IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY ALAN GEORGE SKYRING 49/1985

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IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION

BY ALAN GEORGE SKYRING

JUDGMENT MASON J. — WILSON J. (Oral) BRENNAN J.

or/r7f 14 «S DAWSON J.

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION

BY ALAN GEORGE SKYRING

In December 1984 the appellant lodged with the Brisbane Registry six documents which he sought to have issued as writs. In five of them, the defendant named was a Commonwealth Minister. In the sixth, the defendant named was "the Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

holden at Brisbane".

On 17 January 1985, the Chief Justice directed the Registrar of the Court to refuse to issue any of the writs without the leave of a Justice first had and obtained.

This direction was given pursuant to Order 58 rule 4(3)

of the High Court Rules.

On 23 January the appellant applied by chamber summons for leave to issue the documents as writs. This application came on before Deane J. ex parte. Deane J. refused the application. In this appeal from Deane J.'s decision the appellant claims that the writs were designed to establish a decision by the Court that the provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution do not authorize the issue of paper money as legal tender, that section 36(1) of the

Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) which so provides is invalid,

2.

that taxation is an infringement of property rights

deriving from Magna Carta and that therefore the

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), in making provision

for taxation, is invalid and unconstitutional.

In relation to the submissions that the applicant

made, Deane J. said at first instance:

"I have come to a clear conclusion that there

is no substance in the argument that there is

a constitutional bar against the issue by the Commonwealth of paper money as legal tender.

Nor, in my view, would there be any substance

in an argument that the provisions of section 36(1) of the Reserve Bank Act 1959 are invalidated or overruled by the provisions of the Currency Act 1965. That being so, I am unpersuaded that there is any substance in the proposed proceedings against Mr Justice Spender [the judge of the Federal Court referred to in the sixth document], nor am I persuaded that proceedings by certiorari against Mr Justice Spender would in any event be appropriate.