IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION DIRECTED TO THE HONOURABLE BASIL HOGAN, A JUDGE OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA; EX PARTE THERESE RUTH MELVILLE 72/1985

[98 - Otay

IN_THE MATTER of an application' for a Writ of Prohibition directed to THE HONOURABLE BASIL HOGAN, a Judge of the Family Court of Australia

Ex parte: THERESE RUTH. MELVILLE

JUDGMENT WILSON _J. CORAL)

IN_THE MATTER of an application for a Writ of Prohibition directed to THE HONOURABLE BASIL HOGAN, a Judge of the

Family Court of Australia Ex parte: THERESE RUTH MELVILLE

This is an application for an order nisi for a writ of prohibition directed to Mr Justice Hogan of the Family Court of Australia. The essential basis of the application is set

out in the affidavit of the applicant wife, as follows:

"I say that His Honour has prejudged my alleged contempt and predetermined what punishment I would receive. His Honour has also formed a_ biased opinion about the outcome of the custody application of my former husband (par. 49).

I am firmly of the opinion that His Honour is not unprejudiced and impartial to my _ position in respect of the applications which are presently before the Family Court of Australia at Newcastle for hearing (par. 50).

I am concerned that His Honour has formed the opinion that I have done something wrong and that he has also determined in advance what the punishment would be (par. 53).

I intend to defend the application that I show cause why I should not be dealt with for contempt

and further the application of my former husband for custody of the child ..." (par. 54).

I fully appreciate the anxiety of the wife and I can understand how she is of the mind that is expressed in these paragraphs. Of course, it may be said, fairly easily,

that there is no sufficient evidence to establish that the

learned judge has, in fact, prejudged anything with respect to these applications. But that is not the whole test. The test is whether in all the circumstances the parties, or either of them, or the public, might entertain a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the questions