RE HEALTH SERVICES UNION OF AUSTRALIA; EX PARTE THE STATE OF VICTORIA AND ANOR.
High Court of Australia
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EALTH SERV; TA
EX PARTE. THE STATE OF VICTORIA AND ANOR
SUDGMENT
(oral)
16 December 1993
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E_HE. SER iT TA:
EX _PARTE ''HE STATE OF VICTORIA AND ANOR
These are applications for orders nisi for writs of
prohibition and certiorari arising out of two separate
findings by the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission of the existence of an industrial dispute.
The firat finding was made on 14 December 1992 upon the
basis of the failure to comply with a log of claims
served by the Health Sarvices Union of Australia ("the
HSUA") on a number of employers including the
applicants, At the time it made that finding of the
existence of a dispute, the Commission made an interim
award dealing with the termination of employment. The
first applicant sought leave to appeal against the
finding and the interim award. Subsequently the appeal
against the interim award was withdrawn and the award
was varied by consent. Leave to appeal against the
finding of dispute was refused,
On 4 March and 11 May 1993 the applicants applied
to McHugh J. for a stay of proceedings generally. On
TTL SURI
ur
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both occasions his Honour refused the application!!),
On the first occasion he did so observing that the
applicants had not applied to the Commission for a stay
of proceedings (2), On the second occasion he
expressed the view that the applicants' case did not
have sufficient prospect of success to warrant his
granting a etay(4),
After this Court had given its decision in fe State
Public Services Federation; Ex parte Attorney-General
(Western Australia )\*) ("the SPSF Case"), the HSUA
served a further log of claims which, in effect,
modified some of the earlier claims with a view to
avoiding the risk of the earlier claims being found to
be fanciful and, for that reason, not capable of giving
rise to a genuine dispute. This second log of claims
was the basis of the second finding of dispute which
was made on 2 December 1993,
(1) See Ke Australian Nursing Federation; Ex parte
Victoria gue. 1) (1993) 67 A.L.J.R. 377; 112
A.L.R. 1773 Re Australian Nursing Federation; Bx
parte Vietorta (No. 2) (1993) 67 A.L.J.R. 571,
(2) Re Australian Nursing Federation; Ex parte
Victoria (No. 1) (1993) 67 A.L.J.R., at p.385;
112 A.L.R., at p.187.
(3) Re Australian Nursing Federation; Ex parte
Victoria [No. 2] (1993) 67 A.L.d.R., at pp.565-
577.
(4) (1993) 67 A.D.g.R. 577; 113 A.L.R. 385.
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Orders nisi for prohibition and certiorari were
granted by McHugh J. on the first occasion when he
refugad a stay. The grounds relied upon then raised
constitutional issues involving the State of Victoria.
These applications seek to raise the same issues and,
in addition, to raise an issue whether the refusal to
accede to the first or the second log of claims was
capable of giving rise to a genuine industrial dispute.
IT have indicated to the parties that I intend to grant
the orders nisi sought, including the additional
ground. That leaves for decision the application which
the applicants algo make for a stay of proceedings.
The applicanta have not sought to appeal in the
Commission against the finding made on 2 December 1993.
Indeed, they have made application that the matter be
referred for hearing by a Full Bench. Nor have the
applicants sought in the Commission to stay the
proceedings. In the present applications before me,
they do not seek to stay proceedings on the interim
award which was varied - they appreciate that they
would have soma difficulty in making such an
application - but thay otherwise seek to stay
proceedings generally,
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I indicated during argument that I would be loathe
to depart from the views expressed by McHugh J. on the
occasions on which he refused a stay and that, unless
there were circumstances which threw a different light
upon the matter I would not be disposed to grant the
application for a stay. It must now be clear that an
application for a stay order under 0.55, r.10 of the
High Court Rules - which is the provision under which
the applicants make their application - is sparingly
granted and then only with caution.
The applicants pointed to the additional ground
concerning the genuineness of the dispute which would
raise questions agitated in tha SPSF Case. However,
whilst I was prepared to grant orders nisi upon that
ground in addition to the others, I am bound to say
that I do not think that upon the material before me it
adds significantly to the strength of the applicants'
case, The applicants also pointed to a change in the
position of the number of relevant employees who are
now employed under individual contracts of employment,
but this does not seem to me to be a circumstance which
would warrant a departure from the conclusion
previously reached by McHugh J.
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The applicants sought to question the view
expressed by McHugh J. that certainty was best served
by regulation by an industrial tribunal - a regime
which had hitherto existed. But as the respondent
pointed out, the view taken as to the strength of the
applicants' case must inevitably have a bearing upon
the question of certainty. The regime which is likely
to prevail is the one which is best preserved in the
interests of certainty pending final determination of
proceedings.
It seams to me that the applicants are in a
difficult position in making their application for a
stay order by reason of the existence of the interim
consent award in this case. True it is that thay do
not sock to stay proceadings on that award, but I do
not think that it can be completely isolated from the
present application. There is, to say the least, some
inconsistency between the acceptance of the
jurisdiction of the Commission on the occasion of
consenting to the award and seeking to stay the making
of further orders on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.
In addition to that, no application for leave to
appeal or for a stay of proceedings has been made in
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the Commission. The applicants say the grounds on
which such an application might be made to the
Commission have already been considered by it and
rejected in other cases. But I am not prepared to
assume that if an application were made in this case
and good grounds for a stay of proceedings were made
out, the Commission would be deaf to those submissions.
After all, the applicants' arguments relate to the
balance of convenience in circumstances which are
continually changing, as much ag to the strength of
their legal arugments. And the former matter is
something which is peculiarly appropriate for decision
by the Commission.
I endorse with respect the remarks of McHugh J. in
fe Austradiian Nursing Federation; Ex parte Victoria
(yo. 1)"),
"Oxdinarily, the Commission will have a
far greater knowledge of the facts and
circumstances affecting the dispute than a
Justice of this Court can hope to gain in an
application for a stay of proceedings
pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction or 0,55
v.10 of the Avgt Court Rules. Furthermore,
if the application is refused by the
Commission before this Court is asked to
(5) (1993) 67 A.L.J.R., at p.386; 112 A.L.R., at
p.188.
grant a stay, the Court will have the benefit
of the Commission's reasona for refusing the
stay."
For these reasons the application for a stay is
refused,
This and the preceding six pages
comprise my reasons for judgment in
Re Health Services Union of Australia;
Ex parte the State of Victorla and Anor.