> {N THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA WHITEHEAD AND OTHER. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Acgolaide Judgment delivered at On Ve ie Appeal dismissed with costs. Ve EHEAD AND AJOTHE EUG ENT wie (ORAL) ITE ND _ANOTHE: In this appeal the appellant submits in substance two things: he says that the trial judge either misdirected himself or gave improper weight to some circumstances disclosed in the evidence; he says secondly, I think, that the award itself, locked at as a figure, is so inadequate in relation to the injuries for which it is said to compensate as to be beyond the exercise of a proper discretion in assessing the damages. The appellant has failed to convince me of either of these points. The question for this Court is not whether this Court would have found a different figure for damages, but whether it is shown that the trial judge had fallen short of the exercise of a proper discretion in the assessment he made. In my opinion, the trial judge did not conmit any error in relation to the facts of the case, nor did he misdirect himself in any matter which related to the assessments So far as the amount is concerned, I am not convinced that it is an amount which is inadequate in the sense that it demonstrates an erroneous exercise of discretion. Consequentiy, 1 would dismiss the appeale MokENZIE Ve Me REEAD AND ANOTHER MENZ McKENZIE Ve WHITEHRAD AND ANOTHER Mr, Burbank, in the course of on argument that put all that can be said in favour of the appellant's case, seemed to me to advence two argunents for the revision by this Court of the damages assessed by the learned trial judge. The first is that his Honour took a too optimistic view of the plaintiff's employment prospects. His Honour did, however, have the evidence of Dr. Holmes that the appellant would be & good tradesman. It seems, moreover, that up to the date of the trial the appellant's endeavours to obtain work were probably not directed to the field in which he has the best prospects. His Honour's sonslusion "I do not think he will become unemploye able, but the kind of work which he will be able to do will not be as congenial, or necessarily very easy to find" seems to me to have been warranted by the evidence. The second argument put forward by Mr. Burbank was that the leamed trial judge made toc much of what he described in his judgment as substantisl deductions for adverse contingencies. It 4s true that his Honour did think the appellant's pre-accident earnings could not be accepted as a certain guide for what he would have baen able to sarn had there been no accident, but it 1 is to be observed that his Honour's observations about this matter were dealing with on argument expressed as follows: "For the plaintiff, it is claimed that his earnings at the time of the accident, inceluding the free rent of the house, free wood and electricity, ond meat supplied at a cheap rate, amounted to approximately $45 per week, and his loss of earning capacity is represented by the present value of these for the period of the remainder of his working life". This his Honour rejected. In the circumstances and having regard to the ev*' as a whole it is not possible for me to be satisfied th Honour took into account matters that he should have avo. 2. that he failed to take into account matters which he should have taken into account to the advantage of the appellant. I agree, therefore, that this appeal should be dismissed, SUDGMENT (ORAL) McKENZIE We WEITERE, 3 (2) WENDEYER J. McKENZIE We In my opinion, this is not a case in which this Court should set aside the judgment of the learned trial judge. I do not think that his assessment oan be said to be a wholly erroneous assessment so as to require the inter- vention of this Court. I prefer to say no more therefore than that I agree that this eppeal should be dismissed.