Ugle v The Queen [2002] HCA 25

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAUDRON, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

MITCHELL JAMES UGLE APPELLANT

AND

THE QUEEN RESPONDENT

Ugle v The Queen [2002] HCA 25

20 June 2002

P61/2001

ORDER

1. Appeal allowed. 2. Set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Western Australia dated 15 March 2001 and, in lieu thereof, order that:

(a) the appellant's appeal to that Court be allowed;

(b) the appellant's conviction be quashed and a new trial be had.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Western Australia

Representation:

A G Braddock SC with R W Richardson for the appellant (instructed by Aboriginal Legal Services of Western Australia)

K P Bates with S A Vandongen for the respondent (instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Australia))

Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Ugle v The Queen

Criminal law – Homicide – Unlawful killing – Murder – Deceased died from knife wound to chest – Whether stabbing was an unwilled act – Whether trial judge erred in failing to direct jury about unwilled acts – Whether trial judge's failure to direct jury gave rise to a substantial miscarriage of justice so that a new trial should be ordered – Whether "event" arguably occurred "by accident".

Words and phrases – "accident" – "act" – "event" – "unwilled act".

The Criminal Code (WA), s 23.

1. GAUDRON J. The facts, the issues presented at the appellant's trial and the relevant provisions of The Criminal Code (WA) are set out in the joint judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ and need not be repeated. And subject to what appears below, I agree with their Honours, for the reasons they give, that this appeal should be allowed. 2. On the question of willed act, a majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Western Australia (Parker and Wheeler JJ, Wallwork J dissenting) took the view that the trial judge "effectively ... resolve[d] the issue whether or not on the [appellant's] account his act in using the knife to wound the deceased occurred independently of the exercise of his will in the [appellant's] favour, by directing the jury to return verdicts of not guilty if they accepted [his] account or were left in reasonable doubt by it"[1]. Were I of the view that the jury must have understood the trial judge's direction in that way, I would be of the further view that there was no miscarriage of justice and that the appeal should be dismissed. However, I do not think that the trial judge's directions can be so understood. 3. In his summing up, the trial judge summarised the appellant's version of events and said that the defence case was that "[the appellant] had no choice but to defend himself". His Honour instructed the jury that, if that were so, they "would be entitled to take the view ... [the appellant] ... was acting lawfully in self-defence". It was in that context that his Honour directed the jury that, if they accepted the appellant's version or were left with a reasonable doubt, they should find him and his co-accused not guilty. Subsequently, his Honour directed the jury in these terms: