ASKEW V. ASKEW AND ANOR.

ca978 35

W. M, Houston, Govt, Print.

Metb.

MW.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ORIGINAL

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ASKEW

Ve

ASKEW AND AVOR.

Decree of the Supreme Court varied by deleting so much thereof as declares "that the Defendant Ivy Lillian Maude Askew is a trustee for the Plaintiff of the estate in fee simple in the said lands of which she is the registered proprietor as aforesaid as a joint tenant with the Plaintiff". Otherwise appeal dismissed with costs.

ASKEW ve

ASKEW AND ANOR.

JUDGMENT DIXON CoJ. ALTTO Je

TAYLOR J.

ASKEW

Ve

ASKEW AND _ANGR.

The appellant and her brother, the first-named respondent (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) are registered under the provisions of the Real Property Act, 1900, as the joint proprietors of a parcel of land at Dee Why near Sydney. The circumstances under which they became so registered are unusual and led Roper J., after hearing the evidence in a suit instituted by the respondent, to conclude that the appellant has no beneficial interest in the property and that her interest was at all material times held by her by way of security only. By the decree which disposed of the suit he so declared and this appeal is brought in an attempt to set the decree aside.

Upon the land 'ts erected a cottage and, originally it was purchased in the joint names of the respondent and his first wife as their matrimonial home. On 22nd October 1948, however, the respondent transferred his interest in the land to his wife. During this year, it appears from the evidence, the respondent suffered a nervous breakdown and, at various times during the year, he received treatment, as an inmate, for his condition in three different institutions in Sydney. He received this treatment prior to 22nd October 1948 and on that day, after executing the instrument by which his interest in the land was transferred to his wife, he left Sydney with the appellant for a sea voyage to Perth. Upon his return he again entered hospital for treatment and he appears to have been in hospital in 1949 during January and February and, again, during April and May. Upon his discharge from hospital in May 1949 he returned home to Dee Why and found the home locked up and his wife missing. The respondent entered the house and since then he has continued to live there. About the time of his discharge from hospital on this occasion the appellant went to live with him andshe continued to live in the home at Dee Why until