty claimed by the plaintiff in respect of
the great number of entries for home consumption listed in
or referred to in the statement of claim.
Counsel for each party addressed me on the
question of penalty. All were agreed that there was no
need to discriminate as between the defendants as to degrees
of culpability and that whatever penalty I decided to impose
should be imposed on each and all the defendants. Counsel
for the defendants, and particularly counsel for the third
defendant, did not seek to minimise the seriousness of the
offences committed over the substantial number of years to
which the plaintiff's claim relates; but counsel for the
third defendant took the course of suggesting to me a figure
for penalty which he submitted I ought to find adequate in
all the circumstances. It was a most substantial figure,
namely, $1,000,000, which though far short of the maximum
penalty possible is about thrice the amount of duty evaded
12.
in the transactions under challenge. Counsel for the
other defendants concurred in the submission. Counsel
for the plaintiff informed me that he had considered this
figure, counsel for the third defendant having given him
foreknowledge of the intention to propose it for my
consideration. Having given the matter some thought counsel
for the plaintiff informed me that it was the plaintiff's
view that such a penalty was adequate in all the circumstances.
Indeed, counsel with some candour informed me that, had he had
need to make a submission in that case, he for his own part
doubted whether he would have pressed for any greater penalty
if I had been able to find an intent to defraud the revenue.
Without endorsing this view of counsel for the
plaintiff - and there is no present need to consider it one
way or another - and after a good deal of consideration, I
have come to the conclusion that a total penalty of $1,000,200
imposed on each and all the defendants is an adequate penalty
poth to mark disapproval of the defendants! course of conduct
and to protect the revenue against the evasion of duty and the
making of false entries.
Accordingly, I make declarations :
1) That the defendants and each of them have
and has been guilty of an offence. under
s. 234 (a) with respect to the duty properly
payable in respect of each entry ex warehouse
for home consumption of the goods comprised
in the entries ex warehouse for home consumption
mentioned in paragraphs 8 to 32 of the Statement
of Claim.
2) That the defendants and each of them have and
has been guilty of an offence under s. 234 (a)
with respect to the entries referred to in the
declaration already made.
13.
I impose a total penalty of $1,000,000 in
respect of the offences under s. 234 (d) and a total
penalty of $200 in respect of the offence under s. 234 (a).
I make the usual order for the handing out
of exhibits.
By consent I make no order for costs.