Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,

GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

BRIAN GODFREY JOHNSON APPELLANT

AND

KATHLEEN JOHNSON RESPONDENT

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48

7 September 2000

P60/1999

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Family Court of Australia

Representation:

G Griffith QC with R S Ingleby for the appellant (instructed by Lewis, Blyth & Hooper)

D F Jackson QC with K R Wilson for the respondent (instructed by Kim Wilson & Co)

Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Johnson v Johnson

Courts and judges – Bias – Reasonable apprehension of bias – Application for disqualification for bias – Statement by trial judge about evidence to be relied upon – Whether statement gave rise to reasonable apprehension of bias.

1. GLEESON CJ, GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ. The question in this appeal from the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia is whether the trial judge, Anderson J, was disqualified from continuing to hear the case on the ground of apprehended bias. The Full Court of the Family Court decided that question in the negative. 2. The parties to the appeal were married in November 1979. The marriage was dissolved in 1996. The proceedings before Anderson J arose out of a dispute as to the financial arrangements to be made following such dissolution. There was a substantial amount at stake. It was held that there was what the Full Court described as an "asset pool" valued at nearly $30 million. Anderson J decided that the respondent (the wife) should receive 40 per cent of that pool. One of the principal areas of dispute at the trial, which lasted for 66 days, concerned the extent of the appellant's assets and, in particular, whether he was beneficially interested in substantial offshore assets owned by other persons and entities. It is unnecessary to go into the detail of that dispute. What is important is that, at the trial, the respondent was asserting, and the appellant was denying, that the appellant was beneficially interested in various assets, and the investigation of that issue of fact involved a great deal of hearing time. 3. On the twentieth day of the hearing, Anderson J made a comment which resulted in an application by counsel for the appellant that he should disqualify himself.