DL v The Queen [2018] HCA 26

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ, BELL, KEANE, NETTLE AND EDELMAN JJ

DL APPELLANT

AND

THE QUEEN RESPONDENT

DL v The Queen [2018] HCA 26 20 June 2018 A38/2017

ORDER

Appeal dismissed.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia

Representation

M E Shaw QC with B J Doyle for the appellant (instructed by Town & Country Lawyers)

C D Bleby SC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia with B Lodge for the respondent (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (SA))

Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

DL v The Queen

Criminal law – Trial by judge alone – Adequacy of reasons – Where appellant convicted of "[p]ersistent sexual exploitation of a child" – Where offence comprised of two or more acts of sexual exploitation separated by not less than three days – Where complainant alleged various acts of sexual exploitation over many years – Where alleged inconsistencies and implausibilities in complainant's evidence – Where trial judge regarded complainant as reliable witness as to "core allegations" – Whether trial judge's reasons inadequate because failed to identify two or more acts constituting offence – Whether trial judge's reasons inadequate because failed to explain process of reasoning.

Words and phrases – "adequacy of reasons", "basis for decision", "conflict between evidence", "credibility", "inadequacy of reasons", "inconsistencies in evidence", "process of reasoning", "reasons", "trial by judge alone".

Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 50(1).

KIEFEL CJ, KEANE AND EDELMAN JJ. Introduction The appellant was charged under s 50(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) with one count of persistent sexual exploitation of a child. At the relevant time, that sub-section created an offence where an adult person, "over a period of not less than 3 days, commits more than 1 act of sexual exploitation of a particular child under the prescribed age". The appellant was tried by judge alone and convicted. He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for "indecent assaults [upon the victim], acts of fellatio upon each other, the showing of pornographic magazines, masturbating in the victim's presence and causing the victim to masturbate". The appellant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of South Australia. One ground of appeal to that Court was that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate. The Court of Criminal Appeal (Blue J, with whom Kourakis CJ and Bampton J agreed) held that the reasons were not inadequate. The appellant appeals to this Court from that conclusion. But he relies upon a different basis for the alleged inadequacy of the trial judge's reasons. The essential basis of his appeal raised an issue that overlapped with two other matters that were also given special leave to appeal. The issue in this appeal is whether the trial judge's reasons failed to identify, and to disclose the process of reasoning leading to his finding of, the two or more acts of sexual exploitation upon which the conviction was based. The appellant's submission that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate for this reason should not be accepted. For the reasons below, the appeal should be dismissed. The particulars and the evidence The particulars of the offence charged The particulars of the offence charged in the information under s 50(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act were that the appellant: (i) touched the complainant's genitals over the complainant's clothes; (ii) showed the complainant pornography; (iii) masturbated in the complainant's presence; (iv) encouraged the complainant to masturbate in his presence; (v) caused the complainant to perform fellatio upon him; and (vi) performed fellatio upon the complainant. The period during which the offence was alleged to have been committed began on 6 February 1984, when the appellant was 31 years old and the complainant was five years old. It was alleged to have concluded on 1 September 1994, when the appellant was 41 years old and the complainant was 15 years old. The prosecution case At the time of the acts relied upon by the prosecution, the complainant was a child who lived with his parents and his brother and sister. The appellant was the complainant's uncle. Because of the work commitments of the complainant's parents, the complainant and his siblings, an older sister and a younger brother, occasionally stayed with the appellant's family at the appellant's house in Christies Beach. The appellant lived with his then wife and, initially, one daughter. The prosecution case relied heavily upon evidence of the complainant although the prosecution also called the complainant's wife, his parents, his sister, his brother, and his aunt. The complainant's evidence was that the first occasion of a sexual assault by the appellant was when the complainant was "about five" years old, in the lounge room of the appellant's house. On that occasion, the appellant touched him on his genital area over his clothing while he and the appellant were playing with a slot car track. The complainant gave evidence of other occasions when the appellant touched him on his genital area over his clothing. One occasion was at his grandmother's house on Christmas Day when he was "nine ... or seven", when the appellant gave him a remote control car. Other occasions of such touching occurred after he was "close to nine", when the appellant would take him to a slot car venue called Red Line. The complainant said that during some of the journeys to Red Line, in the appellant's car, the appellant would touch the complainant on his genital area. The complainant said that when he was "about seven" the appellant began to show him pornographic videos and magazines "of Asian content". The appellant's ex-wife gave evidence that the appellant had been "quite persistent" that she watch pornographic videos with him and she recalled seeing a DVD or video of Asian pornography arrive at the house, about which she questioned him. The complainant said that on three or four occasions he and the appellant masturbated after the appellant showed him what to do. He said that each time this occurred he was playing on a computer in the master bedroom at the appellant's house, although he accepted in cross-examination that the computer could have been subsequently in a different room. The complainant gave evidence relating to two sheds at the appellant's house, described at trial as shed 1 and shed 2. The complainant said that when he was "past the age of nine, going on 12", accepting that his age was "somewhere in that gap", he and the appellant performed fellatio on each other in shed 2 at the appellant's house in Christies Beach. The complainant's evidence about the sheds at the appellant's house was that (i) the appellant grew marijuana hydroponically inside shed 1, which the appellant would give him to smoke nearly every time that he stayed from the age of nine, and (ii) the appellant built shed 2 and started growing the marijuana hydroponically in it when the complainant was around 12 years old. The complainant described two other occasions when he and the appellant performed fellatio on each other. One occasion was when he was "over 12, 12 nearly", in Cherry Gardens, where, as the appellant's ex-wife said in evidence, the appellant grew cannabis. The second occasion was when the complainant was "close to 12", at a South Terrace unit leased by a woman with whom the appellant was in an extra-marital relationship. In 1989, a second daughter was born to the appellant and his then wife. It was an agreed fact at trial that on 28 August 1994, when the appellant's second daughter was five years old and the complainant was 15, the complainant sexually assaulted her by putting his finger into her vagina. The complainant's evidence was that this occurred in shed 2 on the same day that he had performed fellatio on the appellant. He said that his act of fellatio was induced by being allowed to ride the appellant's motorbike, a privilege he said the appellant had permitted since he was "nine, ten, onwards". After the complainant's assault on the appellant's daughter, the complainant was no longer permitted to stay with the appellant's family, although the complainant did continue to visit. The Crown's case, and the complainant's evidence, was that the appellant's offending ceased after the assault on 28 August 1994. The complainant said that the appellant told him that the appellant would use a gun on him and his family if he told anyone about the activities between them. Around 2003 or 2004, at the beginning of his relationship with his partner, later his wife, the complainant told her that he had been abused as a child, although he did not give her any details of the abuse. The evidence from the complainant's wife was consistent with this, although she said that the disclosure was in 2001 or 2002. In 2007 or 2008, the appellant's daughter, assisted by the appellant, made a claim for compensation under the Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA) for the indecent assault by the complainant. She received a payment of $50,000. The complainant was told of the claim by the Director of Public Prosecutions. He later learned that the appellant had encouraged his daughter to make the claim. The complainant said that he had told his counsellor about being sexually abused as a child and that she had suggested that he do something about it, stand up for himself, and see what the appellant was doing. Around 2010, he went to see the appellant twice. On the first occasion they smoked marijuana and on the second occasion the complainant sold marijuana to the appellant. In 2011, the complainant made a complaint at the Christies Beach police station. The appellant's evidence The only witness called by the defence was the appellant. The appellant admitted many of the circumstances described by the complainant but he denied that any of the sexual acts constituting the s 50 offence occurred in those circumstances. The appellant admitted growing marijuana in the bush near Cherry Gardens. But he denied taking the complainant there and denied that any sexual contact occurred there. He admitted growing marijuana in shed 1 and shed 2. But he denied ever supplying marijuana to the complainant prior to the complainant's sexual assault of his daughter. He admitted that there was a slot car track in shed 2 but he said that shed 2 was not built until 1991 (when the complainant was 12 years old) and, relying upon an entry in his calendar, said that he did not finish installing a slot car track in shed 2 until June 1993 (when the complainant was 14 years old). The appellant admitted having a pornographic video and having ordered a catalogue. But he denied ever showing pornography to the complainant. He admitted having a computer in his house but he denied any abuse of the complainant while the complainant used the computer. He also denied that the computer was located in the master bedroom; the evidence from him and his ex-wife was that the computer was located in a spare room that later became his daughter's bedroom. The appellant admitted taking the complainant to the South Terrace unit occupied by the woman with whom he had a relationship, but he said that this occurred after the complainant's assault on his daughter when the complainant was 15 years old. The appellant denied any sexual assault on that occasion and said that he had just taken the complainant there to help him cut up pieces of plastic to make a frame because, at the time, the appellant was "pretty stoned". The appellant admitted that he let the complainant ride his motorbike. But he said that this only occurred sometime after the assault upon his daughter when the complainant was at least 15 years old. The appellant denied that allowing the complainant to ride his motorbike had anything to do with fellatio. The appellant admitted that he had been at the complainant's grandparents' house on Christmas Day, but he did not recall the complainant receiving a remote control car. He denied ever abusing the complainant at the house. He admitted having an air rifle and a semi-automatic firearm, which he had shot at the complainant's family's property when the family was present. But he denied ever threatening anyone with a gun. Finally, the appellant gave evidence related to the complainant's evidence that in 2003 or 2004 the complainant had told his partner (later his wife) that he had been sexually abused, without giving her details. The appellant said that the complainant's father had told him that the complainant was sexually abused by a group of boys described at trial as the Moana boys. One possible inference, therefore, may have been that the sexual abuse about which the complainant had told his wife was abuse by the Moana boys. The complainant's father denied ever telling the appellant this. The trial judge expressly disregarded the complainant's evidence about his complaint of sexual abuse to his wife. The findings and reasons of the trial judge The trial judge was aware, and recorded in his reasons, that the offence in s 50 does not require the prosecution to prove every particular. The trial judge also correctly observed that even if he were to reject the evidence of the appellant, which would have to be rejected beyond reasonable doubt, he would still need to be independently satisfied beyond reasonable doubt about the allegations before he could convict. The trial judge's reasons set out the background to the case, the charges, the particulars, and the essential evidence of the witnesses. One particular matter which the trial judge considered was the significance of the complainant's visits to the appellant twice around 2010. He said that although these visits, on their face, seemed inconsistent with the alleged abuse, they were part of the complainant's way of dealing with his past. The trial judge also rejected the submission that the complainant, encouraged by the appellant's ex-wife, had made false allegations due to long-term ill-feeling that the complainant and the appellant's ex-wife held towards the appellant. The trial judge described a number of matters that he characterised as inconsistencies that the appellant submitted meant that the complainant could not be "relied upon about the substantive allegations" and that his account was implausible. In his summary of the appellant's case, the trial judge said that these formed "an attack upon [the complainant's] truthfulness and reliability". These matters included: (i) the failure by the complainant to mention the final occasion of an assault on him (28 August 1994) until a proofing session with counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions on 25 July 2013; (ii) the complainant's failure to disclose the offences by the appellant during his counselling sessions; (iii) the evidence concerning the Moana boys, which the trial judge described as confusing but not affecting the complainant's credit and reliability; and (iv) inconsistencies about when and where the cannabis was grown and when the slot car track was completed, which are discussed in further detail below. When assessing the credit and reliability of the complainant generally, the trial judge described the complainant as having given evidence "in a forthright and convincing manner". He described the complainant as "a straightforward man", lacking in guile. He said that the complainant presented as "a man endeavouring to tell the truth". After discussing the complainant's demeanour he said that the complainant "was describing real events that happened to him and was not led by the suggestions of others". Although finding that the complainant was endeavouring to tell the truth and was describing real events, the trial judge accepted that some of the complainant's evidence "about when some events occurred [was] inaccurate". He also said that he was conscious that the complainant was a long-term user of drugs. The trial judge then said: "I also accept him as a reliable witness as to the core allegations. I have scrutinised his account very carefully. Some of his estimates of his age when events occurred were not reliable (for example, when he rode the motorbike or being 'stoned'), but they were not sufficient to cause me to doubt either his truthfulness or reliability. Any exaggeration was not deliberate. As reflected in cross-examination, he had trouble remembering the process whereby statements were taken from him, who he told beforehand, who he was with and when he made particular allegations. My comments above should not be overlooked and it should not be forgotten that the conduct alleged took place many times over many years ... Even though he said he lied on one occasion, I do not consider that he deliberately told an untruth, rather he was careless in the way he answered; there is a clear difference. He corrected himself ... Although it is not determinative of the case, having listened to [the complainant] over a number of days, I simply believed him and found him to be reliable. I had the same view of him at the end of all of the evidence." When these paragraphs are considered in the context discussed above, the findings by the trial judge that the complainant "was describing real events that happened to him" and that he was "a reliable witness as to the core allegations" were an acceptance that the complainant was truthful and reliable about all of the sexual acts that he had described, which fell within the particulars of the s 50 offence for which the appellant was charged. The "core allegations" to which the trial judge referred must have been a reference to those acts that were the basis for the s 50 charge, with allegations such as the complainant's particular age at the time of the sexual offences or the precise location of those offences being outside the core allegations. The reference to "core allegations" is consistent with the description by the trial judge of all the allegations of sexual conduct as the "substantive issues". It is also consistent with the distinction that he drew between the evidence concerning the "substantive allegations" and inconsistencies on other matters arising from the evidence. The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal and the appeal to this Court The appellant relied upon three grounds of appeal in the Court of Criminal Appeal. The first was that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence. The second was that the trial judge had erred in his application of the burden of proof. The third was that the trial judge erred "in failing to give adequate reasons in so far as he did not deal with incontrovertible, or arguably incontrovertible inconsistencies affecting the credibility of the complainant, and consequently his conclusion of proof beyond reasonable doubt". The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed all grounds. None of those grounds was relied upon in this Court. Before this Court, there were three limbs to the appellant's sole ground of appeal. The appellant alleged that the Court of Criminal Appeal should have found that: (i) the trial judge had failed to give adequate reasons; (ii) the verdict of guilty was uncertain, unreasonable, and unsafe; and/or (iii) there was a miscarriage of justice. As the appellant clarified in oral submissions, the references to "unreasonableness" and "miscarriage of justice" were in support of the submission that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate due to a failure to identify sufficiently the actus reus of the offence. Although the appellant's oral submissions strayed at times from the grounds of appeal, the appellant's argument reduced ultimately to whether the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they "did not identify the two or more acts of sexual exploitation found proved beyond reasonable doubt ... and the process of reasoning leading to guilt of those acts". The appellant submitted that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred because it did not approach the ground of appeal concerning adequacy of reasons "by reference to the proof of actual sexual offences comprising the actus reus". The submission that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate on that basis was not made in the Court of Criminal Appeal. The submission might not have been made in the Court of Criminal Appeal because counsel may have concluded that the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole, involved a finding that the appellant had committed all of the acts alleged in the particulars to constitute the s 50 offence. At the special leave hearing and in written and oral submissions on this appeal, the appellant submitted that the failure to rely upon the ground of inadequate reasons in the terms relied upon in this Court was because the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Little was handed down the day before argument in the Court of Criminal Appeal in the present case. In fact, the decision in R v Little was handed down five months after the Court of Criminal Appeal decided the present case. Although there might have been doubt about the prospective result in R v Little at the time of hearing the present case in the Court of Criminal Appeal, the relevant part of the decision in R v Little was not novel. It applied earlier South Australian authority, which was held to be "correctly decided" and consistent with the 1997 decision of this Court in KBT v The Queen, to conclude that s 50 requires that a trial judge direct the jury to agree on the same two or more acts of sexual exploitation. Adequacy of reasons The content and detail of reasons "will vary according to the nature of the jurisdiction which the court is exercising and the particular matter the subject of the decision". In the absence of an express statutory provision, "a judge returning a verdict following a trial without a jury is obliged to give reasons sufficient to identify the principles of law applied by the judge and the main factual findings on which the judge relied". One reason for this obligation is the need for adequate reasons in order for an appellate court to discharge its statutory duty on an appeal from the decision and, correspondingly, for the parties to understand the basis for the decision for purposes including the exercise of any rights to appeal. The appellant submitted that the inadequacy of the reasons to identify two or more acts of sexual exploitation and the basis upon which they were found to be proved lay in the trial judge's failure to resolve a number of factual and evidential contests at trial. Not every failure to resolve a dispute will render reasons for decision inadequate to justify a verdict. At one extreme, reasons for decision will not be inadequate merely because they fail to address an irrelevant dispute or one which is peripheral to the real issues. Nor will they be inadequate merely because they fail to undertake "a minute explanation of every step in the reasoning process that leads to the judge's conclusion". At the other extreme, reasons will often be inadequate if the trial judge fails to explain his or her conclusion on a significant factual or evidential dispute that is a necessary step to the final conclusion. In between these extremes, the adequacy of reasons will depend upon an assessment of the issues in the case, including the extent to which they were relied upon by counsel, their bearing upon the elements of the offence, and their significance to the course of the trial. In particular: "Ordinarily it would be necessary for a trial judge to summarise the crucial arguments of the parties, to formulate the issues for decision, to resolve any issues of law and fact which needed to be determined before the verdict could be arrived at, in the course of that resolution to explain how competing arguments of the parties were to be dealt with and why the resolution arrived at was arrived at, to apply the law found to the facts found, and to explain how the verdict followed." The trial judge's reasons were not inadequate In Hamra v The Queen, this Court held that s 50(4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act "modifie[d] the common law by providing that although the information must allege a course of conduct consisting of acts of sexual exploitation it need not 'identify particular acts of sexual exploitation or the occasions on which, places at which or order in which acts of sexual exploitation occurred' (s 50(4)(b)(ii))". If "two or more distinct acts can be identified, [the sub-section] does not require the occasions of those acts to be particularised other than as to the period of the acts and the conduct constituting the acts". For instance, it would be open to a jury, and therefore also to a trial judge, to conclude that particular acts of sexual exploitation were committed every day over a two week period without "identifying an occasion and determining what is the evidence to prove that occasion". As described above, the reasons of the trial judge, at the outset, correctly set out the issue to be decided beyond reasonable doubt as required by s 50. He recorded that it was necessary, but not sufficient, that before he convicted he should reject the evidence of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which he did. He described the evidence of the witnesses and the central submissions of the parties, particularly the appellant's attack on the reliability and credibility of the complainant. He resolved that issue by finding that the complainant was honest and reliable about all of the allegations of sexual abuse. The ultimate conclusion of the trial judge was that "the [appellant] sexually assaulted [the complainant] on numerous occasions over a period of some years. The sexual assaults mainly took the form of indecent assaults and mutual oral sexual intercourse." The reference to "numerous occasions" was adopted directly from the complainant's evidence that mutual oral sexual intercourse had occurred numerous times. The trial judge did not, and perhaps could not, reach any conclusion about (i) the complainant's age when various types of offending commenced, or (ii) the likely number of occasions of indecent assaults or mutual fellatio before the assaults ended on 28 August 1994. Nevertheless, his conclusion meant that the elements of the s 50 offence had been proved. The "simple and obvious logic" of this conclusion was that over a period of not less than three days, the appellant had committed more than one act of sexual exploitation of the complainant. The appellant submitted that the failure by the trial judge to resolve some disputes of fact meant that his reasons were inadequate to explain why he had reached his conclusion beyond reasonable doubt. Some of the disputes were relied upon by the appellant only in passing. They can be disposed of shortly as either (i) matters which the trial judge expressly took into account, such as long-term drug use by the complainant, or (ii) matters that were not submitted to be relevant to any real issue and which were, in any event, expressly considered by the trial judge, such as the abuse by the Moana boys, whether the complainant received a remote control car for Christmas, and the content of pornographic videos shown to the complainant. Although the appellant made oral submissions alleging that the showing of pornography to the complainant did not constitute an act of sexual exploitation, this issue was not raised in the Court of Criminal Appeal, it was not the subject of the grant of special leave to appeal, and it was not contained in any ground of appeal or particular. The appellant focused upon five factual disputes. Four of those were referred to, but not specifically resolved, by the trial judge: (1) whether the complainant was "always stoned" because the appellant had given marijuana to the complainant to smoke from when the complainant was nine years old; (2) whether the complainant was permitted to ride the appellant's motorbike from about the age of nine to 10 years; (3) whether the appellant took the complainant to the bush near Cherry Gardens; and (4) whether the appellant built shed 2 in 1991 (when the complainant was 12 years old) and the slot car track in that shed in 1993 (when the complainant was 14 years old). This would have meant that if the complainant was wrong about the time that the sexual offences were committed then the first act of fellatio occurred when the complainant was 14 years old, and the offending would have ceased when he was 15 years old. If the trial judge had specifically resolved each of these issues to which he referred, there could have been no suggestion that his reasons were inadequate. Although the trial judge noted, but did not wholly resolve, these four issues, once the role of these issues in the trial is placed into context it can be seen that his reasons were not inadequate. As to issue (1), whether or not the appellant had given marijuana to the complainant from the age of nine, as the complainant claimed, would not have established the commission or lack of commission of any of the particularised acts. It is a matter that could only have affected the credibility of the complainant. The trial judge had assessed the credibility of the complainant with the awareness that the appellant had disputed the complainant's evidence on this point. And he could not have placed much weight upon the appellant's denials on this matter, because he was "unimpressed by the [appellant's] presentation", and found answers by the appellant to be "glib and evasive on some topics" and "quite evasive" on others. As to issue (2), the trial judge did not fail entirely to resolve this issue. The trial judge accepted that the complainant's estimate of his age when he rode the motorbike (nine or 10 years) was not reliable. Any assessment by the trial judge of the likely age, below 15 years, at which the complainant was allowed to ride the appellant's motorbike had little bearing on the real issues at trial. The complainant's evidence about riding the appellant's motorbike was linked to the final sexual assault by the appellant on 28 August 1994, when the complainant was 15 years old. It was not in dispute that the appellant had permitted the complainant to ride his motorbike from the age of around 15 years. As to issue (3), like the other evidence of offences, the trial judge accepted the complainant's evidence on this matter, rejected the appellant's evidence beyond reasonable doubt, and concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the sexual offence occurred on that occasion. The appellant's denial that he took the complainant to the bush area near Cherry Gardens was only a denial about the precise location of that sexual offence. As to issue (4), when the evidence is properly considered, there was little inconsistency between the evidence of the complainant and the appellant. A model of clarity in this respect is the reasons of Blue J in the Court of Criminal Appeal, when considering issue (4) as part of the appellant's submission that the verdict of the trial judge was unreasonable or not supported by the evidence. Blue J described the alleged inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence concerning his age when the acts of mutual fellatio began in shed 2. The complainant's evidence had varied from saying that he was "around 12" when shed 2 had been built, to saying that the mutual fellatio occurred when he was "past the age of nine, going on 12", or "[a]round about nine or 12 ... I don't know the exact year that it was, how old I was" or that it "didn't start happening until I was about 13 years old". However, the complainant did not accept that he was as old as 14 years when the events began. The complainant accepted that he was "certainly not talking about when [he was] 14 years of age" and that "there was definitely something [going] on by that time". As Blue J explained, the complainant had not purported to give his precise age in years and was addressing events that had occurred 15 to 25 years earlier. He had consistently identified the commencement of the mutual fellatio as being after the construction of shed 2 rather than by reference to his precise age. The trial judge observed that "[t]he timing of the building of [s]hed 2 became an important topic during the course of the trial". At a police interview held before trial, the appellant said that shed 2 had not been built until around 1993, which would have meant that the first act of fellatio that the complainant described in shed 2 could not have occurred until the complainant was 14 years old. However, the trial judge correctly summarised the appellant's evidence at trial as being that "[s]hed 2 was built in 1991 to house the slot car track". The complainant would then have been 12 years old. Considerably less significant than the evidence concerning the date of construction of shed 2 was the contents of shed 2 at the time of the acts of fellatio described by the complainant. In his evidence in chief, the complainant said that the appellant's offences occurred when shed 2 contained a slot car track. In cross-examination, the complainant also said that the acts occurred "when shed 2 was built and that's when we smoked a lot of marijuana in shed 2, that's when that was built". The appellant said (relying upon his calendar) that the construction of the slot car track in shed 2 had not been completed until June 1993, when the complainant was 14 years old. He also said that he did not grow marijuana in shed 1 until 1996 or in shed 2 until late 1996 but that, although there was sometimes a mention of his crop in his calendar, he did not want to look at the calendar to see if there were details to assist with these dates. The trial judge generally rejected the appellant's evidence, including in relation to the slot cars. The trial judge concluded that the appellant had been glib and evasive about the occasions when he was alone with the complainant, and had understated the complainant's interest in using the slot car track in shed 2 because that track "provided an opportunity for sexual misconduct". As Blue J noted, the trial judge was entitled to reject the appellant's evidence about the slot cars "for the purpose of assessing the complainant's credibility". In summary, these four issues were not so essential to the complainant's credibility and reliability that the failure of the trial judge specifically to resolve them meant that his reasons for conviction were inadequate. Further, the trial judge did refer to these issues and their potential to undermine the reliability of the complainant's evidence concerning the particulars of the s 50 offence (which he described as the "substantive allegations"). And the trial judge concluded that the complainant was reliable as to the "core allegations" and was describing "real events". A fifth matter relied upon by the appellant on this appeal was that the trial judge had failed to consider an inconsistency between, on the one hand, the evidence of the complainant and, on the other hand, the evidence of the appellant and his ex-wife, concerning the location of the computer in the appellant's house. The complainant's evidence about the offences in the room containing the computer clearly identified the room as the master bedroom. But the appellant and his ex-wife gave evidence that the computer was located in the room that became the appellant's daughter's bedroom. It is unclear to what extent this alleged inconsistency was relied upon at trial. The parties did not reproduce on this appeal the closing submissions of counsel. In the Court of Criminal Appeal, the appellant relied upon this alleged inconsistency as casting doubt upon the complainant's evidence about the acts that occurred while he was playing on the computer in the master bedroom. However, as Blue J explained, although the evidence from the appellant's ex-wife was that she recalled that the computer had been located in her daughter's room, she did not know whether the computer had ever been set up anywhere else in the house. The evidence from the appellant's ex-wife was that the computer had been located in their second daughter's room when her daughters were living with them. Her second daughter was born in July 1989. Since the appellant's ex-wife did not say whether the computer had been located in, or moved to, her second daughter's room immediately after birth or some years later, there is no inconsistency between her evidence and the evidence of the complainant. Her evidence is equally consistent with the supposition that the computer had been located in the master bedroom and moved to her second daughter's bedroom sometime after the sexual assaults (which concluded when her second daughter was five years old). The complainant also accepted that the computer might have been located in the daughter's bedroom at times after the sexual assaults occurred. The conflict in evidence therefore reduced to a conflict between the appellant's evidence that the computer was located in his second daughter's room even before she was born and the complainant's evidence that the computer had been located in the master bedroom. As Blue J observed in the Court of Criminal Appeal, that conflict was subsumed into the conflict about whether the sexual assaults had occurred whilst the complainant was playing on the computer. Conclusion None of the issues raised by the appellant, singly or in combination, had the effect that the reasons of the trial judge were inadequate. The trial judge's reasons were sufficient to identify, and to disclose the process of reasoning leading to his finding of, the two or more acts of sexual exploitation upon which the conviction was based. The appeal is dismissed.