IN THE HIGH COURT OF PEE 2 NEW SOUTH WALES REGISTRY. CAM _& SONS PTY. LIMITED. ve SARGENT. ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT DELIVERED BY DIXON J. AT SYDNEY ON 1st AUGUST, 1940. CAM & SONS PTY. LTD. ve SARGENT ORAL JUDGMENT DIXON J. I agree. The proceedings are based upon an award of the Commonwealth Court of Cénciliation and Arbitration, but the award was not put in evidence. We have not, therefore, the advantage of knowing its exact terms. We are told, however, that in the view of the parties the liability of the defendant depends upon the existence between it and the plaintiff of the relationship of master and servant. The course of business between the parties, viewed from the outside, would appear to suggest that the plaintiff was no more than the master of the ship ownegby the defendant, occupying the ordinary positién of a master. But an agreement is relied upon by the defendant in order to show that xxak the true relationship was something else. That agreement purports to demise the ship to a partnerskip consisting of the master and fers; of the ship, all apparently being treated as jointly suntributing constituting the charterers or hirers of the ship and in that respect as standing on an equality. The clause in which that is done merely speaks of the partnership hiring the ship. There is no hire specified and there are no words which expressly put the possession of the ship in the partnership. The agreement shows that the ship was to be loaded and discharged by the CR eS ee a ree ne ee cra owners and it may be doubted whether on the whole agreement, notwithstanding the use of the word "hire", an intention appears of completely depriving the owners of control and placing the exclusive possession of the ship in the master and crew forming the so-called partnership. An examination of the provisions of the agreemmnt discloses that in truth the remuneration of the crew is a fixed sum of money per trip of voyage, a sum which cannot increase, although conceivably it might dimimish, if the so- called earnings of the partnership were insufficient to provide it. The use of the ship is strictly limited to voyages between two specified ports, Sydney and Swansea, and it is limbted to the carriage of cargoes provided or found by the ship-owner. In a matter of this sort we are to look at the substance of the transaction and not to treat a writ_ten agreement , which is designed to disghise its real nature, as succeeding in doing so if it amounts merely to a cloud of words amd, without really altering the substantial relations between the parties, describes them by elaborate appropriate to provisions expressed in terms sf/some other relation. In my opinion this agreement, whilst it contains many clauses and seeks to elaborate many ideas which look towards a relationship of hire or demise, when it is analysed does nothing more than provide for a lump sum payment per trip to a number of people who are to conduct the operations of the defendants in an ordinary normal manner. operations which are carried out by means of the ship. All moneys arising from the ship a_re to wome to the hands of the owners, though under the description of "agents." They are to provide the ship in all respects except food and they are not accountable to the "partnership" who receive nothing but a fixed sum per trip. No new member of the ship's company is to be signed on without the approval of the owners Nothing is said as ta the position of the original members who leave the ship and in fact two did so and were replaced by two new members whose status must have been that of employee. Like all the others they signed articles opened in the ordinary form. I think the learned judge was perfectly right in treating the substance of the relation of maséér and servant as subsisting between the parties to the litigation before him. In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed.